

**WHAT MAO
REALLY
MEANS**

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Publisher's Note

The importance of studying developments in China to students of world affairs in India cannot be over-emphasised. Both India and China are engaged in a herculean effort to modernise their predominantly agricultural economies and raise the standards of living of their peoples. While the two countries have apparently similar objectives they have adopted different methods to achieve them. India has established democratic institutions as part of an over-all effort to add a new dimension to the lives of her people. The human personality is to be enriched and not debased in the process of economic development in India. The Communist regime in China despite the appearance and claim, is pursuing what is essentially a traditional path ; its methods are not significantly different from those of authoritarian regimes in the past.

The ideological differences between democratic India and Communist China is only part of the story. With the incorporation of Tibet into its territory China has become India's next-door neighbour. We now have an over 1,500-mile long common frontier with China stretching from the hills and monasteries of Ladakh to the unsurveyed jungles of Assam. Inevitably, the developments in one country must impinge on those in the other. The history of India and China bears witness to the great influence they have exercised on one another in the past when the means of communication and transport were meagre. With the annihilation of distance, the impact of one country on the other is likely to grow.

Democratic India would have met Communist China even if Tibet had been allowed by the latter to stay an independent country playing the traditional role of a buffer State between the two major powers of Asia. The meeting would have taken place in South-East Asia, as it did in the

past before the rise of the Muslim, and later the Western, powers in this ancient continent. Indo-China derives its very name from this meeting of the two colossuses of Asia. The end of the Western dominance leaves India and China facing one another once again. As friends or foes, India and China are bound to exercise a decisive influence on the future of this strategically important area with immense untapped natural resources. The precondition of continued peace between India and China is that they must understand not only the hopes and aspirations of one another but also the logic of the rival political systems, democracy and Communism. Impersonal forces at times frustrate the human will. Whatever the myth, the ancient civilisations of India and China were far from being similar and the points of divergence may come to be emphasised in the new context.

In any realistic appraisal, relations with China must be regarded as the pivotal point of India's foreign policy. Despite the distractions or diversions over Goa and Kashmir and the desire to promote world peace and understanding, we will have to pay greater attention to the problem of relations with China with the passage of time than is evident now. This observation would have been valid even if the Communist Party had not succeeded in overthrowing the Kuomintang regime. A strong and united China under Marshal Chiang Kai-shek would have posed a problem to India as to other neighbouring countries. With the triumph of Communism, a new dimension has been added to the problem of China for free India and free Asia. Napoleon once described China as a sleeping giant. The giant is now awake. We owe it to ourselves to seek to understand the forces stirring the giant.

It is a commonsense view that the development in China under Communism can be intelligible only in the context of the Marxist-Leninist doctrine as interpreted and enforced by Mao Tse-tung, the unquestioned leader of Communist China. Chinese rulers swear by the doctrine. Unavoidably

the facts of the situation and the Marxist-Leninist doctrine influence each other. Clearly, therefore, it is imperative for a student of Chinese developments to study objectively the doctrine which has come to be known as Maoism.

Mao Tse-tung is widely held to be the exponent of a new *genre* of Communism. His addresses of February and March, 1957—the first is discussed in this monograph—have emphasised the impression that under his leadership the Chinese Communists have made a clean break with the methods of Stalin, which were denounced by Mr. Nikita Khrushchev, first Secretary of the Soviet Communist Party, at its 20th Congress in February, 1956. The text of the February address is available to the outside world and deliberate leakages from Peking have indicated that the address which Mao Tse-tung delivered in March, 1957, runs along similar lines. It is therefore, legitimate to assess whether the Chinese Communists have really taken a stride on the road to 'liberalisation' and 'democratisation.'

The present monograph is an attempt at this assessment. Inevitably Mao Tse-tung's above mentioned speech has been analysed in the context of his own previous formulations and the Communist Party's pronouncements on major developments in the Communist world since the 20th Congress of the Soviet Communist Party.

We invited Mr. G. L. Jain to undertake this study on our behalf. Mr. Jain has shown a lively interest in developments in China and her neighbours. His study on Sino-Burmese border disputes was published last year, and his book discussing developments in Nepal since the end of the Rana rule in 1950 is already in press. We are confident that the readers will agree with us that Mr. Jain has been as objective and dispassionate in his assessment as is possible for a man of well defined views.

WHAT MAO REALLY MEANS

Mao Tse-tung's address on "The Correct Handling of Contradictions Among the People" (delivered on February 27 and published on June 18, 1957) has raised worldwide speculation. Its publication on the eve of the biggest purge in the Soviet leadership since the blood-bath of the 'thirties has been seen to lend support to the view that Mao Tse-tung's address "represents a most radical repudiation of Stalinism". It is, however, only proper that the address in question should be judged in the context of the situation in China and the earlier pronouncements of Mao Tse-tung and other Communist leaders. A reference to the general situation in the Communist part of the world may have to be made only to place the address in perspective. Specifically the following questions will have to be answered in order to be able to judge the importance of the address :

1. Has Mao Tse-tung said anything significantly different from his previous statements and speeches ?
2. Does the address denote a fundamental change in the character of the Communist movement in general and the Communist regime in China in particular ?
3. Does it indicate a shift in the tactics of the Chinese Communist Party for the achievement of unaltered and unalterable goals ?
4. What was the compulsion for Mao Tse-tung for making the statement, particularly at this time ?
5. What are its implications, if any, for Communist parties, particularly those of Asia, and consequently for the non-Communist world ?

The title of the address itself makes it clear that Mao Tse-

tung seeks primarily to tackle the question of contradictions in society in the context of the specific situation obtaining in the People's Republic of China and to outline the best method to resolve them. Twenty years earlier Mao Tse-tung had delivered another address on the same subject. Recently the question of contradictions in a Communist society assumed considerable importance for the Communist theoreticians on account of the popular uprising in Communist Hungary. The Chinese Communist leadership, as perhaps the leadership of any Communist Party, had to find theoretical explanation for this development. A comparison between what Mao said earlier and his present address will be useful to determine whether there has really been a shift in Mao Tse-tung's views or the position taken by the Chinese Communists on the issue of contradictions. What actually Mao Tse-tung and after him other Communist theoreticians mean by this term we should better depend on him to know.

Mao Tse-tung said in February, 1957, that the Communist rulers were "confronted with two kinds of contradictions—contradictions between ourselves and the enemy and contradictions among the people". The two types of contradictions, Mao says, "are totally different in nature". For "the contradictions between ourselves and the enemies are antagonistic ones". Within the ranks of the people, contradictions among the ranks of the working people are non-antagonistic, while those between the exploiters and the exploited classes have, apart from an antagonistic aspect, a non-antagonist's aspect." The contradictions among the people, as he puts it, can be resolved peacefully, while the first function of the "People's Democratic Dictatorship", is "to suppress the reactionary class and elements and those exploiters in the country *who range themselves against the Socialist revolution*, to suppress all those who try to wreck our Socialist construction, that is to say, to solve the contradictions between ourselves and the enemy within the country. For instance, to arrest, try and sentence certain counter-revolutionaries and for a specified

period of time deprive landlords and bureaucrat-capitalists of their right to vote and freedom of speech—all this comes within the scope of our dictatorship." (*Italics ours*) This concept of dictatorship "does not apply in the ranks of the people" because theoretically "the people cannot exercise dictatorship over themselves....What applies among the people is democratic centralism....But this freedom is with leadership and this democracy is democracy under centralized guidance, not anarchy."

This would in substance be what in the past Stalin and other Communist leaders held to justify the existence of the dictatorship of the proletariat for the "suppression of counter-revolution" on behalf of the working people. Mao-Tse-tung himself said in his address "On Contradictions" in 1937 that "antagonism is a form of struggle within a contradiction, but not its universal form..." His view then as now was that "the two contradictory classes co-exist for a long time in one society—but it is not until the contradiction between the two classes has developed to a certain stage that the two sides adopt the form of open antagonism which develops in into a revolution...Contradictions and struggle are universal, absolute, but the method for solving contradictions, that is, the form of struggle, differ according to the differences in the nature of the contradictions. Some contradictions are characterized by open antagonism, some are not. Based on concrete development of things, some contradictions, originally non-antagonistic, develop and become antagonistic, while some contradictions, originally antagonistic, develop and become non-antagonistic... Economically, in capitalist society...the contradiction between the town and countryside is one of extreme antagonism. But in a Socialist country and our revolutionary bases, such an antagonistic contradiction becomes a non-antagonistic contradiction; and it will disappear when a Communist society is realized." In 1937 Mao Tse-tung also quoted Lenin as having said: "Antagonism and contradiction are utterly different. Under Socialism, antagonism disappears but contradiction exists." (Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung, Vol. II, People's Publishing House, Bombay, Pp. 48, 50, 51 and 52.)

For a correct understanding of what Mao and other Communist theoreticians mean it is also necessary to bear in mind the semantic difference between the expressions they use and those used by the uninitiated ones. Mao makes it clear that the definition of words like "people" and "enemy" change from time to time. According to his 1957 address the term "people" has different meanings in different historical periods in each country." Citing the example of his own country, Mao asserts that "during the war of resistance to the Japanese aggression, all those classes, strata and social groups which opposed Japanese aggression belonged to the category of the people, while the Japanese imperialists, Chinese traitors and pro-Japanese elements belonged to the category of the enemies of the people." But "during the war of liberation, the United States imperialists and their henchmen—the bureaucrat capitalists and the landlord class—and the Kuomintang reactionaries, who represented these two classes, were the enemies of the people." Mao leaves nobody in doubt about the specific meaning he attaches now to the word "people". "At this stage of building Socialism," he lays down, "all classes, strata and social groups, which approve, support and work for the cause of Socialism, belong to the category of the people, while all those social groups and forces which resist the Socialist revolution and are hostile to and try to wreck Socialist construction, are the enemies of the people."

Armed with this definition the regime can enforce the strictest measure of discipline and eliminate opposition to itself in the name of "Socialist construction" and the "suppression of counter-revolution". Purges should therefore be a recurrent feature of Chinese Communist society as of any other Communist society. Needless to say that against this background prospects for opposition as we know it are both dim and grim.

The attention that Mao's present address has attracted is primarily because of the explicit admission that there exist in China despite the establishment of a Socialist society "con-

traditions between the people and the Government," even though simultaneously it has been claimed by him that "our People's Government is a Government that truly represents the interests of the people." One would be reasonable in interpreting this to mean that the contradiction between the Government and the people exist because the people have not yet adjusted themselves with the demands of the People's Democratic Dictatorship. But of this later. In Mao's words, contradictions exist between "the interest of the State, collective interests and individual interests, between democracy and centralism, between those in position of leadership and the led, and the contradictions arising from the bureaucratic practices of certain State functionaries in their relation with the masses."

In his address "On Contradictions" of 1937 the Chinese Communist leader did not mention that contradictions could and would exist between the people and the Government in a Socialist society. But that he was aware of the whole problem even then is obvious. In the first instance, he noted the existence of contradictions between peasants and workers on the one hand and within the Communist Party on the other in the Soviet Union, where dictatorship of the proletariat had been established 20 years earlier. Secondly, he noted that contradictions existed universally. He then wrote : "Whether in ideological or objective phenomenon, whether in simple or complex forms of motion, contradiction exist *universally...and in all processes...* Within the party, opposition and struggle between ideas occur constantly ; they reflect in the Party the class contradictions and the contradictions between the old and new things in society".

Inferentially we have it now on the authority of Mao himself that contradictions would continue to exist within the Communist Party even after the abolition of all classes. Asserting that such contradictions would be "gradually" solved, he admitted in 1937 that the question is "*of distinction in the character of contradictions, not a matter of presence or absence of them. Contradiction is,*" he added, "*universal, absolute,*

existing in all processes of the development of things and running through all processes from beginning to end." For the benefit of those among the faithful who might have genuinely felt disheartened by such a disenchanting prospect he held out the promise: "The use of different methods to solve different contradictions is a principle which Marxist-Leninists must strictly observe." He blamed the doctrinaires, as someone else also does elsewhere for not observing this principle: "They do not understand the difference between various revolutionary situations...on the contrary they uniformly adopt a formula which they fancy to be unalterable and inflexibly apply it everywhere..." It is thus clear that there is no essential difference, much less contradiction, between the views expressed by Mao Tse-tung in 1957 and 1937. In both cases he interpreted Marxism-Leninism-Stalinism.

Mao's admission about the existence of contradictions between the Government and the people has to be seen in its proper context. For unless related to other relevant formulations in the same address, this is likely to put one off the scent. It is noteworthy that Mao Tse-tung does not confine himself to the bald statement quoted above. He defines at some length what he would regard the basis of this contradiction. He says: "The basic contradictions in socialist society are those between the relations of production and the forces of production and between the superstructure and the economic base."

This is mainly because "our socialist revolution has just been set up; it has not yet been fully established, nor yet fully consolidated. In joint State—private industrial and commercial enterprises, capitalists still receive a fixed rate of interest on their capital, that is to say, exploitation still exists....Some of our agricultural and handicraft producers cooperatives are still semi-socialist....It is a complicated problem to settle on a proper ratio between accumulation and consumption within the sector of socialist economy in which the means of production are owned by the whole people and that sector in which the means of production are collectively owned, as well as between

the two sectors."

Further, "there is conformity as well as contradiction between the relations of production and the development of productive forces ; similarly, there is conformity as well as contradiction between the superstructure and the economic base. The superstructure—our State institutions of People's Democratic Dictatorship and its laws, and the socialist ideology under the guidance of Marxism-Leninism—has played a positive role in facilitating the victory of socialist transformation..., it is suited to the socialist economic base. *But the survival of bourgeois ideology, bureaucratic ways of doing things in our State organs and flaws in certain links of State institutions stand in contradiction to the economic base of socialism.*" (Italics ours). Thus the total elimination of private enterprise and the "survivals of bourgeois ideology" and the complete subordination of the bureaucracy to the Party would, according to Mao Tse-tung, help in the removal of the contradictions between the Government and the people, even though he provides for the emergence of new forms of contradictions which the Dictatorship of the Proletariat will be needed to resolve. Thus neither the Communist Party leadership nor the Marxist-Leninist ideology of socialism stand in need of adjustment and modification in the interest of the elimination of contradictions between the Government and the people. The adjustments have all to be made by the people.

It is interesting to note what another propounder of Communist law had said on this subject 35 years after the great October Revolution. In his "Economic Problems of Socialism in the USSR", published on the eve of the 19th Congress of the Soviet Communist Party in October, 1952, Stalin wrote : "The conformity between the relations of production and the forces of production in the Soviet Union must not be understood in the absolute sense. They must not be understood as meaning that there is no lag of relations of production behind the growth of productive forces under socialism. They are to be understood as meaning that under socialism things do not usually go to the

length of a conflict between the relations of production and the productive forces ; that society is in a position to take timely steps to bring the lagging relations of production in conformity with the character of the productive forces. Socialist society is in a position to do so because it does not include obsolescent classes that might organize resistance. Of course, even under socialism there will be backward, inert forces that do not realize the necessity for changing the relations of production ; but, they, of course, will not be difficult to overcome without bringing matters to a conflict." (Economic Problems of Socialism in USSR, Published by the Foreign Languages Publishing House, Moscow, 1952. P. 25).

And even Stalin was not markedly reluctant to admit of more or less the same contradictions which have brought so much praise to Mao Tse-tung. "There certainly are, and will be", he said, "contradictions, seeing that the development of the relations of production lag, and will lag behind the development of the productive forces. Given a correct policy on the part of the directing bodies, these contradictions cannot grow into antagonisms, and there will be no chance of matters coming to a conflict between the relations of production and the productive forces of society....The task of the directing bodies is, therefore, promptly to discern incipient contradictions and take timely measures to resolve them by adapting the relations of production to the growth of productive forces. This above all concerns such economic factors as group, or collective-farm, property and commodity circulation....It would be unpardonable blindness not to see...that these factors are already beginning to hamper the powerful development of our productive forces, since they create obstacles to the full extension of Government planning to the whole of national economy, especially agriculture....The task, therefore, is to eliminate these contradictions by gradually converting collective-farm property into public property and by introducing, also gradually, product exchange in place of commodity circulation." (*Ibid.* PP. 75 and 76.)

To students of Marxism the difference in the formulations

of Stalin and of Mao Tse-tung is reduced to practically nothing. In fact Mao Tse-tung's formulations flow out of Stalin's thesis, which the latter must have studied carefully. As long there is a lag between the relations of production and the productive forces, there is bound to be, in Marxist terminology, contradictions between the superstructure in the form of the People's Democratic Dictatorship and the economic base, that is, between the Government and the people. That is the basic point to Marxism itself. According to Marx, the capitalist system or any other social system is doomed when this form of contradiction between the relations of production and the productive forces becomes sharp. Neither Stalin nor does Mao Tse-tung advocate that the structure of the regime needs to be modified in the case of socialist societies to remove the contradiction in question. On the contrary, they aspire to extension of the control of the Government machinery to the whole economy, and all aspects of national life.

It is not a matter of fundamental importance whether the existence of contradictions between the Communist Government and the people is explicitly admitted or not. The admission is implicit so long as they do not put forward the claim that under a Communist regime there is no lag between the relations of production and the productive forces and that class distinctions between the peasantry and the proletariat have disappeared. The moment they make such a claim they would destroy the very basis for the continuance of the dictatorship of the proletariat because it loses its functional role as soon as the Communist society is established, and the possibility of counter-revolution eliminated. It is a sad commentary on the ideological competence of the first Secretary of the Soviet Communist Party, Mr Nikita Khrushchev, that he should have failed to appreciate (vide his TV interview broadcast in America in June 1957) that Mao Tse-tung's formulations on the subject did not in any way weaken the case for the continued existence of the dictatorship and that on the contrary they reinforced the case for it.

But even if it is admitted that Mao Tse-tung has taken an unusual position on the question of contradictions between the Government and the people in a Socialist society, the important thing clearly is not the admission itself. The important issue is how these contradictions are going to be resolved. We have already seen that in the economic field the contradictions are to be resolved through the extension of Socialist ownership and planning and in the ideological field through the elimination of what is called "the survivals of bourgeois ideology." In the political field, the people will be required to adjust themselves to the needs of the Dictatorship. This point is strongly emphasised by Mao Tse-tung in his discussion of the impact of the Hungarian uprising in China. He says : "Certain people in our country were delighted when the Hungarian events took place. They hoped that something similar would happen in China....There were other people in our country who took a wavering attitude towards the Hungarian events....They felt that there was too little freedom under our People's Democracy and that there was more freedom under the Western parliamentary democracy. They ask for the adoption of the two-party system of the West....But this so called Party system is nothing but a means of maintaining the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie....As a matter of fact democracy and freedom cannot exist in the abstract....Those who demand freedom and democracy in the abstract regard democracy as an end and not a means. Democracy sometimes seems to be an end, but is in fact only a means....Both democracy and freedom are relative, not absolute and they come into being and develop under specific historical circumstances. Within the ranks of the people, democracy stands in relation to centralism and freedom to discipline. They are conflicting aspects of a single entity, and we should not one-sidedly emphasise one to the denial of the other. Our democratic centralism means the unity of democracy and centralism and the unity of freedom and discipline."

Clearly, therefore, in Mao Tse-tung's scheme of things the People's Democratic Dictatorship is there to stay and the so

called contradictions between the Government and the people are to be resolved within this limitation. In fact the whole issue of resolving this form of contradictions is reduced to determining the degree of freedom that the people are to be allowed to enjoy under the Dictatorship. The demands of the people, whether economic, cultural or political, are to be met only insofar as they are consistent with the needs of the Dictatorship. Mao Tse-tung like Lenin asserts that the Dictatorship distinguishes a socialist society from a bourgeois society.

II

Mao Tse-tung's address has been hailed as a step in the direction of "liberalization" because he has advocated that ideological issues or "questions of right and wrong" (the terms are apparently not used in a moral sense) should not be attempted to be settled through "administrative orders or coercive measures. "Such an approach, he warns his followers, will not only be ineffective but harmful. But he does not wholly rule out the need for the use of administrative orders to settle these ideological issues. All that he insists on is that the administrative orders should be accompanied by "methods of education and persuasion," which, one can reasonably assume, means ideological indoctrination on the one hand and the effort to convince the people of the correctness of the policies of the regime on the other. But this has always been the Communist theory as well as practice. The extensive machinery of propaganda and of education in Marxism-Leninism in Communist countries would not have been forged if the Communist parties had depended solely on administrative orders to settle ideological questions.

Mao Tse-tung has not staked out any claim to a new formulation in advocating that "administrative orders and methods of persuasion and education complement each other in solving contradictions among the people." This method, he claims, was successfully applied at the time of the rectification campaign within the Chinese Communist Party in 1942 when it was to be steered ideologically in preparation for capturing power. The campaign was undertaken during the alliance with the Kuomintang to resist Japanese aggression. Its purpose was to restore the Party to the sharp outlines in the ideological sense because the less conscious among the Party cadres were showing a tendency to mistake the tactical nature of the alliance

for a permanent change in the programme of the Communist Party. The formula then was: "Unity-criticism-unity. This means, to start off with a desire for unity and resolve contradictions through criticism or *struggle* so as to achieve a new unity on a new basis." (emphasis provided) Mao Tse-tung claims that the method ensured complete unity within the ranks of the Party at the time of the seventh Congress in 1945.

Mao Tse-tung adds that this method was tried during the war against Japan. In fact "We have used this method to deal with relations between the Party and the masses, between the army and the civilian population, between the officers and men, and in general with relations among the people" since 1927 when "we began to build our revolutionary armed forces and bases in the South." He has thus claimed that the Chinese Communist Party has depended on methods of 'persuasion and education' ever since he came to be associated with its leadership. All that is recommended now is that the Communists should make a still better and more extensive use of this well tested method.

According to the official text, Mao Tse-tung has not admitted that the Communist Party under his leadership had committed undue excesses on the people in the past and it needs to build internal safeguards against arbitrary action. According to Polish sources (quoted by *The New York Times*, International Edition, June 13, 1957) Mao Tse-tung had said in his original address that 800,000 persons had been liquidated in the period from 1949 when the Communists seized power to 1954. The figure does not occur in the published version of the address. But the significant point is that Mao Tse-tung does not regret that such drastic measures had been adopted in those years. In fact there is little scope for doubt that he regards the measures as having been necessary.

According to Mao Tse-tung, "there were no squalls in our country" following the Hungarian uprising even though "these events caused some of our intellectuals to lose their balance a

bit...because we had succeeded in suppressing counter-revolutionaries quite thoroughly." He proceeded to reprimand those who might mistakenly demand that the victims of the past purges and liquidation campaign be morally rehabilitated as had been done in many of the countries of Eastern Europe. In China such a course might have meant a repudiation of the leadership of Mao Tse-tung himself. "Some people do not understand that our present policy fits the present situation and our past policy fitted the past situation ; they want to make use of the present policy to reverse decisions on past cases and to deny the great success we achieved in suppressing counter-revolution. This is quite wrong and the people will not permit it."

All that Mao Tse-tung has admitted in the published text is that "in the suppression of counter-revolutionaries, good people were sometimes mistaken for bad. Such things have happened before, and they still happen today." But it is simultaneously claimed on behalf of the regime that "we have been able to keep them within bounds because it has been our policy to draw a sharp line between our people and the enemies and where mistakes have been made, to take suitable measures for rehabilitation." Admittedly then the scope for improvement in the methods of the regime is limited. The question of modifying it in essentials does not arise at all.

As noted earlier, 'people' in the Communist semantics is a variable and not an absolute. Anyone who is not in agreement with the broad policies of the Party or challenges its leadership and supremacy runs the risk of being characterised as an enemy of the people. Customarily 'foreign imperialists' are held responsible for the expression of any discontent among the people. The existence of a foreign agency is necessary to explain hostility on the part of the people to the regime in view of the theoretical position that the contradictions between the Government and the people in a socialist society are not antagonistic and the Government represents the best interests of the people. In explaining the Hungarian uprising, Mao Tse-tung says : "Such antagonistic actions on a fairly widespread scale

as took place during the Hungarian events are accounted for by the fact that domestic and foreign counter-revolutionary elements were at work. In a case like this, the reactionaries in a socialist country, in league with the imperialists, took advantage of the contradictions among the people to foment disunity and dissensions and fan the flames of disorder to achieve their conspiratorial aims."

Reverting to the situation at home, Mao Tse-tung adds : "This is how things stand today : the turbulent class struggle waged by the masses on a large-scale characteristic of the revolutionary period have, in the main, concluded, but the class struggle is not over." The policy therefore is that "counter-revolutionaries must be suppressed whenever they are found, mistakes must be corrected whenever they are discovered....The line we adopted in this work was the mass line, that is the suppression of the counter-revolutionaries by the masses themselves." Thus Mao Tse-tung seeks euphemistically to explain and justify the liquidation of hundreds of thousands of people following summery trials by what are called people's courts, a more effective and cruel way of disposing of inconvenient and not so inconvenient people than any thing known in the worst period of terrorism under Stalin in the Soviet Union. That the decisions of the people's courts are not determined by any code of law, renders these courts into instruments of the People's Democratic Dictatorship, which, according to the Leninist definition, is "unrestricted by law and is based on force." To quote Lenin again by whom Mao Tse-tung and other Communist leaders continuously swear : "The scientific concept of dictatorship means nothing more nor less than unrestricted power, absolutely unimpeded by laws or regulations and resting directly on force...Dictatorship means unlimited power based on force and not law." Not surprisingly, therefore, Mao Tse-tung pleads that even in the correction of mistakes in cases where good people have been taken for counter-revolutionaries "we must help, not pour cold water on, the large number of functionaries and activists who took part in the work. It is not right to dampen their spirits."

But it is in a latter section of the 1957 address on "Letting Hundred Flowers Blossom" that Mao-Tse-tung defines his own concept of the 'class struggle not being entirely over'. He says : "It is true that in China, Socialist transformation, insofar as change in the system of ownership is concerned, has in the main been completed, and the turbulent, large-scale, mass class struggle characteristic of the revolutionary period, in the main, concluded. But the remnants of the overthrown landlord and comprador class still exist, and the petty bourgeoisie has just begun to remould itself. Class struggle is not over. *The class struggle between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat, the class struggle between various political forces, and the class struggle in the ideological field between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie will still be long and serious and at time may even become very acute*" In the last eventuality, the People's Democratic Dictatorship based on force and unimpeded by laws must operate freely in the defence of what is called socialism. In other words, classes and groups now collaborating with the Communist Party would be forcibly liquidated in case they resisted their gradual transformation. This concept of the Chinese Communist Party was discussed at length by the *Kommunist*, official ideological organ of the Soviet Communist Party, in the October, 1956, issue. We shall quote it at some length later to show what precisely "peaceful transformation" in China means.

Mao Tse-tung makes himself even more explicit when he adds : "The proletariat seeks to transform the world according to its own world outlook, so does the bourgeoisie. In this respect, the question of whether socialism or capitalism will win is still not really settled. Marxists are still a minority of the entire population as well as of the intellectuals. Marxism, therefore, must develop through struggle....It will take a considerable time to decide the issue in the ideological struggle between socialism and capitalism in our country. This is because the influence of the bourgeoisie and of the intellectuals who come from the old society will remain in our country as the ideology of a class for a long time to come. Failure to grasp this, or still worse, failure

to understand it at all, can lead to the gravest mistake—to ignoring the necessity of waging the struggle in the ideological field."

It is to further the struggle in the ideological field that Mao Tse-Tung seeks to promote a debate in the country. In this respect he has only lent his powerful support to a process which had started nearly a year earlier when the policy of "Letting Hundred Flowers Blossom" was in the first instance initiated. The Chinese Communists have discovered that it will not do to ban the expression of unorthodox and unacceptable ideas. They have to be brought out into the open before they can be fought. But this is not to be a free-for-all debate. The outcome of the debate is settled in advance. It is intended to prove once again the superiority of Marxism-Leninism over other philosophies of life. The advocates of non-Marxist approach to life are to be allowed expression because that would help the Marxists to convince them of the error of their ways: "Marxism must develop through struggle." Also it is not a straight debate between the Communists and the rest. The Communists themselves are required to avoid the pitfalls of both doctrinairism and revisionism; the latter being more dangerous to the cause of Communism than the former. That is why Mao Tse-tung warns that "while criticising doctrinairism, we should at the same time direct our attention to criticising revisionism. Revisionism, or rightist opportunism, is a bourgeois trend of thought which is even more dangerous than doctrinairism...The revisionists...oppose or distort materialism and dialectics, oppose or try to weaken People's Democratic Dictatorship and the leading role of the Communist Party, oppose or try to weaken Socialist transformation and Socialist construction. They are the right-hand men of those who seek to restore the capitalist system and wage a struggle against the working class on every front, including the ideological front." This uncompromising stand on so called "doctrinaire and revisionist tendencies" stems from the heart of Maosim and the whole approach contained in the address is traceable to it.

But how are the flowers to be distinguished from poisonous weeds. Mao Tse-tung provides the answers: "Broadly speaking, words and actions can be judged right if they: 1. Help to unite the people of our various nationalities and do not divide them; 2. Are beneficial, not harmful, to Socialist transformation and Socialist construction; 3. Help to consolidate, not undermine or weaken, the People's Democratic Dictatorship; 4. Help to consolidate, not undermine or weaken, democratic centralism; 5. Tend to strengthen, not to cast off or weaken, the leadership of the Communist Party; 6. Are beneficial, not harmful, to international Socialist solidarity and the solidarity of the peace-loving peoples of the world. Of these six criteria, 'the most important are the Socialist path and the leadership of the Party.'" He leaves no one in doubt as to his mind that in a Socialist country, there can be no "useful scientific or artistic activity which runs counter to these political criteria." Even "those who do not approve of these criteria can still put forward their own views and argue their cases" but "these criteria can be applied to people's words and actions to determine whether they are fragrant flowers or poisonous weeds."

Clearly there is a "close" (end) in "bloom" (debate) as Teng Ch'u-min, who has served for many years as a spokesman of the Chinese Communist Party in non-party groups, put it. *Cheng Ming* monthly in its April issue carried a transcript of a discussion on the issue in which Teng had participated. According to the transcript, Teng said: "After we heard Chairman Mao's report, some of us might be inclined to think that Chairman Mao only encouraged us to 'bloom', but as far as I can see there is a 'close' in 'bloom'. For example, the grass should be weeded just as idealism should be criticised. *Contention by all schools of thought will finally lead to the discovery of the truth, and there is only one truth under prescribed conditions.* Chairman Mao said that internal contradictions among the people should be solved with the attitude of a doctor curing the malady to save the patient. *Let us all criticise but let us not*

beat people to death at one blow. To contend we must take the attitude of having the patient cured of his malady. By malady here we refer to the petty bourgeois and bourgeois mentality..."

He added: "The four circles I draw must be adhered to by oneself...when one starts to contend. The four circles are: 1. There must be guidance for the contention, and that is the Marxist-Leninist leadership; 2. There should be direction for the contention, and that is the path of Socialism; 3. There must be some scope for contention and that is that contention should be confined to the ranks of the people and not participated in by the enemy; 4. There must be a standard for the contention and for the truth, and that is practice."

In a reply to the opposite point of view, Teng said: "The four circles I draw are based on fundamental principles—the material nature of the world and its necessity of development....In fact they are not drawn by me but have existed under the objective, realistic circumstances. What are the present objective, realistic circumstances? They are the need to build Socialism. It would be impossible for us to achieve this unless we follow the leadership of the working class and its political party—the CCP. The leadership strength of the CCP lies in its ideological weapon of Marxism-Leninism...If we place the policy, 'Let all Flowers Bloom and Let all Schools of Thought Contend', in opposition to the Party's leadership position in the realm of thought...it would be a metaphysical way of approaching problems and tantamount to considering the Marxist-Leninist ideological leadership as the ideological control of the reactionary class of the past. That is really what we call 'missing by one millimeter makes a big difference of a thousand lies.'"

He added: "Chairman Mao's speech I heard personally. Chairman Mao stated that the poisonous plants grow just as the beautiful flowers, but the farmers weed them every year, and it will actually not do to tell the poisonous plants not to grow, but we can just go ahead cutting them..." The consistency of

Teng's interpretation with Mao Tse-tung's intent is borne out by later developments.

The manner in which the debate was allowed to proceed is of considerable educational value for the non-Communists. Following the speech, the newspapers, magazines and all other means of propaganda at the disposal of the regime were pressed into service to exhort the people to speak out freely and frankly on the shortcomings of the regime. In May last, the United Front Department of the Central Committee of the Communist Party invited the leaders of the collaborating groups and other intellectuals to participate in forums to discuss the shortcomings of the leadership. It would appear that the discussions at these forums took an unexpected turn as one speaker after another assailed the leadership of the Communist Party. The non-Communist participants in the discussions complained that the "members of the democratic parties did not have a chance to play their due role in State affairs during the past several years. While the Communist cadres got promoted very fast, the non-Party cadres scarcely have such a chance." (New China News Agency, May 8, 1957) They alleged that the non-Communists in the administration did not have any real authority. "They act as if they were guests", said Chang Po-chun, Vice-President of the Democratic League, on the opening day of the forums on May 8. Others talked of sectarianism in the Communist Party. Chen Chi-yu, of the China *Chih Kung Tang*, was quoted by the official news agency as having said on May 9 that "democratic parties and groups were not notified of the reasons when some of their individual adult members were arrested at the time of purging the reactionaries." He inquired "whether it was due to the fact that the democratic parties and groups were not trusted or regarded as organs having no relation with their members." Such quotations can be multiplied *ad infinitum* from official sources, but we shall add just one more and the reader will have an adequate idea of the nature of the criticism directed against the Communist Party. *The Jen Min Jih Pao*, Peking, quoted Chu An-Ping as having said at the forums :

"In the past few years the relations of the Party (Communist) and the masses were not good and have become a problem in our political life that urgently needs adjustment....*In my opinion the key lies in the idea that the world belongs to the Party. I think that a party leading the nation is not the same thing as a party owning the nation...*It is natural that the Party should want to remain strong and hold the key positions in Government. But is it not too much that within the scope of the nation, there must be a Party man as leader in every unit...that nothing, small or big, can be done without a nod from the Party man?...*For many years the talents or capabilities of many Party men have not matched their duties. They have bungled their jobs, to the detriment of the State, and have not been able to command the respect of the masses with the result that the relations between the Party and the masses have been tense. But the fault has not lain with Party members, rather with the Party which has placed square pegs in round holes.*

"I wonder if the Party entertains the idea that 'everywhere it is royal territory' so that it can establish a big family of Communists only. I think that this idea that the 'world belongs to the Party' is at the bottom of all sectarianism and the root of all contradictions between the Party and non-Party members. Today it is a nationwide phenomenon that sectarianism is so obvious and the relations between the Party and the masses are so bad. The Communist Party is a highly organised, highly disciplined Party. *Do these defects of nationwide nature have anything to do with the central leadership of the Party?* Recently the public advanced many critical opinions against unimportant people, but nobody has anything to say against important people. Now I want to cite an instance and ask Chairman Mao and Premier Chou about it.

"Before the Liberation, I heard it told that Chairman Mao wanted to organise a coalition Government with non-Party members. In 1949...three of the Deputy Chairmen of the Central Government were non-Party men. It looked like a coalition Government. Later when the Government was reorganised, there

was only one Deputy Chairman of the People's Republic of China, and the seats of the non-Party Deputy Chairmen were removed to the Standing Committee of the People's Congress. That is not all. Now there are 12 Deputy Premiers in the State Council and not one of them is a non-Party man. Could it be that there is not a single person among the non-Party people who can sit in a Deputy Premier's chair or that none of them can be cultivated to hold this chair ?"

He squarely placed the responsibility of removing the contradictions between the Communist Party and the democratic parties and groups on the one hand and the Party and the people on the other on the leadership of the Communist Party in view of the fact that "the strength of the Party is so great and what the democratic parties can do is so limited."

In the nature of things, this kind of criticism could not be allowed to continue without endangering the foundations of the Communist power structure. By the third week of June the criticism campaign was clearly coming to a close and the Communist functionaries were on the offensive. *The Times*, London, carried on June 25, 1957, a despatch from its Hong Kong correspondent which deserves to be quoted at some length. It said that "all along there had been every intention, even on the part of the severest critic, to keep the argument within the dialectical bounds. For instance when the forums started...one of the principal critics, the Minister for Communications, Mr. Chang Po-chun, warned students against going into the streets and creating a 'Hungarian incident' when he was informed that students of a Russian language school had put up reactionary posters supporting him and two other Democratic Party leaders, Mr. Chang Nai-chi and Mr. Lo Lung-chi...Now senior members of the collaborating groups have taken up the cudgles in a broad defence of the Government and are criticising critics who incurred the wrath of the more fanatical members of the Party. The counter-campaign is led by Mme. Soong Ching-Ling (Mrs. Sun Yat-sen) and Mr. Shen Chun-ju, Chairman of the Democratic League, as well as Chairmen of other leading

non-Communist groups, while the *People's Daily* yesterday called on workers and revolutionary intellectuals to launch a strong counter-offensive 'against those attempting to overthrow the Communist Party and leadership of the proletariat.' " He quoted the newspaper as saying that a number of rightists, dissatisfied with socialism, took advantage of the Party's call for criticism to expand their influence and vie for positions. "They thought that they had stirred up a real mess, but the masses met them with opposition because the overwhelming majority support socialism....The people learnt to distinguish real countenances of different people," the *People's Daily* said.

Soon it was clear that the campaign of criticism had turned out to be a trap for the unwary. Only on a couple of occasions did the criticism exceed that common-place in the Party elsewhere and that turned out to be unacceptable. The Peking *People's Daily* carried an article on July 1, 1957, to expose "the scheming against Communism, against the people and Socialism, by bourgeois rightists, who took advantage of the liberalisation policy and the rectification campaign to do their utmost to create trouble. Some hatched their schemes in secrecy and others stirred up things among the rank-and-file. Their ultimate aim was to throw the whole country into chaos, so as to usurp power and step by step achieve their object."

The article traced the origin of this conspiracy to the "alliance of Chang Po-chun and Lo Lung-chi, both vice-chairmen of the Democratic League, which played a particularly sinister role...It has had...a line of its own in this connection directed against the Communist Party and Socialism, all of which has alienated the League from the people." The *People's Daily*, Peking, similarly attacked the Peasants and Workers Party, of which also Chang Po-chun was the chairman. The Communist daily admitted that at first the Party had allowed the intellectuals and the bourgeoisie to wage battle without countering it "to enable the masses to distinguish clearly those whose criticism was well intentioned from those with ill intentions. In this way the forces for opportune counter-blow amassed strength. Some

people will call this scheming, but we say it is quite open. We told the enemy in advance that before 'monsters and serpents' could be wiped out they first had to be brought into the open, and only by letting poisonous weeds show themselves above ground can they be uprooted...The class struggle is an objective reality which cannot be changed at will...Why have reactionary class enemies enmeshed themselves in the net spread for them?"

The Peking daily itself supplied the answer. "They are socially reactionary groups and their lust for advantage robs them of their wits. They mistake the overwhelming superiority of the proletariat for overwhelming inferiority. They thought that by starting fires everywhere they could incite the workers and peasants and students, and that full-blast blossoming and contending could set the world in chaos and at one full swoop bring down the Communist Party." The paper said that this was the assessment of the situation that Chang Po-chun had outlined to six professors in Peking. (*The Times*, London, July 3, 1957)

About a week later, the *People's Daily* carried a report of a mass meeting in the Communications Ministry itself attacking Chang Po-chun. The Minister listened while speakers alleged during a four-hour meeting that he had sent five trusted men into the countryside to recruit anti-Communists in the Peasants and Workers Party. According to the accusers, these methods produced 200 recruits in just one month in Tientsin alone. One member of the staff said that Chang had told him that "China being so big a country, the rule of more than 500 million peasant slaves by a single god and nine million puritans must result in insurrection." He was also charged with neglecting his work as a Minister. (*The Times of India*, Delhi, July 11, 1957).

On July 12, Mr. Lu Ting, Director of the Communist Party's Propaganda Department, in a speech to the National People's Congress, accused the rightists of trying to "beguile the people with their absurd lies with a view to creating troubles

before carrying on a counter-revolutionary type of Government." He said that the rightists while "propagating absurd arguments against Socialism had aimed at seizing leading positions in the democratic parties and education, cultural, journalistic, commercial and other circles as a preliminary step to getting hold of the national leadership. They attempted to stir up disturbances among the students." (*The Times of India*, July 13, 1957) Earlier a similar speech by the Prime Minister, Mr. Chou En-lai, to the National People's Congress was sprinkled with references to "rightist conspiracies." In Nanking leaders of the China Construction Party had been arrested on charges of conspiring to subvert the regime. (*The Economist*, London, July 6, 1957). It will be seen that almost in every case the charge of sedition was levelled against the critics. True to form, all major critics of the Communist regimes were made to confess their ideological sins.

Mr. Chang Po-chun (Communications), Mr. Lo Lung-chi (Timber) and Mr. Chang Nai-chi (Food), non-Party Ministers who had been described as the ring-leaders of the plot to seize power, confessed to having conspired to overthrow the regime. Their written confessions were circulated among 1,062 delegates to the National People's Congress.

Mr. Chang Po-chun in his confession blamed "personal ambition" for the alliance he had made with Mr. Lo Lung-chi. One of his crimes, he said, had been to advocate the constitution of a Political Planning Board, which would permit non-Communist participation in major State decisions and a bicameral legislature. His aim was to replace Communist rule with the old type of democracy. He "bowed low" to the Congress and apologised for the "dreadful state" of his political education. He invited the people to punish him for being a "rightist" and promised more disclosures and self-criticism later. He concluded by saying that he hoped that the Communist Party would help him once again so that he could return to the Socialist standpoint.

Mr. Lo Lung-chi, who holds a doctorate degree from Columbia University, New York, confessed that he was guilty of "anti-Party and anti-Socialist activities. He and Chang had moved the Democratic League to the 'right' and attacked Communism under the cover of the criticism campaign. The Democratic League had sought, he added, to increase its influence among the students and in the Government. He admitted that he had been "very wrong" in his actions and speeches against the Communist Party "in spite of the fact that I was well treated by the people and the Party after the Liberation." He said that he had been poisoned by the reading of British and American magazines and had spoken many wrong things "through bad analysis and lack of understanding of the international situation." He had been arrogant in his treatment of comrades and had lagged behind in study and thought reform. He had not attended to his work as well as he should have done.

Mr. Chang Nai-chi admitted having committed errors because of "thought and action springing from bourgeois individualism." But he emphasised that in his case "the questions were questions of thought and wrongs but wrongs of theory." (*The Times of India*, Bombay, July 16, 1957.) All three Ministers lost their seats in State Council of Ministers. (*The New Statesman*, London. July 27, 1957.)

A few days earlier 67-year-old Ku Chim-chung, Professor of Peking University, attempted to commit suicide when he was being cross-examined about his past political activities on July 5 by self-appointed judges. He had been grilled for hours when in desperation he threw himself against a stone pillar injuring himself seriously. The main charge against him was that he had received an award from Chiang Kai-shek in 1939 for having been wounded by a Japanese spy. Also he had been seen reading posters on the walls of a local institute. (*The Pioneer*, Lucknow, July 7, 1957.)

Chu An-Pin, who had been dismissed as Editor-in-Chief of

the *Kwangming* daily, organ of the Democratic League, for overstepping the tolerable limits of criticism, confessed to all his faults saying "I apologise to the people and surrender to the people, as well as thank the Communist Party which has saved me from making further errors." He blamed Chang Po-chun and Lo Lung-chi for his lapses and promised to accept "more honestly the leadership of the Communist Party hereafter and to take the course in Socialism more seriously." He confessed to having sent reporters on behalf of the daily to seven cities to stir up trouble there. (*The Times of India*, Delhi, July 15, 1957.)

Wang Hsi-chang, Vice-Chairman of the Peasants and Workers Party, broke down as he cried in the presence of the delegates to the National People's Congress on July 13. According to a Reuter report, sobbing loudly and blowing his nose, he ended his confession of ideological sins by shouting: "Long Live the unity of the Chinese. Long Live the Communist Party." On the same day, Lung Yun, Governor of Yunan under the KMT regime, confessed to having oppressed the people in that capacity. He confessed that his plea at the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress that the payments of debts to the Soviet Union be spread over a period of 20 to 30 years was "in effect anti-Soviet and anti-Socialist." He said that he had become conceited as a result of being elevated to high office under the Communist rule. (*The Times of India*, Delhi, July 15, 1957.) Thus ended the criticism campaign which had been launched with such fanfare by the highest and mightiest in the land. Since the end of the session of the National People's Congress on July 15, 1957, there have been a number of reports regarding alleged attempts at revolts and counter-revolution. We shall refer to them later.

III

Mao's marathon address is divided into 12 sections. We have already examined the implications of the more important sections on : 1. Two different Types of Contradictions ; 2. The Suppression of Counter-Revolution ; 3. The Questions of Intellectuals and 4. On Letting a Hundred Flowers Blossom. There is nothing in the other sections which can give legitimate cause for hope that Communist regime in China is being liberalised or democratised. But they do contain confirmation of reports of widespread unrest in China, which might as well have been the compulsion for Chairman Mao to deliver the address in question.

In his section on "Agricultural Co-operation", Mao Tse-tung says that despite the increase in the output of the food crops as a result of the formation of co-operatives, "some people have stirred up a miniature typhoon. They are grouching that co-operative farming won't do, that it has no superior quality." Despite the claim that the production has increased, Mao Tse-tung advises the critics of the new experiment not to judge it by immediate results. It will take five years or even longer when it will be possible to judge the success or failure of the experiment, he says, adding : "As most of our co-operatives are only a little over a year old, it would be unreasonable to expect too much from them so soon." He seeks to demolish the case that the peasants are leading a hard existence and simultaneously indicates his willingness to stabilise over a number of years the total amounts of grain tax and State purchases at approximately 80,000 million catties a year. This, he hopes, will make the peasants self-sufficient in food grains. This statement has to be read in the context of official reports of widespread famine conditions in large parts of China which compelled the Government to introduce rationing even in the countryside.

Mao Tse-tung admits that "in certain places both great Han chauvinism and local nationalism still exist in a serious degree" adding that "because conditions in Tibet are not ripe, democratic reforms have not yet been carried out there." He warns against impatience in carrying out the so-called democratic reforms in Tibet. When these reforms will be carried out "can only be decided by the great majority of the people of Tibet." It had been decided "not to proceed with democratic reforms in Tibet during the period of the second Five-Year Plan, and we can only decide whether it will be done in the period of the third Five-Year Plan, in the light of the situation obtaining at that time." This indirectly confirms reports of widespread revolt and unrest in Tibet. The Chinese troops and personnel have had to be withdrawn from parts of Tibet in view of hostility on the part of the people.

In still another section of the address (1957), Mao Tse-tung admits that there have been demonstrations and strikes in different parts of China among the students, workers and peasants. "The immediate cause of these disturbances was the failure to satisfy certain of their demands for material benefits....But a more important cause was bureaucracy on the part of those in position of leadership....Another cause of these disturbances was that the ideological and political educational work done among the workers and students was inadequate. In the same year, members of a small number of agricultural co-operatives also created disturbances...." He makes it clear that the authorities will not put up with these disturbances and adds: "We believe that our people stand for Socialism, that they uphold discipline and are reasonable, and will not create disturbances without reason. *But this does not mean that in our country there is no possibility of the masses creating disturbances.*

"In our country, there are also a number of people who are unmindful of public interests, refuse to listen to reason, commit crimes and break the laws. They may take advantage of our policies and distort them, deliberately put forward unreasonable

demands in order to stir up the masses or deliberately stir rumours to create trouble and disrupt social order. We do not propose to let these people have their way. On the contrary legal action must be taken against them. The masses demand that these persons be punished. Not to do so will run counter to popular will."

Mao Tse-tung, while emphasising the need for "economy and elimination of waste in every respect throughout the country", advocated that the majority of the undertakings must be medium and small-scale enterprises and not large-scale modern ones. He deplored that a "dangerous tendency has shown itself of late among many of our personnel—an unwillingness to share the joys and hardships of the masses, a concern for personal position and gain." Soon after the publication of the address, the wages of the lower Government staff were reduced on the plea that this reduction would help to bridge the gap between them and the people. While affirming that "heavy industry is the core of China's economic construction" Mao Tse-tung pleaded that "full attention must be paid to the development of agriculture and light industry...With the development of agriculture and light industries, heavy industry will be assured of its markets and funds and thus grow faster. Hence what may seem to be a slower pace of industrialisation is not so."

Significantly in this context of industrial development, Mao Tse-tung poses the question: Who designed and equipped so many factories for us? "Was it the United States? or Britain?" He supplies the answer: "No, neither of them. Only the Soviet Union was willing to do so because it is a Socialist country and our ally...It is perfectly true that we should learn from the good experience of all countries, Socialist or capitalist, but the main thing is still to learn from the Soviet Union."

One can only speculate if Mao Tse-tung was replying to some silent or not so silent a criticism that the Chinese Government's policy of solely depending on the Soviet Union had not

paid off. China has been anxious to open trade relations with the West and Japan in an effort to get capital goods. Also in 1956 work was in progress on 137 projects. Of these 11 were expected to be completed during the year. But in 1957 work is to continue or begin only 102 instead of the remaining 126 projects. Of the much advertised 156 industrial projects that Russian engineers and technicians are believed to have been building in China for the past several years, only 43 have been "completed or partially placed in operation" (Peking Radio, April 14, 1957.) Nothing has been heard of the 55 additional projects Mikoyan had promised Mao Tse-tung during his visit to Peking in April, 1956, after the 20th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union where Khrushchev had made his famous secret speech indicting Stalin for decimating the Communist Party through a regime of terror. It is not impossible that the Soviet aid fell short of the Chinese expectation or that the Soviet experts tendered unsuitable advice.

That may have been in Mao Tse-tung's mind when he said: "There are two attitudes to learning from others. One is a doctrinaire attitude, transplanting everything, whether suited or not to the conditions of our country. This is not a good attitude. Another attitude is to use our heads and learn those things which suit conditions in our country.... This is the attitude we should adopt." This follows the advice that though China should learn from all other countries, the "main thing is still to learn from the Soviet Union."

Clearly the Chinese leaders have been confronted with major discontent at home. On Chairman Mao's own showing, the "Hungarian events caused our intellectuals to lose their balance a bit", "certain people in our country were delighted when the Hungarian events took place", "some people have stirred up a miniature typhoon" on the issue of agricultural co-operatives, "Marxism that once the rage is not much in fashion now", "both great Han chauvinism and local nationalism still exist in a serious degree in certain places", forcing the authorities to abandon the plan to introduce reforms in Tibet, and "workers

and students in certain places went on strike." His repeated references to Hungary, his promise to stabilise the Government's acquisition of food grains and the emphasis on the development of agriculture and small-scale industries are significant pointers to the situation in China.

It would appear that Prof. Ko Pei-chi was only being factual when he contrasted the popular acclaim for the Liberation Army in 1948-49 with popular apathy towards the Communists today. "Nothing could be wider apart than the Party and the masses today compared with the pre-Liberation days. The masses are under the surveillance of Partyites who behave like plain clothed policemen," he said, adding that China belonged to 600 million people and not to the Communist Party alone. He warned the Communists: "Your adoption of the attitude 'I am the State' cannot be tolerated. The Communist Party must not become conceited and arrogant, nor must it distrust us intellectuals. If you carry on satisfactorily, well and good; if not, the masses might bring you down...The downfall of the Party does not mean the downfall of China; we would not be traitors to the country." (*The Times*, London, June 26, 1957.)

An analysis of the situation by different committees of the Chinese Communist Party drew attention to the "preliminary contradictions" facing them. These reports showed: Since last winter lakhs of peasant households had withdrawn from co-operatives and "in areas where there had been great economic changes, little had been done to improve the livelihood of the people." Since last year there had been 13 strikes by workers in one province alone. Discrepancies in the wage system and the nature of the management had made the relations between the workers and the management tense. There was widespread unemployment in the towns and cities. Over 60 per cent. of the middle pass students had no chance to continue their studies. Because of sectarianism in the Party, intellectuals were not treated with enough respect with the result that the relations between the two were far from being happy. There was a strong

dissatisfaction among the democratic parties and the industrialists and business men because only their "negative side" had been emphasised by the Party cadres. The special characteristics of the minority nationalities had been ignored during the collectivisation drive because the minority cadres had no real authority. Also necessities of life were generally in short supply and their prices had shot up due to inflationary pressure in the economy.

In view of China's breakneck speed of industrialisation with accent on heavy industry and the collectivisation of 90 per cent. of the peasant holdings from July 1955 to July 1956 even before an adequate industrial base had been created to mechanise agriculture, it was only natural that there should exist in the country widespread economic discontent. Nothing is more revealing of the failure of the agricultural policy than the constant exodus of poor peasants to the cities. Hundreds of thousands of these peasants chose to sleep under stalls, to beg or to pull rickshaws to living in the villages after the collectivisation of agriculture. In June, 1956, the regime found it advisable to recreate the free market in respect of agricultural goods. In September, 1956, Liu Shao-chi told the Party Congress: "The production of agricultural goods and the products of auxiliary occupations of agriculture has likewise diminished; the exchange of parts of the products has been hindered." He also mentioned that the quality of the industrial goods was poorer than before and the variety of products had diminished. The situation in agricultural sector was aggravated by major floods resulting in widespread famine conditions in different parts of China. The Chinese press was full of stories detailing how the peasants had been oppressed by the *kanpus*, armed with both economic and political power in the collectives.

Earlier Deputy Prime Minister Chen Yen had admitted that there was inflationary pressure within the economy and that there was shortage of meat, eggs, paper, cloth, leather shoes, woollen cloth, radios, cycles, pig iron, steel, timber and firewood.

In consequence of the frank admission of waste, inefficiency and extravagance, the pace of the development plan had to be held down. The regime denounced as grossly excessive the recruitment of labour based on the demands of ambitious local enterprises. According to the State Statistical Bureau: "The total number of workers increased by 2,5 million during 1956, swelling China's labour force to 24,730,000. Because of lack of investigation and study of actual needs of the national economy, the army of the newly added workers represented double actual requirement....Personnel not directly engaged in production grew to such proportions as to be intolerable. There were more employees than jobs and the nation's resources were squandered." (*The Economist*, London, March 9, 1957.)

Announced changes in the Plan included reduction in capital construction, more intensive development of arable land and improvement in farming methods in place of earlier plans of mechanising agriculture through the production and import of tractors and other agricultural implements, cut in the Army expenditure and social services, and increased emphasis on quality of goods instead of quantity. The ratio between heavy and light industries was revised in favour of light industries. (For details, see *The Economist*, London, March 9, 1957). At the National People's Congress in June-July, 1957, the Finance Minister admitted that there had been a deficit of £ 260 million in the budget of the last year. He attributed it mainly to expenditure on flood relief and the "over-fulfilment" of capital projects. He announced cuts of 1.5 per cent. on defence, eight per cent. on administration, and 20 per cent. on capital construction. The aid to other countries, however, would be raised by 25.7 per cent. This should by itself indicate the nature of Peking's interest in North Viet Nam, the chief recipient of Chinese aid, as also the problems facing Ho Chi Minh.

Vice-Premier Po I-Po informed the National People's Congress that the "worst in decades" crop failure in 1956 had reduced the scope for industrial expansion. The export of food grains had to be cut down by 22 per cent. and in

consequence "in import plans, major reductions had been made in the amount of the general machinery." The Prime Minister, Mr. Chou En-lai, said that natural disasters during the previous year had damaged crops over an area of 38 million acres inhabited by a population of nearly 70 million. In the previous month Peking Radio had admitted that 15 million people had faced the threat of famine in Eastern Hopei province alone. Two Vice-Governors and eight local functionaries had been dismissed and downgraded respectively in Kwangsi province on the charge of having failed to transport food grains to the deficit areas resulting in the death of 550 persons. The President of the Supreme People's Court threw light on still another aspect of the situation in China when he told the Congress that the people's courts had in 1956 handled 1,000,000 cases of 'corruption, theft, assault, public disturbances' and other crimes, mostly involving the peasants.

The nature of the economic problems confronting the regime is emphasised by the change in its attitude on the population question. The Chinese in 1956-57 abandoned the classical Marxist position that Malthus was wrong in holding that the increase in population could outstrip world's total food resources. The Marxist economists and propagandists had contended that the capitalist system was the main bottleneck in the expansion of national economies and that Socialist societies would never face the problem of over-population. The Russian experience of the need for raising population underscored this theoretical position. The Chinese Communists took up the same position. Only in 1956 they publicly admitted that the rise of population by 15 million a year would make it difficult for them to improve the living standards of the people. The official line was suddenly changed and the Government legalised abortions and sterilisation. Mao Tse-tung himself said in the address under discussion that large population was in a sense contradictory to the plans of economic development in a poor country.

Meanwhile throughout the latter part of 1956 and early

1957, the Chinese press was full of articles revealing loss of faith, disillusionment and disappointment among the students. These articles drew pointed attention to the sense of doubt among the students about the superior merit of the socialist system. The students clearly had been dissatisfied with the imitation of Soviet educational methods, dogmatism, uniformity, forced regimentation, excessive supervision, stifling discipline, sectarianism and 'mechanical and unvarying life' they were forced to live and shortages of accommodation and long hours of work in schools and colleges. The press complained that the students had rejected Communist morality and that they were disrespectful to university authorities and sent ultimatums to them. Below are quoted some excerpts from the Chinese papers.

Mr. Feng Chun wrote in *The Chinese Youth* on December 1: "After seeing several Socialist States resorting to incorrect measures, which have aroused the people's displeasure, a small portion of young people are beginning to doubt the superiority of the socialist system and are losing confidence in socialism.... Some young people extend and apply their discontent to everything, deny and reject everything.... They hold themselves apart, jeer at our organisers, criticise the shortcomings in our work, express their feelings by gestures.... They believe every rumour they happen to hear."

The December 16, 1956, issue of the same review carried another article by Hsia Shu, who wrote: "Confronted with the problems arising from the internal relations of socialism, a number of young people have been visited by all kinds of doubts, they have become sceptical, their minds are in utter confusion.... Students have taken a keen interest in the various events which have taken place within the international Communist movement.... But in considering these events, the students have failed to judge them correctly. Some of them fail to distinguish our friends from our enemies.... A considerable number of students have no clear idea of the fundamental difference between Socialist and bourgeois democracy. Others tend to lack interest in politics."

Earlier Chiang Nan-hsiang had written in October 16, 1956, issue of the *Chinese Youth*: "A certain number of comrades discovered defects and shortcomings. For instance they declared that university students were over-worked. They wondered, sceptically, whether it was right to study and follow the Soviet Union."

The Kuang Ming Jih Pao, Peking, regretted editorially on October 26, 1957: "Some students are undisciplined, disrespectful towards their professors and display a tendency towards excessive democratisation....Some students simply waste their valuable time....One state of things is quite customary....In their studies, university students are guided entirely by their personal tastes....In their lives university students set up individualism in opposition to collectivism. At every opportunity they lay stress on the freedom of the individual, the habits of the individual, the tastes and opinions of the individual, thus showing a rather dangerous tendency towards individualism. But faced with this situation, neither the professors nor the organisers responsible for the students, nor the students themselves venture to intervene for the fear of being regarded as interfering with individual liberty or strangling the development of personality....University students are displaying a tendency towards excessive democratisation....Their attitude is one which rejects discipline. The principles of liberty have come into fashion with grave results..." (For a detailed analysis of such reports, see March-April issue of *Saturn*, published by the International Commission against Concentration Camp Practices, Paris.)

Apparently this discontent was not confined to students. It affected the intellectuals as well. It was officially admitted that the output of literary and artistic works had considerably gone down in terms of quantity and quality. The regime might have suspected that the intellectuals were spreading disaffection among the people. In fact soon after the criticism campaign was brought under control and the Communist functionaries launched an offensive against the "rightists" and the "enemies of the people," the Government alleged that it had discovered

several plots to overthrow the regime. Some of these plots were allegedly organised by the intellectuals. On July 24, 1957, Peking Radio announced that the intellectuals had led an uprising in distant Tsinghai adjoining Tibet. According to Peking Radio, the revolt had been financed by capitalists from other parts of China. The small party of revolutionaries and their leaders had been arrested. (*The Statesman*, New Delhi, July 25, 1957.)

This announcement was only the beginning of the discovery of numerous such plots by Peking. Six days later on July 31, 1957, the New China News Agency reported that the leaders of a secret "China Liberal Party" had been arrested at the Yellow Sea port of Tsingtao for planning to build anti-Communist armed forces in China. The arrests had been made on June 15 and it was alleged that the arrested leaders had tried to extend their organisation to Shanghai, Hong Kong and Peking. On August 6, 1957, Chinese newspapers reported that more than 1,000 middle school students in Manyang in Central China had rioted and demonstrated against the Government on June 12 and 13. The reports said that 'counter-revolutionaries', who had since been arrested, had incited the students to smash the local Communist Party offices and to kidnap the leading Communists and beat them. According to these reports, students of Hanyang shouted slogans like "Welcome to Kuomintang", "Down with the Party", and "Chairman Mao Will Come Down Off the Stage Soon." (*The Times of India*, August 7.)

A day earlier on August 5, Peking Radio announced that the security police had arrested leaders of a counter-revolutionary organisation plotting to overthrow the regime in Honan and Hopch provinces. They were alleged to have planned to organise riots on June 24. Besides the alleged plot in Tsinghai referred to above, other counter-revolutionary groups were said to have been uncovered in Kwangtung, Kwangsi, Shantung, Szechuan and Chinghai. (*The Statesman and Hindustan Times*, New Delhi, August 8, 1957.) The greatest living woman writer

Ting Ling (52) was accused of being a rightist. She had been a member of the Communist Party since 1931 and once had a poem written to her by Chairman Mao. She and Chen Chi-hsia, another woman writer, were alleged to have thought in October last at the time of the Hungarian revolt that the time had come to launch a counter-attack against the Party. The charges against the two writers were made at a series of meetings of the China Writers' Association and at the tenth such meeting on August 3 Chen Chi-hsia confessed.

Whatever the truth in these allegations, they do indicate the nature of the problems facing the regime. These problems are in no way different from the problems facing the Communist regimes in Eastern Europe—overstrained economy, discontent among the peasants, workers and intellectuals and the failure of the traditional methods of terrorism to produce the desired results because they only drove the discontent underground and thus made it more dangerous for the survival of the regime. As in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union itself, the Communist rulers in China must have faced the dilemma inherent in Communism: how much of terrorism is to be combined with the 'methods of education and persuasion?' The Chinese Communists have an advantage over others in that they possess a united and mature leadership. The convulsions in the Communist part of the world, however, were bound to produce reverberations in Communist China as well. Also whatever the strength and weakness of the regime, the Chinese rulers had to maintain at least verbalised consistency with the pronouncements of other Communist leaders. If not in fact, at least in words, they had to pay homage to the concept of de-Stalinisation by which the Kremlin sets so much store. It is not impossible that they calculated that a mild dose of "liberalism" might help the regime tide over an admittedly difficult situation without in any way weakening the power structure of the Communist state in China.

IV

It is, therefore, clearly established that there has been no fundamental shift in the position of Mao Tse-tung. In our view, this position is essentially a Stalinist position. Defining the role of the Dictatorship of the Proletariat, Stalin had said : "The proletarian revolution, its movement, its scope, and its achievements acquire flesh and blood only through the dictatorship of the proletariat. The dictatorship of the proletariat is the instrument of the proletarian revolution, its organ, its most important mainstay, brought into being for the purpose of, firstly, crushing the resistance of the overthrown exploiters and consolidating the achievements of the proletarian revolution, and, secondly, carrying the proletarian revolution to its completion... The revolution can vanquish the bourgeoisie...without the dictatorship of the proletariat. But the revolution will be unable to crush the resistance of the bourgeoisie, to maintain its victory and to push forward to the final victory of Socialism unless, at a certain stage in its development, it creates a special organ in the form of the dictatorship of the proletariat as its mainstay...*The whole point is to retain power, to consolidate it, to make it invincible.*" He added : "The dictatorship of the proletariat, the transition from capitalism to Communism, must not be regarded as a fleeting period of 'super-revolutionary' acts and decrees, but as an entire historical era, replete with civil wars and external conflicts with persistent organisational work and economic construction, with advances and retreats, victories and defeats. The historical era is needed not only to create the economic and cultural prerequisites for the complete victory of socialism, but also to enable the proletariat, first, to educate itself and become steeled as a force capable of governing the country, and, secondly, to re-educate and remould the petty bourgeois strata along such lines as will assure the organisation of Socialist production. "Further the dictatorship of the proletariat can-

not be 'complete' democracy for all, for the rich as well as the poor ; the dictatorship of the proletariat must be a State that is democratic in a new way—for the proletariat and the propertyless in general—and dictatorial in a new way—against the bourgeoisie..." (On Leninism, Published by the People's Publishing House, Bombay, Pp 27,29,31.) Mao Tse-tung has said exactly this in mild terms, and sometimes the terms are not so mild.

The significance of Mao Tse-tung's address lies in the change of tactics that it denotes. The somewhat soft line in which the critics have escaped without being made "shorter by a head" has been advocated primarily in response to the needs of the situation at home and in the Communist world. Incidentally, it improves considerably the chances for Peking to win support among the Chinese traders and industrialists settled in other countries of Asia.

Moreover this is not the first time that the Chinese Communists are taking to the devious path of feigned liberalism in the pursuit of unchanging goals. Mao Tse-tung's famous maxim for guerilla warfare was :

When the enemy advances, we retreat,
When he escapes, we harass,
When he retreats, we pursue,
When he is tired, we attack.

This concept of political as well as military strategy in the past has now re-emerged in the period of Socialist construction. It is neither possible nor necessary in the course of this monograph to discuss all the shifts in the line of the Communist Party during the period of the struggle for power. The essential point to be emphasised is that a stage of war either within or without the Party exists permanently under Communism. This can be established by a reference to the post-1949 developments in China as well as to history of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. Two apparently contradictory developments took place when the Communists seized power on the mainland. Unlike in the previous decades, the Party began to emphasise the lead-

ing role of the urban workers in building the revolution. This liquidated the heresy of which the Chinese Communists were erroneously believed to have been guilty in the pre-1949 period. The Chinese Communists were not after all agrarian reformers. Simultaneously with this affirmation of the orthodox Communist position, an effort was made to rally the maximum number of social groups in support of the Communist cause and minimise the number of social groups which would be implacable enemies of the new regime. In this period, the petty-bourgeoisie and intellectuals and administrators were of necessity included along with the workers and the peasants as legitimate co-partners in the new set-up. Only the unregenerate KMT leaders, "imperialists" (read the U. S.), landlords and bureaucrat capitalists were regarded as 'enemies of the people.' The principle to be followed clearly was: "To unite with the majority, to attack the minority, to divide the enemies and to destroy the enemies one by one." The objective was to avoid unnecessary clashes during the formative period of the regime when it still had to consolidate itself. No effort was made to replace the bureaucracy. The Communists, following Mao Tse-tung's seasoned advice, had to learn the art of administration and business from the old functionaries and business men before seeking to eliminate them.

During this period of persuasion when an intensive propaganda campaign was launched for "the triple purpose of winning over the Chinese population to the new regime; educating the Chinese people into its peculiar vocabulary and perspective and defining the terms, concepts and attitudes required of the citizen if he was safely to survive in the new order," there was an unrelenting drive to educate and discipline the cadres themselves so that they could be ready to discipline the people in turn. The technique of running the persuasion campaign was the same as had been defined by Mao Tse-tung at the time of the *Cheng Perg* Movement in 1942.

Mao Tse-tung had laid down: "if the reasoning is good, if it is to the point, it can be effective. The first method in reasoning is to give the patients a powerful stimulus, yell at them

'you are sick' so that the patients will have a fright and break out in over-all sweat ; then they can be carefully treated." This clinical approach was followed in 1949-50 and hundreds of thousands of people "sweated" and humiliated themselves in public through 'voluntary confessions'. The regime subsequently exploited the Korean War to mobilise support for itself among the people on the slogan of fighting a patriotic war in self-defence against the U. S. imperialists. The Communists were simultaneously able to let loose a reign of terror.

The Korean War broke out on June 22, 1950. On July 23, 1950, Peking announced its decision to "suppress all counter-revolutionary activity, severely punish all Kuomintang counter-revolutionary elements who collaborate with imperialists, commit treason against the fatherland and oppose the cause of People's Democracy". By the end of the year a general campaign of repression and terror had been let loose at levels of the society. On February 21, 1951, a new law was enacted listing crimes punishable with death, life imprisonment and detention without trial. Mutual spying and denunciations among friends, relations and neighbours was encouraged as a part of a drive to uncover the "enemies of the people." A large number of people were publicly executed following summary trials by people's courts. In many cases the mobs at these courts were encouraged to stone the accused to death even before they were adjudged guilty. Forced labour became an important ingredient of the programme of economic construction as a large number of concentration camps were opened to serve as centres for the 'rehabilitation' of 'counter-revolutionaries'. In October, 1951, Premier Chou En-lai indicated that the campaign had passed its peak and terror was going to be relaxed.

Accurate figures of the people killed, imprisoned and sent to concentration camps as a result of this campaign are not available. Eight lakh is, however, too small a figure to be accepted as being correct or nearly correct. To quote W.W. Rostow from his *Prospects for Communist China* (pub-

lished by the New American Library, Pp. 82 and 83): "Communist press reports boasting of the accomplishments of the People's Liberation Army, set a total of 261,686 'bandits' killed in Kwangtung and Kwangsi in the first six months of 1951; a total for the Central-South regions of 1,060,000 by October, 1951. Moraes set total executions by mid-1952 at nearly two million. A priest, resident in China 23 years, basing his figures on the statements of Communist officials, estimated in 1953 that all-China executions numbered about seven million—out of 20 million imprisoned in the same period. He points out that priests expelled from North China, and familiar with the area, consider seven million to represent but a fraction of the total. Obviously both figures represent purely personal estimates. Assistant Secretary of State Walter S. Robertson has set the four-year total of the regime's killing of its people at approximately 15 million. A Nationalist summary of August 1, 1951, speech by Fu Tso-yi, Minister of Water Conservancy in the Communist Government, placed the number of forced labour in China at 18 million, but we have no verifiable figures."

Before the campaign against the counter-revolutionaries came to an end, the Communist Party leadership launched the famous three-Anti and five-Anti movements one after the other. The first movement was a drive within the Party and the State bureaucracy ostensibly aimed at the elimination of corruption, waste and bureaucratism. It resulted in widespread purges throughout the country. In these purges former KMT officials, who had earlier been retained in return for desertion to the Communist side, were replaced as far as possible by Communists who had been trained in the tasks of the administration in the meantime. Primarily it demoralised the bureaucracy and thus reassured the Party leaders that there was no danger of a rival centre of power growing up in the country.

Similarly the five-Anti movement was ostensibly aimed at eliminating bribery, tax evasion, fraud, theft of State property and the leakage of State economic secrets. In effect it was an attack on the residual middle class, which

was in theory co-operating with the workers and peasants in completing the bourgeois revolution and laying the foundations of Socialism. This movement was launched in November 1951 and continued till May 1952. During this period, many of the "offending" business men were sent to jail or forced labour camps for re-education and many others fled the country or committed suicide. Those who remained in business found themselves deprived of the power of independent action because of shortage of cash and financial resources and reduced to the position of State employees. In the end they were compelled to accept a five per cent. return on their investment subject to the provision that their rights in the property would disappear at the end of seven years by 1962. Additionally the State is estimated to have secured assets and cash worth about two billion dollars by way of fines and seizures of properties.

Inevitably the period of relaxation followed both at home and abroad. Peking liquidated its commitments first in Korea and then in Indo-China and settled down to a programme of economic reconstruction. There was a major shift in the Party line once again in 1955-56 when it was decided to force the pace of collectivisation and to convert private enterprises into joint State-private enterprises. In the preceding period, disciplinary measures inside the Communist Party had been tightened and Kao Kang, Communist boss of Manchuria and Northern China who was at one time rated second only to Mao Tse-tung in terms of personal power, was liquidated along with his supporters. In the subsequent period, Party spokesmen boasted that the peaceful transformation of the country's economy with the 'voluntary and joyous' co-operation of the people was an "unprecedented event in history" of mankind.

The Communist, Moscow, in its October issue devoted a 6,000-word article to defining the real character of the "peaceful growth of capitalism into Socialism" in China. It said: "The experience of building Socialism in the USSR,... China and other People's Democracies proves that the development of all countries that have set on the road to Social-

ism is subject to the laws that are effective for all. In order to build Socialist society in any country it is necessary for the working class to seize class domination and dictatorship on the basis of a strong union between the working class and the toiling peasantry. Supported by its regime, the working class appropriates the basic levels of economy and then step by step wrests all capital from the bourgeoisie, centralises all means of production in the hands of the State....*It must be noted that the sharpness of this struggle and its forms are not identical in the different countries. They are determined by the concrete historic conditions prevailing in each country.*"

The article said that the Socialist transformation in China had been assisted by "brotherly countries" and the fact of a "considerable portion" of the "national bourgeoisie" taking a "patriotic attitude" and entering the "unified anti-imperialist front together with the working class, the peasantry and the small-town bourgeoisie" was *"connected with the fact that the Chinese national bourgeoisie was fairly weak in economic and political respects."* The Chinese bourgeoisie "considered it expedient to recognise the leading role of the Communist Party....At the same time the Chinese national bourgeoisie could not but take cognisance of the deplorable fate of the Russian bourgeoisie. *The fact that in the phase of building of Socialism in China, the working class collaborates with the national bourgeoisie does not mean that there is not a sharp struggle between them. It would be unnatural to expect that the working class...will not meet with resistance on the part of the bourgeoisie—its main enemy.*"

Recalling Liu Shao-chi's statement at the eighth Party Congress in October, 1956, that in the beginning there was an unceasing struggle of the State against the national bourgeoisie, the article said: "At the time, this struggle took the character of mass campaign which reached great bitterness and sharpness. Thus in 1950, the Government had to conduct a decisive struggle against the bourgeoisie for the stabilisation of prices and against the bourgeoisie's speculative activities....In

1952 the well known campaign began against the five misdeeds of the bourgeoisie...In 1953, when the Chinese people tackled the task of the first Five-Year Plan...they again met with embittered resistance of the village and town bourgeoisie. The policy of restriction as implemented by the People's Government in regard to capitalist private property clashed with the narrow class interests of the capitalists, who were not prepared and willing to yield their position." It again quoted Liu Shao-chi as having said : *"The struggle for and against the limitations and restrictions was the basic form of class struggle during the last few years."*

The article added : "We cannot ignore the fact that in 1955...the struggle to stifle the counter-revolution flared up again....The Chinese Communist Party chose the right path, the path outlined by Marx and Lenin....The Chinese Communist Party...evolved a system of transition measures aimed at the gradual transformation of agriculture and the capitalist sector of economy on a Socialist basis." The article indicated clearly that the main battle in 1955-56 had been joined in the villages.

It said : "The Socialist transformation of the capitalist sector of the Chinese economy is a process of its gradual liquidation...which is achieved by the State as a result of an intensive, economic political and ideological struggle....Thus towards the middle of 1956, more than 90 per cent—of all peasant farms were co-operativised, while about two-thirds of them joined co-operatives of a higher—that is, Socialist type. By this very fact the Socialist transformation of agriculture can be considered basically completed. At the same time the transformation of capitalist industry and trade was basically completed. Ninety-five per cent of all capitalist industrial enterprises, calculated on the basis of the value of finished products, were transformed into mixed State-private enterprises....This is a decisive step towards converting capitalist property into Socialist public property."

According to the *Kommunist*, "the crux of the matter lies in the fact that capitalism as a system is in the process of being liquidated in industry and agriculture. The capitalist system of economy...does not 'grow' into Socialism. It is destroyed and annihilated in the course of building Socialism. The objective essence of this process does not depend upon this or that form or on the grade or intensity of the class struggle."

Lenin had provided the clue to the Chinese experiment when he said : "The transition to Communism is also possible by means of State capitalism provided that the power in the State is in the hands of the working class", needless to say that working class being used to mean the Communist Party. Viewed from any angle, the dictatorship of the Communist Party is the most important feature of the Socialist society from the Communist point of view. The Chinese Communists have not given any indication that they are prepared to modify their position on this point.

V

It is somewhat surprising that some of the political commentators, who had consistently, even though not wholly correctly, argued that the essentially humanistic philosophy of Marxism became the basis for the emergence of the worst form of tyranny and despotism in the process of being exported to predominantly agricultural and industrially backward Russia without a tradition of democratic form of Government and liberal thought, should have advanced the view that Communism in China is developing along humane and liberal lines. China today shares many features with pre-Revolution Russia. It is predominantly agricultural and industrially backward. If one is permitted to generalise in matters of ideas, liberal ideas never had in China the circulation they had even in Russia. China has a tradition of political despotism and the middle class is conspicuous by its near absence. If anything, therefore, Marxist philosophy, according to their logic, was likely to be further orientated towards despotism in being re-exported to China from Russia. Surprisingly enough, the fact of the Chinese Communist Party's dependence on the peasantry in the struggle for power created a widespread belief that the Chinese Communists were mere agrarian reformers. The fact that the strategy had been tailored primarily to seize power was ignored. Not enough notice was taken of the fact that the rise of Mao Tse-tung as the leader of Chinese Communism and the acceptance of his line of building military bases in the countryside followed the destruction of the Party in the urban areas. But even otherwise in agricultural China with a tradition of peasant revolts, it would have been only natural for the Communists to seek the support of the peasantry in the struggle for power.

Implicit in this mistaken analysis of the Chinese scene was the failure of the non-Communist political thinkers and com-

mentators to grasp firmly that Lenin was a political determinist whose sole contribution to Marxism was to perfect the theory of capturing power, retaining it and extending its scope till nothing in the so-called Communist society was left outside the purview of the State Power. Mao Tse-tung is a true follower of Lenin in that he accepts that the first task of a Communist Party is to seize power and maintain it and that the means utilized in doing so are of secondary importance. He knew that in China, the poverty stricken peasantry was the best available instrument for helping the Communist Party into power. Nothing could illustrate the utter confidence that Mao Tse-tung had in the validity of his strategy than the following account by the late Mr. M.N. Roy, one of the founder-members of the Communist International, of his first meeting with Mao Tse-tung. The latter was then not one of the top leaders of the Chinese Communist Party, while the former was in China in 1927 as the Special Representative of the Communist International :

"I first met him in the hectic days of summer of 1927....It was after midnight ; we were in the midst of a heated discussion in the Politburo of the Communist Party. Borodin was present sitting next to me. A tall man with a swarthy, broad face, longish straight hair thrown back on the high forehead, walked calmly but haughtily. Everybody looked up. Chen Tu-hsiu was speaking to expound once again his famous thesis...He stopped. 'Mao Tse-tung', Borodin whispered in my ear. We two foreigners looked at each other. Borodin remarked in an undertone : 'A hard nut to crack. Typically Chinese.' Mao whispered a few words with Chen Tu-hsiu and started making a speech. He had not taken a seat on entering....

"Neither Borodin nor myself understood Chinese. But it was evident that the speech was addressed to me....From a running translation I could gather that the President of the Peasants' Federation was endorsing Chen's thesis on the basis of first hand experience. 'How could foreigners have any idea of the Chinese reality ? I am coming straight from Hunan; irres-

possible members of the Communist Party are misleading the peasantry....

"It was nearing dawn, I suggested that Mao should meet me later in the morning to discuss the matter further. No, he could not live comfortably in Hankow when the peasant masses were suffering. He must return to Hunan immediately and demanded a prompt decision....He left as abruptly as he had come. A man who evidently knew what he wanted and was not to be deflected, either by reason or authority, was born to be a dictator...."

Eight years later in 1935 Mao Tse-tung graduated to the dictatorship of China when he emerged as the unquestioned leader of the Chinese Communist Party. In 1949 he assumed dictatorial powers in the world's most populous country with the oldest civilisation. It must be said to his credit that all along in his remarkable career he made it clear that he was adapting his programme and strategy to winning power for the Communist Party in the peculiar conditions of China. He made no secret of the fact that all his major formulations originated from Marxism-Leninism and Stalinism and were adapted to suit the conditions in China.

Though it might sound hetrodoxical, the fact remains that Mao Tse-tung's greatness has lain not in his theoretical formulations but in his ability to apply Marxism-Leninism to the specific situation in China as it has developed from time to time. Primarily he is a strategist and not a thinker in the sense of having fathered new ideas. He is essentially a man of sound political judgment who justly claims to be able to exploit every situation. One of his great strokes as a political strategist was to form the united front with the Kuomintang against the Japanese in 1937. Whatever the motivation, the alliance suited the interests of the Communist Party as it fitted into the worldwide Communist strategy of forming united fronts with liberal and social democratic parties; Russia was certainly interested in thwarting the expansion of

Japanese power in China. But the Chinese Communists were not acting mainly on Russia's behalf in forging a united front against Japanese aggression. To quote W.W. Rostow from his *Prospects for Communist China* (P 44) once again :

1. It was in the interest of the Chinese Communists that Chiang Kai-shek commit his military resources against the Japanese rather than devote them to the destruction of the Communists.
2. It was in Chinese Communists' interest to present themselves to the Chinese people, and especially to intelligentsia, as the most energetic defenders of the Chinese nation against a foreign aggressor.
3. As in the earlier days of Communist-KMT collaboration, an alliance against Japan would offer the Chinese Communists respectable reasons and increased channels for carrying on nation-wide propaganda.
4. Operations against Japan would afford the possibilities of extending the area over which the Communist armies, and therefore, Communist civil administration, could extend their control.

The alliance against Japan was necessary in view of the widespread antipathy against foreigners in China. The Chinese people in the later half of the last century had suffered great humiliations at the hands of Western nations; the feeling of nationalism was particularly strong among them. This strategy also helped the Communists to spread the myth that they were not Communists at all. When the war ended in 1945, the Communists found themselves in control of 95 million people inhabiting an area of over 300,000 sq. miles. In 1937 they had controlled an area of 30,000 sq. miles with a population of two million. The Communist army emerged stronger with 900,000 soldiers as it had confined itself to guerilla warfare and had not risked frontal operations against the Japanese. The Soviet

occupation of Manchuria, the Ruhr of China, as a result of a 10-day war against Japan, completed the work of laying the foundation for the Communist seizure of power.

Mao Tse-tung's *New Democracy* (1940), which was at once a theoretical justification for the policy of the united front as well as an attempt to prepare the Party for the collapse of the alliance with the KMT, strengthened the impression that the Chinese were not Communists in the classical sense of the term. Mao Tse-tung emphasised the 'bourgeois-democratic' nature of the revolution in which there would be a joint 'dictatorship of several revolutionary classes.' The qualification that he made was that the character of the 'bourgeois' revolution itself had been modified by the fact of its taking place in the era of proletarian revolutions initiated by the Soviet Union. This formulation clearly flowed from Lenin's definition of the role of liberation movements in colonies and dependent countries. But in this aspect of the formulation, Mao Tse-tung laid primary emphasis on the 'bourgeois-democratic' character of the revolution and not on the qualification because the aim was to disarm the suspicions of the intelligentsia and of the commercial and trading classes. The final objective of the Communist Party of seizing power and establishing a socialist Society on the Soviet model was under-played as also the determination of the Communist Party to maintain its supreme position among the parties to be allowed to function under *New Democracy*. The role of *New Democracy* as a transitional stage in the emergence of the Dictatorship of the Proletariat on the Russian model was deliberately not emphasised.

This formulation did not confuse the outside world and the enemies of Communism alone. It confused the rank and file of the Communist Party itself. The leadership had to open the *Cheng Feng* (ideological remoulding) movement in 1942 to bring the Party members into line with Mao Tse-tung's version of Leninist orthodoxy. The dictatorial discipline within the Party was tightened to restore it to the sharp outlines which had

been somewhat blurred by the impact of the united front in the patriotic war and *New Democratic* formulations. Incidentally, it may be noted that the leadership in the Chinese Communist Party has always tightened discipline within the Party whenever it has relaxed pressure on the people.

A new illusion was created about the Chinese Communists after they had captured power in 1949. It took the form of the belief that Mao Tse-tung would be the Tito of Asia. The hope that the Chinese Communists would break away from the Kremlin was entertained in the face of repeated statements by Mao Tse-tung about the inevitability of 'leaning towards one side', 'indestructible unity of socialist countries' and the unreserved support that be extended to the Soviet Union in its conflict with Marshal Tito. Additionally, the theoretical position of the Chinese Communists was that the struggle against imperialism was continuing. According to them, the cold war itself was the expression of the determination of the imperialist countries to destroy the Socialist countries. Since the Chinese revolution was itself in its character anti-imperialist, the Chinese Government could not but support the Soviet Union in its struggle against the imperialist powers headed by the United States. From any point of view, therefore, the illusion that the Chinese Communists would break away from the Soviet bloc was unsupportable. This illusion has not yet been shattered. The view that the Chinese Communists are different from the Soviet ones is an expression of this illusion.

A well known commentator, Mr. G. F. Hudson, in an article in the April issue of the *International Affairs* (published under the auspices of the Royal Institute of International Affairs, London) poses the question: How have such misconceptions about the Chinese Communists prevailed so widely and so long? According to him, "Partly they have been due to mere wishful thinking, partly due to misunderstanding of practices which appeared to be at variance with the Soviet model, partly to exaggeration of points of real conflict or disagreement, but

above all to the fact that nearly all observers with long experience and knowledge of Chinese affairs were quite ignorant of Marxist-Leninist doctrine and incapable of judging whether the Chinese Communists genuinely adhered to it or not. He adds: "Certainly no systematic study of writings accepted as authoritative by the Chinese Communists could have given rise to the belief that they regard themselves as anything but orthodox Marxist-Leninists or that they have failed to take their convictions extremely seriously."

This writer is in complete agreement with this view. An analysis of the stand taken by the Chinese Communist Party on the three major issues which have convulsed the Soviet world—Khrushchev's speech on the crimes of Stalin in February, 1956, Hungarian uprising in October-November, 1956, and the Soviet leadership's second rupture with Tito following the Hungarian uprising—should help to substantiate the view that the Chinese Communists are orthodox Marxist-Leninists.

There is little scope for doubt that the attack on Stalin by Khrushchev at the 20th Congress of the Soviet Communist Party was not well received in China. The fact that the Chinese leadership had not been taken into confidence by the Soviet leaders in taking such a vital decision was not the sole reason for the former to feel put out. For one thing, this violent attack on the cult of personality was personally embarrassing to Mao Tse-tung whose word was the law in China. But more important still, the whole theory and practice of Chinese Communism had been fashioned after the teachings of Lenin as interpreted by Stalin. Stalin was for long years regarded as the supreme leader of the international Communist movement and many of the decisions of the Chinese Communist leadership had been justified by references to Stalin's writings and speeches on the one hand and the policies of the Soviet Union under his leadership on the other. Only three years earlier on the occasion of Stalin's death, Mao Tse-tung had described him as the "greatest genius of the present era" and the "great teacher and leader of the world Communist movement."

The Chinese Communist Party avoided taking up a position on Khrushchev's secret speech. Peking broke its silence on the issue of de-Stalinisation only on April 5, 1956, on the eve of Mikoyan's arrival in Peking on April 6. Its views were expressed through an article published in the *People's Daily*, Peking, on behalf of the Editorial Board. The article had been prepared on the basis of discussions at an extended meeting of the Politbureau of the Party to which non-members had been invited. Why the Chinese leadership was so circumspect is not yet clear. The article opened with a praise for Stalin and his achievements.

It said : "After Lenin's death, Stalin as the chief leader of the Party and the State, creatively applied and developed Marxism-Leninism. In the struggle to defend the legacy of Leninism against the enemies of Leninism,... Stalin expressed the will and wishes of the people and proved himself an outstanding champion of Marxism-Leninism. Stalin ... played an important historic role, first of all, because...he defended Lenin's line of industrialisation and agricultural collectivisation of the Soviet State." His crime was that he "carried the problem of eliminating counter-revolutionaries to excess, showed lack of necessary vigilance on the eve of the anti-Fascist war, failed to pay proper attention to the further development of agriculture... advocated certain erroneous lines in the international Communist movement, especially on the question of Yugoslavia." This part of the statement was clearly a concession to the dominant group in the Soviet leadership.

The Chinese leaders sorrowed over the fact that "even so outstanding a man as Stalin inevitably made unrealistic and wrong decisions on certain important matters." This happened because he "tolerated and encouraged" the cult of the individual. The implication clearly was that in the Soviet Union Stalin alone was not the victim of this cult. But he should not be judged harshly on that account because "the cult of the individual is a putrid carry-over from the long history of mankind"

with the result that it is a "force of habit of millions and tens of millions." Even more significantly, the statement reaffirmed the role of the leaders in history. "Marxism-Leninism acknowledges that leaders play an important role in history. The Party and the people need outstanding personalities who can represent the interests and the will of the people and stand in the forefront of the historic struggle to lead them. To deny the role of the individual, the role of the vanguard and leaders is completely wrong." By implication, the Chinese leaders listed Stalin among such personalities.

The statement drew a clear distinction between Stalin the man and his achievements as the leader of the Communist movement. It said that his achievements "will still, as hitherto, be studied seriously. All that is of benefit in his works, especially much of his writing in defence of Leninism and incorrectly summarising Soviet experience in construction, we should take as an important historic legacy. To do otherwise would be a mistake." (For detailed discussion on this issue, see *Thought* magazine, New Delhi, October 13, 20 and 27, 1956). The Chinese leadership thus rescued Stalinism even when for the sake of unity with the Soviet Union, it had to criticise certain aspects of his personality, for all writings by Stalin either defend Leninism as he understood it or summarise Soviet experience in Socialist construction. Certainly his adventures into fields like philology are not essential parts of the Stalin doctrine.

The Politbureau of the Chinese Communist Party discussed this issue once again in December, 1956. The occasion was the open rupture between the Soviet leaders and Tito which had led the latter to make the famous speech at Pula in which he had charged Stalinists in the Kremlin and other Communist parties with being responsible for the difficulties of the Communist world. Once again non-members were invited to the meeting of the highest organ of the Party and the discussions were published in the form of an article on behalf of the editorial board in the *People's Daily*, Peking, on December 29, 1956. This article went even further in exonerating Stalin ;

his worst crime being that he had fallen into 'subjectivism.' It sought to discourage the use of the word 'de-Stalinization' among the Communists and said: "The western bourgeoisie and right-wing social democrats have deliberately labelled the correction of Stalin's mistakes 'de-Stalinisation' and described it as a struggle waged by 'anti-Stalinist' elements against 'Stalinist' elements. Unfortunately similar views of this kind have gained ground among some Communists. We consider it extremely harmful for the Communist to hold such views." This was a sharp rebuke to Marshal Tito because he had posed the choice between the 'Stalinist' course and the path followed by Yugoslavia. We shall return to it later. Here we are only concerned with Chinese Communist Party leadership's attempts to rehabilitate Stalin and 'Stalinism'.

The statement said: "As is well known, although Stalin committed grave mistakes in his later years, *his was nevertheless the life of a great Marxist-Leninist revolutionary.... Stalin's mistakes did harm to the Soviet Union, which could have been avoided....Nevertheless the Socialist Soviet Union made tremendous progress during the period of Stalin's leadership.... Therefore, in summing up Stalin's thoughts and activities, we must consider both his positive and negative sides, both his achievements and mistakes....As long as we examine the matter in an all-round way, even if we speak of Stalinism, this can only mean, in the first place, Communism and Marxism-Leninism, which is the main aspect; and secondarily it contains certain extremely serious mistakes which go against Marxism-Leninism and must be thoroughly corrected....In our opinion, Stalin's mistakes take second place to his achievements.*"

These observations on Stalin should be read in the context of the statement on the fundamental aspects of the Soviet experience, which is regarded as being of universal significance at this stage of human development and history. According to the statement, the fundamental experience of the Soviet Union can be summed up as:

1. The advanced members of the proletariat organise themselves into a party which takes Marxism-Leninism as its guide to action, builds itself up along the lines of democratic centralism, establishes close links with the masses, strives to become the core of the labouring masses, and educates the Party members and the masses of people in Marxism-Leninism.
2. The proletariat under the leadership of the Communist Party rallying all the labouring people, takes political power from the bourgeoisie by means of revolutionary struggle.
3. After the victory of the revolution, the proletariat under the leadership of the Communist Party rallying the broad masses of the people on the basis of worker-peasant alliance, establishes a dictatorship of the proletariat over the landlord and capitalist classes, crushes the resistance of the counter-revolutionaries, and carries on the nationalization of industry and the step-by-step collectivisation of agriculture, thereby eliminating the system of exploitation, private ownership of the means of production and classes.
4. The State...leads the people in the planned development of Socialist economy and culture, and on this basis gradually raises the people's living standards and actively prepares and works for the transition to Communist society.
5. The State,...led by the proletariat and the Communist Party resolutely opposes Imperialist aggression, recognises the equality of all nations and defends world peace, firmly adheres to the principles of proletarian internationalism....

It need hardly be pointed that Stalin would not have found it essential to change a comma in this definition of the 'path of

October Revolution' from which the 'imperialists' and the revisionists are allegedly trying to deflect the working class. By implication the statement rejects the possibility of peaceful transition to Socialism, a concept accepted at the 20th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. Instead it clearly lays down that the proletariat takes "power from the bourgeoisie by means of revolutionary struggle" and the successful conclusion of this struggle is to lead to the establishment of the dictatorship of the proletariat. The Chinese leadership is not content to leave the reader to draw his own conclusion on this vital point. It explicitly states: *"Among those who are trying to revise Marxism-Leninism on the pretext of combating doctrinairism, some simply deny that there is a demarcation line between proletarian and bourgeois dictatorships....According to them, it is possible for certain bourgeois countries to build Socialism without going through a proletarian revolution led by the Party of the proletariat; they think that State capitalism in those countries is in fact Socialism....But while these people are publicising such ideas....the imperialists are actively preparing to undermine the Socialist countries....While the revisionist trends serve the interests of the imperialists, the action of the imperialists do not benefit revisionism but point to its bankruptcy."* In short those who believe in the possibility of peaceful transition to Socialism are the allies of imperialism. This is as Stalinist a view as there can be. The statement of December 29, 1956, contains several such formulations in the truly Stalinist tradition. This document deserves to be studied by all serious students of Communism today and Mao Tse-tung's address should be read together with it. With the best will in the world, it will be difficult to find a doctrinal divergence between what is essential Stalinism and the formulations of Chinese leaders, including Mao Tse-tung.

The statement in question seeks to overcome the difficulties among the countries of the Soviet bloc by emphasising the division of the world into two irreconcilable and hostile camps and the need of the Communist countries to close their ranks against the common enemy. It divides the contradictions into

two categories on the lines of Mao's addresses in 1937 and 1957. The contradictions among the people are non-antagonistic, while those between the Communists and the imperialists are antagonistic one. Contradictions between the Socialist countries fall in the first category and their solution "must, first and foremost, be subordinated to the over-all interest of the struggle against the enemy." Incidentally this analysis is an additional proof that the classification of contradictions into antagonistic and non-antagonistic ones is common currency among the leaders of Chinese Communism and that there is nothing new in Mao Tse-tung's address as far as this question is concerned.

The position that the Chinese Communists took on the Hungarian uprising is equally illuminating. It is no longer a debatable issue that it was a nationalist uprising and the Soviet Union had unjustifiably used its forces to suppress it and instal a Government of its choice. The Soviet forces intervened in a massive form on November 4, 1956, and the *People's Daily*, Peking, carried an editorial on November 5 fully supporting Soviet armed intervention in the affairs of Hungary. The official daily wrote :

"The Hungarian people have thwarted the plans of the counter-revolutionaries and brought the situation under control....Our Hungarian brothers who were caught in the vice of counter-revolutionary terror have been liberated. Hungary once more has won the condition for further development of Socialism....The conspiracy of the imperialists and Hungarian traitors which aimed at the restoration of counter-revolution has been routed....The re-establishment of a counter-revolutionary regime in Hungary would have created a grave menace to the independence, freedom and security of the European Socialist countries on the part of aggressive imperialist forces....The Hungarian people assisted by the Soviet Union rapidly eliminated the danger of the restoration of counter-revolution....It is clear that the Hungarian people achieved this victory with the assistance of the Soviet Union.

"The position of the Soviet Union towards Hungarian development is a perfectly correct position of proletarian internationalism. The Soviet Union respects the territorial integrity and sovereignty of the Hungarian People's Republic and does not interfere in Hungary's internal affairs. However, the Soviet Government and the Soviet people have no reason to sit with folded hands when the Government of Hungary which represents the will and the national interests of the people appeals to the Soviet Union for assistance. The Hungarian people would have become slaves of Fascism were it not for the friendly hand of friendship extended by the Soviet Union.

"In order to help the working people of a fraternal country to cope with this agony, the heroic Soviet people now as before shed their blood without hesitation....We greet the Soviet people and the Soviet army who on two occasions have helped the Hungarian people to gain freedom."

The *People's Daily* emphasised the importance of "great friendship between the peoples of all socialist countries and the great Soviet Union." It chastised those who under-estimated the "necessity of the Warsaw Treaty," and of "overcoming chauvinistic leaning among the peoples of various countries." The article contained a word of warning for the Hungarian people, who "still fail to draw a line between themselves and the enemies, still fail to realise the necessity of a revolutionary dictatorship over the enemy....Democracy for the people and dictatorship for the enemy, these are two sides of one and the same question and any one-sidedness in this respect would be wrong."

Peking did not change its line on Hungary even in the face of pressure of public opinion in Asia where the massive use of Soviet forces to crush a nationalist uprising in Hungary had given rise to widespread misgivings about Russia's anti-imperialist faith and professions. Chou En-lai visited several Asian countries and conferred with their leaders, including India's Prime Minister, Mr. Nehru, partly to reassure them

that the Soviet Union was not an imperialist country and that she and other Communist countries genuinely believed in the five principles of peaceful co-existence and non-interference. He had to admit in New Delhi that there were differences of opinion between him and Mr. Nehru on the issue of Hungary.

The nature of the faith that moved the Chinese Communists was further emphasised when they joined the issue with Marshal Tito and other Yugoslav leaders on behalf of the Soviet leadership following the Hungarian uprising. It is no secret that having failed to reconcile his national interests with the desire to promote the solidarity of the Communist movement, Marshal Tito had accorded the first priority to the preservation of his country's interests. In the interest of his own survival and his country's independence, he had sought to promote a desire for freedom from Soviet control among the countries of Eastern Europe. Consequently the Soviet leadership's efforts to arrange a rapprochement with him encouraged from their point of view disruptionist tendencies in eastern Europe. The Soviet leadership had no choice but to attempt to cut Tito to size if it was to avoid the dismemberment of the empire in Eastern Europe. Mr. Hoxha, leader of the Albanian Communist party, was chosen to act the hatchet man. He delivered the first attack on Tito and Titoism through the columns of the *Pravda* in the form of a letter to the editor. This was the signal and the battle was joined between the Russian and Yugoslav leaders. The Chinese readily joined the issue with Tito on the side of the Kremlin. One can only speculate if Mao Tse-tung and other Chinese Communist leaders were unaware of the division inside the Kremlin on the issue of relations with Yugoslavia. (Khrushchev and his supporters now allege that Molotov and other Stalinists in the Soviet leadership had been responsible for the rupture with Tito.) As far as we are concerned, we would find it difficult to believe that Mao Tse-tung was unaware of the conflict inside the Soviet leadership. Did he then knowingly lend support to Molotov and other die-hard Stalinists in the Soviet leadership? In the alternative, did he not attach any importance to the platforms of the rival con-

tenders for power? The third alternative view can be that he was so keen to present a united front with the Soviet Union that he ignored all other considerations. While it is not possible to answer these questions in a direct manner, it deserves to be noted that it was not accidental that on the three crucial issues—Khrushchev's secret speech, Hungarian uprising and rupture with Tito—the Chinese Communist Party under the supreme leadership of Mao Tse-tung was found taking a line close to that of the so-called Stalinists in Moscow. Is it not likely that Mao Tse-tung found himself in agreement with the 'fundamentalists' and not with the 'pragmatists' in the Soviet leadership?

The Chinese Communists attacked Tito on the ground that his actions seriously disrupted the solidarity of the international Communist movement. Indirectly they held him and other Yugoslav leaders guilty of the worst of all sins under Communism, the sin of revisionism. The attack on Tito was contained in the statement of December 29, 1956, quoted at some length on the issue of de-Stalinisation earlier. It said: "The attitude taken by Comrade Tito and other leading comrades of the Yugoslav League of Communists towards Stalin's mistakes and other related questions...cannot be regarded by us as well balanced or objective...We are amazed that in his speech, he attacked almost all the Socialist countries and many of the Communist parties...Comrade Tito made assertions about 'hard-bitten Stalinist elements who in various parties have still managed to maintain themselves in their posts...' We feel it necessary to say in connection with these views of Comrade Tito that he took a wrong attitude when he set up the so-called Stalinism, 'Stalinist elements' etc. as objects of attack and maintained that the question now was whether the course 'begun in Yugoslavia' or the so-called 'Stalinist course' would win out. This can only lead to a split in the Communist movement."

The Chinese leaders rejected the views expressed by

Kardelj, Vice-President of Yugoslavia, on the Hungarian uprising in the Yugoslav National Assembly. They said : "Comrade Kardelj not only made no distinction between ourselves and the enemy, but also told the Hungarian comrades that a 'thorough change is necessary in the political system' (of Hungary). He also called upon them to turn over State power wholly to the Budapest and other regional workers' councils, 'no matter what the workers' councils have become' and declared that they 'need not waste their efforts on trying to restore the Communist Party.'...Such is the blueprint of the 'anti-Stalinist course' which Comrade Kardelj has designed for brotherly countries....Clearly the Yugoslav comrades are going too far. Even if some of their criticism of brotherly parties is reasonable, the basic stand and the methods they have adopted infringed the principles of comradely discussions.... For the sake of consolidating the unity of international Communist ranks and avoiding the creation of conditions which the enemy can use to cause confusion and division in our ranks, we cannot but offer our brotherly advice to the Yugoslav comrades."

The statement warns : "Socialist democracy must in no way be pitted against the dictatorship of the proletariat, nor should it be confused with bourgeois democracy. The sole aim of Socialist democracy, in the economic, political and cultural fields alike is to strengthen the Socialist cause of the proletariat....If there is a kind of democracy that can be used for anti-Socialist purposes..., it cannot certainly be called Socialist democracy....Some people, however, do not see things that way. Their reaction to events in Hungary has revealed this most clearly.

"In the past the democratic rights and the revolutionary enthusiasm of the Hungarian working people were impaired ; while the counter-revolutionaries were not dealt the blow they deserved with the result that it was fairly easy for the counter-revolutionaries in October, 1956, to take advantage of the discontent of the masses to organise an armed revolt.

This shows that Hungary had not made a serious enough effort to build up its dictatorship of the proletariat. Nevertheless when Hungary was facing a crisis...they did not raise the question of realising the dictatorship of the proletariat but came out against the righteous action taken by the Soviet Union in aiding the Socialist forces in Hungary. They came out with a declaration that the counter-revolution in Hungary was a 'revolution' and that the Worker-Peasant Revolutionary Government extend democracy to counter-revolutionaries."

It posed the question : What is the meaning of the criticism in the socialist press (Western) of the Hungarian Communist regime ? and answered that this meant that "those Socialists who depart from the dictatorship of the proletariat to prate about 'democracy' actually stand with the bourgeoisie against the proletariat ; they are, in effect, asking for capitalism and opposing Socialism....Lenin pointed out time and again that the theory of the dictatorship of the proletariat is 'what constitutes the most profound difference between the Marxists and the ordinary (as well as big) bourgeoisie."

A careful study of the important documents produced by the Chinese Communists in 1956 and 1957 is rewarding in that they establish clearly that the positions taken by them on all major issues are in no way different from those Stalin would have taken. That is not a conjecture because the Stalinist positions can be deduced from his writings and actions. Invariably Lenin is quoted by the Chinese rulers in support of these positions, but on all these issues almost identical quotations from Stalin's works could have been cited. Stalin can be quoted even in condemnation of the cult of personality or individuality. In any event a powerful case can be made in support of the view that Stalin was the natural and logical successor to Lenin and that he developed the legacy of the master. (For a detailed discussion on this issue, see *Thought*, Delhi, March 24, 31 and April 14, 1956). An orthodox Leninist is by implication essentially a Stalinist.

To quote Hudson from his article in the *International Affairs*, London, once again : "The voice of Peking today is the voice of Leninist orthodoxy ; indeed the Chinese may claim to have been the guardians of the pure faith which was in danger in Europe, and even in the Soviet Union, of being contaminated by revisionist heresies. Far from watering down the doctrine they received from Moscow, the Chinese have become its most relentless and uncompromising exponents. Mao Tse-tung does not trot round the world with his Prime Minister in the B & K manner ; he remains remote and aloof in the old capital of the Sons of Heaven, the teacher and prophet of new China."

In a sense this development was inevitable with the triumph of Communism in predominantly agricultural and industrially backward China and the industrialisation of the Soviet Union and the death of Stalin. The character of the Communist movement had undergone a sea change with its triumph in Russia. The significance of the change did not lie in the fact that Lenin had upset Marxist calculations by leading the Communist Party to power in industrially backward Russia. In fact the Communist movement met its nemesis in the very hour of its triumph ; it became the philosophy of backwardness the moment the Russians became its chief exponents. To catch up with and beat the industrialised West in terms of production became the dominating theme of national life in the Soviet Union in the post-Revolution period. Ever since 1917 in general and the 'thirties in particular, the Communist regime in the Soviet Union has justified its continued existence on the strength of its claim of being able to force the pace of industrial growth. The 'primitive accumulation of capital' took the place of the welfare of the people. The regime discarded one by one the principal tenets of Socialism which had at one time inspired the best part of humanity. Even today Khrushchev's first slogan is : We shall catch up with and beat America in terms of production. No attempt is made to claim that the Russian people

are better off or going to be better off than the American people. Even today the accumulation of capital had priority over consumption.

Some of the worst features of Stalinism can be shown to have arisen from this anxiety to force the rate of accumulation of capital beyond the limits of human endurance. Several million people perished in the famines of the 'thirties and in concentration camps in hostile climatic conditions so that the gigantic industrial structure could be built. Communism got purged of its humanist traditions as Stalin built Russia into the world's second greatest industrial power, and converted millions of illiterate muzhiks into industrial workers and technicians. The worst forms of social and economic inequalities were justified in the name of industrialisation. But Stalinism like many other historical phenomena destroyed its *raison d'être* by its very success. The emergence of a vast intelligentsia and technocracy anxious to enjoy the fruits of its labour in peace and security is antithetical to the demands of permanent revolution and the continued existence of the dictatorship. The death of Stalin removed the greatest power strategist in history from the Soviet scene. There existed then neither the need for the terror regime nor the man who could manipulate all the instruments of terror that he had forged during the course of three decades. The inevitable fight for power among his successors has weakened the structure that Stalin bequeathed to them.

China has still to go through the same process of industrialisation. The regime cannot afford to be divested of the powers that are necessary to achieve results in terms of industrial growth, which alone can provide a modicum of justification for its survival. The success of the Soviet Union in building a mighty industrial structure excites the admiration of millions in Asia. The people of this ancient continent have learnt through personal experience that the lack of industrial development has in the past meant not only poverty, disease and illiteracy but also subjugation at the hands of the indus-

rially developed countries of the West. They are afraid that the same fate might befall them once again if they are not able to catch up with the West. China had made the choice of trying to do it in the Stalinist style. The regime has, therefore, no option but to follow the Stalinist techniques. In Mao Tse-tung they have a leader of sufficient stature and ability who can organise and manipulate the instruments of power. Mao Tse-tung as the tallest among the Communist leaders takes the place of Stalin in the ideological field, while the power to do good or evil still vests in the Kremlin. That is the division in the Communist world. How this contradiction will be resolved, time alone can show.

VI

Maoism is thus neither an advance on Marxism-Leninism-Stalinism nor a partial repudiation of it. Mao's greatest contribution to the Communist world lies in his successful adaptation of the faith to suit the requirements of the situation in China in particular and Asia in general. Primarily Maoism is not a new philosophy. It does not open up new vistas in human or even Communist thought. Maoism is more correctly the name of the strategy that the Chinese Communists have followed under Moa Tse-tung since the 'thirties in the pursuit of power and its consolidation. Its importance lies in the fact that the experience of the Chinese Communists is more relevant than that of their Russian counter-parts as far as the problem of capturing power is concerned. The Russian revolution was a fluke. Three months prior to the success of Communists in seizing power in Russia, the attempt to do so had collapsed in July, 1917, and the top leaders, including Lenin, had to seek asylum abroad. The revolution could well have been averted if the Social Democrats in power had the imagination to realise that the Russian people were war-weary and desired peace above all. The October Revolution was largely the handiwork of a small, but determined, group of men who knew how best to exploit the situation created by the collapse of the State's civil and military apparatus following major reverses at the front. Its social base was limited to a small section of the working class, which itself constituted only a small percentage of the Russian population. In China, on the other hand, the Communist Party was able to mobilise the support of millions of people in the task of seizing power. It won support even among social groups and classes which cannot be allowed to exist in any Communist society. The revolutionary struggle was waged over a period of 22 years. The Chinese revolution was not a fluke. The leadership had prepared for it and created the necessary conditions for it.

Even though it is true that the Chinese Communists succeeded in exceptional circumstances, their experience and technique have considerable validity for Communists in other Asian countries struggling to seize the State apparatus.

Briefly, the Maoist strategy steers a middle course between what in Communist parlance are called the 'right' and 'left' strategies. The advocates of the classical 'left' strategy among the Communists regard capitalism as the main enemy in both industrialised as well as predominantly agricultural societies. The aim is to establish Socialism at one stroke by capturing power even in industrially backward societies slowly emerging into freedom from colonial domination. They derive their inspiration from the Russian example. The strategy involves the formation of a united front of poor peasants and workers (revolutionary classes according to Leninist definition) with individuals and groups belonging to other social classes and groups by appealing to them over the heads of their organisations, that is, united front from below. Communist parties pursuing this line do not normally enter into alliance with other organisations; they seek to wean away the following of the latter. The 'rightists' among the Communists regard Fascism as the main enemy in industrialised countries and feudalism and imperialism in the industrially backward societies. They seek to form united front with other organisations to defeat the main enemy, even though the attempt to infiltrate and thus destroy the collaborating parties is not given up at any stage. The task of establishing Socialism is to be accomplished in two stages, though the two stages can overlap in certain conditions. In the first stage, the character of the revolution is regarded as being bourgeois-democratic, that is, feudalism and imperialism are to be eliminated at this stage. Simultaneously the Communist Party will attempt to capture power so that it can establish Socialism.

Mao Tse-tung singled out feudalism and imperialism as the main enemies in his *New Democracy*, which presented the Maoist strategy in a organised manner. He then said that the revolution was to be accomplished in two stages. So far he is in

agreement with the advocates of the 'rightist' strategy. But on the lines of the 'left' strategy, he advocates the formation of united front from below, because he contends that the bourgeois-democratic revolution today can be accomplished only under the auspices of the Communist Party. The Party itself claims to represent the best interests of the whole nation without giving up the claim of being the vanguard of the proletariat. The basic presumption of the Maoist strategy is that in colonies and dependent countries, the big bourgeoisie betrays the revolution and makes terms with the imperialists.

The establishment of revolutionary armed bases is not an essential ingredient of the Maoist strategy. The situation in a given country will determine whether the Communist Party can hope to forge such an instrument for the capture of power. Similarly the Maoist strategy is not inextricably tied with the use of violence during the period of the struggle. Its primary emphasis is on winning the support of the largest number of social groups so that it is possible to isolate and defeat the main enemy first and tackle the others later. "Divide the enemy", that is the crux of the Maoist strategy. There is no place for dogmatism in the pursuit of this aim.

The Maoist strategy, though fashioned in the period of struggle for power, has inevitably shaped China's foreign policy since 1949. Communist China's foreign policy is based on the theoretical presumption that on the international scale, the imperialist powers, led by the United States, are the main enemies of Communism. The enemies have to be isolated and all possible allies have to be recruited in the fight against them. That is precisely why the Chinese Communists lay primary emphasis on the solidarity of Socialist countries on the one hand and of Afro-Asian countries on the other. Just as at home, the collaborating groups are to be liquidated one by one, the non-Communist nations on the international scene have to be divided into the main and secondary enemies and have to be dealt with in that order of priorities. During the current phase, it is essential to isolate the imperialist countries

from the newly liberated countries of Asia and Africa. In the pursuit of this policy, it is necessary for the Chinese regime to give the impression of sweet reasonableness. Chou En-lai is ideally suited to play the role of a good friend. The present address of Chairman Mao provides him with a perfect armour.

The validity of the Maoist line had been accepted by the Kremlin even when Stalin was alive. The editorial of January 27, 1950, in the Cominform journal *For a lasting Peace, For a People's Democracy*, which advised the Asian Communist parties to follow the Chinese path, is a point in illustration. The editorial said: "The path taken by the Chinese people...is the path that should be taken by the peoples of many colonial and dependent countries in their struggle for national independence and people's democracy." This line was advocated by the Kremlin on the conclusion of a prolonged debate among the Soviet theoreticians. (For detailed discussion on this issue, see *Moscow and Communist Party of India*, by John H. Kautsky, published jointly by the Technology Press of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and John Wiley & Son Inc., New York.) Since then the Maoist strategy has been followed by various Communist Parties of Asia with varying degrees of success. With the latest address, Mao Tse-tung makes a major bid to take over the ideological leadership of these parties. It is not necessary to visualise any conflict between Peking and Moscow at this stage. The two centres of world Communism obviously collaborate. The Chinese do not appear at all anxious to deprive themselves of the invaluable support they are receiving from Moscow.

ERRATA

<i>Incorrect</i>	<i>Correct</i>	<i>Page No.</i>
lies	lis	19
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