In recent weeks, the British Prime Minister, Mr. Harold Macmillan, and the foreign secretary, Lord Home have repeatedly quoted India’s experience in support of the view that the policy of non-alignment does not make a country immune to aggression by a communist power. They have urged this argument largely to silence the unilateralists and neutralists at home. This does not mean that they favour abandonment by India of her non-alignment policy. As far as it can be discerned, they are facing as much of a predicament as Mr. Nehru and his advisers.
The Indian experience has been contrasted with President Kennedy’s success in forcing the Soviet Union to withdraw its missiles and bombers for Cuba. This American victory in Cuba is cited as a demonstrable proof that the deterrent deters. Though communists, fellow-travellers and others go on prattling about the Soviet Union’s policy of peaceful co-existence, they are finding it difficult to convince the ordinary people that Mr. Khrushchev’s attempt to install nuclear missiles in Cuba was an exercise in reducing tension.
The Lessons
The Americans and their European allies including Britain have drawn wholly divergent lessons from the Cuban episode. This divergence of opinion centres on the roles of the nuclear striking force and the conventional forces. The Americans believe that they were able to force a Soviet retreat in Cuba because of the overwhelming superiority of their conventional forces in the Caribbean which made it clear to Mr. Khrushchev that his only choice was between retreat and initiating a nuclear war. The result could well have been the opposite in an area where the adversary possessed the advantage of stronger conventional forces. They therefore find in the Cuban experience a fresh justification for impressing on their European allies the imperative necessity of increasing the strength of their conventional forces.
The Europeans on the other hand are convinced that it was President Kennedy’s manifest preparedness to risk a nuclear war over Cuba that forced Mr. Khrushchev to see reason. The French argument is that since they cannot be sure that America would be willing to run the same risk in Europe, they must go ahead with the establishment of their own independent deterrent. The British government apparently concurs with this view and is not at all willing to give up its own nuclear striking force, except in favour of a European one.
This argument has been going on for a long time and will probably continue. I have alluded to it only to emphasise that in these parts the Soviet Union is not seen to be a peace loving power with whom it is possible to come to an understanding. The optimism which was generated immediately in the wake of Soviet agreement to withdraw offensive weapons from Cuba is beginning to evaporate and no one is hopeful of reaching even limited agreements with it on issues like test ban, denuclearised zones and the elimination of the possibility of surprise attacks. This is relevant to us in India because it means that our policy of maintaining friendly relations and extending the area of co-operation with the Soviet Union will continue to be suspect here.
The situation is, however, not as ample as that. It is realised fairly widely here that the Soviet policies take on an altogether different appearance when they are viewed from New Delhi. For years the Soviet Union has done nothing to harm India’s national interests. In fact it has rendered valuable assistance in helping India to establish basic industries. The western leaders cannot convince even themselves that this economic assistance can possibly subvert India’s political institutions and drag her into the Soviet bloc. Other factors apart, India’s needs in terms of both aid and trade are too great to be met by the Soviet group of nations alone.
The western world has also a great stake in the continuation and extension of the Sino-Soviet rift. Experts believe that the conflict centres round the struggle for leadership inside the communist movement and cannot be resolved unless the Chinese agree to accept Soviet leadership. This must involve abandonment by the Chinese of their efforts to become a nuclear power. In fundamental terms therefore, the Chinese attitude towards India is regarded as peripheral to the dispute with Russia; since it has become a visible symbol of the clash its importance cannot be denied. This demands acceptance of India’s policy of neutrality.
Obvious
It is only too obvious that the Chinese efforts to woo the Afro-Asian nations would be vastly facilitated if India abandoned her policy of non-alignment. If anything this would add to the headache of the West. Also, if the concept of non-alignment gels discredited it does not follow that all or even most of its practitioners would rush to take cover under the West’s protective umbrella. Several of them might well gravitate in the opposite direction of Moscow.
The British government’s awareness of these considerations makes it difficult for it to decide whether it wants India to remain unaligned or to become aligned. That may well be one of the reasons why it is unwilling at least publicly to make a firm and long term commitment to help India strengthen her defences. Though there is no evidence, I have a strong feeling that the Kashmir issue has been dragged into the question of strengthening India’s defences more as a result of the prevailing confusion than of deliberate act of policy.
It is a verifiable fact that during and since the Chinese onslaught against India not a single article on the Chinese designs and policy in Asia has appeared in the popular papers. The papers have on the other hand been flooded with articles and reports on Sino-Soviet relations. One can only speculate whether this reflects the absence of a coherent, comprehensive and long-term China policy in Whitehall. This is not to absolve New Delhi for its failure to develop such a policy. The intention is only to suggest that the absence of a China policy in Whitehall could hamper the task of shaping an Indian policy.
It is neither necessary nor desirable to state the British assessment of the condition in which the Indian army finds itself after over a decade of neglect. It will take years of dedicated effort on the part of both India and her friends and the most intimate co-operation based on mutual trust and confidence between them to make it a modern army capable of meeting the Chinese threat. Since military science changes so rapidly it is unavoidable that such co-operation continues indefinitely if the Indian army is not to risk gelling outdated in equipment and techniques once again.
MIGs
The British government has yet to decide whether it is prepared to engage in such a massive long-term commitment. What is to be the frame-work of such a co-operation is not an insignificant matter. It has to be acceptable to the British people. A helpful decision by the government is not being facilitated by Mr. Nehru’s attitude towards the MIG deal. Experts here find it difficult to discover where these planes are going to fit into overall scheme of Indian defence.
Apparently all these conflicting considerations will take time to be reconciled. Meanwhile the Government of India would do well to take note of the fact that on the whole its case has found less than little appreciation among the Labour left-wing in this country which unlike the communists and Trotskyites was not basically hostile. In fact it used to be positively friendly.
No doubt this is partly due to the left’s inclination to take the communist professions of peace at its face value. But there remains the fact that over the years, India House has not found it necessary to cultivate the left here. This probably did not do too much damage as long as Mr. Bevan was alive. If today India still has some friends among the Labour left-wing, India House can claim little credit for it.
The Times of India, 8 December 1962