

CHINESE “PANCHSHEELA” IN BURMA

by Girilal Jain

Democratic Research Service

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DEMOCRATIC RESEARCH SERVICE

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
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INTRODUCTION

PANCHSHEELA as the code of international relations making for perpetual peace among nations has revealed its unreality in the events of October in East Europe, particularly Hungary. Referring to the Anglo-French attack on Egypt and to Russian intervention in Hungary, Prime Minister Nehru was constrained to confess that "we seem to live in a world of unreality where profession has little to do with practice." He went on to declare that "when that practice imperils the entire future of the world, then it is time to come back to reality in our thinking and in our actions." (Speech to UNESCO Conference at New Delhi on November 5, 1956)

The present pamphlet by Mr. Girilal Jain lifts the veil that has shrouded the doings of Red China in Burma. Chou En-lai signed an agreement of Panchsheela with the Burmese Prime Minister U Nu in 1954 immediately after a similar agreement (included in the Indo-Tibetan Treaty) was signed in New Delhi. It was in these documents that the five principles of good conduct among neighbouring (and other) nations of the world received the Buddhist nomenclature of Panchsheela which means the five forms of good conduct. In its original Buddhist context, the word refers primarily to individual ethics such as dana (charity), virya (fortitude), kshanti (patience), dhyana (meditation) and prajna (insight). Taking into account the general precept of ahimsa or non-injury, the word

Panchsheela has been transferred to the plane of international relations to yield the five-fold code of mutual respect for each other's territorial integrity and sovereignty, mutual non-aggression, non-interference in each other's internal affairs, equality and peaceful co-existence.

In the subsequent declaration issued in Moscow during the Indian Prime Minister's visit to Russia, the condition of non-interference in the internal affairs of other nations was accompanied by a clause to exclude motives of political, economic or of ideological nature. The last motive was directed especially against the Marxist doctrine of the inevitability and righteousness of world revolution and of the action of the Cominform in directing communist parties in non-communist countries in their subversive activities against established governments.

Now Panchsheela has been consigned to the limbo of disappointed hopes and ineffective declarations like Dr. Kellogg's pronouncement for the outlawry of war as an instrument of national policy and the Locarno Pact in the inter-war years. It is demonstrated once more that, in the words of the Athenian Delegation to the islanders of Delos "the strong take what they can and the weak have no alternative but to submit."

Pandit Nehru said sadly in the speech at the UNESCO Conference already referred to, that "old colonial methods which we had thought in our ignorance, belonged to a more unenlightened age are revived and practised."

But there has been singularly little justification for this ignorance, since abundance of evidence regarding the real nature of the regimes that threatened *panchsheel*a in their very nature (and built-in ambition for world conquest) has been accumulating for decades now. Every count in the indictment of communism by the conscience and intelligence of the free world (being made in study after study by informed and impartial students) has been revealed to be utterly true by the leaders of the Kremlin

themselves since the historic admissions on Stalin by Khrushchev in his speech to the 20th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in February last. The revelations consequent on the Poznan riots and on the more recent revolt of the people of Poland made by Communist leaders like Gomulka bear out in full the criticism made by the outside world against the extreme form of totalitarian control and exploitation that the Kremlin exercises over the satellite countries of Eastern Europe.

The Burmese experience regarding Panchsheela throws a lurid light on the cynicism with which communist regimes can continue to profess impeccable moral principles, sign agreements of unexceptionable idealism and make declarations of attachment to the loftiest principles of international morality while all the time planning for the most unscrupulous and treacherous expansion of their power.

Panchsheela was signed in 1954 but, as Mr. Jain shows here, Communist Chinese troops were already inside the borders of Burma in 1953 and the Burmese Government were aware of the fact. Apart from the double dealing of the Chinese Reds, a number of other grave questions of procedure in respect of communist powers arise out of the situation described by Mr. Jain.

One question is why the Burmese leaders and Government chose to hide the fact of the Chinese incursion from the public. They came out with public mention of the fact only after the Rangoon newspaper *The Nation* bravely published an account of the attack of the Chinese on a contingent of Burmese forces during their flag march at Manao. Perhaps as Mr. Jain suggests, the reason was that the Burmese leaders and Government hoped to persuade the Chinese authorities to withdraw their forces from Burmese soil by means of negotiation and appeal to Panchsheela principles. Moreover, Burma had followed India in her non-alignment policy and refused to join military alliances directed against communist States or rather against expansion by communist States. There is a

grave danger in thus refusing to take the people and international public opinion into confidence. Weak or small nations can only hope to safeguard their independence (in so far as it may be possible) only through mobilisation of world public opinion in their favour.

There is evident the same shortsighted policy in India as well in regard to communist States. There was some mention of the entry of Chinese forces inside the Indian border to the north of Sikkim and in the northeast above the bend of the Brahmaputra in Assam. Whatever protest or representation India might have made to China on these incidents, there was a distinct tendency on the part of Indian authorities to black out such news and to deprecate enterprise on the part of newspapers to obtain and disclose such news to the public.

The only safeguard of democratic liberties and national independence for small or weak nations lies in full publicity of all events endangering their existence or safety. It is a mistake to think that aggressive nations drunk with power, steeled in their resolution to achieve world power and fortified by the conviction that history is on their side (on the strength of the doctrine of historical or dialectic materialism) will appreciate the delicacy and consideration of weak nations in keeping ugly facts behind a curtain of secrecy. This will only encourage them further. Indeed, China seems to have remonstrated with Burma for making such a grievance (though in diplomatic negotiation) of border incursions while the great nation of India was observing silence and patience in regard to similar border violations!

As Mr. Jain shows conclusively, border-incursions seem part of a comprehensive plot on the part of the Reds to acquire territorial sovereignty over Upper Burma including Kachin and Wa States and all the lands to the north of them and to reduce the rest of Lower Burma to the position of a satellite nation.

The activities of foreign embassies in financing elements

opposed to the democratic and patriotic Government party during the recent elections seem to form a further part of the conspiracy against free Burma.

These activities assume a formidable proportion and appear as an integral part of the full conspiracy when they are seen against the background of what can only be called a systematic, officially-sponsored immigration of Chinese settlers into Burma. Red China has been augmenting the numbers of Chinese nationals in Burma for quite some years now, arranging for their passports and visas and assisting them with loans to open businesses in Burma.

A perusal of the essay of Mr. Jain will reinforce the adage that the leopard cannot change its spots. Nor is this surprising in view of the leaders of the Kremlin themselves swearing by the name of Lenin even while overthrowing the ascendancy of Stalin. While signing a Panchsheela declaration at Moscow along with Pandit Nehru, Bulganin and Khrushchev were particular in adding the rider that the peaceful co-existence they had in mind was that recognised by Leninism. This takes away by the left hand what was vouchsafed by the right hand. For the spirit of Leninism is worlds apart from that of the Buddhist panchsheela. Let us remind ourselves of the words of Lenin on co-existence between revolutionary communism and capitalistic countries:

"We are living not merely in a State but in a system of States and the existence of the Soviet Republic side by side with imperialist States for a long time is unthinkable. One or the other must triumph in the end. And before that end supervenes, a series of frightful collisions between the Soviet republic and the bourgeois States will be inevitable."

Co-existence and "panchsheel" are provided for in the Leninist theory only as *tactics* or temporary retreats or reversals of policy to avoid certain difficulties or to take advantage of certain situations in which gullible peoples or classes could be lulled into confidence and their trust duped

to the advantage of revolution in due time. The tactics are justified under the famous analogy of zig-zag courses in mountain climbing:

"To carry on a war for the overthrow of the international bourgeoisie, a war which is a hundred times more difficult, more prolonged and complicated than the most stubborn of ordinary wars between States and to refuse beforehand to manoeuvre, to utilise the conflict of interests (even though temporary) among one's enemies, to refuse to temporise and to compromise with possible (even though transient, unstable, vacillating and conditional) allies—is not this ridiculous in the extremel" Then comes the famous analogy of the zig-zag course in mountain climbing. "Is it not as though in the difficult ascent of an unexplored and hitherto inaccessible mountain, we were to renounce beforehand the idea that sometimes we might have to zig-zag, sometimes retracing our steps, sometimes giving up the course once selected and trying various others!"

This is the context of Leninism in which Communist leaders themselves would have us understand their adherence to the practice of peaceful co-existence!

Is there any excuse for leaders of free nations to plead ignorance or express startled surprise when communist States behave true to type when crisis confronts them? Soviet Russia has revealed in a flash that Stalinism is inherent in her system in her ruthless action in crushing the Hungarian nation by means of military might in all its nakedness. In such moments, the camouflage of *panchsheel*a or peaceful co-existence disappears and brutal power animated by limitless lust for domination pours forth like molten lava from a volcano.

The lesson of the Chinese penetration into Burma on the threefold front of border incursions, financial support to opposition parties and assistance to large scale immigration

of her nationals should not be lost sight of in a futile attempt to appease the Red Dragon. The policy of 'hush hush' has little to commend it. It might even amount to a betrayal of the people by their own leaders albeit in the best of intentions.

It is to be hoped that Mr. Jain's straightforward recital of the situation in Burma will arouse the attention and interest of publicists both in Asia and elsewhere. This will enable the public opinion of free countries to take its fair share in shaping events in the coming period of Burma's trial. The trial will not be Burma's alone but that of all Asia.

M.A.V.

CHINESE "PANCHSHEELA" IN BURMA

IRREFUTABLE evidence of Chinese incursions into Burma has been piling up since July 31, 1956, when the fact of the occupation (by Communist Chinese troops) of over 1,000 square miles of indisputably Burmese territory in the Wa State along the eastern border first came to light. Since then the Chinese forces have crossed in considerable strength into Kachin State and are now within a striking distance from Myitkyina, the State capital. Peking had admitted the presence of its troops in the Wa State while disputing the Burmese claim to the area. It is still maintaining a studied silence on the movement of its troops in Kachin State.

The Chinese military moves in Burma's frontier areas are clearly part of an overall plan whose other constituents are continuous attempts to disrupt the loyalty of the tribals in that part of the country, large-scale illegal immigration of Chinese and the financing of the activities of the local communists and their allies. No objective student of Burmese affairs and Chinese ambitions can avoid being convinced that Burma is facing a serious threat to her independence and territorial integrity.

The Chinese Communists are not being original in seeking to combine their faith with the country's traditional imperialist ambitions in South Asia, which besides being the rice bowl of the continent possesses immense mineral wealth. It offers empty spaces for a fast expanding Chinese population. The Russians achieved this under Stalin. The two strands in the current Chinese thinking and action are so carefully fused together that it is impossible to disentangle them. It is not possible to say where Communism ends and traditional imperialist ambitions begin. In the current phase of expansion, there is no conflict between the two. They subserve each other. The

cause of Communism is synonymous with the extension of Chinese influence.

It is clearly outside the scope of this discussion to detail the Chinese moves and policies in the whole of South Asia and the measures that should be adopted by democratic Governments to meet the challenge which can no longer be shirked. The subject deserves greater attention than it has received so far at the hands of Asian writers and commentators. Here we confine ourselves solely to Chinese moves in Burma which are clearly designed to subvert democratic institutions in the country and to absorb large parts of its frontier areas in the Chinese empire.

The reality of the Sino-Burmese relations was well and thickly covered under frequent protestations of goodwill and friendship and faith in the principles of peaceful co-existence and non-interference till April 23 of this year when U Nu (then Prime Minister of Burma) decided to speak out frankly on the issue. But it was not before July 31 that the real nature of the threat facing Burma was revealed by *The Nation*, an English language daily of Rangoon. Till then, the developments in mountain fastnesses and jungles in the frontier areas had been kept a well-guarded secret. The Burmese leaders had not thought it proper to take their people and the world into confidence and tell them of the Chinese attempts to subvert the loyalty of the tribals and to change the complexion of the population in northern Burma through large-scale illegal immigration.

U Nu, it is now beyond doubt, was forced to speak out in the manner he did on April 23 because the Chinese had intervened openly in the election by pouring large funds into the campaign on behalf of the United National Front which was the legal wing of the Burmese Communist Party still under ban. The stark facts of the situation had left him no other alternative. The reality could no longer be shirked because at stake were the very existence of democratic institutions and the country's territorial integrity.

Also, it was no longer possible to keep up the pretence of Sino-Burmese friendship as it had become an open secret in Burma that hundreds of workers belonging to the ruling party had been bought over in the countryside by the National United Front with funds placed at their disposal by the Chinese.

With just four days to go for the polling on April 27, U Nu on April 23 characterised the election as "a contest between stooges on one hand and genuine patriots on the other, between those who are going to convert Burma into a battlefield and those who are building both internal and world peace, between those who want to instal a totalitarian regime in Burma and those who are sowing the seeds of democracy, between those who are shouting from the house-tops that they will bring about internal peace and those who are exerting their utmost to perpetuate a genuine, enduring peace."

He added: "In the past, if a country wanted to have another country, it invariably launched war and conquered the country. Nowadays, however, military conquests are not as easy as in the past. Therefore, new tactics are employed whereby the interested country breeds stooges and pawns in the country in which it is interested. When the stooges and pawns gain political power, the outside hand pulls the strings. While these stooges and pawns are denied political power, the distant masters just incite them to unrest and insurrection. I need not tell who in our country are whose stooges. Their own words and actions are unmistakable evidence of the character of their allegiance."

The Burmese Prime Minister did not want to leave anyone in doubt about the identity of the "stooges". He dwelt at some length on the differences between democracy and dictatorship and added: "Believers in dictatorship in this country attempted to wrest political power in 1948. At one time about nine-tenths of the country fell under their sway, and only one-tenth remained under the

AFPFL* Government. Even this very small fraction was far from stable; it trembled on the edge A large majority of our people residing in this nine-tenths of the country had a bitter taste of what dictatorship means. The reason why the Union has been successfully rid of these oppressive dictators in so short a time is the indisputable fact that our forces got whole-hearted co-operation from the masses who were thoroughly fed up with their satanic rules of conduct."

During this speech U Nu recalled that it was after the conference of the Communists in Calcutta (he was obviously referring to the so-called South-East Asia Youth Conference in February, 1948,) which was also attended by Thakin Than Tun and other Burmese Communist leaders that they abandoned the policy of supporting the AFPFL, which they had professed for a few brief months after the murder of Aung San and his colleagues and took to the path of violent insurrection. "The insurrection spread like wild fire and for four years from 1948 to 1951 the rebels had a hey day. . . . The Government offensive was launched only in 1952 and now the rebels are on the run Now they are talking of peace and negotiations." He said that they had started the rebellion on the orders of "their masters" and spurned two amnesty offers earlier. They just wanted to gain "breathing time".

As the election results started pouring in U Nu, together with U Ba Swe, the present Prime Minister, and U Kyaw Nyein and U Ba Thakin Maung Gale, his two other senior Cabinet colleagues, addressed a press conference on May 2. Two sensational statements were made at the conference so far as the outside world was concerned. U Nu said that the National United Front had won its victories because the armed insurgents had terrorised the voters in the villages. U Ba Swe, who was the strong man of the Cabinet even under U Nu, told the reporters that the Front had been supplied with a large amount of funds. There was

* Anti-Fascist People's Freedom League.

buying of votes for sums ranging from K 5 to K 15 per vote. Large sums of money had gone for suborning AFPFL organisers. "Many of our organisers, wearing our colours, were won over to their cause with bribes."

He was naturally not willing to name the source of the funds, though he did not leave anyone in doubt about it. Asked where the opposition obtained its funds, U Ba Swe said: "You know that source as well as I do." Pressed for a more definite answer, he said: "I have reason to believe that the money came from the 'jungle.' As to where it originated, your guess is as good as mine." The Home Minister, Bo Khin Maung Gale, detailed the manner in which the voters had been terrorised by the insurgents on behalf of the United National Front candidates. They issued pamphlets and made speeches to warn the voters: "If you want bullets, vote for the AFPFL." The Prime Minister, U Nu, named areas where even the relations of the AFPFL candidates did not have the courage to vote for them because of the terror of the insurgents. The United National Front tried this technique even in Rangoon, capital of Burma.

The election results have turned out as expected. The Communists under the guise of the United National Front have captured 43 out of 222 seats according to the results which have been announced so far. In all there are 250 seats in the House of Deputies. Most of the Communist gains have been in Lower Burma. Before the elections, the Workers' and Peasants' Party, which was the chief constituent of the so-called United National Front, had only 20 members in the Lower House of the Burmese Parliament. The AFPFL leaders could be in little doubt that the threat to the country's independence and democratic institutions had not passed with the reduction in the strength of the insurgents. The threat had revived in a more formidable form since the Communists were able to combine Parliamentary methods with terrorism and open rebellion. What is even more significant, it was clear beyond a shadow of

doubt that Peking was not "neutral" any longer if it ever was neutral, in the conflict between dictatorship and democracy in Burma. The policy of friendship and peaceful co-existence that U Nu had followed had not been reciprocated by the Chinese Communists. U Nu and his colleagues were fully aware of the military moves that the Chinese had been making in the frontier areas with the obvious intention of assisting the Communists in converting Burma into a "People's Democracy." They, however, chose to remain silent on the issue during the elections for reasons we shall discuss later.

The elections and the intensification of military moves by the Chinese left U Nu sad, disillusioned and even embittered. He felt that he had been let down by the Chinese Communists whose *bona fides* he had been willing to accept during the difficult period of his stewardship of Burma. He knew that it was neither possible nor desirable for him to ask his people to trust in the professions of friendship on the part of Peking any longer. He felt personally guilty for having led the country up the garden path and that the time had come for him to leave the country's destiny in other hands. Meanwhile, on his own admission the barter deals with Soviet bloc countries had gone off badly for Burma, the loss ranging from 10 to 30 per cent. It was in that context that he made up his mind to resign from the office of Prime Minister.

The people in Burma and the world outside came to know of this decision through a leak in a letter to the Editor, which appeared in *The Nation* of Rangoon on June 3. The letter gains in importance in view of later developments. The letter said U Nu would not head the next Government because of the "alleged failure of his neutralist policy and of his pet aspiration for the establishment of friendly relations with all countries.... He is reported to have been disillusioned at the absence of reciprocal attitude on the part of some countries for whose friendship he had worked so assiduously. The same sources disclosed that

U Nu was extremely disappointed at the way in which the Soviet and Chinese embassies operate in this country. To the constant embarrassment of U Nu and his colleagues, these missions were in the habit of inviting BWPP and other near Communist leaders to Russia and China on this or that mission. The hand-picked selectees, in most cases, happened to be those hostile to the Government, and they returned to Burma to engage in occasional clandestine parleys at the respective embassies.

"According to this source of whose reliability I have no doubt, the last straw that broke U Nu's back, so to say, was the reported financial help rendered lavishly by some foreign embassies in Rangoon to many opposition candidates in the recent general elections. Thus the great edifice of international understanding which U Nu had been persistently building was crumbling before his eyes. The frustration and disillusionment at the collapse of his cherished ideal forced U Nu, according to this source, to make the supreme decision."

Only three days later, the letter was confirmed when on June 5 at a crowded press conference, U Nu announced his decision not to head the new Cabinet and to accept the Presidentship of the AFPFL to "purge" the organisation of undesirable elements. In respect of the behaviour of the Soviet and Chinese embassies, he was asked a specific question: "What are your feelings about the Russian and Chinese embassies pouring money into the opposition, giving them aid and advice to subvert and overthrow the Government which you head?" His reply though couched in diplomatic language, could not leave anyone in doubt that the charge was 100 per cent correct. U Nu said: "I am in a different position from the press which can make accusations and get away with it. I am in the responsible position of having to maintain good international relations. Without proof it would be improper for me to make any such statement as you have made." He held out an assurance that he would have the accusation investigated. No

Prime Minister, even when he was giving up office, could be expected to be more forthright unless he favoured the severance of diplomatic relations with the countries concerned. He has been succeeded as Prime Minister by U Ba Swe who is known in Burma as "Kvar-Gyi" (the tiger). It would appear that the Chinese had been emboldened to intervene openly in Burma's affairs because the Burmese Government, in its anxiety to maintain friendly relations with the northern colossus, had not earlier reacted strongly to the Chinese troops' incursions into the border areas, to large-scale illegal immigration and attempts to subvert the loyalty of tribesmen inhabiting the frontier between the two countries. According to the later admissions by the Burmese Prime Minister, U Ba Swe, and other spokesmen of the Government, the Communist troops in the Wa State were first located in 1953 when the areas were cleared of the KMT* forces, which had crossed into Burma in 1950 from Yunnan. It was not unlikely that the Chinese Communist troops had entered the area along with the KMT forces in 1950.

II

Also, thousands of Chinese immigrants from distant provinces of Canton and Fukien had been finding their way into Burma in an illegal manner month after month over the years. It was impossible that these Chinese immigrants could have travelled several thousand miles in China itself without the permission, in fact encouragement, of the Communist authorities. The immigrants, who happened to be detected before they could get mixed up with the local Chinese population, had been invariably found armed with official exit permits. Similarly it was common knowledge among the Burmese officials that the Chinese had formed the "Free Kachin," the "Free Tai" and the "Free Wa" Com-

* Kuomintang.

mittees in Yunnan to promote "liberation" movements among the tribals on the Burmese side.

The willingness of the Burmese Government to swallow these and other provocations over a period of at least three years and still to subscribe to the principles of peaceful co-existence must have led the Chinese to believe that the time was ripe for them to act boldly. It is not unlikely that the Chinese mistook the Burmese peaceful disposition and patience to be a sign of willingness to pursue a policy of appeasement. They must have calculated that Burma had become so deeply committed to the policy of pro-Peking neutrality that no administration would have the courage to seek the assistance of its potential friends. It would have been unlike the Chinese not to advance following the failure of the Burmese to react to earlier provocations. In any event, the moves in the border areas had to be supplemented by moves in the hinterland.

But why did the Burmese Government follow such a policy? A number of explanations are possible. First, the Burmese must have been over-awed by the military strength of the new regime in China, particularly after they had succeeded in creating the impression that they had beaten the best equipped army in the world in Korea. It was, therefore, regarded essential to maintain good relations with the northern colossus. This need was underscored by the fact that Burma has a 1,500 mile-long common frontier with China which is literally crossable at scores of points. Secondly, it is likely that the Burmese mistook the Chinese inability to assist the insurgents earlier as a sign of Peking's willingness to establish friendly relations. In any case, this was the official view in India. Mr. K. M. Panikkar had expressed this view under the pseudonym of "P" in an article in *Foreign Affairs Quarterly* in its January 1954 issue.

Thirdly, the policy of neutrality once adopted develops its own logic and momentum not easy to reverse. There

can be little doubt that the Burmese Government's anxiety not to be drawn into any defence arrangements sponsored by the West has been a compelling factor in the formulation of Burma's policy towards China. Here it is not necessary to discuss the anatomy of the policy of neutrality or policy of peace as it is erroneously called. All that is necessary to emphasize here is that if military alignments are ruled out on principle, the only feasible policy is one of "friendship" which may under certain circumstances become indistinguishable from appeasement. The validity of this assessment is proved by the fact that even during the elections, U Nu and his colleagues did not think it proper to tell the people that Chinese troops were in occupation of their territory. This fact was disclosed by *The Nation*, Rangoon, on July 31.

The first reaction of the Rangoon Government was to minimise the extent of the threat. A press communique issued by it on August 1 said: "The Government of the Union of Burma is in close touch with developments in the Burma-China border region. It is not true, as stated in *The Nation*, that Chinese troops have occupied Mankungam, Nogmung and two other villages between Hipmaw and Sadon. Two of these places are at present manned by Burmese armed forces in wireless contact with the headquarters concerned and the others are under surveillance The actual position is that some Chinese troops entered Burmese territory and established outposts on Burmese soil in the Wa State in close proximity to the China-Burma border. The Burmese Government have already brought this to the attention of the Government of the People's Republic of China and negotiations are in progress". It did add that the Government was seriously concerned over this development, but emphasized that the situation was not such as to warrant the treatment accorded to it by the press. The communique did not mention that the Chinese troops had occupied an area as large as 1,000 square miles and that they had been there at least since 1953. It is no

longer a secret that the leak in *The Nation* was arranged by the military authorities, who were chagrined by the difficult situation they were facing in the border areas. Since then *The Nation* has been able to give an accurate picture of the situation in the border areas as the Chinese established their outposts in Kachin State as well. The Government spokesmen, still anxious to find a "peaceful" method of persuading the Chinese authorities to withdraw their troops, have in every single case trailed behind the disclosures, which *The Nation* could not have made without the assistance of some high military authorities. The situation of the Burmese Army has been made difficult by the fact that they are under orders not to resort to firing to push the Chinese troops out of their territory. The attitude of the Burmese Government, which is known to be anxious and even nervous over the situation created by the Chinese occupation of their territory, is understandable to a sympathetic observer, though the only peaceful course open to them to secure the release of their territory from the Chinese occupation is to mobilize world opinion in their favour. If they forego this course the situation is bound to deteriorate.

Peking has indirectly admitted that the Chinese troops are present in the area mentioned by *The Nation* on July 31. The official *Peking People's Daily* on August 4 in a special article admitted the presence of Chinese troops in the said area, while denying that these troops were stationed in Burma! The Chinese position is that the border between the two countries had not been clearly defined. The article referred to above said: "Although China and Burma have different opinions on the undemarcated zone, such differences should be settled through negotiations. Both sides should maintain the *status quo* and avoid disputes before the question is settled—and it is in such a friendly spirit that the Chinese frontier troops have always been stationed there." A typical Communist version of friendship! The Chinese position is completely untenable. The Sino-

Burmese borders have been clearly *defined* and except for a 200-mile-long stretch along the Wa State fully *demarcated*.

III

FRICTION between Burma and China on the frontier is an old story. The greatest explosion was nearly two centuries ago when a great Chinese army invaded Burma from the north in the period 1765-69 and suffered a decisive defeat. Since then, the dispute has smouldered off and on, though there has been no major clash of arms over the exact situation of the border. The areas now under dispute have been the subject of negotiations and agreements between the British Government and China.

The first mention of the demarcation of the Burma-Yunnan border occurs in Article III of the Chefoo Agreement of September 13, 1876 between Great Britain and China. The first attempt to delimit the frontier was made only after the annexation of Upper Burma by Britain in 1886 when a convention was drawn up between Britain and China giving effect to Article III of the Chefoo Agreement. Article III of the 1886 convention stipulated that another convention would be drawn up between the two Governments. At this time the British rulers of Burma treated Upper Burma mainly as a gateway to China, which they thought offered an unlimited market for their goods. They agreed to send missions to Peiping every ten years in return for the Chinese recognition of them as the rulers of Burma. This concession was made on the plea that Burma had been a vassal State of China in earlier times. The mission was never sent because it was soon discovered that Burma had never been a vassal of China and that in fact at the end of the last Sino-Burmese war in 1769 the generals of the rival armies had negotiated the treaty on terms of perfect equality.

A correspondent of *The Times*, (London) summed up the situation when he wrote in its issue of February 26, 1886: "If at the close of war in 1769 the Burmese had to acknowledge themselves as the vassals of China, as is asserted by the Chinese, how is it that M'Leod on his visit to Kiang Hung in 1837 and Gournier in 1867 found the Burmese still in power at Kiang Hung successfully combating the claims of China over that state.... The Shans of Kiang Hung, for the sake of peace, paid tribute to China as well as Burma, but Burma had the sole power to levy troops from these Shans in case of hostility."

Despite the existence of positive proofs to negate the Chinese claims to Kiang Hung, the British ceded this territory to China under the convention of 1894. China violated the convention by ceding a part of the territory to France, which was in possession of Indo-China and was Great Britain's greatest rival in Asia. The British Government refused to accept this position and a new agreement was drawn up between Britain and China on February 4, 1897, under which the area in question was returned to Burma. A boundary commission was set up in accordance with the terms of the convention, which started functioning in December, 1897. The commission completed its work in 1900. The boundary between Burma and China was fixed by the Joint Commission with the exception of the portion passing through the Wa State territory. The Chinese raided Burma beyond this line in 1900, 1908 and 1911. But on each occasion, they were defeated at Hpore, Hpala and Hpinaw in Kachin State and forced to retreat beyond the line on their side. For over 50 years, therefore, the Burmese boundary along the Kachin State has been clearly defined.

The position in respect of the Wa State is equally clear. The Joint Boundary Commission had failed to agree on the boundary line in 1900. The two countries drew up their own lines known as the Scott Line and the Liu-Chen Line.

There was, however, no trouble in this area till 1934 when the Chinese raided it following the discovery of mineral resources and the sending of prospectors by The Burma Corporation to Lufang area. The key points in the dispute were the disposition of the area of the silver mines and the location of the Kunmeg Shan range of mountains. The exchange of notes in April 9, 1935, between Sir Alexander Cadogan, then British Minister to China, and Mr. Wang Ching-Wei, Foreign Minister of China, resulted in an agreement to set up another commission to settle the long outstanding question of the undemarcated portion of the southern section of the Burma-Yunnan frontier.

Dr. Tevik Rustu Aras, President of the Council of The League of Nations, was approached in this connection and he appointed Col. Frederic Iselin, of the Swiss Artillery, who had become well-known for settling the Mosul boundary dispute as the neutral chairman of the Joint Commission. The Commission started its work on December 1, 1935, and signed its first report on April 24, 1937. It completed its work in 1941. The Iselin Commission was a success. In an exchange of notes dated June 18, 1941, the boundary was drawn up.* The Lufang area, where the silver mines were supposed to lie was awarded to Burma by the Commission. The British agreed to the Chinese participation in the working of the mines only as a gesture of goodwill because they were allies in a war against the Axis Powers.

IV

DESPITE the agreement, which was based on the report of a Commission presided over by a neutral chairman, the Chinese nationalists did not give up the ambition of annexing Upper Burma. Two Chinese battalions entered the Kachin State in 1946 and marched up to Myitkyina. But

* See Appendix I.

they withdrew on the protest of the British Government in Burma. In 1948 the Nationalist Chinese regime suggested the erection of Boundary Pillars along the Wa State. Unfortunately the Burmese Government at that time was faced with major rebellions from the Communists, the Karens and the PVOS and could not take up the work of demarcating the Wa State's frontier.

The above discussion proves beyond doubt that the Chinese Communists' plea that the border between their country and Burma is not clearly defined wears thinner than the thinnest excuse ever thought of even by a confirmed aggressor. Even if they felt that the agreement had been negotiated under duress by their predecessors, they could at best have approached the Burmese Government for its revision. They were certainly not entitled to change international frontiers with a friendly neighbour in a unilateral manner. On the contrary, they marched in their troops to occupy the area in the Wa State which had been the subject of negotiations and agreement earlier on June 18, 1941.

According to Burmese sources, it would appear that the present situation arose out of a flag march undertaken by the Burmese troops in the Wa State in 1953 after they had cleared the KMT remnants from the border area between Myitkyina and the Wa State and succeeded in stabilizing the situation in the interior. Before that time the Communist troops must have been present in the area in relatively small numbers. There is evidence to show that their main objective before 1953 was to seek to subvert the loyalty of the Wa chieftains and ordinary Was and encourage them to demand an independent State with their fellow tribals on the other side of the border. With the flag march, it should have become clear to the Chinese that the Burmese had every intention of consolidating their administration up to their border. Ignoring legal niceties and international obligations, the Chinese reacted by occupying positions which could lend support to their claims. The Chinese had

all along included large areas of Upper Burma in their maps as being part of their country.

A number of these maps have been circulating in Burma. *The Nation* said editorially on August 1: "We have before us a large-scale map of Yunnan (Chinese version). In the area coloured 'China' is to be found the whole of Sumprabum and Putao sub-divisions. The border as outlined on the Chinese map runs below N'Sopzup. N'Sopzup is only 48 miles from Myitkyina. Putao is 219 miles away. The same applies to the Wa State where the Chinese have included in their maps the whole territory which their troops are now holding by force in open defiance of the Burmese Armed Forces." It would be worthwhile recalling that in 1955 the *People's China Weekly* carried a map which included large parts of India and Burma in the North as belonging to China.

From the information available from Burmese sources (the Chinese are maintaining a studied silence on the subject), it would appear that from 1953 onwards the Chinese have been busy constructing roads in Yunnan leading to the Burmese frontier just as they have built highways in Tibet over rugged mountains upto several points on the Indian and Nepalese frontiers. The then Burmese Prime Minister, U Nu, took up the matter of border violations with the Chinese Prime Minister, Mr. Chou En-lai during his visit to Peking in December, 1954. Though no official account of the discussions between them is yet available, it is understood that Mr. Chou En-lai assured U Nu that his Government was keen to settle the issue in a peaceful manner. He is understood to have been unwilling however to withdraw his troops from Burmese soil. In fact he would not even admit that Chinese troops were on Burmese soil! U Nu could not have been satisfied with the Chinese assurances. But he still signed the joint statement with the Chinese Premier.

This writer has no means of determining the development on the Sino-Burmese border from the time of U Nu's

visit to China in December, 1954, till November 20, 1955, when fire was exchanged between the Chinese and Burmese troops in the Wa State, about 10 miles within Burma's territory. This incident was officially acknowledged only on August 7, 1956 during a press conference addressed by U Ba Swe. The Manao column of the Sixth Infantry Brigade based at Lashio was attacked by a Chinese unit while on a routine flag march. According to the Burmese press, the attack came at the very moment when Col. Chit Myaing, of the Burmese Army, who had just returned from a goodwill mission to Peking, was at breakfast with the Chinese military representatives at Lashio. The breakfast was broken up as the Colonel received a message from the commander of the column under attack. The Burmese authorities are insistent that there could be no question of mistaken identity. "The Burmese column", according to *The Guardian*, an English language daily of Rangoon, "unfurled the Union flag to let the attackers know the true identity of the attacked. The Burma Army also restrained their fire under orders from the Brigade headquarters... (to)... give the attackers a chance to repair their mistake, if mistake it was. It wasn't. The Red Chinese troops, it was later gathered from clear evidence, had planned the attack deliberately."

The Nation of Rangoon sent its two top correspondents, Daphne E. Whittan and On Myint, to Lashio to report on the situation in Wa State. They reported that 1,500 Chinese soldiers, apparently organised in area command groups, had seized 1,000 square miles of territory and had penetrated up to 60 miles within Burma. The troops were armed with small arms up to light machine-guns. That they were there to stay was obvious from their outposts. They had put up permanent buildings, in many cases of brick, to house the troops. Further, the outposts were being maintained on a permanent basis with full supplies of arms and ammunition coming up by huge mule trains numbering 150 each from

Yunnan along tracks cut by the Reds. They had established wireless communications between the outposts. Also they had established telephonic communications from Songra-mang, their southernmost outpost in Wa State to Hsi-meng just across the border in Yunnan and from there to the Command Post at Mongtum and to Kunmig itself. Kunmig is the Chinese Army Headquarters in Yunnan.

The Burmese Prime Minister confirmed at his press conference on August 7 that the Chinese troops were in occupation of areas of 750 to 1,000 square miles. By implication he confirmed press reports that the Chinese had penetrated up to 60 miles within Burma's territory. He estimated the strength of the Chinese troops at 500 though he admitted he could not be sure about the figure. He and the Deputy Prime Minister, Thakin Tin, said that there was no question of a fresh *definition* of the Sino-Burmese border. What they were asking China was to withdraw her troops. U Ba Swe confirmed that they had been negotiating with the Chinese for the withdrawal of the troops since U Nu visited Peking in December, 1954. It was at this press conference that Col. Aung Gyi gave details of the skirmish between the Chinese and Burmese troops on November 20, 1955, and the casualties sustained by the two sides.

It was at this stage when the Burmese people and authorities were exercised over the question of the Chinese incursions into Wa State that the Chinese invasion of Longseng, north of Putao came to light, again through *The Nation*. Its two correspondents named above reported from Myitkyina, capital of Kachin State that 3,000 Red Army regulars were in occupation of Longseng and that these troops were part of a heavy concentration of Communist forces which had made their presence felt during the last few weeks at several points along a 50-mile stretch of the Burma-Yunnan-Tibet border. Longseng is within Burmese territory near the boundary pillar point of Namnilka (pt. 12061). According to *The Nation*, these troops had entered the area on July 21 after destroying the

boundary pillar at Namnilka. Simultaneously there were reports of the Chinese troops having entered the Kachin State at two other points after in each case destroying the boundary pillars. These points were Gamlanghka (point 16037) about 20 miles south-west of Namnilka on the Burma-Tibet border, and Sharalika (Pt. 11,204) about 30 miles south-west of Namnilka on Burma-Yunnan border.

On August 23 and 25, *The Nation* reported the opening of a third front by the Chinese. It said that the Chinese had established three fortified positions only a few miles from Sadon in Myitkyina district. *The Rangoon Daily* described it as the most daring thrust uptodate by the Chinese invaders. The invasion put them only three days' march from Myitkyina, the capital of the Kachin State and the Burmese Army Headquarters. The places occupied by the Chinese were Mahtu Bum 12 miles inside Burma, Hoyayang eight miles inside Burma, Dubu Bun 15 miles inside the country. All the places command a pass. All these positions were within one day's march of Sadon. In all over 700 troops were involved in this area and as in Wa State they had built barracks and established communications with their command posts in Yunnan.

V

Nor even the apologists of Communist China can offer any explanation much less justification for the territorial violation of Burma in the Kachin State. In each case the Chinese have been careful to demolish boundary pillars on the frontier which was demarcated as long back as 1900. Peking has not openly admitted the presence of its troops in this region, though the Chinese are reported to have offered to evacuate Wa State in case the Burmese are prepared to accede to their claims in respect of Kachin State. According to the maps published by the Chinese

Communists in 1953, the whole of the Kachin State about 21 miles from Myitkyina and the Wa State belong to them. The news that the Chinese were willing to withdraw from Wa State in return for territorial concessions in Kachin State was broken by *The Rangoon Daily* a Burmese language daily, on September 3. Next day the Prime Minister addressed a press conference where this question was posed to him. He admitted that a communication had been received from Peking and added that the reports published in the newspapers about the negotiations were "not devoid of facts". He was naturally not willing to divulge the details of the Chinese proposals.

It can be taken for granted that the Burmese Government would not fall into the trap that the Chinese are laying for it. India has reason not to be disinterested in the negotiations between Rangoon and Peking in this connection. An expert, who would not reveal his identity, wrote in *The Nation* on August 26: "The occupation of northern Putao by Chinese... is almost of equal concern to India because from northern Putao there is a caravan route right through to Assam. In fact there are two or three alternative passes which are not new but which have been used by the Tibetans at least since the days of Marco Polo. The Tibetans themselves do not come down into Assam because they cannot stand the climate which is often fatal to them; so they dispose of their goods while still in the highlands. It should be noted that the Chinese claim part of Hukawng valley, but entry into Assam is perfectly feasible by way of these other passes much further north in Putao. That may be one of the reasons for the Chinese occupation of a region like Putao." The expert claims to have known this area for over 20 years.

According to some experts in Burma and India, who must naturally remain unnamed, the Chinese moves in Burma may in course of time be followed by similar moves in India's north-east frontiers, which have never been surveyed and demarcated. What is even worse, these ex-

perts point out, these moves may be diversionary tactics so that the Chinese Communists may be able to pursue their aims more boldly in areas which are of even greater significance for them. These areas inevitably lie on the Indian side of the Himalayas and the Chinese have been known to be carrying on intensive diplomatic activity in Nepal. According to INSAF of *The Hindustan Times*, the Chinese are seeking to win the support of the Ranas in Nepal who feel aggrieved against India. It would be superfluous to add that India would do well to heed the warning signals. As the Prime Minister himself put it after Mr. Chou En-lai's visit to New Delhi in June, 1954; "It is better for nations . . . to hope and expect for the best, but at the same time be prepared for any eventuality."

The texts of the letters that have been exchanged between Peking and Rangoon in respect of the border trouble are still to be published. According to reports in the Burmese press, which have not been contradicted by the Government, it can be surmised that the Burmese Government sent a protest note to Peking soon after the "incident" on November 20, 1955. Peking did not feel obliged to reply to the note till sometime in May after U Nu had made his speech warning his countrymen against "stooges" and would-be dictators. The Chinese reply is believed to have made it clear that the present regime could not recognize the treaty signed by the previous Government. Peking is also reported to have made light of the Burmese protest and told them that even a great country like India had made no such protest when Chinese troops crossed the Indian border because she realized that China was a friendly country! The implication of this note was to remind Burma that she was a small country and would be well advised not to protest. The Burmese have naturally resented this attitude of bullying on the part of the "big brother." This resentment has been fully reflected in the Burmese press.

Burma sent a second note immediately on the receipt of

the Chinese reply in May. Nothing happened for months till the Burmese Ambassador in Peking, U Hla Maung, brought a reply in August after the storm had burst in Burma because of the sensational disclosures by *The Nation* regarding the movements of Chinese troops in the Wa and Kachin States. It is the subsequent third note from Peking which is believed to contain the suggestion referred to above, that the Chinese would be willing to withdraw from Wa State if the Burmese were prepared to make territorial concessions in Kachin State.

The Burmese position has been clearly stated by the Prime Minister. He said at his press conference on August 7 that the People's Republic of China and the Republic of Burma, as successor states to the original signatories to the agreement of June 18, 1941, had the obligation to respect it and other earlier agreements. "If the Chinese have any matters connected with the border which they wish to discuss, even if they should wish to reopen the subject of the 1941 Agreement, we should be prepared to enter into talks with them as friends and not as enemies. But as a first step the Chinese will be asked to withdraw to their side of the border." Not even Moscow can find the statement exceptionable. Uptodate the Chinese have not shown any willingness to respect Burma's territorial integrity.*

VI

THE invasion of Burma on three fronts, listed earlier in some detail, has been preceded by a determined bid on the part of the Chinese to subvert the loyalty of the tribals straddling the Sino-Burmese frontier. According to fully confirmed reports, the Chinese have been taking the sons of Wa Chieftains to Kunming and Paoshan in Yunnan for ideological indoctrination. Ordinary Was have been

* See Appendix II.

attracted to visit Yunnan by offers of free gifts. Large numbers of Chinese propagandists have been coming into Wa State. In certain cases where the Wa Chieftains have resisted the Chinese attempts, there have been clashes and the Chinese are known to have sent large troops to quell the intransigent Was. The Was numbering between 80,000 and 90,000 and inhabiting an area of roughly 4,000 square miles are a war-like tribe and still resort to head-hunting.

Further north-east in Putao sub-division, which is claimed as a part of Tibet, Chinese propaganda teams have been carrying photographs of the Dalai Lama and the Panchen Lama being feted by Chairman Mao Tse-tung in Peking. In Myitkyina and Bhamo districts they have sponsored the Pawng Yawng Liberation Movement. Kachin agents from the Chinese side infiltrate into Burma to "persuade" the Kachins to work for an independent State under the sovereignty of China. Naw Seng, Kachin rebel leader, is still harboured in China where he is believed to be raising an army for the "liberation" of the "oppressed" Kachins in Burma. He is reported to have established his headquarters at Paoshan in Yunnan. In the Shan State, the agents trained by the "Free Tai" Committee have been busy. Generally these tribals have been loyal to Burma even during the worst phase of the rebellion when the Burmese Government's authority was confined to a small area around Rangoon. Only those who have been in Burma in recent months can have some idea of their bitterness against the Chinese.

There is still another aspect of the Chinese invasion which is causing a major headache to the Burmese. Illegal immigration of the Chinese into Burma, which has been going on for decades, has now suddenly assumed alarming proportions. The nature of the threat can well be judged from the fact that the Chinese population in the country has jumped from about 300,000 in 1948 to over one million.

As *The Nation* put it in its editorial on July 30 one day before it broke the story of the Chinese incursions into Wa State: "At this rate, Myitkyina,, Bhamo, Lashio and the Wa State will soon be swarming with Chinese To our knowledge not one of the "escapees" has asked for political asylum in Burma. Therefore, they are not escaping. They are coming with the knowledge, the permission or the connivance of the Chinese border guards. We already have too many Chinese guests and friends. It is time to cry halt."

According to fully authenticated reports, a vast majority of the immigrants are coming from Fukien and Canton. They are all armed with exit permits issued by the Chinese authorities. Whole families do not cross the border together. The men come first and they are later joined by their wives and children after they have been proved to be loyal to the motherland. In almost all cases, the immigrants, who have been detected, have been found not to possess any money. They are provided with the necessary amounts of money in Burmese currency as soon as they have got mixed up with the local Chinese population. The Chinese Embassy in Rangoon has unlimited money at its disposal because it accepts large amounts from the Chinese in Burma for remittance to their relatives at home. They are merely issued a receipt and their families and relations are paid by Peking in the national currency. Without any exception whatsoever, the Chinese immigrants have found it possible to establish business. In Rangoon, they are taking the place of Indians as the dominant business community. The immigrants when detected, are easily accepted back by the Chinese authorities. These are formidable proofs of the official complicity in promoting the immigration.

The flood of the officially sponsored illegal immigrants is hitting Burma all along the eastern frontier from Putao and Myitkyina in the north to Bhamo, north Hsenwi and Kokang in the south. The concentration is said to be

heaviest from Kokang to Bhamo. Over this 650-mile stretch of frontier, crossable at scores of points, thousands of Chinese are finding their way into Burma. The Burmese Prime Minister himself accepted the veracity of these reports at his press conference on August 7.

The Burmese have hardly had the means to check this invasion. They do maintain check posts at Sedon, Sima, Manwing, Pangkam, Namkhan, Muse, Mongyu and Kyukhok. But each of these points is manned by just one officer and a peon. They do not have even the assistance of the military and police to deal with the situation. They are hardly in a position to frustrate the activities of elaborately organised and well-financed organisations that function on both sides of the border. Should this mass immigration continue, the Burmese would in course of time be facing a situation similar to the one the Czechs faced under the late Edward Benes in respect of the Sudetan Germans.

To sum up, the Burmese Government is faced with a very serious crisis. It will be a miracle if it can survive without the assistance of its genuine friends in Asia. The Chinese Communists have shown that not much trust can be placed in their professions of friendship and peaceful co-existence. Like their mentors in Moscow, they are pursuing their traditional imperial ambitions. Only, for the first time in modern times, China has at its disposal the strength to make good its imperialist claims on the neighbouring countries. It has already annexed Tibet and integrated North Viet Nam into its empire. The Chinese appetite seems to grow with the eating and there is no knowing where they propose to stop. The logic of tyranny at home is expansion abroad. Hitler's Germany and Stalinist Russia have proved that proposition beyond a shadow of doubt.

APPENDIX I

SINO-BURMESE BORDER TREATY

The following is the text of the Notes exchanged between the British Government and the Republic of China concerning the Burma-Yunnan boundary.

Dr. Wang Chung Hui to Sir Archibald Clark Kerr
Chungking, 18th June, 1941.

Sir,

I have the honour to refer to the Notes exchanged between Your Excellency's predecessor and then Minister for Foreign Affairs on 9th April, 1935, defining the terms of reference of a Boundary Commission to be charged with the investigation of the undemarcated southern section of the Yunnan-Burma frontier; and to the additional understanding embodied in further notes exchanged upon the same day.¹

2. The joint Boundary Commission having been duly established and having submitted its report to our respective Governments in accordance with its terms of reference, the question of modifications of the general treaty line found by the Commission has since been under negotiations between the National Government of the Republic of China on the one hand and His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Government of Burma (as the successor in interest of the Government of India) on the other, as provided in the additional understanding of 9th April, 1935.

3. I now have the honour to inform your Excellency that the National Government of the Republic of China agrees that for the boundary line described in paragraphs 4 and 5 of Article 3 of the Agreement between China and

¹ "Treaty Series No. 15" (1935) 4884

Great Britain, signed at Peking on 4th Feb. 1897,² shall be substituted the following:

"The line commences at the confluence of the Nam Hpa (Nam P'a Ho) with the Nam Ting (Nam Tin Ho) where Boundary Pillar No. 97 of the northern demarcated section is erected, and ascends the Nam Ting for a distance of about three miles to a point in the neighbourhood of the village of Pang Kwi where Cairn No. 1 was erected by the Sino-British Commission in 1899-1900 on the left bank of the Nam Ting at the point where a spur strikes the river. The frontier then follows this spur generally in a southerly direction to Cairn No. 2, where the road from Hopang to Mengting crosses the spur, and thence to Cairn No. 3 on the summit of the hill known as Loi Hseng (1366). It then follows the watershed between the basin of the Nam Tap, including the Nam Loi Hsa (which, also known as the Kung Mengmo, is a tributary of the Nam Tap, joining it through or under a natural bridge), and the basins of the Nambka and the Nam Kun (Hei Ho) to hill 2360 (approximately longitude $98^{\circ} 57' 14''$ and latitude $23^{\circ} 21' 40''$). Thence it descends the nearest tributary of the Nam Pan stream to (Chin Ho), which has its source about half a mile west of hill 2303 and follows the Nam Pan stream to its confluence with the Nam Kunlong (approximately $99^{\circ} 0' 30''$ and latitude $23^{\circ} 14' 48''$). It then descends the Nam Kunlong to the point where that river is joined by a tributary on its left bank at approximately longitude $98^{\circ} 59' 50''$ and latitude $23^{\circ} 13' 20''$; the line then ascends that tributary to its source and continues south-eastwards on to a ridge along which it proceeds to hill 1970 (approximately longitude $99^{\circ} 3' 58''$ and latitude $23^{\circ} 10' 42''$); thence it proceeds southwards along the same ridge to hill 1770 (approximately longitude $99^{\circ} 3' 27''$ and latitude $23^{\circ} 7' 25''$). The line then proceeds generally eastwards along the watershed between the basins of the Nam Kunlong and the Nam Htung till it strikes the point on the Salween-Mekong water-

² "Treaty Series No. 7" (1897) 8654

shed (approximately longitude $99^{\circ} 10'$ and latitude $23^{\circ} 6' 23''$) about a mile south of hill 2179. Thence it follows the Salween-Mekong watershed, first generally in an easterly direction to a point just south of hill 2178 and then generally in a southerly direction over hill 2146 to hill 1930 (approximately longitude $99^{\circ} 34'$ and latitude $22^{\circ} 56'$). Thence it proceeds first in a south-westerly, then westerly and finally north-westerly direction along the watershed between the basins of the Nam Ma and the basins of the Nam Hka Lam (Ku Hsing Ho) and the Nam Hka Hkao (Nan Hsing Ho) to hill 1523 (approximately longitude $99^{\circ} 26' 43''$ and latitude $22^{\circ} 56' 43''$); thence it descends the nearest tributary of Nam Hka Hkao and follows that river down to approximately latitude $22^{\circ} 50' 52''$, where it is joined by a tributary on its right bank. The line then ascends this tributary in a westerly and south-westerly direction to its source and crosses the ridge, of which hill 2180 (approximately longitude $99^{\circ} 24' 38''$ and latitude $22^{\circ} 48' 37''$) is the highest point, by the most direct route to the source of the nearest tributary of the Nam Sak and follows that stream down to its confluence with Nam Hse (approximately long. $99^{\circ} 18' 42''$ and lat. $22^{\circ} 44' 18''$) thence it descends the Nam Hse to its confluence with the Nam Hka (approximately long. $99^{\circ} 23' 20''$ and lat. $22^{\circ} 35' 10''$) and thence it follows the Nam Hka river downstream to Boundary Pillar No. 1 of the southern demarcated section."

4. A copy of the Boundary Commission map with the line marked in red is appended.

5. I have the honour to request that Your Excellency will confirm that His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Government of Burma agree that the boundary line described above shall be substituted for the line described in paragraphs 3 and 4 of Article 3 of the Agreement between China and Great Britain signed at Peking on 4th Feb., 1897.

I avail, & etc.

(Signed). Wang Chung Hui

No. 2

Sir Archibald Clark Kerr to Dr. Wang Chung Hui
British Embassy,
Chungking, 18th June, 1941.

Sir,

I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your Excellency's Note of today's date, which reads as follows:
(As in No. 1)

In reply I have the honour to confirm that His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, on their own behalf and on behalf of the Government of Burma, agree that the boundary line as quoted above, shall be substituted for the line described in paragraphs 3 and 4 of Article 3 of the Agreement between China and Great Britain, signed at Peking on 4th February, 1897.

I avail, & etc.

(Signed) Archibald Clark Kerr.

No. 3

Sir Archibald Clark Kerr to Dr. Wang Chung Hui
British Embassy,
Chungking, 18th June, 1941.

Sir,

With reference to the Notes exchanged between us today regarding the determination of the southern section of the boundary between Burma and Yunnan, I am authorized by the Government of Burma to inform your Excellency's Government that the Government of Burma is willing, as a gesture of goodwill, to undertake to permit Chinese participation in any mining enterprises which may be undertaken by British concerns on the eastern slopes of the Lufang ridge provided that Chinese interests in these

enterprises do not exceed 49 per cent of the total of the capital of each enterprise.

2. The area in question is shown enclosed by a red line on the attached map and its boundaries are as follows:

A line commencing at the summit of hill 2304 running along the ridge to the hill of Lufang Camp (2025), thence along the ridges to Man Hsiang village, thence in a south-easterly direction down the ridge to join the Nam It stream, thence following the course of the Nam It upstream to its source below the peak of hill 2304, thence to the summit of hill 2304,

I avail, & etc.

(Signed) Archibald Clark Kerr.

No. 4

Dr. Wang Chung Hui to Sir Archibald Clark Kerr

Chungking, 18th June, 1941.

Sir,

I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your Excellency's Note of today's date, which reads as follows:

(As in No. 3)

I have the honour to request that you will convey to the Government of Burma the National Government's appreciation of this gesture of goodwill.

I avail, & etc.

(Signed) Wang Chung Hui

APPENDIX II

U NU-CHOU EN-LAI AGREEMENT

[Since this brochure was printed, news of an agreement between Mr. U Nu and Mr. Chou En-lai regarding the border dispute between their countries has appeared in the press. We have given here the report of the correspondent of *The Statesman* that appeared on 12 November 1956 in its Calcutta issue.

It would appear from this news item that Mr. U Nu has agreed to a *de novo* settlement of the border based on mutual concessions. He seems to have agreed to give up Burma's claim to Hpimaw, Gwalum and Kanfang falling immediately to the south-west of the Inmaikha-Salween watershed. Mr. Chou En-lai seems to have quoted a British letter in support of his claim on behalf of China. U Nu has also agreed to terminate the prepetual lease granted to Burma by China of some 100 square miles of territory near Bhamo at a rental of Rs. 1000 per year. In return for these concessions, Chou En-lai seems to have agreed to withdraw his claim for Wa State. The area proposed to be ceded to China under this agreement falls within Kachin State who are now being approached by the Central Burmese Government for compliance. The news report says that the Chinese forces have already begun to withdraw from their camps on Burmese soil.

A full and final border settlement is to be arrived at and a new boundary line drawn up in the course of future negotiations. U Nu expresses himself as satisfied and as reconciled to the loss of some territory in the hope of a new and permanent settlement arrived at through peaceful negotiation on the principles of Panchsheela.

But the fact that U Nu has agreed to the abrogation of the Iselin Line dissolves the basis of treaty and interna-

tional recognition attached to the work of The League of Nations Commission (leaving the final line of demarcation to be determined by future negotiation) and emphasises the need for vigilance on the part of the Burmese people and Government.

Also, U Nu's statement as reported here to the effect that in all history there has never been a boundary completely defined seems to run in the face of the evidence summarised in this pamphlet. The situation as revealed by Mr. Jain from documentary evidence is that the boundary line all along the Sino-Burmese border from Tibet in the North to the Wa State in Central Burma has been *defined* clearly in the treaty. Only in some areas the line has not been *demarcated* on the ground by pillars and other landmarks.]

RANGOON, Nov. 10.—Burma's former Prime Minister, U Nu, today said that the Chinese proposals for adjustment of the 900-mile long Burma-China frontier were "fair and just" and that the final settlement would be one that would endure as between two friendly neighbours.

U Nu was speaking on the Rangoon Radio. He gave details of the understanding reached between the Burmese and Chinese Governments on principles to be adopted for the settlement of border problems between the two countries.

"There was nothing reliable to show that the boundary between China and Burma was ever completely defined at any time in history, not even during the British regime," U Nu added.

"We are attempting today to make an overall settlement of our entire border with China on the basis of Panchsheel to which we subscribe. And if there is a final settlement it will be a Sino-Burmese border which will endure, a border that will be satisfactory to both and respected by both, a border that will be peaceful and one that does not

require stationing of armies at the ready on either side of it," U Nu declared.

Describing his negotiations with the Chinese Premier Mr. Chou En-lai, he said he wished to pay a tribute to Mr. Chou's sense of "justice and fairness."

U Nu said both he and Chou had taken a realistic view and added "like me he did not wish to go back to history. He agreed that in regard to sections of the frontier delimited by consent, the Burmese may have suffered and the Chinese too may have suffered but since there is a legal basis his Government would accept them.

"He considers the 1941 line (that is the Iselin line dividing the Wa State of north-east Burma and Yunnan) as unfair and one that was imposed upon China while she was under Japanese attack. But nevertheless he would be prepared to accept it if an overall settlement could be reached."

U Nu said Mr. Chou was prepared to accept the existing borders, including the Burmese contention that the boundary line should be along the Nmaikha-Salween and the Nmaikhashweli watersheds.

"But Mr. Chou made one reservation. He claimed that Hpimaw, Gawlum and Kangfang falling immediately to the south-west of the Nmaikha-Salween watershed should be returned to China.

Mr. Chou quoted a British letter to the Chinese Government dated April 10, 1901, supporting the Chinese claim. (Burma has agreed to evacuate this area according to a joint communique issued last night.)"

"Mr. Chou made a second reservation when he said he wished to abrogate the perpetual lease granted by China to the British of 100 square miles near Bhamo known as the Namwan Assigned Tract. This had always been recognised as Chinese territory but had been under perpetual lease to Burma at a rental of Rs. 1,000 a year.

The Kuomintang Government of China had refused to accept the rental since 1948.

"He (Chou) says and I agreed with him entirely that such a state of affairs is not in conformity with the dignity of sovereign countries," U Nu said.

Thus the Chinese asked for return of Hpimaw, Gawlum and Kangfang which they claim as Chinese territory, a claim the British did not deny: second, abrogation of the perpetual lease of Namwan Assigned Tract.

"To my mind these proposals are fair and just," U Nu said.

Since these areas lie in Kachin State, it was necessary for the Central Government to seek the consent of the Kachin State Government. Talks were going on between the Centre and the State Government on this matter. With the acceptance of the Chinese proposals by Burma, China agreed to withdraw her troops from Wa State. In return Burma agreed to withdraw her garrisons from Hpimaw, Gawlum and Kangfang.

U Nu said Burma must act on moral grounds. "She should not retain what she does not own", he added.

"In all history never has a boundary been completely settled between China and Burma. A friendly settlement will be an achievement, a friendly settlement is always better than a forced one for the feeling of being done down is always the seed of poison. "I realize that it is always hard to part with what we have or what we think we own, but it is better to give up what is not ours rather than allow such property to become the bone of contention at every opportune moment. We want the wrong righted. If the frontier is not settled in the way satisfactory to both, it will always remain a spark which will become a flame when passions are aroused.

"In regard to Namwan, since we go upon the legal basis we cannot say it is ours. We must leave it to the friendly feeling of the Chinese to consider what they would do with it.

"It will be wrong for me to give you false hopes but it

may well be that we shall be able to come to an arrangement beneficial to both in regard to Namwan."

Earlier today a Burmese Army spokesman announced that Chinese troops have already withdrawn from Wa State. Messages from the commanders in the Frontier area had reached the War Office here saying that no Chinese troops were to be seen in the areas which they once occupied. According to agreement the Chinese were to have started withdrawing at the end of this month.

RANGOON, Nov. 10.—China has agreed to recognize the McMahon line in the interests of an overall settlement of frontiers between Burma and China, U Nu, former Premier told a Press Conference here today.

The McMahon line agreed to in 1914 marks the Indo-Tibetan border. It stretches over 700 miles and reaches Burma at Diphuk Pass (also called Talok Pass) and extends to Izurazi in north-east Burma. The Chinese Government had never ratified this McMahon convention.—P.T.I.