

On the other hand, it was not before the eighth century A.D. that the first contacts between Nepal and Tibet were established. In that period Tsrong Tsang Gampo, one of Tibet's most illustrious and powerful Kings, extended his sway over Nepal. A Nepalese prince gave away his daughter to the Tibetan King in marriage and it was this princess who carried Lord Buddha's message to Tibet. The Tibetan overlordship over Nepal did not last longer than 50 years and the Nepalese people were able to assert their freedom by 702 A.D. The Chinese impinged on the Nepalese political scene only in 1792 A.D. when a combined Tibeto-Chinese force, placed by different authorities at 40,000 to 70,000, crossed into Nepal to avenge the Gorkha invasion of Tibet in the previous year.

During the Gupta period, Nepal was almost an extension of India. There is historical evidence to indicate that the conquests of Samudra Gupta and Chandra Gupta extended up to Nepal. But that is not the significant point. The significant point is that during this period the cultural exchanges between the two countries were considerably developed. To this date the Gupta era, which is known as the Vikram Samvat, is in vogue in Nepal. Shaivism, the faith of the Gupta Kings, spread in Nepal and it struck such deep roots that it has been the dominant faith in Nepal ever since. The Lichhavis, who gave Nepal a monarchical form of Government as distinct from the earlier practice of elected chieftains, were related to the Guptas of India. Even the art forms of the two countries were deeply influenced by each other.

During the subsequent period of Nepalese history, the origin of various ruling dynasties could definitely be traced to India. The Mallas, who figured prominently in the history of Nepal from the tenth to the eighteenth century, were definitely of Indian origin. Buddhism declined in Nepal with its decline in India. In the course of his fanatical career, Shankaracharya is said to have visited Nepal. In the Kathmandu valley, however, the Niwars, tolerant by nature and tradition, continued to worship at both Hindu and Buddhist shrines and Buddhism continued to attract followers. The

Hindu influence in Nepal was strengthened in the subsequent centuries when thousands of Brahmins and Rajputs fleeing from the Indian plains, where the Muslims had come to rule, took shelter in Nepal. It was a Rajput prince, Prithvi Narayan Shah, who started uniting different parts of present-day Nepal under one administration.

The rise of Prithvi Narayan Shah in the 1760's coincided with the expansion of British power in India. It was inevitable that the two expanding powers, the Gorkhas and the British, representing two different cultural patterns and *milieus*, should clash. A British contingent under the command of Captain Kinloch moved into Nepal in 1767 in response to the request of the Raja Jaya Prakash of Kirtipur, whose Kingdom had been invaded by Prithvi Narayan Shah. The progress of the contingent was checked in the Terai by swollen rivers and its ranks decimated by malaria. The British were thus unable to prevent Prithvi Narayan from conquering the whole of the Kathmandu valley by 1769. This marked the opening of a clash of interests between the British and the Gorkhas and it was not before the middle of the nineteenth century that this conflict was finally resolved.

Prithvi Narayan Shah was intensely suspicious of British influence. He drove out the Capuchin monks, who had taken abode in the Kathmandu valley after their expulsion from Tibet. He shut his passes to British merchandise and pleaded with the Dalai Lama that he should forbid the entrance of British goods and personnel into Tibet in return for access to Indian goods through Nepal. The Gorkha power continued to expand even after the death of Prithvi Narayan Shah in 1771. The Chief of Morang was induced to invade Sikkim in 1788, and this forced the Tibetan authorities to cede to the Gorkhas a piece of land at the head of the Kuti pass. The Tibetans, who regarded themselves as suzerains of Sikkim, promised to pay tribute to the Gorkhas and thus persuaded them to retire from Sikkim. In 1790 the Gorkhas invaded Tibet, which brought on them retribution from China in 1792. Checked in the north, they moved south and by 1794 their dominion extended from



Sikkim to the border of Kashmir and included Kumaon, Garhwal and the Simla hills. The expansion of the Gorkha power in the western direction brought them into conflict with the Sikhs. Checkmated by the Sikhs, they moved into Gorakhpur district across the Terai and occupied nearly 200 villages. This led to the 1814 war between the Gorkhas and the British Government in India.

For the second time in the course of 25 years, the Gorkhas suffered a defeat. General Amar Singh Thapa of Nepal was forced to sign an agreement with General Ochterlony under which the Gorkhas were to evacuate the whole of the territory between the Sutlej and the Kali rivers comprising the area they had conquered in the previous 30 years. Also, Gorkha soldiers were enlisted in the British Army for the first time. But the Nepalese Government refused to ratify the terms of the agreement when they found that the British were facing a threat of war with the Sikhs and the Marathas. Hostilities were again resumed in January, 1816. The peace treaty was finally concluded on March 4, 1816, under which Nepal gave up its claims to Kumaon, Garhwal and other hilly areas in the west and on Sikkim in the east. The Gorkhas were forced to cede the Terai to the British. The eastern part was annexed to British India and the western part was returned to the Kingdom of Oudh. They agreed to accept a British Resident in Kathmandu.

The British authorities realised that it would be profitable to establish friendly relations with the valiant Gorkhas. During the war, General Ochterlony had expressed the view that Indian soldiers would find it difficult to hold their own against the Gorkhas in mountain fastnesses. This assessment of the fighting qualities of the Gorkhas and the terrain determined the policy of the British Government. Before the end of 1816 Lord Hastings returned to Nepal a large part of the Terai on a nominal payment of Rs. 20,000 a year (two decades later, this area yielded a revenue of Rs. 9,91,000 a year). But despite the ceding of territory by the British, the Nepalese rulers remained hostile to the British in India as long as Bhim Sen Thapa was the Prime Minister (1804-37). His downfall in 1837 marked the opening of a

period of intrigue and murder resulting in the rise to power of Jang Bahadur in 1846 and the reversal of Nepal's policy towards the British Government in India.

There is little evidence in support of the view that the British Resident assisted in Jang Bahadur's rise to power. But the significant point is that Jang Bahadur made the establishment of friendly relations with the powerful neighbour in the south the first principle of his policy. To have pursued a policy of hostility to the British rulers in India would have jeopardised the independence of Nepal. As a realist, he recognised that no Government in Nepal could prosper in the face of hostility on the part of the power that ruled in India. He knew that the compulsions of geography and economy could not be ignored and it was not desirable to attempt to do so. Having concluded that friendship with the British in India was in the best interests of Nepal, he did not hesitate to make a move in that direction. Soon after coming into power, he offered six regiments of Gorkha troops to the British in case they found themselves at war with the Sikhs. The offer was then declined, but it served Jang Bahadur's purpose of convincing the British of his friendly intentions.

Two years later he visited Great Britain, which gave him an opportunity to appreciate the military and industrial might of imperial Britain. He returned home firmly convinced of the desirability and necessity of cultivating and strengthening friendly ties with the British in India. As the mutiny broke out in 1857, Jang Bahadur offered to send troops to the British East India Company's aid. Following the acceptance of the offer by Lord Canning, Jang Bahadur rushed 3,000 troops to India. Moving by forced marches down the Trisula Ganga Valley, the Gorkha troops occupied two rebel strongholds and then swept through Oudh, thereby eliminating any chance of a flank attack on the British troops as they were moving towards Lucknow. Later Jang Bahadur took the field at the head of 8,000 men and scored success after success. He captured Gorakhpur in January, 1858, which broke the military strength and morale of the rebels in the area. The Nepalese troops played an important



role in the capture of Lucknow two months later. Jang Bahadur disarmed several thousand rebels when they swarmed across the border into Nepal. In recognition of these services, the British Government restored to Nepal the remaining part of the Terai territory which had been ceded to them in 1816. This cemented the bonds of friendship between the Rana rulers of Nepal and the British Government in India. Henceforth, the former assisted in the recruitment of the Gorkha troops for the Indian Army.

This policy of friendship between the Governments of India and Nepal continued in the subsequent period. In 1904, Chandra Shumshere as the Prime Minister of Nepal played a notable part in finalising the peace terms between the Government of India and the Tibetan authorities at the time of Colonel Younghusband's expedition to Lhasa. In the First World War, 200,000 Gorkhas joined the Indian Army and suffered 20,000 casualties. When Chandra Shumshere was Prime Minister the Anglo-Nepalese Treaty of 1923 was signed under which the British Government recognised the sovereignty of Nepal. In the Second World War the Nepalese rulers once again placed their entire resources at the disposal of the Government of India and over 200,000 Gorkha soldiers did military duty in India and abroad in this period. Since the end of the First World War, the British Government in India had paid Rs. 10 lakhs annually to the Nepal Government as a mark of its appreciation of the latter's services. The Nehru Government inherited these arrangements in 1947 when India achieved independence.

But unlike the British, the new Government in New Delhi could not in these changed times monopolise diplomatic relations with Nepal. Under a tripartite agreement between New Delhi, London and Kathmandu, the British Government retained the right to recruit Gorkha troops and to continue diplomatic relations with Nepal. On June 12, 1947, it was announced in London that the British legation in Kathmandu would be raised to the status of an Embassy. On April 25, 1947, an agreement was concluded between Nepal and the U.S.A. for the exchange of diplomatic

representatives. The Government of India welcomed these new openings for Nepal. The situation was complicated with the Chinese invasion of Tibet. The Indian response to this development has been discussed in the first chapter.

Inevitably the overthrow of the Ranas resulted in instability in the strategic Kingdom and removed from the helm of affairs a group of men who had been known for their realism. India found herself confronted in the post-insurrection period with two diverse streams of the nationalist movement in Nepal, both of which developed anti-Indian overtones. The aggrieved Ranas were able to whip up an anti-Indian sentiment among the people by making it appear that India was interfering in the internal affairs of Nepal with a view to dominating her. The forceful personality of the Indian Ambassador, Mr. C. P. N. Singh, lent itself to a misrepresentation of India's policy. The Communists and their allies aided the disgruntled Ranas in this anti-Indian campaign. The anti-Indian movement found support among the members of the majority community in the Kathmandu valley as the civil servants belonging to it created the erroneous impression that the Indian advisers had taken over the administration. Primarily it was a case of national pride, which was legitimate in a people who had always maintained their freedom. The Indian advisers were invited to Cabinet meetings, which was regarded as proof enough that the independence of Nepal had been compromised.

In Nepal, the business community had all along resented the presence of Indian business men. To this outstanding, though irrational, grievance was added a new one in the form of the restrictions imposed on Nepal's import and export trade as a result of the Indo-Nepalese trade agreement of October, 1950. This agreement stipulated that the "Government of Nepal agree to levy at rates not lower than those leviable in India custom duties on imports from, and exports to, countries outside India. The Government of Nepal also agree to levy on goods produced or manufactured in Nepal, which are exported to India, export duties at rates sufficient to prevent their sale in India at prices more favourable than those of goods produced or manufactured



in India which are subject to Central excise duty." The Government of India had presumably been influenced by the consideration of preventing the smuggling of goods into India from Nepal and of protecting the country's industries. Additionally it wanted to restrict the import of goods from abroad by Nepal because it had to provide the necessary foreign exchange. New Delhi was keen to help Nepal build up its financial resources as well. But without doubt the restriction on export of goods to India was rather harsh, particularly in view of the intimate economic and cultural ties between the two countries.

The Nepali Congress, which commanded the support of a significant section of the Niwar community in the immediate post-insurrection, could have attempted to remove the misunderstandings about India's role and intention in Nepal. But it was incapacitated by a split, which was accentuated when the strong man of the organisation, Mr. B. P. Koirala, was passed over by the King in favour of Mr. M. P. Koirala for appointment as the first commoner Prime Minister. The aggrieved group in the Nepali Congress blamed the Indian Ambassador for the King's decision. The allegation that the Indian envoy was interfering in the internal affairs of Nepal was widely accepted as being true in Kathmandu. It was freely alleged that the Indian Ambassador and Mr. B. P. Koirala had clashed when the latter was Home Minister in the interim Rana-Nepali Congress Coalition Government. Mr. B. P. Koirala himself gave currency to this story. He charged the Indian Ambassador with taking an "undue interest" in the internal affairs of Nepal and frustrating reforms. Mr. C. P. N. Singh had to officially deny the charge. Mr. Tanka Prasad also raised the cry of Indian imperialism in Nepal. His party, the Praja Parishad, organised a black flag demonstration when the Indian Prime Minister, Mr. Nehru, visited Kathmandu in the summer of 1951.

By the end of 1951, India's standing in Nepal had been gravely undermined. Mr. Robert Trumbull of *The New York Times*, who was by no means ill-disposed towards India, reported: "Nepal appears to fear India's encroachment

on its ancient freedom more than Communist infiltration from its northern neighbour... It is said openly in Kathmandu that the real ruler of Nepal today is the Indian Ambassador, Mr. C. P. N. Singh... Anti-Indian feeling is intensified by the consciousness of every Nepalese that India could, if she wished, throw an economic stranglehold on the country by her geographical position. It is known that India discouraged the consideration by Nepal of opening diplomatic relations with China."<sup>1</sup>

In the midst of this bitter campaign against India Dr. K. I. Singh attempted to stage a *coup* on the night of January 22, 1952. The episode exposed the weakness of the set-up and inevitably the King and the Prime Minister, Mr. M. P. Koirala, thought of reorganising the Army, which alone had remained loyal to the regime at the time of the crisis. They requested India to lend some military officers, who could take up the onerous and difficult task of reorganising the Nepalese armed forces on a more efficient basis. The Government of India readily complied with the request in view of its own interest in the security and stability of Nepal, though it could not have been unaware of the propaganda advantage it would afford to its opponents in Kathmandu. The arrival of the military mission, the strength of which at no time exceeded 120 including barbers and other similar servants, provided the critics of India and the other opponents of the regime with a stick to beat them with. The Indian gesture was misrepresented as being aimed at placing the Nepalese army under her own control. Some of the military officers, who had earlier held ranks out of all proportion to their ability and responsibilities, suffered diminution in status as a result of the reorganisation of the Nepalese army. They and the demobilised personnel—the strength of the army was reduced from 25,000 ill-organised, ill-paid and indisciplined soldiers to 6,000 properly trained men—looked askance at the Indian mission. Today there are no two opinions on the contribution that the small Indian military mission has made to the

<sup>1</sup> *The Dawn*, Karachi, quoted *The New York Times*, New York, to this effect on December 21, 1951.



development of a regular organised force in Nepal. In 1952 the Nepalese soldiers did not even have barracks or uniforms. There was no regular course of training. Today a soldier's salary has been raised from Rs. 6 in 1952 to Rs. 30, with rations.

The climate of opinion in 1952 was such that the Government of India and its envoy were blamed even for the departure of a number of wealthy Ranas to India. In short, India found herself caught in a vicious circle. Strategic considerations for the safety of both Nepal and India necessitated the building up of a viable system of defence in the Kingdom. India had, therefore, of necessity to assist the Nepalese authorities in establishing a workable administrative machinery and in stabilising the economic situation. To help Nepal improve her means of communications with India so that she could receive assistance from the latter in an emergency, India agreed to finance the development and improvement of the Gauchar airport in Kathmandu and to construct an 80-mile highway, which involved cutting through a series of mountain ranges. Even these measures, which have greatly benefited the people of Nepal, were misrepresented by a section of the local politicians and newspapers as being intended to destroy the Kingdom's invulnerability.

The anti-Indian feeling in the Kathmandu valley continued to grow in 1953 and 1954. India suffered from the failure of the Nepalese leaders to give the country a stable administration and to improve the lot of the people. In March 1953, a section of the Nepali Congress found itself leading the anti-India campaign. Its Working Committee adopted a resolution demanding the withdrawal of both the Indian civilian experts and the military mission in the interest of what it called the "healthy relations between India and Nepal" and with a view to "thwarting the attempts to foster misunderstanding between the peoples of the two countries." It expressed the view that "the experience of the last two years, particularly the last eight months during which the participation of foreign advisers has been maximum, has not been happy. There are enough educated

and experienced Nepalese who are capable of carrying on reforms in our mode of administration."<sup>2</sup> It would be difficult to determine how far this demand arose out of the Congress leadership's differences with the Prime Minister, M. P. Koirala, which as indicated earlier were soon to burst out into the open. It was, however, the Communists, who reaped advantage from this anti-Indian campaign in the elections to the Kathmandu local body.

In May, 1954, an Indian parliamentary delegation visited Kathmandu on a goodwill mission. This delegation was greeted by hostile crowds, lining the route from Gauchar airport to the city. The angry mob pelted stones and garbage at the delegates and stoned the car of the Indian Ambassador.<sup>3</sup> The Gorkha Parishad and the illegal Communist Party were the leaders of the demonstrations, though the followers of other parties did not abstain from participating in it. This demonstration was a measure of the uphill task that the Indian diplomatic personnel faced in the neighbouring Kingdom.

The Indian officials and leaders took the view that the anti-Indian feeling had been promoted by politicians out of power. This view was expounded ably by Sir Girja Shankar Bajpai, who had been the Secretary-General of the External Affairs Ministry in New Delhi. In an article, which appeared in the *Indian Yearly Book of International Affairs*, Madras, 1954, he wrote that there were among political parties out of office, persons who misrepresented India's programme of aid as inspired by selfish motives. But the real cause of this unfriendliness was the frustration of their political ambitions. Because they could not secure for themselves the reins of Government in Nepal, India was made the scapegoat of their disappointment and malice. The fact that some of them once wanted the administration to be practically run by Indian nationals, covertly or overtly joined in such accusations against India, was itself proof of the insincerity of the charges. Sir Girja added that India's role throughout an uneasy period of internal political

<sup>2</sup> *The Times of India*, New Delhi, March 16, 1953.

<sup>3</sup> *The Times of India*, New Delhi, May 20, 1954.



rivalries, had been strictly advisory. It was an example, not common in world politics, of a big neighbour helping a small one to work out its own salvation peacefully.

Mr. Bajpai justified the interest the Government of India had taken in promoting the setting up of a broad-based Government in Nepal. Referring to political instability in Nepal, he wrote that Pessimists could argue that the sudden introduction of democratic institutions had upset what was, with all its defects, a stable Government. But this conclusion ignored the fact of the civil war which had broken out and was certain to have spread if no concessions had been made to demands with the spirit of the times. It also ignored the spreading of anarchy as the result of the civil war in a country of high mountains and pervasive and insalubrious jungle, without an organised and efficient administration or any system of communications. From the standpoint of Indo-Nepalese relations, this would have been a menace to law and order in India along a common frontier. That would not have been a source of friendship but of constant friction; besides possibly creating international problems involving the Kingdom's other neighbours.

Mr. Bajpai faithfully represented the official Indian viewpoint. The observations about the politicians were by and large true. But Mr. Bajpai stretched the point a little too far in respect of the insurrection. The incursions into Nepal by rebels based on India could certainly have been prevented. What is even more significant, the rebellion had been smashed within less than a fortnight. The majority of the people in the hills had shown little interest in the outcome of the struggle as was evident from the fact that the demonstrations against the Ranas had been confined to Kathmandu. It is also doubtful if King Tribhuvan would have decided to leave his capital if he did not find his hands strengthened by the cooling off of relations between Kathmandu and New Delhi.

It would appear that India's policy in Nepal was for some time bedevilled by lack of consistency, which had found expression in the two statements that Mr. Nehru had made in the Indian Parliament on December 6 and

7, 1950, defining India's policy in Nepal. He said on December 6: "We have inherited both good and bad things from the British. Our relations with some of our neighbouring countries developed during an expansive phase of British imperial policy. Nepal was an independent country when India was under British rule; but strictly speaking, her independence was only formal. The test of the independence of a country is that it should be able to have relations with other countries without endangering that independence. Nepal's foreign relations were strictly limited to her relations with the Government functioning in India at that time."<sup>4</sup>

He modified the statement in his address to Parliament the next day when he said:

"My attention has been drawn to the fact that perhaps I was unjust in what I said about the State of Nepal. My description about the independence of Nepal, I am told, was perhaps not quite correct. I think it was perfectly correct, but I have been somewhat misunderstood. What I said yesterday was this, that the independence of a country is ultimately judged by the foreign relations of that country. A country can be completely independent as Nepal has been; but, if it has no foreign relations, it does not count in the comity of nations in the way an independent country does. I pointed out that during the last hundred years or more, although Nepal was an independent country, she had no foreign relations except through the British in India. That was her only window on the outside world. It was only during the last 20 to 30 years that I believe she had an Ambassador at the court of St. James and still more recently in America. What I wish to make clear is this: I was not hinting that the Government in India prevented her from having independent foreign relations but rather she herself did not think it necessary or desirable or feasible to develop these international contacts."<sup>5</sup>

<sup>4</sup> *Jawaharlal Nehru's Speeches*, The Publications Division, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, New Delhi, p. 175. <sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 188.



The inconsistency in the two statements is apparent. The independence of Nepal could not have been "formal" and "complete" at the same time, during the period of the British rule in India. If the British in India did not prevent Nepal from developing foreign relations, the question of Nepal's independence being formal did not arise. It was not logical for Mr. Nehru to argue that all independent countries, irrespective of their size, resources and strength, should seek to have foreign relations with several other countries to be able to count in the comity of nations.

It does not have to be established that all nations do not wield equal influence in the world. Complete independence is today a myth for the simple reason that all nations must recognise, in the interest of survival, compulsions of geography and physical resources. Today even the world's two greatest powers, the U.S. and the U.S.S.R., cannot claim to be wholly independent in that they have to concert their policies with their allies. Major powers like Britain and France subordinate their policies to U.S. assessment of the needs of Western alliance.

The Rana rulers only recognised the compulsions of the situation when they chose to co-ordinate their policy with that of the British Government in India. As long as the Himalayas cannot be shifted to the south of Nepal, it is only logical for any Nepalese ruler to maintain the friendliest relations with India. The fact that Indo-Nepalese relations were developed during the expansive phase of the British policy was thus not the main cause for inducing the Nepalese to maintain close relations with India. If Mr. Nehru's purpose in referring to the limitations of Nepal's independence was merely to place the Chinese on notice that India's ties with Nepal were indissoluble, a reference to the historical, geographical, economic and cultural factors binding India and Nepal together would have sufficed. But the real problem was to effectively guarantee that Nepal's freedom was not encroached upon by any other power.

By the time King Tribhuvan left for Europe for treatment in October, 1954, the policy of friendship with India was in ruins in Nepal, even though Mr. M. P. Koirala as

Prime Minister continued to adhere to it. With the decline in India's standing arose the demand for opening diplomatic relations with China and the return of Dr. K. I. Singh. The resignation of Mr. M. P. Koirala, the death of King Tribhuvan and the installation of Prince Mahendra as the new King marked the opening of a new chapter in Indo-Nepalese relations. The years 1955 and 1956 marked the arrival of China in Nepal through agreements on diplomatic relations, Tibet, and economic assistance, signed respectively on August 1, 1955, September 20, 1956 and October 7, 1956. Apart from the failure of Indian efforts in Nepal, her general policy towards China during this period had an important bearing on developments in Nepal. The history of Anglo-Nepalese relations in the past would show that the Nepalese rulers tried two contradictory sets of policies before and after 1846. Before 1846, the Nepalese were hostile to the British in India. In the latter phase the Ranas had pursued a policy of complete co-operation and friendship with the British. A case could be made for Nepal pursuing either of these policies in the new context created by the Chinese occupation of Tibet. Before 1846, when the Nepalese pursued the policy of hostility to the British, the Chinese position was fairly strong in Tibet. It was only in the 1840's when the Chinese got involved in the First Opium War with the British that the Tibetans were able to shake off their control. The historical parallel between the situation today and before 1846 is too striking to be ignored by students of Nepalese affairs.



## CHAPTER VI

### CONSEQUENCES OF TIBET

THE CONTRADICTION in India's policy towards Nepal noted in the previous chapter resulted from an appreciation of the need to secure the defence of Nepal against internal and external subversion. This possibility arose primarily from the Chinese occupation of Tibet. It is a debatable issue whether India was in a position to prevent the incorporation of Tibet into the Chinese empire. It is at best a conjecture to argue that the Chinese would not have marched into Tibet if India had made it plain that she would regard it as an act of hostility against herself and would take suitable measures to help the Tibetans defend their freedom. It can be argued equally cogently that such a gesture on the part of New Delhi would have been futile in view of India's known inability to accept the additional awesome burden of an undeclared war with China. The official position is that all that India could do without inviting the risk of permanent hostility with China was to protest, which she did. When China decided to ignore these protests, there was little that the Government of India could do to secure the freedom of Tibet. Consequently it sought to protect its interests in the sub-Himalayan region by other methods.

But Tibet was not an isolated affair. Almost simultaneously the Chinese forces had intervened in the Korean war. The least that the Indian leaders could do was to take cognizance of the fact that the invasion of Tibet and intervention in Korea were parts of an over-all strategy and seek to mobilise Asian opinion against the Chinese aggression in Tibet. The Government of India on the other hand decided to ignore the affront it received on the Tibetan question and to support the Chinese and Soviet position on Korea in the fond hope of being able to play a mediatory

role. There is no explanation why the Government of India decided not to link its policies on Tibet and Korea.

The Chinese Communists had made no secret of their aims and ambitions in Tibet. Tibet was to be "liberated" from the stranglehold of "feudalism" and "imperialist intrigues." Since India alone, besides Nepal, had maintained diplomatic ties with Tibet, the insinuation was clear. It was the Indian influence which was to be eliminated from Tibet. Geographically, Tibet was accessible only from India and Nepal to the non-Communist world and Nepal itself was accessible only through India. China had earlier made the explicit assertion that she like the Soviet Union did not regard India as an independent country. Peking Radio had graphically described Mr. Nehru himself as a "running dog of British imperialism." Mao Tse-tung had in a letter to the Communist Party of India in 1949 expressed the hope that "relying on the brave Communist Party of India and the unity and struggle of all Indian patriots, India certainly will not remain long under the yoke of imperialism and emerge in the socialist and People's Democratic family. That day will end the imperialist, reactionary era in the history of mankind."<sup>1</sup>

Instead of reacting sharply to these insinuations, India under the leadership of Mr. Nehru made it her business to win the friendship of the Chinese Communists. India opposed in the U.N. Security Council the resolution branding China an aggressor. Her plea for the admission of China in the United Nations became increasingly more urgent as the Korean war progressed. In fact Mr. Nehru expounded the remarkable theory that the Korean war itself could have been avoided if the People's Republic of China had been given its legitimate place in the United Nations. Tibet was hardly mentioned in the speeches of Indian leaders during this phase. The conclusion is unavoidable that rudeness and firmness on the part of the Chinese rulers paid them rich dividends. By negating India's interests in Tibet and challenging the United Nations in Korea, they won the respect of India.

<sup>1</sup> *The Communist*, Bombay, January, 1950.



This policy of abandoning the cause of Tibetan freedom was the more surprising in that the Government of India and the Prime Minister, Mr. Nehru, could not have been unaware of China's ancient claims on Nepal, Bhutan, and Sikkim and by proxy on Ladakh, which is a part of the state of Jammu and Kashmir. The occupation of Tibet clearly placed China in a position to be able to assert effectively her traditional claims on these sensitive areas.

Historically, China's interest in Nepal dates back to 1792 when a combined Tibeto-Chinese force crossed into the Kingdom and defeated the Gorkhas at Nawakot, just 20 miles from the capital city of Kathmandu. The Chinese authorities and scholars later claimed that Nepal had then accepted Chinese suzerainty, which contention is strongly denied by the Nepalese authorities. According to the Nepalese, the Chinese commander had agreed to withdraw after coming within striking distance of Kathmandu because of the fear that his forces would be annihilated if he led them into Kathmandu valley.<sup>2</sup> But it is an undeniable fact that the Gorkha Kingdom sent missions every five years to Peiping bearing gifts till 1908, even though it had avenged its earlier defeat in 1856 A.D. by occupying parts of Tibet and compelling the Tibetans to send Rs. 10,000 annually as tribute and to grant to the Nepalese traders extra-territorial rights in Tibet.<sup>3</sup> The Chinese claim has been that both Nepal and Tibet had in the preamble to the Treaty of 1856 recognised, as in 1792, the Chinese emperor as the common overlord.

There is a difference of opinion among scholars on this issue. According to the Nepalese text as translated by Mr. Perceval Landon as also by the Nepalese authorities themselves, the treaty only stipulated that the "Emperor of China shall continue to be regarded with respect as heretofore" by both parties. The Tibetan text as translated into English by Aitchison, however, says that the two contracting parties agreed that "the Emperor of China shall be obeyed by both States as before."<sup>4</sup> The Nepalese contention is that

<sup>2</sup> *The History of Nepal*, translated by Daniel Wright, London, 1877.

<sup>3</sup> *Nepal*, by Perceval Landon, London.      <sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*

no subservience of any kind was involved in their relations with China and that they sent missions to Peiping because that was the only way of establishing relations with a neighbouring country in those days. That the Chinese emperors in turn loaded the missions with gifts and allowed them to take merchandise for sale without payment of duty is often quoted by the Nepalese in support of their claim.

The Tibetan-Nepalese Treaty of 1792 is not found in Nepalese records. A search for it was made in the early twenties of the present century when Mr. Perceval Landon was writing his book *Nepal*.<sup>5</sup> But Padma Jang Bahadur Rana, son of Jang Bahadur, quoted the terms of the said treaty in his *Life of Maharaj Sir Jang Bahadur*. According to him, Nepal and Tibet had agreed to consider China as "father to both" and to refer their mutual disputes to Peiping for settlement. They agreed, in addition, to send "some produce of their countries every five years in token of their filial love" to China, which in turn was obliged to come to the help of Nepal in case of invasion by a third power and to send friendly presents to Nepal. This does not indicate any subservience on the part of Nepal to China. The Chinese, however, failed to come to the aid of Nepal in 1814 when she was involved in a war with the British in India.

Whatever be the validity of the rival positions, the significant point for the purpose of the present discussion, is that the Chinese regarded Nepal as one of their satellites. As late as 1908—four years after Colonel Younghusband had led a successful expedition to Lhasa in 1904 and compelled agreement on the part of the Tibetan authorities—the Chinese resident in Lhasa known as *Amban* had sought to assert the Chinese claim of suzerainty over Nepal, Bhutan and Sikkim. He had informed Nepal that she and Tibet "being united like brothers under the auspices of China should work in harmony for mutual good."<sup>6</sup> He suggested

<sup>5</sup> This statement has been made on the basis of discussions with Field-Marshal Kaiser Shumshere Jang Bahadur Rana, who was third in line of succession at the time of the downfall of the Ranas in 1951.

<sup>6</sup> *Nepal*, Perceval Landon, London.



the blending of five colours representing China, Tibet, Nepal, Bhutan and Sikkim as a part of his programme to assert the Chinese claim in the face of British opposition. Subsequently, the Chinese pressed the Nepalese Government to accept their right to enlist Tibetan-Nepalese half breeds in their Tibetan contingents. Nepal turned down the demand. But it was renewed by the Chinese on March 1, 1911, to be rejected this time by the British Government on March 24, 1911. The British Government made it clear that it would resist any attempt on the part of the Chinese Government to enforce the demand and that it would defend the integrity of Nepal, Bhutan and Sikkim.<sup>7</sup>

The downfall of the Manchu dynasty in 1911 did not affect the official Chinese viewpoint in respect of Nepal. The claim was maintained, even though the Chinese authorities were hardly in a position to bring even their own country under one administration. Mr. Perceval Landon raised the issue with the then Foreign Minister, Mr. Wellington Koo, during his visit to China in 1924. The Minister's Secretary wrote back to him: "The last tribute from Nepal was in the 34th or last year of Kwang Hsu in the third month (April, 1908). No tribute has since come from the Republic. In early days of the Manchu dynasty tributes came once in five years, but on account of distance between Nepal and Peking it was agreed that they would come once in 12 years instead."<sup>8</sup>

According to Landon, the Nepalese authorities were not aware of any such agreement. The Kuomintang regime, however, made no attempt to enforce the Chinese claims over Nepal. But as early as 1939, Mao Tse-tung in his brochure the *Chinese Revolution and the Chinese Communist Party* listed Nepal as one of China's dependencies. He wrote: "In defeating China in war, the imperialist States have taken away many Chinese dependent States and a part of her territories. Japan took away Korea, Taiwan and Ryuku islands, the Pescadores, Port Arthur; England seized Burma, Bhutan, Nepal and Hong Kong; France occupied Annam and even an insignificant country like

<sup>7</sup> Ibid.    <sup>8</sup> Ibid.

Portugal took Macao." If the experience of Russian expansion and the Chinese behaviour under the Communist rule is any guidance, these areas constitute the Chinese irredenta. Many of these areas have often been shown in the Chinese maps as part of their country.

The history of the Chinese interest in Nepal runs even deeper theoretically in that they claimed sovereignty over Tibet, which had held sway over Nepal or at least some parts of it for some 50 years in the seventh century A.D. The Chinese had claimed suzerainty over Bhutan and Sikkim by the same logic. They characterised these latter two States as gateway to the Middle Kingdom. Though it is difficult to fix a date when Bhutan passed under the Tibeto-Chinese influence, the Chinese emperors claimed since early times the right to grant the patents of investiture and seals of office to the Deb and Dharam Rajas of Bhutan, the counterparts of the Dalai Lama and Panchen Lama of Tibet. The claim was revived in 1736 A.D. when the Chinese had once again succeeded in establishing their dominion over Tibet. As late as 1830 A.D. the Chinese and Tibetan officials came down to Bhutan to help the local rulers resist the British demand for building a road there.<sup>9</sup>

In fact, it was not before 1910 A.D. that the British Government in India was able to enter into an agreement with the Bhutanese ruler—by now the Deb Raja had become supreme—under which he agreed to place his foreign relations under the control of the Government of India.<sup>10</sup>

Similarly, Sikkim, which has provided the easiest route to Tibet from India ever since the Younghusband mission to Lhasa in 1904, was regarded as a vassal State by the Tibetan authorities till 1890 A.D. when a convention was drawn up between the Governments of China and Great Britain laying down that in future Sikkim would be a British protectorate. But the ruling family continued to maintain close cultural and social ties with Tibet.<sup>11</sup> Ladakh, once the entrepôt of trade between India, Tibet and Central

<sup>9</sup> *Tibet, Past and Present*, Charles Bell, London.

<sup>10</sup> *Bhutan and Sikkim*, Sir Claude White, London.

<sup>11</sup> *Tibet, Past and Present*.



Asia, was under Tibeto-Chinese influence with some long breaks till 1834 A.D. when for the first time in history it was incorporated into the Indian principality of Jammu by Raja Partap Singh's commander, Zorawar Singh. The Tibetans sought to re-establish control over Ladakh after they had annihilated Zorawar Singh's 15,000-strong force, which had advanced into Tibet. The force was repulsed and Ladakh became a part of Jammu State.<sup>12</sup> In short, on the same basis as the pretext for occupying Tibet, China has a basis for activating the whole frontier of India.

New Delhi could not have been unaware of this dangerous possibility when Tibet passed under the domination of the Chinese Communists. The Chinese Communists soon enough made it clear that Nepal figured in their calculations. Soon after the occupation of Tibet, the Chief of the Central Office of the Chinese Communist Party, Yuang Shang-kim, said in a message: "After the liberation of Tibet, the Chinese people and Nepalese people will be united in close solidarity for the sake of defending Asia and preserving world peace."

The odds were in favour of India in control of the sub-Himalayan belt as long as China was involved in Korea and later in Indo-China. During this difficult period, Peking needed India's goodwill and support which was given easily and unconditionally by Mr. Nehru in the conviction that Sino-India friendship was the key to peace in Asia and the world. Peking was freer to pursue its ambitions in Nepal more directly after the Geneva Agreement of 1954, which led to the cessation of hostilities in Indo-China. During the previous four years, the Chinese activity in the sub-Himalayan region had of necessity to be limited in scope, for the additional handicap that Peking had to concentrate its efforts on building highways in Tibet to link it effectively with China and important points of India's borders and pacifying the Tibetan people. They could make no bold move forward with these essential conditions unfulfilled.

<sup>12</sup> *India Quarterly*, January, 1950, published by the Indian Council of World Affairs, New Delhi.

China established her right to be regarded as a major military power in Asia by her performance in Korea and her capacity to assist effectively the Communist-dominated Viet Minh in Indo-China to inflict crushing defeats on the French forces. The Chinese delegation stole the limelight at the Geneva Conference, which opened on April 26, 1954, to discuss the situation in Indo-China. It alone was in a position to determine whether the war in Indo-China would end. On April 29, 1954, China was able to provide another visible demonstration of its status as the leading Asian power by signing with India an agreement on Tibet on her own terms. The agreement came at the end of negotiations lasting nearly four months. During this period India surrendered her bargaining points one by one and accepted wholly the Chinese claim that Tibet was legitimately a part of the empire.

India gave up all the privileges in Tibet which had accrued to her partly as a result of the successful expedition led by Colonel Younghusband in 1904, and partly as a result of the goodwill that had been built up between India and Tibet in the subsequent period when the Dalai Lama and other leading authorities of Tibet had found it difficult to get along with the Chinese. India agreed to withdraw her military escorts from Yatung and Gyantse and hand over to China the telegraphic, postal and telephonic services along with the equipment and the rest houses and other buildings in Tibet.

Ironically enough the preamble to this treaty enunciated the five principles of peaceful co-existence, non-interference, and mutual co-operation. The Chinese thus won India's valuable support and friendship on their own terms. The Chinese Prime Minister, Mr. Chou En-lai, admittedly the most accomplished negotiator in all Asia, crowned this success with his triumphant visit to New Delhi on his way back from Geneva in the last week of June, 1954. He was written about in the Indian press and feted by the Government of India with an enthusiasm which had never before been shown for any foreign dignitary since independence. The five principles were once again reiterated in the joint



Sino-Indian statement issued by the two Prime Ministers as providing a basis for world peace. In October, 1954, Mr. Nehru visited China to continue the process of winning China's friendship. The Bandung Conference in 1955 when Mr. Chou En-lai stole the show marked the culmination of a process which had started with the Chinese intervention in Korea and invasion of Tibet. Communist China had arrived on the Asian scene.

With the conclusion of the Sino-Indian Agreement recognising Tibet as an integral part of China, it was untenable that Nepal should continue to enjoy the rights that she had secured following the invasion of Tibet in 1856. The Chinese immediately pressed the advantage and discussions opened in 1954 for the establishment of diplomatic relations between the two countries as a prelude to other agreements. Logically, the Government of India advised the Nepalese authorities to "regularise" their relations with China on Tibet. The Bandung Conference offered another opportunity to the Chinese rulers to establish contacts with the Nepalese authorities.

Following the conclusion of the Sino-Indian Agreement, it was taken for granted in India and Nepal that an agreement between Nepal and China on Tibet would soon follow. But simultaneously it was thought necessary to take measures to prevent the infiltration of Communist agents from across the border into Nepal. This duality of approach was reflected in the statements made by the Home and Foreign Ministers of Nepal. On May 4, 1954, the Home Minister, Mr. Tanka Prasad Acharya, announced that his Government proposed to establish police posts in the Himalayan regions. India lent to the Nepalese Government personnel to man the outposts and the necessary wireless equipment to help them maintain contact with Kathmandu. In the meantime King Tribhuvan and two Ministers, including the Foreign Minister, D. R. Regmi, visited New Delhi for discussions with the Government of India. While in New Delhi, Dr. Regmi welcomed the agreement between India and China on Tibet, saying that Nepal would soon face the question. On May 8, in an interview, Dr. Regmi

said that so far Nepal had not been formally approached by the Chinese, but if "they approach us formally, we will do the right thing at the right moment. For the moment we want to be on friendly terms with the Chinese and we would not do anything which creates embarrassment for either side."<sup>13</sup>

The Indian commentators were agreed that the Nepalese leaders had been officially advised by India to "regularise" their relations with China over Tibet, that Tibet would no longer pay the annual tribute to Nepal and the Nepalese in Tibet would not enjoy extra-territorial rights. They viewed these concessions as natural, just and inevitable. But some of them were concerned over the probable role of Dr. K. I. Singh, who was still in Peking. Mr. M. P. Koirala, Nepalese Prime Minister, saw Mr. Nehru in Calcutta on October 15, 1954, on his way to Peking. He met the Indian Prime Minister again on his return from China to "learn about Mr. Nehru's experiences." In an interview, he said that *India and Nepal should have common foreign policy based on partnership and equality*. Nepal was contemplating to establish direct relations with Peking, but he wanted to hear Mr. Nehru's impressions of China before considering the next move, he added.

Nepal came up for discussion between Mr. Nehru and the Chinese Prime Minister, Mr. Chou En-lai, during the former's visit to Peking. At Mr. Nehru's press conference in New Delhi on November 13, 1954, on his return from China, one correspondent remarked to the Prime Minister that he was reported to have achieved two concrete results; first, China had agreed that Nepal was in "India's sphere of influence," and secondly, that China would establish diplomatic relations with Nepal. Mr. Nehru replied:

"I am sorry that many statements, that have appeared in the press about my visit to China, have been very far from accurate. Sometimes they have a grain of truth, but so far as Nepal is concerned, it is a well known fact—

<sup>13</sup> *The Statesman*, New Delhi, May 9, 1954.



and it is contained in our treaties and other agreements with Nepal—that we have a special position in Nepal, not interfering with their independence but not looking with favour on anybody else interfering with their independence either.

“You will remember that before India became independent, Nepal was not independent in any reality. It was very much under the British Government, not internally, I mean, but in regard to external factors. When we became independent, we went much further in recognising the independence of Nepal than the British Government had done, but it was even then—and this was before the change in Nepal when the old Rana regime was still there—India’s special position in regard to foreign affairs in Nepal was recognised. As for diplomatic relations between Nepal and China, that is a matter which the Nepalese Government no doubt will deal with in its own way.”

In response to a question regarding Dr. K. I. Singh and his activities in Peking, Mr. Nehru said: “This case was mentioned by me, not as affecting us, but as an instance. I was told that political asylum had been given to him in the normal way and nothing more. There was no further argument about it. I do not think that Dr. K. I. Singh will function in future.”<sup>14</sup> Earlier on November 5, *The Times of India* had carried a report that broadcasting facilities were no longer being made available to Dr. Singh by the Chinese Government.

Formal talks for diplomatic exchange between Nepal and China opened in Kathmandu in the last week of July, 1955. The two sides were represented by the Chinese Ambassador in India and the Principal Royal Adviser, Mr. Gunjman Singh. Mr. N. P. Thapa, a brilliant young man, who was soon to be the Foreign Secretary in Kathmandu, functioned unofficially as an adviser to the Nepalese delegation. Mr. Thapa was known to be a leftist. The talks were speedily concluded on July 31, 1955, when it was decided to establish

<sup>14</sup> *The Times of India*, Delhi, November 14, 1954.

diplomatic relations between China and Nepal on the basis of the five principles of "mutual respect for each other's territorial integrity and sovereignty, non-aggression, non-interference in each other's internal affairs by any reason of an economic, political or ideological character, equality and mutual benefit and peaceful co-existence." The agreement, signed on August 1, 1955, presaged future developments in Sino-Nepalese relations. It said: "The two Governments believe that the establishment of diplomatic relations will also promote further developments in cultural and economic co-operation between the two countries." Prior to the signing of the Agreement, the two delegations had discussed the question of drawing up a new agreement on Tibet consistent with its new status as a part of the Chinese Republic. The Chinese Ambassador, General Yung Chung-hsien, presented his credentials to King Mahendra on August 3. ✕

By itself the agreement regarding the establishment of diplomatic relations was unexceptionable. But it was indicative of a new trend in the thinking and approach of the Nepalese rulers and provided an opening for China in the strategically vital mountain Kingdom. King Mahendra's six-week visit to India in November-December 1955, did not reverse this trend. On his return from India, he appointed Mr. Tanka Prasad Acharya, as the Prime Minister. This appointment was apparently made after considerable deliberations. According to the correspondent of *The Pioneer*, Lucknow: "In the formation of the present Ministry, the Indian sentiment had been more or less completely ignored." This correspondent quoted an Indian official as saying that the Indian aid to Nepal was one of the most thankless jobs. Whether certain forces were working against India was not certain, but it was obvious that "the ruling section, if it can afford it, will not accept any help or assistance from Indian quarters. Possibly this spirit has also played an important part against the Nepali Congress in recent political developments."<sup>15</sup> Whatever be the validity of this observation, it can be stated on the highest authority

<sup>15</sup> *The Pioneer*, Lucknow, March 3, 1956.



that Mr. Tanka Prasad Acharya took it for granted that India would be unfriendly to his Government. In fact, he is known to have given expression to his apprehension that India would not continue to extend economic aid to Nepal. These fears were laid to rest when the Government of India promptly offered aid of Rs. 10 crores for financing the projected five-year plan. The Government of India also assisted Nepal in tiding over a difficult food situation.

Indian commentators and officials began to be alarmed by the rise of the Chinese influence in Nepal only towards the middle of 1956. This concern resulted partly from the knowledge that machinations on the part of the high-powered Chinese delegations to the coronation in February, 1956, headed by one of the Vice-Premiers, had met with favourable response in certain influential Nepalese quarters.<sup>x</sup> But the cloak of secrecy for Indians outside of the Government remained until the political commentator *Insaf* lifted the lid in his June 5th column in *The Hindustan Times*, New Delhi. He wrote: "The Chinese delegation to the recent coronation of the King of Nepal made its presence felt leaving behind the impression that some Chinese diplomats may not be averse to playing the Rana game." *Insaf* was the pen name for Mr. Durga Das, then Joint Editor of the English daily. In the same piece he noted that some of the Nepalese "wish Nepal to act as a buffer between the two great powers so that it can blackmail both."

Significantly, even after Mr. Tanka Prasad became the Prime Minister, the *Samaj*, official organ of his group in the Praja Parishad, made a plea on April 16, 1956, that Nepal should open diplomatic relations with Pakistan. A week later the paper published a series of six articles demanding that the Indo-Nepalese Trade Treaty be revised. On August 6, and 7, 1956, the *Samaj* strongly criticised the Indian press for its allegedly calling into question the independence of Nepal during the period of British rule in India. It charged that the Indian journalists were suffering from "slavery complex." It questioned whether the Government of India was justified in recommending to other nations the five principles of co-existence

and non-interference when it had not been able to convince its people of their validity in determining relations with the neighbouring countries, including Nepal.

These writings clearly reflected the thinking of the ruling group in Kathmandu. In September, 1956, China was able to negotiate with Nepal a new agreement on Tibet under which Nepal agreed to give up all privileges and rights that had accrued to her under the Treaty of 1856. The new Treaty signed on September 20, 1956, stipulated that Nepal would cease to receive the annual tribute of Rs. 10,000 from Tibet. Nepal agreed to withdraw within six months of the signing of the Treaty her military escorts from Tibet, which had been stationed there for nearly a century to afford protection to the Nepalese traders and pilgrims. The Treaty entitled China to open a Consulate-General in Kathmandu and three trading agencies at suitable points in the interior in return for similar advantages that Nepal had in fact been enjoying since 1856. The Nepalese trading agencies were functioning at Shigatse, Kyerong and Nyalam.

The Treaty abolished the extra-territorial rights which had so far been enjoyed by the Nepalese traders and residents of Nepalese origin in Tibet. All documents and agreements in force so far between Nepal and China on the one hand and Nepal and Tibet on the other were abrogated. Another significant clause in the Treaty specified that persons of Nepalese descent whose families had lived in Tibet for several generations would be entitled to acquire Chinese citizenship if they desired. It was agreed to establish a direct telegraphic service between Lhasa and Kathmandu. As noted earlier the agreement on economic assistance between China and Nepal, which was finalised and signed during Mr. Tanka Prasad's visit to China in October, 1956, provided that the Chinese technicians would not come to Nepal and that one-third of the total aid of Rs. six crores would be in cash and the remaining in machinery. Unlike India and America, China did not insist on examining the soundness of specific projects on which the amount was to be spent.



Many in India were taken by surprise by this agreement. But it was not a surprise move either on the part of the Chinese or the Nepalese authorities. Within a fortnight of his appointment as the Prime Minister, Mr. Tanka Prasad Acharya told newsmen on February 7, 1956, that China had offered assistance for the economic development of Nepal. The offer, which was conveyed to him by the Chinese Ambassador to India and Nepal during his visit to Kathmandu, had been made without any approach on the part of Nepal. On the eve of his departure for China, Mr. Tanka Prasad reaffirmed his willingness to accept Chinese aid if it was offered without strings. Also, it was not an accident that the first ever women's delegation and the first official cultural delegation from Nepal visited China in May, 1956, and July, 1956, and not India. The cultural delegation was headed by the then Education Minister, Mr. Balchandra Sharma.

The fact, however, remains that the Sino-Nepalese aid agreement served as a rude shock to public opinion in India. *The Statesman*, New Delhi, reflected the sense of concern over the security of the country when it said editorially on October 15, 1956: "It does not require much imagination to foresee charges in the market place, with the Nepalese General Elections expected in a year's time, that some at least of this money will serve party rather than national needs." *Insaf*, of *The Hindustan Times*, New Delhi, was more forthright. He wrote on October 9, 1956:

"The present Government of Nepal (presuming that Mr. Tanka Prasad is acting with due authority) seems to be overplaying its hand. It has gone out of its way to sign a Rs. 6 crore economic deal with China. Nepal does not possess the organisation to absorb even the aid India is giving. A deal with China can thus be interpreted only as a political move."

*Insaf* added that some influential persons had been "pleading with the young King that Nepal being a buffer between two powerful states—India and China—could

exploit both by creating unhealthy rivalry among them. . . . There can be no buffer between Communism and democracy." On October 16 this columnist gave expression to the fear that much of the cash aid would go into "the pockets of the ruling clique," and would be used "for political propaganda." Once a channel for the remission of the funds was established, he said, there could be no guarantee that "amounts above the stipulated figure will not pass through the pipe-line." He added that "the situation can be saved by either India taking a firm line diplomatically or by the people of Nepal electing a Government which will adopt a realistic foreign policy. For the time being a big question mark has appeared over the future of the Himalayan Kingdom."

The Government of India could not be unconcerned over the new relationship of forces emerging unmistakably in Nepal. It is not unlikely that the economic agreement between Nepal and China was modified in response to India's views. In the original agreement, it was provided that Nepal was to receive Rs. four crores in cash and Rs. two crores in machinery. Subsequently the arrangement was reversed and the amount of cash aid was reduced to Rs. two crores. The detail of how this amendment was negotiated must still remain secret.

As the aid agreement was negotiated in Peking, Dr. K. I. Singh visited New Delhi in the second week of October and met the Indian President, Prime Minister, and the Home Minister. ~~It was obviously not a private visit.~~ Significantly, the Indian press remained silent on the substance of his talks with the Indian leaders. But Dr. Singh himself provided useful clues at the press conference in New Delhi on October 11, 1956. He made much of the expenditure on Mr. Tanka Prasad's visit to China. It had cost a sum of Rs. 2,00,000, he said, adding that the amount could have been utilised to build bridges. When he was reminded that the visit had yielded aid to the tune of Rs. six crores, he sharply retorted, "Well, Rs. six crores is not the price of Nepal." Additionally, he expressed the view that it was not possible for Nepal to stop the recruitment of



Gorkhas to the British Army in the absence of alternative avenues of employment.<sup>16</sup> Since Dr. Singh was said to be seeking to disarm the fears of New Delhi in a bid to come to power in Kathmandu, it would be a reasonable presumption that he was giving expression to the fears of Delhi as he understood them after consultations with India's top policy makers.

The Government of India was naturally keen to recover the lost ground in the strategically important Himalayan Kingdom. As a part of this effort, India's President, Dr. Rajendra Prasad, visited Nepal in October, 1956, and Mr. Tanka Prasad was induced to visit India in December the same year. Dr. Rajendra Prasad did not mince matters during his speeches and discussions in Kathmandu and communicated to the Nepalese authorities his Government's anxiety about developments in Nepal. He said in Kathmandu on October 22, 1956: "Any threat to the peace and security of Nepal is as much a threat to the peace and security of India. Your friends are our friends and our friends yours." Given the geographical situation of Nepal, the threat to her security could be seen to arise only from one direction. President Prasad sought to assure the Nepalese authorities and people that India had no territorial ambitions and did not want to interfere in the internal affairs of Nepal. He made it known that India would fully support the Nepalese Rs. 33-crore plan of economic development. India was then already committed to provide Rs. 10 crores for the purpose.

<sup>16</sup> *The Times of India*, New Delhi, October 12, 1956.

## CHAPTER VII

### NEPALESE VERSION OF CO-EXISTENCE

WHILE STILL IN jail under the Rana regime, Mr. Tanka Prasad Acharya smuggled a letter to Mr. Jaya Prakash Narayan, then General Secretary of the Congress Socialist Party. The provocation was that in Mr. Acharya's view Mr. B. P. Koirala and Dr. D. R. Regmi had betrayed the freedom struggle in Nepal. But its significance lay in that it outlined Mr. Acharya's political philosophy in unequivocal terms. Mr. Tanka Prasad accepts that the letter as published by Mr. Kashi Prasad Srivastava in his *The Story of Nepal* (Hindi) is a genuine document. He then expressed the view that the movement for freedom from Rana rule in Nepal should be organised on socialist principles. It did not matter to him that Nepal had not been industrialised and as such did not possess an industrial working class. He cited the example of the Soviet Union and her Asian Republics in support of his case that socialism could be established in a predominantly agricultural country. In fact, he said that nowhere in the world had the working class as such been instrumental in establishing a socialist State. The revolution in the Soviet Union, according to him, was the handiwork of a band of determined men. He saw no reason why Nepal could not take a short cut to socialism without having to pass through the capitalist phase of development.

Mr. Acharya did not content himself with a discussion of the short-term and long-term problems of his own country. He found it necessary to prescribe that the Socialist Party of India itself would do well to take to the "revolutionary path" to achieve its goal. He argued that it was inevitable that Indian capitalists would forge a counter-revolutionary Fascist organisation as their counter-parts had done in the



past in Germany and Italy, should the Socialist Party hope to be voted into power. "If we [socialists] have to be prepared for an armed struggle in any case, why should we not take to the 'revolutionary path' right now?" he asked.

The Nepalese leader politely but firmly rejected the widely held view that Communist parties the world over were the instruments of the Russian Foreign Office. "It would be a mistake to think that Communism is spreading in the world solely on the strength of Russian money and organisational ability," he wrote, adding that Communism was not only a new political, economic and social philosophy, but a new religion. He was convinced that the Communist parties alone could give battle to the capitalists and their supporters. That was why the Communist movement had grown into an irresistible force. "The poor people in the world are turning towards the ideal of economic equality. Only the Communists can take the movement forward by giving it an international character," he wrote.

There was no change in Mr. Tanka Prasad's outlook on national and international issues when he emerged from jail in 1951. His alliance with the Communists has been referred to earlier. He headed the United Front from the middle of 1951 to the middle of 1952 and on his own testimony the Front survived the ban on the Communist Party on January 25, 1952. Mr. Tanka Prasad broke away from it only when he started negotiations with Mr. M. P. Koirala, the then Prime Minister, for inclusion in the Cabinet. His charge that India was pursuing an imperialist policy in Nepal flowed from his ideological position as well as his assessment of the situation in India. The Communists the world over then regarded India as a colony of the Anglo-American bloc.

Soon after coming into power, Mr. Tanka Prasad outlined his foreign policy at a press conference on January 29, 1956. He said that his Government's policy would be in "conformity with Nepal's desire for stable peace in the world." Nepal would certainly "join the forces of world peace and make a constructive contribution to the cause

of peace." She would accept economic aid from all friendly countries, including the Soviet Union if the "aid is unconditional and without strings." His Government would in addition work towards the goal of ending colonialism in the world, particularly in Asia. Though apparently unexceptionable, the closeness of this statement to the Sino-Soviet line could not be missed. Nepal, he added, would seek to develop direct trade with foreign countries, implying thereby that economic ties with India would be loosened. He spoke of mass awakening in India and China and said that this awakening had resulted in substantial progress in the two countries.<sup>1</sup>

Apparently Mr. Tanka Prasad's claim to serve the cause of world peace and the freedom of dependent countries linked Nepal's policy with India's. But the appearance was deceptive in that the ideological links with Moscow and Peking were even stronger, for it was clearly the Communist line to link up the causes of peace and national liberation as parts of the very same struggle—against the West. Stalin had conceived the peace movement as a part of his overall plan to extend the influence of the Soviet Union and Communism. India had only lent a helping hand unwittingly to the Communists in the pursuit of their well defined and inflexible objectives. Superficially, Mr. Acharya was flattering Mr. Nehru by imitating him. In fact, he was delivering a heavy blow to the Indian position in Nepal. If Nepal was to work for peace, she would logically not maintain special ties with any one nation. Since in the past Nepal had been effectively concerted her foreign policy with India's, the policy of non-alignment amounted to placing India on notice that she could not take the former for granted. Also, if Nepal had to lend her weight to the struggle for liberation, she had to take up a generally anti-Western position, which in the context of the cold war amounted to lining up with the Communist bloc against the democracies. In Nepal, the democratic cause was represented primarily by India and only secondarily by Britain and America. Whether the Indian leaders realised

<sup>1</sup> *The Times of India*, New Delhi, January 30, 1956.



it or not, they had to bear the brunt of the struggle against Communism in Nepal. The issue between India and China had been joined in Nepal the day the Chinese armies marched into Tibet.

It is not wholly unlikely that the idea that Nepal should seek to be a buffer between India and China had taken roots before the appointment of Mr. Tanka Prasad as the Prime Minister. As indicated earlier, such a policy had been pursued by Nepal under the Prime Ministership of Bhimsen Thapa in the first four decades of the nineteenth century. In any event, it would be a fair assumption that King Mahendra and his advisers approved of the policy that Mr. Tanka Prasad pursued. Their motives could be different from those of Mr. Tanka Prasad and in fact, it is highly unlikely that the King and his advisers were favourably disposed towards Communist China as such. Their primary impulse could have been to weaken India's influence in their country by making deals with China.

Mr. Tanka Prasad Acharya outlined his view of Nepal's future role as a buffer between India and China in his address at the civic reception that was accorded to him in the Indian capital during his visit in December, 1956. He said that it would be Nepal's endeavour to cement the bonds of friendship between India and China. Situated between them, Nepal would in co-operation with the two countries seek to promote international peace, he said, adding that in the present situation in the world, smaller nations had to be careful because it was difficult for them to avoid being entangled in conflicts. In that context India and China, he advised, had to act with utmost responsibility. Friendship between the two countries was, therefore, of great importance to Asia. He made it clear that Nepal was prepared to provide the bridge between the two powers.<sup>2</sup>

This approach on the part of the Nepalese rulers provided an easy opening for the Chinese Communists. The Chinese Prime Minister's visit to Kathmandu from January 25 to 29, 1957, was a measure of the importance

<sup>2</sup> *The Times of India*, New Delhi, December 5, 1956.

that Nepal had come to possess in China's scheme of things. Mr. Chou En-lai had heavy commitments to fulfil at that time. He had to silence Asian doubts provoked by Russia's massive armed intervention in Hungary. He had to reassure Burma about China's *bona fides* after long drawn negotiations on the withdrawal of Chinese troops from the Burmese soil had failed to produce satisfactory results. Above all, he had to provide a bridge between the Russian leaders and the new men at the helm of affairs in Poland following the October Revolution.

The nature of the talks between the two Prime Ministers and the success Mr. Chou En-lai achieved can be gauged by his speeches and utterances on one hand and the joint communique issued at the conclusion of the talks on the other. As usual, Mr. Chou En-lai exuded charm and sought to win the friendship of even those known to be hostile to Communism. On the first day of his visit, the Chinese Premier assured the Nepalese that China fully realised the importance of economic development for safeguarding national independence and would contribute "within its ability" to Nepal's development.<sup>3</sup> He thus assumed for his country the role of being the defender of Nepal's freedom. By implications, the threat to Nepal's independence came from India.

But the defence of Nepal's independence had to be secured, in the Chinese scheme of things, without doing violence to the larger Communist objective of promoting anti-Western feeling in Asia. This objective could not be achieved without the co-operation, or the least connivance, of India. Mr. Chou En-lai, therefore, immediately proceeded to state that the colonialists, who were not reconciled to the loss of power in Asia and Africa and were manoeuvring to stage a come-back, could be forestalled only if Asian countries, particularly China, Nepal and India, worked in close co-operation with all peace-loving forces of the world.<sup>4</sup> The crusade against the West provided in this case a convenient cover for the statement of a more specific objective of drawing Nepal closer to China.

<sup>3</sup> Ibid., January 28, 1957.      <sup>4</sup> Ibid.



The same day the Chinese Prime Minister told a gathering of citizens in Kathmandu that "Nepal and China are blood brothers and nothing can poison this relationship."<sup>5</sup> He was obviously reminding the Nepalese that a section of them were of Mongolian origin—a revival of the old theme that China, Tibet, Nepal, Bhutan and Sikkim should blend their colours. During his visit, the Chinese Prime Minister found time to address the Nepal Chamber of Commerce to assure the business community of Niwars that his Government would do all that was possible to promote trade between Nepal and Tibet. He thus sought to silence doubts that the Nepalese business houses in Tibet might be squeezed out in course of time. At a news conference, he sought to sow distrust in the minds of the Nepalese authorities against the West when he advised them to keep a close watch on all foreign mountaineers "who penetrate into Tibetan territory under the plea of climbing this peak or that."

The joint statement issued by the two Prime Ministers said :

"The Premiers agreed that Asian-African solidarity was of tremendous significance to the safeguarding of world peace. To complete this tremendous task, the Asian and African countries should rise above the minor differences between them. Despite their different political systems, the Asian and African countries shared great aims of defending their national independence and freedom, constructing their own countries and promoting the welfare of their peoples. The Premiers regarded this unanimity of purpose as providing a basis for their solidarity. *They further pointed out that unity among the countries which they had in mind was not confined to the Asian and African countries, but also formed a basis for real unity among all peace-loving countries in the world.*"<sup>6</sup> (Emphasis provided.)

The significance of the joint statement cannot be over-emphasised. The appeal to the Asian countries "to rise

<sup>5</sup> Ibid.    <sup>6</sup> *The Statesman*, New Delhi, January 29, 1957.

above the minor differences between them" was clearly addressed to India and Burma. India had taken strong exception to the use of Soviet armed forces in suppressing the Hungarian people's struggle for freedom. Burma had been experiencing difficulties with China on the question of the demarcation of their common border and the Burmese attitude on the Hungarian tragedy was even more unequivocal than India's. But more significant was the linking of the plea for unity among the Afro-Asian countries with the advocacy of unity among the so-called peace-loving countries of the world, which is the well-known Communist position the world over. Thus Mr. Tanka Prasad had accepted the Chinese Prime Minister's approach to the international situation.

This acceptance is further underscored by the speech that Mr. Tanka Prasad had made while playing the host to Mr. Chou En-lai during his visit. He said :

"Most of the countries of Asia are under-developed or non-developed. Naturally, therefore, we are at times liable to forget the paramount importance of Asian unity and solidarity and to be led astray by considerations of petty gains. We should devote great thought to this serious possibility and take adequate measures to preclude it."

The only legitimate inference that could be drawn from this pronouncement was that Mr. Acharya feared that some of the countries of Asia, which were either receiving aid or hoped to receive substantial aid from Western Powers, particularly America, might allow new policies to be influenced by this consideration. By implication, he invited these "black sheep" among the Asian nations not to be tempted or influenced by Western aid.

Mr. Tanka Prasad elaborated his approach to international problems to this writer when he was still the Prime Minister. He said that considerations of geography and racial composition made it necessary for Nepal to seek and win China's friendship without doing violence to her



relations with India. According to him, over 50 per cent of Nepal's total population was of Mongolian origin and a policy of exclusive friendship with India would fail to win their support. Also, Nepal had ties of trade, culture and religion with Tibet, which it was neither wise nor possible to disrupt. As if to provide a second line of defence in support of his policy, he said that Nepal had a 500-mile long common frontier with Tibet, and proceeded to spell out the implication of this statement. In the absence of means of transport and communications the people living in the border areas had weak links with the Central Government in Kathmandu. They had maintained a large measure of freedom and had not been integrated with the rest of the community. Nepal could not, therefore, risk China's hostility as long as she was not able to link the border areas effectively with the rest of the Country through a programme of road construction and win the loyalty of the people there by giving them a feeling of having a stake in Nepal's unity and independence through the implementation of schemes of economic development.

Clearly, these arguments could not by themselves have been decisive in reorientating Nepal's policy in favour of China. Their weaknesses were obvious. For example, it was far from convincing to argue that the simple, uneducated and illiterate people in the hills, who for ages had looked to India for employment and trade and had been deeply influenced by the Indian way of life, were pressing for a reorientation of Nepal's traditional foreign policy of friendship with India in favour of China. Even one superficially acquainted with the political scene of Nepal would agree that the martial tribes in the hills do not regard Nepal as a separate country from India. They are hardly aware of their common ancestry with the Mongolian peoples and racial considerations have never been known in history to be decisive in determining the policies of nations and States. If this view of the affiliations of the Gorkhas is true, then only the Sherpas and Bhotia and other small communities in the trans-Himalayan part of Nepal could be said to be interested in the shift in favour of China.

It is a little exaggeration to argue that Nepal's foreign policy turns on these simple people whose strength does not exceed 50,000.

Similarly, it was unrealistic for Mr. Tanka Prasad to argue that the Chinese in Tibet were proving Nepal's good neighbours just because Nepal was following a policy of equal friendship with Peking and New Delhi. For one thing, Tibet was occupied by China in 1950-51 and it was not before August 1, 1955, that the agreement regarding the exchange of diplomatic representatives was signed between Nepal and China. Also, whatever trouble took place in Nepal's border areas was during Mr. Acharya's tenure of office as the Prime Minister in 1956. Also, China could not launch on a policy of adventurism for both local and general reasons. She was still desirous of maintaining at least apparently friendly relations with India and could not adopt an adventurist policy in respect of Nepal as long as the policy of friendship with India was not given up. Besides, in the given international situation, Nepal would not be friendless in case of unprovoked aggression from China. China, it may be noted has not been able to execute her threats in respect of Formosa and other offshore islands. Equally significant was the fact that China had been able to consolidate her gains in Tibet where a vast majority of the people remained hostile and defiant.

Mr. Tanka Prasad assured this writer that the Chinese in Tibet would not create difficulties for the Nepalese Government in the border areas as long as the latter did not allow its territory to be used as a centre of espionage and hostile activities against them. Later, in April 1957, he reaffirmed his Government's determination not to allow the Mimang, Tibetan rebel organisation, to operate from Kathmandu or any other part of Nepal. During his visit to Nepal in February 1957, this writer found evidence in high places to suggest that the Chinese Prime Minister had impressed on the Nepalese authorities that he viewed with misgivings the presence of the American technical personnel in Nepal. But neither Mr. Tanka Prasad nor his close advisers on foreign policy had any explanation to



offer for the Chinese behaviour in Burma. Burma was not even accepting U.S. aid at the time of the border trouble in 1956.

Strangely enough, this writer was assured at the highest official and Cabinet levels when Mr. Acharya was still the Prime Minister that they were aware of the threat the Chinese Communists in Tibet posed to the unity and national independence of Nepal. Some of them even went to the extent of saying that there could be little doubt that in course of time the Chinese would seek to build an empire on the basis of racial ties; only they would proceed cautiously and slowly during the next ten years or so in view of the heavy commitments at home. They clearly hinted at the possibility of the Chinese financing a political party to help it win the elections as they did in Burma in respect of a thinly disguised Communist front in 1956. A senior official at the Foreign Office, however, said that the fear that the Nepalese had opened up their country to the Chinese influence was unfounded. In view of the interests of Nepalese settlers and traders in Tibet, Nepal had no option but to regularise her relations with China over Tibet, he said. He added that the Nepalese had to accept in principle the Chinese right to open three trading agencies in different parts of the country and the Consulate-General in Kathmandu, in return for similar facilities they were already enjoying in Tibet. Nepal, he emphasised, had as a precautionary measure provided in the Agreement that the question of location of the Chinese agencies would be discussed later between the two Governments and they would in fact be opened only when the nature and extent of the Tibeto-Nepalese trade justified them. The trade between the two countries could not be sufficiently developed, as long as a road was not built to link Lhasa with Kathmandu, he said. This official said that Indians were uncharitable in their criticism that the Nepalese Government had accepted Chinese aid when it was hardly in a position to even fully utilise the Indian aid. The offer, he said, had been made by the Chinese to the Nepalese Prime Minister during his visit to Peking. He had no option but

to accept it. To reject the offer would have lent itself to the interpretation that Nepal was hostile to China. This writer heard the same version from Mr. Tanka Prasad Acharya himself. But the fact remains that that aid offer had been made by the Chinese soon after Mr. Acharya came to power in the last week of January 1956. In this context, it is worth recording that among certain circles in Nepal the view prevailed that neither India nor America, which had so far been the principal participants in Nepal's programme of economic development, would assist them to establish industries. They expected China to fill the gap. The attractions of industries in a backward country are well known.

Mr. Tanka Prasad told this writer that India, in her own interest, must encourage the development of Nepalese nationalism, for nationalism alone could meet the challenge of Communism in an Asian country. He clearly intended to convey the impression that India had sought to reduce Nepal to the position of a satellite. He made this charge openly after he ceased to be the Prime Minister in July, 1957. He said that that his Ministry's fall had been secured by "foreign machinations," leaving no one in doubt that the charge was directed against India. But his basic suggestion raises a number of important issues, which merit consideration. Nepal, with a total population of nearly 8·5 million, is the home of diverse races and communities divided into watertight compartments by geographical barriers. The Western concept of a nation thus does not apply to her. In our times, these peoples can be held together only by a sense of patriotism born out of a feeling of pride in their achievements. The suppression of the Tibetans by the Chinese can be turned to their advantage by the Nepalese rulers if they have the imagination. The participation of popular representatives in the Government can in favourable circumstances assist the growth of national unity. It is too early to assess whether the elections in Nepal will help promote a feeling of solidarity.

In course of time, the Chinese might seek to exploit racial ties with a section of the Nepalese to win them over



to their side. Expansion is the logic of totalitarianism. If and when the Chinese make such a move, only India's prestige and strength can help the Nepalese redress the balance in their favour. Thus friendship with India on the part of the Nepalese rulers is the precondition for their country's independence and unity. They would do well to emphasise the cultural, religious, economic, ethnic and even geographical ties that bind India and Nepal together. The Indians on their part must learn to respect the susceptibilities of the Nepalese. The dangers of emphasising the points of disagreement and dissimilarity between India and Nepal would inevitably do violence to the national interests of both the countries.

Before the appointment of Dr. K. I. Singh as the Prime Minister for a brief period of 110 days in the later half of 1957, the Nepalese political scene in respect of foreign relations bore striking resemblance to India's. The ruling party's policy was generally endorsed by the Communist Party with minor reservations. The Communist Party demanded the termination of the agreements with India and Britain for the recruitment of Gorkha troops from Nepal, revision of the trade agreement with India and the withdrawal of the Indian military mission as well as the Indian personnel manning the checkposts on the Tibeto-Nepalese frontier. All major parties in Nepal were agreed on the need to revise the trade agreement with India and the Government of India has not been opposed to it. As Prime Minister, Mr. Tanka Prasad himself felt that the Indian military mission had completed its task and it was about time that it was withdrawn. It would appear that he was overruled by authorities higher than himself in Nepal and that was why he could not press the demand. The only major difference between the Communist Party and the Government headed by Mr. Tanka Prasad thus related to the recruitment of Gorkha troops to the Indian and British armies. In India in 1957, the Communist Party fully supported the foreign policy of Mr. Nehru with just one reservation. It demanded that India should quit the Commonwealth and champion the cause of the freedom of

the colonial people in concert with other "peace-loving countries" more vigorously.

In Nepal all other major political parties were critical of the pro-China overtones of Mr. Acharya's Government's foreign policy. With the sole exception of Dr. K. I. Singh, no other politician in Nepal had the courage to emphasise the need for cementing the old ties with India. In private they accused Mr. Acharya of being a fellow traveller if not a Communist, just as he privately accused them of being either India's or America's stooges. Consequently there was a visible shift in the Nepalese situation when Dr. K. I. Singh became the Prime Minister. The emphasis shifted from foreign relations to internal affairs. He defined his Government's minimum programme as :

1. To hold impartial elections as soon as possible ;
2. To tackle the food situation as best as possible ;
3. To solve the land problem "within reasonable limit of time and possibilities" ; and
4. To eliminate corruption, injustice and lawlessness and such other evils "as quickly as possible" and to increase the national income "with the utmost effort."

He indicated that there would not be any expansion of Nepal's international representation for the time being. Nepal, he said, wanted the "love and goodwill, co-operation and friendship of the entire humanity. But yet, until we have achieved success befitting the age in economic and other fields, we may not be able to have a wider expansion in this direction."<sup>7</sup> Under Dr. Singh's Prime Ministership, Nepal shelved all suggestions for diplomatic relations with other countries, pending from the time of Tanka Prasad's Prime Ministership. According to a pro-Praja Parishad newspaper in Kathmandu, 24 countries had formally or informally expressed their desire to open diplomatic relations with Nepal.<sup>8</sup>

<sup>7</sup> *The Statesman*, New Delhi, July 29, 1957.

<sup>8</sup> *Ibid.*, September 24, 1957.



On August 3, 1957, Dr. Singh lined up his country behind India on the issue of Kashmir, affirming that "we shall support India over the Kashmir issue. There is no doubt about it. Kashmir was and is a part of India and the people of Kashmir desire to live with the Indian Union." What is even more significant, he said that the "*status quo* will be maintained" in respect of the recruitment of Gorkhas to the Indian and British armies as long as the Nepalese Government was not in a position to provide alternative jobs to these soldiers. He disclosed that his Government was proposing to enter into an agreement with Pakistan under which Nepalese nationals in Pakistan would be evacuated as soon as possible and the same facilities would be extended to Pakistan nationals.<sup>9</sup> It was common knowledge in Kathmandu that he did not view with favour the terms of the Sino-Nepalese agreement on Tibet and held up its ratification. At his first press conference as Prime Minister, he said in reply to a question that he did not know whether the Sino-Nepalese agreement on Tibet had been ratified because "I have not attended to these papers yet."<sup>10</sup> This clearly indicated that he was not enthusiastic about the terms of the agreement.

During Dr. Singh's Prime Ministership, the Nepalese daily *Samaj*, known to be closely associated with Mr. Tanka Prasad, opened a campaign of vilification against India. It carried a story on October 15, 1957, that the Government of Nepal, under the pressure of India, had given a contract to an Indian firm for operating a bus service on the Tribhuvan Rajpath, which had been built by the Government of India. According to the story, the Nepal Government had passed over the claim of a co-operative society of ex-service-men, which wanted to operate the service. The Indian Embassy had to deny the story making it clear that the Government of India was not interested in any contract for any firm in any part of Nepal and would welcome the development of the service by Nepalese enterprise.<sup>11</sup>

<sup>9</sup> Ibid., August 4, 1957.

<sup>10</sup> Ibid., August 4, 1957.

<sup>11</sup> *The Commoner*, Kathmandu, October 20, 1957.

Subsequently, the *Samaj* charged the Nepalese Government with having mortgaged the entire forest wealth of Nepal to India for Rs. 20 crores. Once again the local authorities and the Indian Embassy in Kathmandu issued a denial. On October 19, 1957, the paper devoted its entire issue to a bitter tirade against India. It alleged that India was seeking to deprive the peasants in Nepal of irrigation facilities from small streams so that she could utilise these waters for irrigation in her territory and that the Nepalese Government had surrendered to India's pressure. All that India had done was to request the Nepalese authorities to demolish the temporary bunds that the peasants raised on these streams after they had irrigated their lands so that the available water could be used in Bihar which had been stricken by a drought.<sup>12</sup> Fortunately this anti-Indian campaign did not catch because no one in Kathmandu was convinced that India had had a hand in the appointment of Dr. K. I. Singh as Prime Minister or that he was subservient to India. Also in Kathmandu, the accent was on the developments at home. In the elections, Mr. Tanka Prasad Acharya forfeited his security, though he was being supported by the Communist Party. He had contested from Kathmandu itself. This conclusively proves that he had failed to win popular support on his programme of anti-Indianism.

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The Chinese could not have been unaware of India's susceptibilities when they decided to offer aid to Nepal, which, they had earlier acknowledged, fell within India's sphere of influence. The decision to introduce cold war into the region must have been deliberate and taken at the highest level. The Chinese striking first in Nepal was only logical. The most important link in India's defence chain, it was also the most vulnerable. The Kingdom was a subverters' paradise. As indicated earlier, the situation in Nepal had been fluid ever since 1950 when the insurrection resulted

<sup>12</sup> Ibid., October 26, 1957.



in disrupting the established order with nothing equally effective to take its place. The anti-Indian feeling, though it was much subdued in 1956 as compared with 1953 and 1954, remained implicit in the Nepalese political life. It was only natural that China should seek to exploit India's weakness in the area of considerable strategic importance to her. The absence of adequate means of communications and administration in large parts of the country offered added attractions to the Chinese.

Nepal invited China's attention and interest from still another standpoint. It was a wholly sovereign nation in whose affairs India had no title to intervene. There was no legal basis for Mr. Nehru's claim that India enjoyed a special position in Nepal "in regard to foreign policy." This was and remains the main and significant difference between India's status with Nepal on the one hand and Bhutan and Sikkim on the other. Bhutan under the existing treaty is obliged to be guided by India's advice on foreign relations. Sikkim is an Indian protectorate. For China to intervene in these two States is to provoke India directly by virtue of her treaty relations. There incidentally, China has tried the oblique approach of drawing them further into Tibet's economic and cultural life.

The Chinese are bound to exploit fully the advantages that the entering edge of diplomatic exchange and economic aid have secured to them. The Nepalese in Tibet may also in course of time be pulverised to serve Chinese interests at the pain of being expelled from Tibet. But India's stakes remain great in Nepal. Her security would be seriously jeopardised with the installation of a hostile regime in Kathmandu. Despite their public professions, Indians at the policy making level were never wholly assured that Communism and parliamentary form of Government, could really co-exist in close proximity. The fact that Nepal may hold, through the large number of Nepalese settlers in Bhutan and Sikkim, the key to these two other Himalayan gateways to India further underscores New Delhi's anxiety. It is only natural that India should seek to retrieve its position in Nepal.

Among the courses open to New Delhi, the most logical one is to exert strong and direct pressure on Peking against its thinly disguised intervention in Nepal. This course may require a reshaping of the entire structure of foreign policy. But there is a strong possibility that Mr. Nehru may undertake in course of time an "agonising reappraisal" of his policy in respect of China. Such a possibility emerged in 1957. The New Delhi correspondent of the *Economist*, London, noted on March 16, 1957, "Senior officials in New Delhi have now reached a point at which they have written off the Panch Sheela (professions of mutual non-interference signed with China and the Soviet Union) as scraps of paper. It came as a tremendous shock when Chou En-lai refused to reason with the Russians over Hungary and, on the contrary, maintained that the Soviet action there was the only way to hold the Communist world together. And China's attitude towards the Burmese frontier, as toward's Nepal's internal affairs, has dimmed the faith of the External Affairs Ministry in neutralism—at any rate as far as south-east Asia is concerned."

New Delhi was said to be cool towards Peking for the additional reason that during his visit to India in December 1956, and January 1957, Mr. Chou En-lai refused to support India's claim to Kashmir, thus lending some indirect support to the view that the Chinese might be willing to do horse trading with Pakistan when such an opportunity offered itself. The countrywide revolt in Tibet following Peking's decision to settle Hans there and reduce the status of the Dalai Lama and Tibet's internal autonomy have acted as eye-openers in New Delhi. On March 23, 1959, Mr. Nehru ruefully recalled that the five principles of Panch Sheela were first enunciated in the Sino-Indian Treaty on Tibet of April 29, 1954. Since then Mr. Nehru has come out strongly in favour of Tibet's claim for full autonomy. The manner in which the Chinese repeated the charge that Kalimpong (India) was the base of rebellion in Tibet would show that the Chinese in fact never accepted Indian professions of friendship at their face value. If the present trend continues, the Government of India may not be



unwilling to assert its rights in Nepal in its dealings with China.

The threat to India's position in Nepal does not, however, arise merely from the activities of the Chinese Government. The rise of the local Communists' influence will serve China's interests and militate against India's. The present weakness of the Communist Party should not lead India to minimise the threat. The British in India were not being just expansionistic or imperialistic in seeking to avoid the rise of Russian influence in Afghanistan. The brave Gorkha soldiers have merely to be given an idea and a gun and they can be a menace to India's security. The preservation of internal stability in Nepal, is, therefore, of vital interest to India.

Sociologically, Nepal is still in what can be called the monarchical stage. The feeling of belonging to one nation has yet to take roots, which will inevitably take a long time. In the intervening period the King alone can provide a cushion against the stresses and strains inherent in a democratic experiment.

The Communists in Nepal, like their counter-parts in other Asian countries, derived till recently strength from stories of the achievements of the Chinese Communists at home and in Tibet. For people living in the border areas of Mustang, Morang-Bhot and Jumla, the new roads, schools, hospitals, cinema houses and cars in Tibetan towns had begun to act as a big draw. The simple Bhotias and Sherpas travelled long distances over difficult terrain to be able to see cinemas in Tibet. They had religious and social ties across the border. Thanks to the estrangement of the Tibetan people and religious leaders from the Chinese Communists, they are unlikely to drift in that direction. The local chieftains have always enjoyed a considerable measure of autonomy. But that they did not have much respect for the central authority in Kathmandu was evident when in the third week of May, 1957, the Raja of Mustang expelled the customs officials manning a border outpost in his area. The people in the area have through the decades improved the tracks leading into Tibet with the result that

it is possible to use pack animals in that area. There is no reason why the tracks towards the south into India cannot be improved to cement ties with India.

From east to west, Nepal is roughly divided into three compartments by river drainages, which in their higher reaches cut through the Himalayan ranges providing passes between Nepal and Tibet. Eastern Nepal is drained by the Sapta Kosi (seven Kosis), Central Nepal by Krishna Kali Gandaki in the north and the Narayani in the south, and the western parts by the Karnali. The different parts of Nepal are today inaccessible to each other except through India. For years, this situation will continue since it is not possible for the Nepalese Government to build permanent bridges to span the rivers and the tributaries at different points. This at once underscores the need for improving communications between India and Nepal and strengthening the ties that bind the two countries together.

Cheap Chinese literature portraying China's real and imaginary achievements at home and in Tibet is pouring into Nepal by the tons with nothing to compete with it from the Indian side. Also, it is not at all surprising that the Chinese should be seeking to soften Nepal by promoting anti-Americanism under the deceptive slogans of Afro-Asian unity. The pattern is familiar and is being tried all over Asia. It is an established fact that the Communist technique of capturing power is assured of success only in backward communities where old cultural, social, economic and political patterns have been disrupted by the partial introduction of modern forms of organisation and thought. That is precisely the situation in Nepal. Nepal is no longer closed to outside influences. Literacy and education are spreading. If the avenues of employment do not keep pace with the growth of educational facilities, frustration and despair among the educated people will become the closest ally of disruption and Communism. It is a common experience that the sons and daughters of the expropriated aristocracy—deprivation of political power is a form of expropriation—in feudal societies undergoing disintegration offer a fertile field to the Communists for the recruitment



of party cadre. It is not an accident that some members of the leading families in Kathmandu are fellow travellers, though the sentiment against India among them is also a compelling factor. India's stake in the economic development of Nepal is obvious and it is doubtful if the problem is being tackled with the urgency demanded by the situation. India's financial and technical assistance to Nepal should be gauged in the scale of her stakes.

Should India act with imagination, she can in course of time, disarm the suspicions of even the Newars and win their friendship and co-operation. The disillusionment of the Newar business community with China would start when the Nepalese business men in Tibet begin to be squeezed out in favour of the Chinese as a part of the general plan to tighten control over the Tibetans and impose Communism there. Colonisation has to be a part of the Chinese programme in Tibet. Already there are reports that a large number of Chinese have been settled in Tibet. Their number is to increase roughly to eight million in the next ten years. The total strength of the local population at the time of the Chinese invasion in 1950 was placed at slightly over three million.

Inevitably, developments in India will impinge on those in Nepal. Should the strength of the Communist Party grow in India, particularly in the bordering states of West Bengal, Bihar and U.P., Nepal will feel its impact. If Communism is finally routed in India, its fate will be sealed in Nepal as well. Being culturally, economically and geographically one, Nepal and India are inter-dependent and this will be emphasised with the passage of time, when with the development of the means of communications and transport, and conquest of malaria in the Terai and the growth of literacy in Nepal, the last barriers between the two countries will have been finally destroyed. The trend in that direction is irreversible.

India should learn a lesson from Burma. As Prime Minister, U Nu, tried unsuccessfully to persuade the Chinese to be reasonable on the border issues, and to take steps to stop mass illegal immigration into his country. India's

national interests have, of course, to be protected in Nepal, but she additionally bears a more awesome responsibility for the whole of South-East Asia. Since taking over Tibet, China has integrated into her empire North Korea and North Viet Nam. The sustenance within her territory of the Free Thai, Free Wa (Burma) and the Free Kachin (Burma and India) and the movement of troops into Burma on the plea of the frontiers not being demarcated in 1956 do not suggest a surfeited appetite. Chamberlain believed that all Hitler wanted was Sudetenland and in 1938 he promised the world "peace in our times" with his surrender at Munich. 1954 and Panch Sheela are barely five years old. The so-called Bandung spirit may prove to be the newest version of the Japanese concept of the co-prosperity sphere, with Communist China playing the role of the big brother.

In 1954, soon after Mr. Chou En-lai's visit to New Delhi, Mr. Nehru assured his people that he was not walking into a trap laid by the suave Chinese Prime Minister. In a circular letter to the State Congress chiefs in his capacity as the President of the ruling party he said :

"In international affairs, one can never be dead certain and the friends of today may be the enemies of tomorrow. That may be so. Are we then to begin with enmity and suspicion and not give any other approach a chance? Surely it is better with nations as with individuals to hope for the best and expect the best and at the same time be prepared for any eventuality. . . . Even if such declarations are not honestly meant, the result will be to create an atmosphere in favour of peace and non-interference."

Chinese rulers have not been restrained by these declarations and this approach of Mr. Nehru has not taken into account the dynamic character of the international Communist movement. The policy of peace does little by itself to strengthen the defences against Communism as an ideology. India has hoped for the best, and even if she has not prepared for any eventuality, there may still be time. Yet the cardinal question remains unanswered: Is India



capable of meeting that eventuality which may compel an "agonising reappraisal" of her foreign policy? Can India evolve a new policy? Would-be aggressors, both in military and ideological sense, need to be told in unmistakable terms that India would not tolerate external interference in her spheres of influence.

The manner in which the people and Government of India have reacted to the suppression of Tibet's autonomy by China give cause for the hope that they are capable of an "agonising reappraisal" of their foreign policy. In the course of his press conference on April 5, 1959, Mr. Nehru said that India's policy towards China would be determined by the three considerations of national security, desire for continued friendly relations with Peking and "strong sentiments about developments in Tibet." The fulfilment of the two other conditions apparently depended on India's ability to secure genuine autonomy for Tibet and the restoration of the Dalai Lama to his position. It is doubtful if India is in a position to do so. The Chinese Communists cannot for reasons of prestige and strategy accept such an advice, should New Delhi make bold to tender it. But in the context of discussion on Nepal, the important point is the growing realisation that with Tibet's autonomy is bound up India's own and Nepal's security. As far as this writer can discover, it was for the first time, on April 5, 1959, that Mr. Nehru referred to the problem of India's security from China since 1950. The victory of the Nepali Congress in Nepal's first General Election also gave cause for hope that once again Nepal might return to the sober and realistic policy of firm friendship with India and give up the adventurism of the past few years. But the outlook is far from certain in view of the fact that the Soviet Government has also entered the race for winning over Nepal to its side. The Soviet Embassy has already been set up in Kathmandu; the American Embassy has been opened because the U.S. cannot allow itself to be beaten by Russia in this competition for influence in Nepal. Thus Nepal has been drawn into the vortex of the cold war. Inevitably India's position has become difficult.

## APPENDIX A

### NOTES ON NEPAL'S ECONOMY

NEPAL PAID WITH backwardness the price of independence during the period of British ascendancy in India. British imperialism by-passed Nepal leaving her medieval economic, social and political structure intact. When neighbouring India underwent a socio-economic revolution, with its inevitable and far-reaching political consequences, as a result of the impact of the British rule, Nepal remained effectively blocked from all outside influence. For close to two centuries life remained frozen in the hermetically sealed Kingdom. When the door was ultimately forced open in 1951, Nepal found herself unable to adjust herself to the outside world, which had changed beyond recognition in those long years of her isolation. Nepal is still busy finding her feet in a new world in flux. During the Rana period there was little contact between the Nepalese people living in different parts of the Kingdom. The rulers did not encourage the movement of the people in the fear that it might not be conducive to the maintenance of their autocratic rule. Till recently the system of internal passport was in force in Nepal. The absence of means of communications and transport, which could link different parts of the Kingdom in one economic system, has been referred to earlier. Even today that remains Nepal's worst problem.

There has been improvement during the last eight years. But the achievement bears little relation to the magnitude of the task. In the mountainous region of the Kingdom there hardly exists a road of any description. The bridle-paths are not good enough even for the use of pack animals with the result that men and women have still to carry heavy loads on their backs. The railway lines in all Nepal do not exceed 63 miles. The road mileage is 310 and of this only 170 miles of roads are motorable. The 80-mile-long Tribhuvan



Rajpath, one of Nepal's two highways, which links Nepal with India has been built by the Government of India, at the cost of roughly Rs. three crores. Exceptionally heavy rains in 1954, which caused the worst floods in the known history of Nepal, washed away the bridges and large parts of the road thus delaying its completion by two years and raising the cost by nearly 100 per cent. It was made over to the Nepalese authorities in the summer of 1957. The other 50-mile highway across the southern Terai from Hitaura to Naraingarh, known as the Rapti Valley Road, was built with the assistance of the U.S. Operations Mission. The 13.7-mile-long ropeway with a carrying capacity of five tons an hour remains the most important means of transporting goods into, and out of the Kathmandu valley. The ropeway as well as railway existed in 1951 and have not since been developed.

Since 1951, however, air services have been operating from Patna to Kathmandu and from Kathmandu to Pokhara, Simra, Bhairawa and Biratnagar inside Nepal. But traders and pilgrims from Tibet, whose number runs into several thousands every year, still cover the distance to and from Kathmandu on foot along mountainous tracks. Many of the travellers from India go either by road or use the narrow gauge railway from Raxaul on the Indian border to Amlekhganj in Nepal. Then there is the 31-mile-long bridle-path to Thankot, which is connected with Kathmandu by a rough road. Till the completion of the Tribhuvan Rajpath all the cars in Kathmandu had to be carried there on the shoulders of groups of porters.

In the absence of means of transport and communications and other similar facilities, Nepal did not attract foreign capital to develop her rich mineral and power resources. Even the local capital of the Ranas found its ways out of the Kingdom. They are known to possess considerable investment in India and some European countries. This trend was accentuated after 1951. The recruitment of Gorkha soldiers to the Indian and British armies has remained Nepal's main source of foreign exchange since the nineteenth century. Today Nepal possesses two jute

mills, one cotton textile mill, two match factories, one sugar factory and some rice milling units. Over 75 per cent of the investment in Biratnagar, Nepal's sole industrial town, has been provided by Indian business houses. Some of the shares in these concerns are held by the Ranas and the Thapas. Roughly Indian investments in Nepal total Rs. 15 crores.

About 95 per cent of Nepal's total population is dependent on agriculture. Effort is being made by India and U.S. experts to improve the agricultural practices to raise the total output. In the mountainous part of Nepal, cultivation has to be carried on in terraces on the steep slopes. All implements and materials have to be transported on human head or back. The implements are primitive and religious taboos limit the use of animals. In Kathmandu, for example, animals cannot be used within the sight of the temples, which are so numerous that in practice most of the arable land has to be tilled by hand.

Of Nepal's total area of 35,840,000 acres, 11,200,000 acres are under forests and 8,000,000 under perpetual snows and Alpine meadow. Of 9,600,000 acres of cultivable land, barely five million acres are normally under the plough. Reclaimable waste land suffers from want of fertilisers and irrigation facilities. Soil erosion resulting from unplanned deforestation poses a major problem. In addition, the existing systems of land tenure hamper the development of agriculture in Nepal. Land reform measures have yet to be attempted.

Birta, zamindari and kiptat are the three important systems of land tenure in Nepal. These systems are highly complicated and they do not operate uniformly in different parts of the Kingdom. There are 16 types of *Birtawals*. Though no reliable statistics are available, it is roughly estimated that nearly one-third of the total cultivable land is held by *Birtawals*. It was awarded to them or their ancestors by the State and a majority of the *Birtawals* are not required to pay revenue. The condition of the tenants on these lands is deplorable. The authorities are unable to ensure security of tenure to them against the will of the



powerful *Birtawals*. A Birta Abolition Committee was set up in 1951 to take steps to abolish this system. It made no progress for a variety of reasons, the most important being the absence of land records and the inability of the State authorities to enforce any law that might be passed. This Committee expressed the view that the State would receive an income of Rs. 80 lakhs if land revenue was levied on birta holdings on the same basis as on zamindari lands. The recommendation has yet to be enforced.

The zamindari system in Nepal is different from the one which obtained in India. In Nepal, the zamindar is in law not the owner but merely an intermediary between the State and the peasants for the collection of revenue. He receives 10 per cent of the revenue as his dues. In addition, he is allotted land by the State for his personal cultivation. He has to pay revenue for this land. But in practice the zamindar till recently held the power of life and death over the tenants and extorted payment from them on all conceivable occasions like marriage of his sons and daughters, religious festivals and other social functions and religious ceremonies. The more unscrupulous among the zamindars maintained private levies and links with dacoits.

Like the Birta system, the zamindari system is also not uniform all over Nepal. In the western parts, some tenants have got small plots of land entered in their names known as "numbari land" from which the eviction of the tenants-at-will depends on the will of the former. Till recently the eviction of the tenants-at-will was a regular feature of life and the zamindars had an unlimited scope for extorting illegal payments from them. In Bethari and Berdia in Western Nepal there still prevails another variant of the system known as "ukhada" under which all land belongs to the zamindars and they let it out to the tenants. The "kipat" system prevails in Eastern Nepal. Persons who inherit the rank of "subas" rent out the land. The "subas" (local chiefs) have to make only nominal payment to the Government in the form of "salami" (presents).

A Land Reforms Committee was constituted in 1952. It took two years to discover that no programme of land

reforms could be effectively implemented in the absence of land records. It, therefore, in its interim report in 1954, emphasised the need for preparing such records detailing the system of tenancy prevailing in different parts of the country and the land covered by them. The Committee also recommended the abolition of non-official intermediary agencies and the adoption of the measures to ensure the security of tenure for the tenants. The Indian agricultural expert on loan to the Nepalese Government lent his support to these recommendations. But no effort was made to meet the grievances of the tenants till the later part of 1955. Then King Mahendra during the period of direct rule promulgated an Act to ensure security of tenure of the tenants. The Act, in law, released the tenants from the obligations to pay illegitimate charges to the landlords and zamindars and an unreasonable and exorbitant rate of interest. But the Act still remains to be implemented.

In spite of these handicaps, Nepal has generally been a food exporting country. A large variety of food crops, fruits and vegetables are grown in the country. The production can easily be raised substantially with little effort by providing the people with better seeds and implements, manure and irrigation facilities. The Indian Technical Aid Mission and the U.S. Operation Mission are trying to provide those facilities. Nepal can profitably develop commercial orchards with India offering a ready market. The people are generally so hard working that they can manage to wrest a living from bare mountains. But widespread drought can result in acute shortage of food as it did in 1957, when the Government of India had to rush supplies from its lean stocks.

Nepal has faced a substantial trade deficit with India over a number of years. The value of the Nepalese currency in terms of the Indian currency fell sharply and at one stage for months the rate fluctuated between Rs. 170 and Rs. 180 (Nepalese) for Rs. 100 (Indian) against the rate of Rs. 105(N) and Rs. 100(I) at the time of the overthrow of the Rana regime. Thanks to the whole of Nepal being a double currency area—Indian currency freely circulates



in all parts of the Kingdom and even the Government revenue is collected in that currency—this did not result in undue hardship for the people outside the Kathmandu Valley. In 1956, the rate was officially fixed at Rs. 135(N) for Rs. 100(I). In 1957 this artificial rate of exchange was maintained on the strength of the grant of Rs. one crore which Nepal received under the aid agreement with China. In turn this prompted speculation in currency because the Nepalese traders, who were provided Indian currency at the preferential rate of Rs. 100(I) for Rs. 128(N) sold it in the black market. Some leading persons in Kathmandu were said to be involved in the racket. In 1958, the market exchange rate was Rs. 100(I) against Rs. 154(N) against the official rate of Rs. 100(I) against Rs. 128(N).

The trade deficit has been accompanied by budgetary deficit since 1951 and it is common knowledge in Government circles in Kathmandu that nearly all the assets in the form of gold and silver, which were in existence at the time of the change of regime in 1951, have disappeared. The situation could well have been critical if the Government was not operating on the basis of cash, which means that the implementation of schemes is held up unless there is ready cash in the treasury. But the rate of taxation is so low that the Government could easily double its revenue. Most of the additional revenue would have to come from land tax.

There was no system of national budget under the Ranas. The Prime Minister was the final authority and he could dispose of the revenue as he thought best. The expenditure on administration under the Ranas was substantially lower than it is now. The bureaucracy has expanded manifold since 1951. The budget figures were released for the first time in Nepal's history in February, 1952, for the current year. These figures showed that there was a deficit of nearly Rs. 2,20,00,000, the total revenue and expenditure being Rs. 3,05,16,000 and Rs. 5,25,21,000. After this the budget was presented for the second time by Mr. M. P. Koirala in January, 1955, for the current year. There was then a deficit of Rs. 1,94,26,000 in terms of Nepalese currency

against a surplus of Rs. 29,52,000 in Indian currency. In 1958, the deficit was estimated at Rs. 1,36,12,000(N).

The budget deficit year after year underscores the inability of the Nepalese Government to meet even the current expenditure on routine administration. It cannot, therefore, finance even partly the growing demand for better conditions of life. In fact, the standard of living in Nepal is likely to decline unless a serious effort is made to arrest inflation and to promote schemes of development. The demand for a rise in the standard of living acquires an edge in the context of a rising population and growing political consciousness among the people. This underscores the need for more taxes.

The need for improvement in public health and educational facilities illustrates the problem. The health standards in Nepal are appallingly low and malaria, filariasis, small-pox, dysentery, cholera and kala-azar claim a large number of victims year after year. Surveys made by the American Technical Mission have shown that in the Terai and the Kathmandu Valley 95 per cent of the population suffers from filariasis, which is such a malignant disease that the infection can become active even after the lapse of five years. It is estimated that nearly 70 per cent of the population in the lower Terai and 95 per cent in the mid Terai suffer from malaria every year. The people living in the valleys and the hills are not immune from malaria. In the Terai, only the Tharus (aborigines) are known to enjoy immunity from malaria. It is estimated that nearly 35,000 persons die of malaria alone every year. The paucity of medical aid available in the country can well be judged from the fact that the total number of doctors and vaidyas (practitioners of the indigenous system) does not exceed 200. A vast majority of them are concentrated in the Kathmandu Valley with the result that for all practical purposes no medical attention is available in the rest of the country. Without doubt medical aid is among the first needs of the people.

In the field of education, some progress has been made during the last eight years. The number of schools has grown



since 1951 with consequent rise in the Government's expenditure on education. Judged by the standards of advanced communities, the educational facilities in Nepal are still woefully inadequate. But already Nepal is beginning to face the problem of unemployment among the educated persons. As in India a majority of Nepalese graduates earn their living by working as clerks in the Central Secretariat. The average pay of a clerk there is Rs. 75 (Nepalese) a month. In terms of Indian currency it works out at less than Rs. 50 at the market exchange rate. It would be an illusion to believe that the graduate clerks with this low pay can have a stake in Nepal's stability. They may turn to extremist parties. The problem is even worse for hundreds of young Nepalese who go to India and other countries for higher education.

To tackle these and numerous other problems, Nepal has prepared a plan of economic development. The first draft was prepared for presentation to the Colombo Powers Consultative Committee in October, 1955. At that time, the estimated total outlay in five years was placed at Rs. 21 crores. The plan was later modified by the Cabinet headed by Mr. Tanka Prasad Acharya to raise the outlay to Rs. 33 crores. The plan was more or less scrapped by Dr. K. I. Singh during his tenure of office as Prime Minister. He favoured a two-year plan instead of a five-year one. His approach to the problem of economic development was also different from that embodied in the five-year plan. The original plan was revived for implementation after the fall of Dr. Singh's Ministry. It may again be modified by the new Cabinet headed by B. P. Koirala. But broadly it indicates the lines of development in Nepal.

The plan is unavoidably based on rough and ready calculations since Nepal does not possess a machinery capable of collecting the necessary data and assessing her requirements in a scientific manner. In a sense the Plan is nothing more than a collection of proposed Government schemes. The pattern of investment as visualised in the Plan is as follows :

APPENDIX A  
ESTIMATED EXPENDITURE

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<i>Type of Development</i>		<i>Estimated expenditure in lakhs of rupees</i>
1. Village Development		275
2. Agriculture		120
3. Cadastral Survey		70
4. Co-operative Societies		10
5. Land Reforms		20
6. Irrigation		200
7. Forestry		200
8. Transportation		
a. Roads	500	1,040
b. Railways	330	
c. Ropeways	150	
d. Airways	60	
9. Communications		
a. Telephones	25	75
b. Wireless	25	
c. Post Office	25	
10. Power		300
11. Industry		190
12. Minerals		50
13. Commerce and Tourism		10
14. Rapti Valley		140
15. Settlement and Government Housing		125
16. Health		250
17. Education		190
18. Surveys, Research, Statistics and Publicity		35
TOTAL OUTLAY		3,300 lakhs

Top priority has been given to the development of the means of transport and communications for the obvious reason that it is necessary to do so to lay the foundations of the country's progress. Agricultural and village development schemes have been placed second on the list of priorities. An agricultural community must be able to export food grains in order to be able to import consumer and capital goods. Also prosperous agriculture provides a suitable base for the development of industries by creating



an internal market for their products. The utilisation of Nepal's immense power potential is placed third in the list of priorities. Social services have not been altogether neglected and the development of industries has been left either to private enterprise or to a second Plan.

Under the Plan, 4,000 miles of roads are to be built in the next 20 years. During the current Plan period, it is proposed to build 300 miles of metalled roads, 300 miles of jeepable track and 300 miles of fair weather roads. A tripartite agreement has been signed between the U.S., India and Nepal in respect of road construction. At one stage, it was proposed to convert the existing 20-mile narrow gauge railway line from Raxaul to Amlekhganj in the Terai to meter gauge and extend it to Hithaura by 25 miles. The completion of this project at a cost of Rs. 330 lakhs would have eliminated the need for the transshipment of goods from the Indian railways to the Nepalese one at Raxaul and vice versa. The provision of through train service between India and Nepal could help Nepal in exporting to India at competitive prices raw materials, forest products, ballast, lime and other goods. In view of the cost is it unlikely that the proposal will go through. Instead, the emphasis will be on construction of roads. The ropeway will be extended. The U.S. has provided \$3,350,000 for this project.

The need for developing air services in Nepal is obvious in view of the division of the country into watertight compartments by river systems and mountain ranges. It is proposed under the Plan to improve the existing fields at Kathmandu, Simra, Bhairawa, Pokhara and Biratnagar and to construct new fair-weather airfields at other important places like Janakpur and Rajbiraj. In 1958, the Nepal Royal Airlines Corporation took over the internal services from an Indian concern. The Patna-Kathmandu service is still operated by the Indian Airlines Corporation.

Similarly it is proposed to develop the means of communications. At present there are, for example, only about 100 post offices in the whole of Nepal, which works out at one post office for 85,000 people scattered over large areas

in small hamlets. In certain areas it takes weeks for a letter to reach the addressee. The number of post offices has to be doubled under the Plan. The number of wireless stations, which alone now link the district headquarters with the capital, is to be raised to 60 from 30. Often the one station in the district goes out of order and there is no means of establishing contact between the District Headquarters and the Capital. These wireless stations will be linked with New Delhi and Calcutta as well. This programme is being implemented under an agreement between the U.S., India and Nepal.

In respect of agricultural development, the Plan emphasises the need for both short-term and long-term measures. The distribution of better seeds and implements, the agricultural extension services and measures to improve the breed of cattle will, it is hoped, help to tackle the problem from the short-term point of view. The long-range agricultural developments are intended to solve problems such as uneconomic holdings, inefficient administrative machinery, the lack of equipment, finance and irrigation facilities, low productivity of the workers and the deterioration in soil fertility. Priority is to be given to the establishment of demonstration farms. These farms will be linked with the proposed agricultural extension service. Simultaneously surveys will be conducted to collect the necessary data regarding crops, methods and yields. Effort will also be made to encourage the development of commercial orchards and to raise the production of vegetables. Nurseries will be established to supply plants and seeds and suitable land will be delineated for horticultural purposes. Research work will be taken in hand to deal with the problem of protecting plants and animals against insects and parasites.

The planners expect that production will increase by 25 to 50 per cent, with the use of manure, fertilisers and lime. Better tillage, crop rotation and water utilisation may account for the rise of another 10 to 20 per cent in production. The Plan provides for the development of dairies, fisheries and livestock. Co-operation is to be encouraged



among the farmers for tackling the problems of marketing and credit. The problems of land reforms and consolidation of holdings are scheduled to be tackled in the Plan period. Simultaneously, the irrigation facilities are to be augmented at a cost of Rs. two crores. It is proposed to recondition the existing Jagdishpur reservoir and Juddha Canal capable of irrigating 9,000 acres of paddy, to complete the projects now under way with Indian and American assistance to irrigate 45,000 acres and to undertake additional projects commanding 200,000 acres. On the basis of the Indian experience, it is expected that the additional yield as a result of the completion of these projects every year will be equal to the total outlay. The Government expects an additional revenue of Rs. one million a year in the form of water rate at Rs. 10 a bigha.

The Plan recognises the need for the proper utilisation of the forest resources. At present Nepal does not possess either a well-defined forest policy and laws or an efficient forest service. The lack of research and training facilities, transport and communications, equipment and public consciousness of the importance of utilising the forest resources in a judicious manner have produced serious effects in the past. These deficiencies have to be met. Otherwise the problems of soil erosion and floods will become acute not only in Nepal but in the neighbouring districts of India.

Nepal with its almost unlimited hydro-electric potential today produces just a few hundred kw. of power in Kathmandu and Biratnagar. It is difficult for the Nepalese authorities to tap the major sources of power at this stage because the best sites are often situated in distant areas where transport facilities are not available and the initial investment is bound to be heavy on major projects. Also the demand for power is bound to remain limited on account of the low purchasing power of the people and lack of industrial development. The Plan takes note of these difficulties and recommends that it would be preferable to produce power in relatively small installations for local consumption. It is proposed to produce 20,000 kw. of additional power by 1961. One half of this power is to be made available to

Nepal from the Kosi project free of cost. Eastern Nepal and the Terai will benefit under this scheme.

The Trisuli project, which will supply power to Kathmandu, Rapti valley and possibly to the Birganj area as well, is also to be completed with India's financial and technical assistance. The entire cost of the project, which is placed at Rs. three crores, is to be made available by India. Indian engineers have already completed the surveys and prepared the designs and estimates. An agreement has been signed between India and Nepal regarding this project. The Tharo Khola, Seti and Tinau rivers are to be tapped for producing power under the Plan. The Plan emphasises the importance of producing 30 to 40 kw. of power through diesel generating sets to meet the needs of remote hilly areas. It is estimated that one such set will cost Rs. 50,000 and it is proposed to instal 100 such sets in different parts of the country. Their one great advantage will be that the cost of power distribution will be low.

The Plan aims at the establishment of mixed economy. By and large, the development of industries is left to private entrepreneurs, Nepalese and foreign. The authorities are hopeful that it will be possible to attract foreign investors once they are in a position to provide the minimum essential facilities like transport and communications. Forest products are to be handled partly by a State Corporation and partly by private enterprise. Industries producing cement, sugar, textiles, cigarettes and iron in the private sector will be given encouragement and assistance by the State.

The Plan assigns an important place to the development of small-scale and cottage industries. The Government will seek to improve facilities for the purchase of raw materials and the marketing of their products. Training-cum-production centres are proposed to be established in different parts of the country (at least one each year) to develop and improve the designs, production and skill. There is a proposal to set up a State Finance Corporation to provide loans and grants to deserving industries. The administration for the assessment and realisation of taxes is to be improved to avoid harassment to the industrialists. It is also proposed



to establish an industrial research bureau to carry on research, training and marketing analysis besides conducting pilot projects.

Meanwhile with the help of experts from the U. N. Technical Assistance Administration, the Geological Survey of India and the U. S. Operations Mission, a beginning has been made to fix the location of mineral deposits in Nepal. It appears that limestone deposits at Bhainse are large enough to be used for the manufacture of cement. Preliminary study has indicated that iron ore deposits at Phulchowki-Danda are sizable. Copper mines at Nangre and Kharle are to be further investigated. Mica deposits north of Kathmandu appear to warrant commercial mining, while lignite deposits near Kathmandu may prove to be suitable for firing brick kilns. Cobalt, zinc and lead exist in Nepal, but it is still to be determined whether these deposits admit of exploitation on a commercial basis. The Plan proposes that private enterprise should be encouraged to develop the kingdom's mineral resources.

The Plan assigns considerable importance to the development of the Rapti valley, 90 miles south-west of Kathmandu. The valley, 600 square miles in area, is populated by only 25,000 inhabitants. It possesses 42,000 acres of land under cultivation. Nearly 84,000 acres of land can be reclaimed for agricultural purposes. The soil is suitable for growing cereals, pulses, sugarcane, oilseeds, fruits and vegetables and the valley can take a much bigger population. Grassland is suitable for cattle breeding. Forests are rich in high class timber and industries for the manufacturing of furniture, matches, paper, tanning materials and bamboo products can be profitably developed. The cement industry can also be established in the valley.

In the past the development of the valley was made impossible by the deadly form of malaria. Now the Rapti valley multi-purpose project has been initiated with the assistance of U. S. Operations Mission. The primary aims of the project are to produce enough food to meet the deficit in the Kathmandu valley and the surrounding mountainous regions and to settle landless labourers from

other parts of the country here. The programme to rid the area of malaria has been almost completed. Twenty-five thousand persons are to be settled in the valley by bringing more land under the plough.

The Nepalese Government depends on foreign assistance for financing even this modest Plan. Under existing agreements, India will provide Rs. 10 crores, China Rs. 6 crores for three years, the U. S. Rs. 8 crores and Russia 30 million roubles. Under a tripartite agreement between India, America and Nepal, which was signed on January, 1958, the U. S. will provide five million dollars, India will provide 1,875,000 dollars and Nepal will find 525,000 dollars for the construction of 900 miles of roads in the Kingdom. It is expected that at the end of three years, the U.S. will allocate another 2.5 million dollars for the purpose of road construction. Britain has built a 30-mile all-weather road connecting its recruiting base at Dharan Bazar in south-eastern Nepal with the Indo-Nepalese border. By 1960, the entire British recruiting establishment will be shifted there. The only remaining British recruiting base at Lehra near Gorakhpur in India will be closed this year. The Anglo-Nepalese agreement of 1953 for recruitment of Gorkhas was renewed for ten years in April, 1958.

The U.S. programme, which began in 1952, had a slow start because the details of the projects had to be worked out. The first year's allocation of funds was 200,000 dollars, the second year's 500,000 dollars, the third year's 2,283,000 dollars including 1.6 million for flood relief. The allocation was raised to two million dollars in 1956 and slightly more in 1957 for technical co-operation and development assistance. In 1957 the U.S. agreed additionally to provide some two million dollars for a special ropeway project. In 1958, the U.S. made commitments totalling 10,475,000 dollars.

Technical experts lent by the United Nations and its agencies, the Colombo Powers and the United States are struggling hard to give Nepal a modern system of administration. These experts are often baffled by the slow pace of developments in Nepal. For instance, most of these experts are unhappy that the Nepal Central Secretariat should



officially open at 11 a.m. and close at 4 p.m. It is not before 12 noon that the Secretariat staff generally settles down to work and hardly any business is conducted after 2 p.m.

The Plan has been criticised on different grounds. Firstly, it is not formulated on the basis of scientific and detailed investigations about the nature of requirements and the available resources. Secondly, there is no provision for the co-ordination of the work of different agencies and departments. Thirdly, in a backward country like Nepal, which does not possess a class of entrepreneurs it is unrealistic to leave the development of industries outside the scope of Government activities. Fourthly, only secondary place has been given to health, education and other social services. Fifthly, the Plan provides no idea of the rate of investment proposed to be made during the coming years and there is no indication of the measures that are to be taken, if at all, to raise the rate of savings and investment in the country. Finally, it has been suggested by some of the critics that the dependence on foreign assistance is excessive, which might compromise the freedom of the nation.

This criticism seems to imply that Nepal is in a position to fulfil these conditions, which is a manifestly wrong assumption. Nepal is in no position to plan her economic development in terms in which planning has come to be understood in advanced countries. Even the first Indian Five-Year Plan was criticised as being nothing more than a statement of proposed Government expenditure. In the given situation of Nepal, planning can only mean Governmental expenditure. Emphasis on the development of agriculture is unavoidable in a backward agricultural country. Dependence on foreign assistance is inevitable and need not limit Nepal's freedom if her rulers do not pursue a policy of bartering away tried friends for doubtful supporters. The present plan is in the nature of an effort to prepare the country for more concerted, organised and ambitious efforts later. It is in the nature of a reconnaissance and not a climb to lofty peaks.

The relevant issue is how to implement any plan of development in Nepal as long as the administrative machinery is not at all geared to getting things done. According

to the Nepalese officials themselves, there has not been in existence so far any machinery to ensure that a proposal or memorandum submitted by one of the numerous foreign experts or one of the assistance agencies is considered and implemented if it is found acceptable. In the past, one department in the Secretariat did not know what the other was engaged in doing and did not seem to be interested in knowing it. There was no co-ordination between the Ministers and the Secretaries. Often the Secretaries were not even informed of the decisions that the Ministers had taken. If by some odd chance a decision came to be circulated within the four walls of the 1,000-room Singha Durbar, there was no machinery for communicating it to the district officers for execution. Even if the orders were communicated to the district officers there was no machinery to ensure that they were implemented. Things are beginning to improve under the new Ministry.

Equally significant is the fact that there is no technical know-how of any order in Nepal. All that the country can provide is unskilled manual labour. The entire supervisory staff will have to be provided by the Governments of India and America, which in the given situation is likely to create new complications. Firstly the presence of a large number of foreigners will, for one thing, substantially raise the cost of each project. Secondly, their presence is likely to be made a political issue. For instance, in the past the Nepalese politicians often blurred all distinction between the members of the Indian military mission and the Army engineering corps, which was engaged on the construction of the Tribhuvan Rajpath, and they openly charged India with maintaining the largest military mission of all nations in the post-war period in a foreign land. The secretary of a leading political organisation told this writer as late as October, 1957, that India was still maintaining a large military mission in Nepal. At that time its strength barely exceeded a dozen officers and men in all. He drew this fantastic conclusion by adding up the number of technical experts engaged in different projects, including the Kosi project.



The absence of the means of communications and transportation makes any plan of intensive development in any area unpractical. Some time in 1957, about 2,000 troops were posted in Pokhara valley, where it was proposed to initiate simultaneously several schemes of development. The army contractors bought up large supplies in the area for feeding the troops with the result that the prices of essential commodities shot up. In certain cases, the rise in prices was of the order of 400 to 500 per cent. The people in the area suffered greatly and the troops had to be withdrawn.

These are formidable handicaps. The precondition for mastering them is a stable administration which can negotiate firm agreements with aiding countries and implement them. Only such an administration can invite a sufficiently large number of foreign experts and advisers to assist it in the task of modernising the country's economic life. Following the elections and emergence of the Nepali Congress as a majority party in the Lower House, there is at the least the possibility that Nepal can now have a stable administration, which will be responsive to the aspirations of the people and responsible to them. As Indian and the U.S. experts improve means of transport and communications, the foundation will have been laid for rapid economic progress. The prospect is *one* of hope.

APPENDIX B

TIBETO-NEPALESE TREATY OF 1792

1. That China should henceforth be considered as father to both Nepal and Tibet, who should regard each other as brothers ;
2. That after due investigation by the Chinese Government, the full value of the articles plundered at Lhasa would be paid to the Nepalese sufferers by the Tibetan authorities ;
3. That all Nepalese subjects, with the exception of armed soldiers, would be permitted to travel, to establish factories and to carry on trade within the jurisdiction of Tibet and China ;
4. That if either of the two brotherly States should commence an unprovoked dispute with the intention of possessing the territories of the other, the representatives of the two Governments would report all particulars to the court of Peking which would finally decide the dispute ;
5. That if Nepal be ever invaded by a foreign power, China would not fail to help her ;
6. That the two brotherly States would send to China some produce of their country every five years in token of their filial love ;
7. That the Chinese Government would in return send to Nepal a friendly present, and would make every necessary arrangement for the comfort of the mission to and from Peking.

(From the *Life of Maharaja Sir Jung Bahadur* by General Pudma Jang Bahadur Rana, Allahabad, 1909.)



## APPENDIX C

### PEACE TREATY BETWEEN TIBET AND NEPAL, 1856

We undersigned Bharadars and Lamas representing the Gorkha Government and the Tibetan Government have mutually settled a treaty of the following 10 articles, and with the Supreme Being as witness we have affixed our seals unto it of our own free will and choice.<sup>1</sup> The Emperor of China shall continue to be regarded with respect<sup>2</sup> as heretofore. So long as two Governments continue to abide by terms set forth herein, they shall live in amity like two brothers. May the Supreme Being not allow that side to prosper that may make war upon the other; and may the side be exempt from all sin in making war upon the other side which violates the terms contained in this agreement (Treaty).

[Here follow the names and seals of the signatories].

*Article 1:* Tibet shall pay a sum of Rs. ten thousand annually to the Gorkha Government.<sup>3</sup>

*Article 2:* Gorkha and Tibet have both been regarding the Emperor of China with respect.<sup>4</sup> Tibet being merely a country of monasteries and Lamas and place of recitation of prayers and practice of religious austerities, should the troops of any other Raja invade Tibet in future, Gorkha shall afford such assistance and protection as it can.

*Article 3:* Tibet shall not levy any taxes (on routes), duties (on merchandise) and rates (of any other kind) leviable by Tibet on the merchandise and subjects of the country of Gorkha.

*Article 4:* Tibet shall return to the Gorkha Government all Sikh soldiers held as prisoners and also all officers, soldiers, women and guns of Gorkha that were captured and taken during the war; and the Gorkha Government shall return to Tibet all the soldiers of Tibet captured in war, as also the arms, the yaks, whatever may be belonging to the Rayats of Kirong, Kutu, Jhunga, Taklakhar, Chhewar-Gumbha and on the completion of the Treaty all the Gorkha Troops that are in Taklakhar and Chhewar-Gumbha, Kirong, Jhunga, Kutu, Dhyaklang up to Bhairab Langur shall be withdrawn and places evacuated.

*Article 5:* Henceforth not a Naiya (Headman), but a Bharadar shall be posted by the Gorkha Government at Lhasa.

<sup>1</sup> The Tibetan text omits "of our own free will and choice."

<sup>2</sup> The translation of the Treaty by Aitchison says instead: "we further agree that the Emperor of China shall be obeyed by both States as before."

<sup>3</sup> The Tibetan text inserts the words "in cash." Aitchison adds the words as "tribute" and Sir Charles Bell "as a present."

<sup>4</sup> Aitchison translates the relevant word as "borne allegiance."

*Article 6:* The Gorkha Government shall establish its own trade factory at Lhasa which will be allowed to trade freely in all kinds of merchandise from gems and ornaments to articles of clothing and food.

*Article 7:* The Gorkha Bharadar at Lhasa shall not try and determine suits and cases among subjects and merchants of Tibet; and Tibet will not try and determine suits and cases among Gorkha subjects, merchants, the Kashmeries of Nepal, residing within the jurisdiction of Lhasa. In the event of dispute between the subjects and merchants of Gorkha and those of Tibet, the Bharadar of both Gorkha and Tibet shall sit together and jointly adjudicate the cases. All incomes (fines, etc.) from such adjudications realised from the subjects and merchants of Tibet shall be taken by Tibet and those realised from the Gorkha subjects and merchants and Kashmeries shall be taken by Gorkha.

*Article 8:* A Gorkha subject who goes to the country of Tibet after committing murder of any person of Gorkha shall be surrendered by Tibet to Gorkha; and a Tibetan who goes to the country of Gorkha after committing murder of any person of Tibet shall be surrendered by Gorkha to Tibet.

*Article 9:* If the property of Gorkha subjects and merchants be plundered by any person of Tibet, the Bharadars of Tibet shall compel the restoration of such property to the Gorkha subjects and merchants; should the property not be forthcoming from the plunderer, Tibet shall compel him to enter into arrangement for restitution (of such property). If the property of Tibetan subjects and merchants be plundered by any person of Gorkha, Gorkha shall compel the restoration of such property to Tibetan subjects and merchants; should the property be not forthcoming from the plunderer, Gorkha shall compel him to enter into agreement for the restitution (of such property).

*Article 10:* After the completion of the Treaty neither side shall act vindictively against the person or property of the subjects of Tibet who may have joined the Gorkha Durbar during the war, or of the subjects of Gorkha who may have joined the Tibetan Durbar.

This the third day of Light fortnight of Chaitra in the year Samvat 1912 (March 24, 1856).

(Translation from Nepalese text by Perceval Landon, in his *Nepal*).



#### APPENDIX D

### TREATY BETWEEN GREAT BRITAIN AND NEPAL, 1923

Whereas peace and friendship have now existed between the British Government and the Government of Nepal since the Treaty of Segowlic on the second day of December One Thousand and eight Hundred and fifteen; and whereas since that date the Government of Nepal has ever displayed its true friendship for the British Government and the British Government has consistently shown its goodwill towards the Government of Nepal; and whereas the Governments of both the countries are desirous of still further strengthening and cementing the good relations between them for more than a century; the two High Contracting Parties having resolved to conclude a new Treaty of Friendship have agreed upon the following articles:

*Article 1:* There shall be perpetual peace and friendship between the Governments of Great Britain and Nepal, and the two Governments agree mutually to acknowledge and respect each other's independence, both internal and external.

*Article 2:* All previous Treaties, Agreements and Engagements since and including the Treaty of Segowlic of 1815, which have been concluded between the two Governments, are hereby confirmed, except so far as they may be altered by the present Treaty.

*Article 3:* As the preservation of peace and friendly relations between the neighbouring States whose territories adjoin their common frontiers is to the mutual interests of both the High Contracting Parties, they hereby agree to inform each other of any serious friction or misunderstanding with those states likely to rupture such friendly relations and each to exert its good offices as far as may be possible to remove such friction and misunderstanding.

*Article 4:* Each of the High Contracting Parties will use all such measures as it may deem practicable to prevent its territories being used for purpose inimical to the security of the other.

*Article 5:* In view of the long-standing friendship that has subsisted between the British Government and the Government of Nepal, and for the sake of cordial neighbourly relations between them, the British Government agrees that the Nepal Government shall be free to import from and through British India into Nepal whatever arms, ammunition, machinery, warlike material, or store may be required or desired for the strength and welfare of Nepal, and that this arrangement shall hold good for all time as long as the British Government is satisfied that the intentions of the Nepal Government are friendly and that there is no immediate danger to India from such importations. The Nepal

Government, on the other hand, agrees that there shall be no export of such arms, ammunition, cetera, across the frontier of Nepal either by the Nepal Government or by private individuals.

If, however, any Convention for the regulation of Arms Traffic, to which the British Government may be a party, shall come into force, the right of importation of arms and ammunition by the Nepal Government shall be subject to the proviso that the Nepal Government shall first become a party to the Convention, and that such importation shall only be made in accordance with the provisions of that Convention.

*Article 6:* No customs duty shall be levied at Indian ports on goods imported on behalf of the Nepal Government for immediate transport to that country provided that a certificate from such authority as may from time to time be determined by the two Governments shall be presented at the time of the import setting forth that the goods are the property of the Nepal Government, are required for the public services of the Nepal Government, are not for the purpose of any State monopoly, or State trade and are being sent to Nepal under the orders of the Nepal Government.

The British Government also agrees to the grant in respect of all trade goods, imported at British Indian ports for immediate transmission to Kathmandu without breaking bulk en route of a rebate of full duty paid, provided that in accordance with arrangements already agreed to between the two Governments, such goods may break bulk for repacking at the port of entry under Customs supervision in accordance with such rules as may from time to time be laid down in this behalf. The rebate may be claimed on the authority of a certificate signed by the said authority that the goods have arrived at Kathmandu with the Customs seals unbroken and otherwise untampered with.

*Article 8:* The Treaty signed on part of the British Government by Lieutenant-Colonel W. F. T. O'Connor, C.I.E., C.V.O., British Envoy at the court of Nepal, and on the part of the Nepal Government by General His Highness Maharaja Sir Chandra Shumshere Jung Bahadur Rana, G.C.B., G.C.S.I., G.C.V.O., D.C.L., Thong-Lin-Pinma-Kokang-Wang-Syan, Prime Minister and Marshal of Nepal, shall be ratified and ratifications shall be exchanged at Kathmandu as soon as practicable.

Signed and Sealed at Kathmandu, this the Twenty-First day of December in the year One Thousand Nine Hundred and Twenty-three Anno Domini corresponding with the Sixth Samvat Era One Thousand Nine Hundred and Eighty.



## APPENDIX E

### TREATY OF PEACE AND FRIENDSHIP BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA AND THE GOVERNMENT OF NEPAL, 1950

The Government of India and the Government of Nepal recognising the ancient ties which have happily existed between the countries for centuries ;

Desiring still further to strengthen and develop these ties and to perpetuate peace between the two countries ;

Have resolved therefore to enter into a Treaty of Peace and Friendship with each other, and have, for this purpose, appointed as their plenipotentiaries the following persons, namely,

#### THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA :

His Excellency Shri Chandreshwar Prasad Narain Singh, Ambassador of India in Nepal.

#### THE GOVERNMENT OF NEPAL :

Mohan Shamsher Jung Bahadur Rana, Maharaja, Prime Minister and Supreme Commander-in-Chief of Nepal.

Who having examined each other's credentials and found them good and in due form have agreed as follows :

*Article 1 :* There shall be everlasting peace and friendship between the Government of India and the Government of Nepal. The two Governments agree mutually to acknowledge and respect the complete sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence of each other.

*Article 2 :* The two Governments hereby undertake to inform each other of any serious friction or misunderstanding with any neighbouring State likely to cause any breach in the friendly relations subsisting between the two Governments.

*Article 3 :* In order to establish and maintain the relations referred to in *Article 1 :* The two Governments agree to continue diplomatic relations with each other by means of representatives with such staff as is necessary for the due performance of their functions.

The representatives and such of their staff as may be agreed upon shall enjoy such diplomatic privileges and immunities as are customarily granted by international law on reciprocal basis, provided that in no case shall these be less than those granted to persons of a similar status of any other State having diplomatic relations with either Government.

*Article 4 :* The two Governments agree to appoint Consul-General, Consuls, Vice-Consuls and such Consular agents, who shall reside in

towns, ports and other places in each other's territory as may be agreed to. Consuls-General, Consuls, Vice-Consuls and other Consular agents shall be provided with exequaturs or other valid authorisation of their appointment. Such exequatur of authorisation is liable to be withdrawn by the country which issued it, if considered necessary. The reasons for the withdrawal shall be indicated wherever possible.

The persons mentioned above shall enjoy on a reciprocal basis all the rights, privileges, exemptions, and immunities that are accorded to persons of corresponding status of any other State.

*Article 5:* The Government of Nepal shall be free to import, from or through the territory of India, arms, ammunition or warlike material and equipment necessary for the security of Nepal. The procedure for giving effect to this arrangement shall be worked out by the two Governments acting in consultation.

*Article 6:* Each Government undertakes, in token of the neighbourly friendship between India and Nepal, to give to the nationals of the other, in its territory, national treatment with regard to participation in industrial and economic development of such territory and to the grant of concessions and contracts relating to such development.

*Article 7:* The Governments of India and Nepal agree to grant, on a reciprocal basis, to the nationals of one country in the territories of the other the same privileges in the matter of residence, ownership of property, participation in the trade and commerce and other privileges of a similar nature.

*Article 8:* So far as matters dealt with herein are concerned, this Treaty cancels all previous Treaties, agreements and engagements entered into on behalf of India by the British Government and the Government of Nepal.

*Article 9:* This Treaty shall come into force from the date of signature by both Governments.

*Article 10:* This Treaty shall remain in force until it is terminated by either party by giving one year's notice.

Done in duplicate at Kathmandu this 31st day of July 1950.

(Sd.) Chandreshshwar Prasad Narain Singh,  
For the GOVERNMENT OF INDIA.

(Sd.) Mohan Shamsher Jung Bahadur Rana,  
For the GOVERNMENT OF NEPAL.



## APPENDIX F

### SINO-NEPAL TREATY OF 1956

The Government of the Kingdom of Nepal and the People's Republic of China, being desirous of further developing the friendly relations between the two countries as good neighbours on the basis of the long-standing friendship between the two peoples,

Reaffirm the Five Principles (Panch Sheela) of

1. Mutual respect for each other's territorial integrity and sovereignty.
2. Non-Aggression.
3. Non-interference in each other's internal affairs by any reason of economic, political or ideological character.
4. Equality and mutual benefit, and
5. Peaceful co-existence, should be the fundamental principles guiding the relations between the two countries.

The two parties have resolved to conclude the present Agreement in accordance with the above-mentioned principles and have for this purpose appointed as their respective plenipotentiaries :

The Government of the Kingdom of Nepal, His Excellency Shri Chuda Prasad Sharma, Minister for Foreign Affairs,  
The Government of the People's Republic of China, His Excellency Pan Tzu-li, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the People's Republic of China to the Kingdom of Nepal, who having examined each others credentials and finding them in good and due form, have agreed upon the following :

*Article I:* The High Contracting Parties declare that peace and friendship shall be maintained between the Kingdom of Nepal and the People's Republic of China.

*Article II:* The High Contracting Parties hereby reaffirm their decision to mutually exchange diplomatic representatives on ambassadorial level.

*Article III:* All Treaties and documents which existed in the past between Nepal and China including those between Nepal and the Tibetan region of China are hereby abrogated.

*Article IV:* In order to maintain and develop the traditional contacts between Nepal and the peoples of the Tibetan region of China, the High Contracting Parties agree that the nationals of both Parties may trade, travel and make pilgrimage in these places in each other's

territory as agreed upon by both Parties, and the two Parties agree to safeguard the proper interests of the nationals of the other party in its territory in accordance with the laws of the country of residence, and for this purpose the High Contracting Parties agree to do as follows :

PARAGRAPH I

The High Contracting Parties mutually agree to establish Trade Agencies.

1. The Chinese Government agrees that the Government of Nepal may establish Trade Agencies at Shigatse, Kyerong and Nyalam.

2. The Government of Nepal agrees that the Chinese Government may establish an equal number of Trade Agencies in Nepal, the specific location of which will be discussed and determined at a later date by both Parties.

3. The Trade Agencies of both Parties shall be accorded the same status and same treatment. The Trade Agents of both Parties shall enjoy freedom from arrest while exercising their functions, and shall enjoy in respect of themselves, their wives, and their children who are dependent on them for livelihood freedom from search.

The Trade Agencies of both Parties shall enjoy the privileges and immunities for couriers, mailbag and communication in code.

PARAGRAPH II

The High Contracting Parties agree that traders of both countries may trade at the following places :

1. The Chinese Government agrees to specify (1) Lhasa, (2) Shigatse, (3) Gyantse and (4) Yatung as markets for trade ;

2. The Government of Nepal agrees that when with the development of Chinese trade in Nepal, it has become necessary to specify markets for trade in Nepal, the Government of Nepal will specify an equal number of markets for trade in Nepal ;

3. Traders of both countries known to be customarily and specifically engaged in border trade between Nepal and the Tibet Region of China may continue trade at the traditional markets for such trade.

PARAGRAPH III

The High Contracting Parties agree that pilgrimage by religious believers of either country to the other may continue according to religious custom. Personal baggages and articles used for pilgrimage carried by the pilgrims of either Party shall be exempt from taxation by other Party.

PARAGRAPH IV

For travelling across the border between Nepal and Tibet Region of China, the High Contracting Parties agree that the nationals of both countries shall use the customary routes.

PARAGRAPH V

For travelling across the borders by nationals of the two countries, the High Contracting Parties agree to adopt the following provisions :



1. Diplomatic personnel and officials of the two countries and nationals of the two countries except those provided by sub-paragraphs 2, 3 and 4, who travel across the border between Nepal and the Tibet Region of China, shall hold passports issued by their respective countries and visaed by the other Party. National of the two countries who enter Nepal or Tibet Region of China through a third country shall also hold passports issued by their respective countries and visaed by the other Party.

2. The Traders of the two countries known to be customarily and specifically engaged in trade between Nepal and the Tibet Region of China, their wives and children dependent on them for livelihood and their attendants, not covered by sub-paragraph 3 of this paragraph, who enter into Nepal or Tibet Region of China as the case may be for the purpose of trade shall hold passports issued by their respective countries and visaed by the other party, or certificates issued by their respective Governments or organs authorised by their respective Governments.

3. Inhabitants of the border districts of the two countries who cross the border to carry on petty trade, to visit friends or relatives or for seasonal change of residence, may do so as they have customarily done heretofore and need not hold passports, visas or other documents of certification.

4. Pilgrims of either Party who cross the border between Nepal and the Tibetan region of China for the purpose of pilgrims need not hold passports, visas or other documents of certification, but shall register at the border checkpoints or the first authorised Government office of the other Party, and obtain permits for pilgrimage therefrom.

5. Notwithstanding the provisions of the foregoing sub-paragraphs in this paragraph, either Government may refuse entry to any particular person.

6. Nationals of either country who enter the territory of the other Party in accordance with the foregoing sub-paragraphs of this paragraph may stay within the territory only after complying with the procedures specified by the other Party.

*Article v:* This Agreement shall be ratified. It shall come into force after mutual notice of ratifications, and remain in force for eight (8) years. Extension of the present Agreement may be negotiated by the two Parties if either Party requests for it six (6) months prior to the expiry of the Agreement and the request is agreed to by the other Party.

Done in Kathmandu on the 20th day of September, 1956, in duplicate in the Nepalese, Chinese and English languages, all texts being equally authentic.

*The Government of Nepal and the Government of the People's Republic of China have also agreed to regulate the following related matters by an exchange of notes:*

1. The two Parties mutually agree to establish Consulates-General:  
The Chinese Government agrees that the Government of Nepal

may establish Consulate-General at Lhasa of the Tibet Region of China.

The Government of Nepal agrees that the Chinese Government may open Consulate-General at Kathmandu of Nepal, the date for the establishment of which will be discussed and determined at a later date.

2. The Government of Nepal will be pleased to withdraw completely within six (6) months after the exchange of notes its military escorts now in Lhasa and other places in the Tibet Region of China, together with all their arms and ammunition. The Chinese Government will render facilities and assistance in such withdrawal.

3. Nepalese nationals in the Tibet Region of China and Chinese nationals in Nepal shall be subjected to the jurisdiction of the Government of the country of residence, observe the laws and regulations of the country of residence, pay taxes to that Government and respect the local customs.

All civil or criminal cases or disputes in which nationals of one Party in the territory of the other may be involved, shall be dealt by the Government of the country of residence.

4. The Government of either Party will protect and safeguard the person, property and legitimate interests of the other Party in its territory.

5. (a) The Governments of the two Parties agree that the nationals of either Party in the territory of the other Party, under the condition that they pay rents according to market prices and sign contract for lease with the house owners on a mutually voluntary basis, may continue to rent the houses.
- (b) Nationals of either Party who have already rented houses in the territory of the other Party, under the condition that they pay rent according to the market prices and contracts for lease are or have been concluded with the house owners on a mutually voluntary basis, may continue to rent the houses.

6. Both Parties agree to adopt necessary measures to promote and expand the trade relations between the two countries, and to levy customs duty on the import and export commodities of the two Parties in accordance with the favoured tax-rates of each Government.

7. The range of business engaged in by the traders of either Party in the territory of the other shall comply with the relevant laws and regulations of the country of residence.

8. The Nepalese primary school in Lhasa in the Tibet Region of China shall be changed into a primary school for children of Nepalese nationals and shall complete registration in accordance with the relevant regulations of the Chinese government.

9. The two Parties agree to establish direct wireless telegraphic service between Lhasa and Kathmandu, the specific arrangements of which will be discussed and decided upon at a later date by the Governments of both Parties.



10. The Government of either Party will assist the Consulate-General and the Trade Agencies of the other in its territory in renting houses.

11. The Trade Agents of both Parties may, in accordance with the laws and regulations of the country of residence, have access to their nationals involved in civil or criminal cases.

12. The Trade Agents and traders of both countries may hire employees in the locality.

13. Traders and pilgrims of both countries shall have the facility of hiring means of transportation at normal and reasonable rates.

14. The two Parties agree that any persons residing in the Tibet Region of China born of parents holding respectively the nationality of the People's Republic of China and the nationality of the Kingdom of Nepal and of 18 years of age or above, may, according to their own will, choose the nationality of the People's Republic of China for themselves and their children who are under the age of eighteen (18) by completing relevant procedures of the Chinese Government. After the completion of the above-mentioned procedures, they and their children under the age of eighteen shall be considered to have lost automatically the nationality of Nepal.

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