In recent years seldom, if over, has an American emissary received such a chilly welcome here as the Attorney General, Mr Robert Kennedy, last week. Though there was sympathy for him personally, he has visibly aged since the assassination of President Kennedy, the press was generally critical and Whitehall resentful of this American intrusion into Malaysian affairs. The consensus was that the American effort in promote a peaceful settlement of Indonesia’s “confrontation” against Malaysia was misconceived possibly out of considerations of domestic politics where there is strong opposition against further aid to Indonesia.
The British have been sizzling with fury against President Sukarno, particularly since the British embassy in Jakarta was burnt down by an angry mob last September. The severance of diplomatic relations were then regarded as a matter of touch and go by seasoned correspondents which was one indication of how high feelings were running against President Sukarno. America came in for criticism on account of extending not only economic but also military aid to Indonesia. America stopped military aid and the economic aid is currently at the low level of about £4,000,000 a year. Though British investment in Indonesia is estimated at about £150,000,000, the general view is that there is not much they can do to protect it. In a nutshell, the British have drawn a blank against Sukarno’s Indonesia. To say that they are not prepared to trust him is an understatement.
US denial
It was, however, not just the question of distrust in President Sukarno that accounts for Britain’s cold reception to the American initiative. In spite of the denial by American spokesmen that Mr Kennedy proposed or even envisaged the withdrawal of some if not all the British troops from the disputed Borneo territories, there is a strong and widespread conviction here that this is precisely what the American efforts to pacify the area would lead to in the first instance and finally to the annexation of these territories by Indonesia and the dismantling of the British base in Singapore.
The British Government, like most West European governments, did not approve of the transfer of Dutch Guinea, now renamed West Irian, to Indonesia and blamed America for it. They now fear that a similar move to “appease” President Sukarno is now on in the case of Malaysia. This fear is reinforced by the American policy of shoring up President Sukarno in the belief that he alone could prevent Indonesia from going Communist under the aegis of a pro- China Communist party. The British view is that Indonesia can be saved from the more likely prospect of anarchy and disintegration only by an efficient administration and careful husbanding of economic resources which, according to them, President Sukarno has not been able to provide.
When the American administration announced its intention to send a part of the Seventh Fleet to the Indian Ocean, the move was welcomed mainly in the belief that it meant notice to President Sukarno against intensifying the policy of “confrontation”. Now it is clear that Washington does not intend, for the time being at any rate, to lend support to Britain against Indonesia. On the contrary, during Mr Kennedy’s visit here, American sources repeated the Indonesian Government’s claim that it had seized last September documents which showed Britain was hostile to their country. Apparently these sources were giving credence to the Indonesian claim. Mr Kennedy confirmed this impression when he dismissed British reporters’ questions about the trustworthiness of President Sukarno. He said that there was all round distrust with every government questioning the bona fides of the others, thus establishing. a kind of moral parity between Britain and Indonesia.
Border Clashes
Mr Kennedy spoke of the possibility of the border clashes escalating into a general conflict. Though this cannot be ruled out altogether, the British do not take so a pessimistic a view. The British Foreign Secretary, Mr Butler’s assertion to Mr Kennedy that if necessary Britain was prepared to go to war in the defence of Malaysia should be seen essentially as an expression of Britain’s firm altitude. The prospects, as seen from here, are that unless President Sukarno has some compelling reasons to abandon the policy of confrontation the border raids will continue indefinitely and that in spite of the obvious complexity of the task in view of the long common border and difficult jungle terrain, it can be tackled.
There are several grounds for this confidence. First, in Sabah, the Indonesians have no strong support. Even Sabah’s 40,000 Indonesian immigrants employed in the estates around Tawau have not be won over. In Sarawak the communists among the Chinese population of 250,000 support Indonesia and 1,000 Chinese are said to be under training across the border for guerilla activities. But it is doubtful if a pro-Indonesian mass movement can be built among the Chinese population as such. The fate of the Chinese traders in Indonesia would be a standing discouragement. The Dyaks are said to be generally pro-British and excellent jungle fighters. Sarawak’s Chief Minister, Mr Stephen Ningkau, is a Dyak and outspokenly anti-Indonesia. In short it is considered doubtful if raiders from across the frontier can find the necessary mass support inside Sarawak and Sabah.
Secondly, it is believed that the Soviet Government is unhappy with President Sukarno on account of his failure to pay the installment for military supplies, which are said to have been worth 800 million to a billion dollars, and is unwilling to extend economic assistance. China cannot fill the gap.
Finally, Indonesia is highly vulnerable to separatist movements. Sumatra and Celebes which united in opposition to Jakarta in 1958 are still believed to be Indonesia’s Achilles heel. Though the Malaysian and British governments have so far confined themselves to offensive measures in Sarawak and Sabah, it is clear enough that it is relatively easy to mount commando raids and guerilla warfare in Sumatra from bases in Malaya. A number of Sumatran exiles have been offering their services to various agencies in Singapore and Kuala Lumpur. In Celebes the leader of the revolt in 1958, Colonel Sumnal, never surrendered and is now reported to be active again. That President Sukarno has decreed death penalty for all forms of economic and political sabotage and expression of sympathy with a hostile country suggests that he himself is uneasy.
Even before the Kennedy peace mission to South-East Asia was conceived by President Johnson in Washington, The Spectator, edited by Mr Iain Mcleod, former Colonial Secretary and till only recently leader of the House of Commons, suggested that the British Government should persuade the Malaysian Government to accept the “alternative approach of an appeal to the United Nations”. It said: “A United Nations mission could call for a ceasefire, then hear evidence from both sides, from the Indonesians that Malaysia has broken the Manila agreement by relying on British troops and from the Malaysians that Indonesia has committed aggression”.
Implication
The unstated implication clearly was that Britain should be willing to withdraw troops from Sarawak and Sabah as a quid pro quo to the ending of aggression by Indonesia. From the withdrawal of troops from the former Borneo territories to the dismantling of the base in Singapore would he a short step indeed. The American approach is similar with the only difference that Mr Kennedy spoke about the desirability of this Asian problem being solved by Asian countries and did not mention the United Nations. If Mr Kennedy chose his words carefully, he was proposing the expulsion of Britain from Malaysia.
Meanwhile there is considerable anxiety regarding the future of Kenya, Uganda and Tanganyika, though after the first rash of speculation reports that the troubles there were inspired and directed by foreign-trained or pro-communist elements are beginning to be discounted. Tanganyika’s Foreign and Defence Minister Mr Kambona, who was maligned as the villain of the piece last week, is now acknowledged to have been wholly loyal to President Nyerere during the mutiny even though he has had his differences with the latter. A federation of these countries is seen as one possible solution and Jomo Kenyatta the key figure in such a set up. His standing is exceptionally high in Whitehall.
The Times of India, 1 February 1964