Cyprus is the British Government’s single biggest headache at the moment. Not only have all attempts to ease the crisis failed, but the position has greatly worsened since British troops landed in the capital city of Nicosia just after Christmas. At that time the relatively moderate President Makarios was still in control of the Greek Cypriots even if the control was somewhat shaky. It is now seriously doubted here whether he is anything more than a figurehead with effective power having been usurped by various armed groups, principally the EOKA. British troops went in at the request of the Government of Cyprus and they were welcomed by both Greek and Turkish communities. Now the bona fides of the British Government have become suspect in the eyes of the Greek Cypriots who are convinced that it tends to side with the Turks.
They have even been fired upon. The number of Greek Cypriots bearing arms is placed around 30,000, according to British intelligence leaks to the press. It is believed that anywhere between 10,000 and 30,000 weapons like self-loading guns have been imported with the support of the Cyprus Government for distribution among these men. Sizable stocks of ammunition are said to have been built up on the island. In case the current Security Council debate does not produce quickly enough an international force with the authority to stop this flow of arms which is only all too likely, weapons would continue to be imported with funds accumulated in Athens. From the British point of view the situation could not have been more ominous.
A Reminder
Under Governor Field-Marshal Sir John Hardinge, 30,000 British troops had failed to eliminate the EOKA because the whole Greek Cypriot community was behind it. Under his successor, Sir Hugh Foot, things had got worse. By late 1958 Britain faced total anarchy in the island. It was averted largely because Archbishop Makarios agreed to accept independence and give up the demand for enosis, union with Greece. This is a grim reminder that British troops can perform their peace-keeping role only as long as they do not invite the charge of being an occupation force. Criticism to that effect is beginning to appear in the Greek Cypriot press.
The day the British Government decided to send troops to Nicosia, the Labour party’s spokesman on foreign affairs, Mr Patrick Gordon-Walker, called on the Prime Minister, Sir Alec Douglas-Home, and urged him to refer the matter to the Security Council. The Government did not heed the advice. It would have indeed been odd if it had because the British Government had spared no effort to undermine the role of the United Nations force in the Congo. The highly slanted coverage on the working of the force, particularly the denigration of the Indian contingent, in the Conservative press could be explained by its unreasoning addiction to the dream of white supremacy in Southern Africa. What was more notable was that in his capacity as Foreign Secretary, Lord Home, as he then was, had repeatedly poured scorn on the United Nations, in particular on the Afro-Asian members for their so-called double standards. Sir Alec’s aversion to the United Nations is shared by the Commonwealth Relations Secretary, Mr Duncan Sandys.
Objections
This is not to suggest that there did not exist other objections of substance against going to the Security Council at that stage. The possibility of an obstructionist veto by the Soviet Union has been cited too often here to need mention. This was obviously one disincentive. Another was that in view of the experience in the Congo, particularly the difficulties encountered in financing that operation, it was considered doubtful whether it would in fact be possible to put a United Nations force in the island. But the overriding consideration was the obsessive desire to keep the problem within the family, not the Commonwealth family of which Cyprus is a member, but the NATO family of which the island is not a member. The presence of the British air base in Cyprus was certainly a factor in the British Government’s calculations.
Though the Zurich agreement is written into the constitution of Cyprus, its legality is doubtful by virtue of the United Nations Charter which bars foreign intervention in the affairs of another country. Cyprus is a member of the United Nations. And its legality or illegality apart, its effectiveness is open to question on another account. Turkey might not have been deterred by the fear of a Greek counter-intervention and consequent disruption of NATO’s Eastern Mediterranean flank but could not ignore with equanimity the possibility of President Makarios seeking and getting Soviet assistance. If Britain, France and Israel could not get away with their invasion of Egypt in 1956 in defiance of international opinion, what chance was there of Turkey doing so?
The threat of Turkish invasion was a bluff and it was called off by President Makarios when he openly denounced the treaties with the three guarantor powers during Mr Sandys’s presence in the island. President Makarios modified his statement under pressure from Mr Sandys but left him in no doubt that he meant to get rid of those treaties. From this point onwards the British Government was fighting a losing battle of nerves. The recruitment of America to the cause made defeat more certain and by Saturday last it was reduced to the expedient of forestalling the Cyprus Government’s appeal to the Security Council by a few hours.
The situation in Cyprus is admittedly complex. There is a long history of conflict between the two communities. It is likely, as several British commentators have asserted, that Cyprus would have been happier under the Radcliffe constitution which the Greek activists rejected. But no one can shirk the fact that the British Government found the worst possible solution for the problems of Cyprus under the Zurich agreement.
Unworkable
When trouble first broke out during Christmas it was widely recognised here that the greatest source of trouble was the constitution with a built-in veto for the Turkish minority which it used on every conceivable occasion and on the slightest pretext. The need to amend the constitution was implicit in this recognition. The Turkish Government was partly to blame because it had refused even to discuss the proposals by President Makarios to amend the constitution.
Having been a party to the Zurich agreement and the unworkable Constitution it resulted in, the British Government could not be expected to support President Makarios in his bid to gain a truly sovereign status for his country by repudiating the highly invidious Zurich agreement. That has been and remains the crux of the problem. A majority of 82 per cent will not indefinitely allow itself to be blackmailed by an outside power. Also to protect a minority and its essential interests is not to arm it with the power of veto.
In this country the issues have been clouded by concern for the Turkish minority which, compared with the Greek majority, is ill-armed. As a NATO ally Turkey is more important than Greece. Not only does Turkey possess armed forces three times bigger and far better trained than Greece, she is also more reliable. Turks are anti-Russian and impervious to communism and non-alignment. Greece continues to have a strong underground leftist movement. Inevitably opinion has moved in favour of some form of confederation of two autonomous Greek and Turkish states in the island. President Makarios cannot be blamed if he resists these moves. If the British are in a mess it is of their own making.
The Times of India, 22 February 1964