For the first time in 18 months it is at the moment credible to speculate on the possibility of the Conservative party winning the next general election for the fourth time in succession. This estimate of the revival of the fortunes of the ruling; party is largely the result of the gallup poll last week which reduced Labour’s lead over the Conservatives to five and half per cent, lowest since October 1962. This may well prove to be a freak figure and Labour’s lead may improve again. All the same a gnawing sense of doubt is visible among the Labour leadership and it is no longer as confident of victory as it was a few months ago.
At one point last year when the Conservative government under Mr Macmillan was being rocked by the Profumo scandal and the efforts to accelerate the role of economic expansion was still clouded by the relatively high figures of unemployment as a result of the worst winter in memory, the Labour party enjoyed a lead of 20 per cent. This was an unprecedented margin in the history of gallup poll in this country. It was to the Labour leader, Mr. Harold Wilson’s credit that he did not take such a massive morale booster seriously and he said so publicly. The margin was bound to narrow down as the sordid scandals were finally laid and the controversies resulting from them began to fade away with the retirement of Mr. Macmillan. For months afterwards Labour’s gallup poll lead fluctuated between eight and eleven per cent. This would have assured for the party a sizable majority in the elections if they were held last year. For the first time last week the margin was too narrow for comfort.
Poll Result
Last week’s gallup poll result suggested that the Prime Minister, Sir Alec Douglas-Home’s arguments in favour of retaining the independent British deterrent were winning support in the country. Of those interviewed 35 per cent were favourably impressed by his arguments against only 17 per cent supporting Mr. Wilson’s plan to cease efforts to prolong the life of the deterrent. Only 16 per cent of the people were opposed to Sir Alec’s case against 27 per cent being opposed to Mr. Wilson’s. The number of people on whom neither the Prime Minister’s nor the Labour leader’s arguments had any effect were about the same, 26 per cent in the first case and 27 in the second. The remaining – 23 and 29 per cent, respectively – were unable to make up their mind.
Personally I am not surprised by these figures. In factual terms Britain is obviously no longer a great empire and depends even for her own security on the American power. Her contribution to the western alliance’s nuclear capability is about three per cent, which in the context of America’s power to destroy Russia more than 1,200 times over is superfluous. It is equally true that Britain just cannot go it alone in the nuclear field against Russia however grave the threat to her national interests. The difficulty is that these and similar other arguments do not take into account either the residue of anti-Americanism in this country which produces an unwillingness to face the hard fact of dependence on America or the popular urge to remain a great power, whatever the odds. It is easier to disband the empire overseas than to be rid of the imperial heritage at home.
The effectiveness of the Conservative case in favour of maintaining the deterrent is greatly increased because of the makeshift nature of the Labour response. In spite of the Labour leadership’s best efforts the impression of indecision and confusion persists. The impression is not ill-founded and is in fact the result of the expedient manner in which the leadership has tried to resolve the controversy within its own ranks.
Unilateralists
To place the matter in perspective it is relevant to recall the Labour party’s famous annual conference at Scarborough in 1960 where the late Mr. Gaitskell suffered a defeat at the hands of the unilateralists. He fought against the decision and got it reversed by a small majority by the national executive in early 1961. This victory did not heal the split in the party and if it were not for external developments the internal struggle would in all probability have continued and possibly damaged the party beyond repair. The most decisive factor in restoring the party was its opposition to the terms on which the Government was prepared to join the Common Market but at the moment we are concerned with the evolution of its defence policy or to be precise of its groping towards a defence policy.
It has repeatedly been claimed by the deputy leader, Mr. George Brown, that once the Government decided to abandon the development of the Blue Streak missile as a successor to the V-bomber force due to become obsolescent in the late ’sixties it became untenable to argue in favour of an independent deterrent. He has also claimed that the Labour party saw the logic of that decision. Facts, however, do not support him.
The cancellation of the Blue Streak missile on the ground that the programme would cost £600 million and more (already nearly £100 million had been spent on it) was announced during the defence debate early in March 1960. This was seven months before the Scarborough conference in the first week of October 1960 when the late Mr. Gaitskell and Mr. Brown, among others, argued against unilateral nuclear disarmament by Britain. They did not accept the defeat they suffered at the conference. In the event the decision of the Scarborough conference was reversed.
Following the cancellation of the Blue Streak the Government decided to buy the Skybolt missile from America. The Labour party’s spokesmen opposed this decision, not because they were against extending the life of the bomber force but because they believed, and as it turned out rightly, that submarine-based Polaris missiles would be the right successors to the bombers. Mr. Brown found it possible to keep himself informed through American sources that the success of the Skybolt, still at the development stage, was by no means assured. This clearly gave him an advantage over the Government which ignored unofficial warnings by the Americans.
The warnings given by Mr Brown were confirmed when towards the end of 1962 the American administration decided to abandon the Skybolt project. This could clearly mark the end of the independent British deterrent. But Mr. Macmillan was able to secure from President Kennedy an agreement under which America agreed to sell to Britain Polaris missiles. This agreement came at a time when Mr Gaitskell was fatally ill. He did not recover. Mr. Wilson succeeded him as leader of the Labour party and during his visit to America last April announced that if he was elected Prime Minister he would denegotiate the Nassau agreement regarding the Polaris missiles.
President Kennedy’s decision to sell Polaris missiles to Britain came in the wake of the Cuba crisis. He felt the need to have the goodwill of the firm ally that Britain has been. He said so in so many words. All the same it made nonsense of the American opposition to the continuation of Britain as an independent nuclear power as enunciated by the Defence Secretary, Mr. McNamara, only a few weeks earlier. In the bargain he undermined the Labour party’s policy of opposition to the deterrent which the leadership had developed under encouragement from Washington.
Diverse Views
Since the Nassau agreement the Labour leadership has wobbled on this issue. Only recently its spokesmen, Mr. Brown and Mr. Dennis Healey, said that they would examine all facts before they took a firm decision either way if ‘they were elected to power’. Two weeks ago the shadow foreign secretary went to Washington and gave the impression of willingness to join in the American sponsored multilateral nuclear force. Earlier this week Mr. Wilson said that a Labour government would be irrevocably opposed to the move.
Like the Congress party in India the Labour party in Britain represents a diversity of viewpoints in a broad movement and as such finds it difficult to avoid confusion. Pacificism, which has been represented in the party all along, has assumed the form of unilateralism. As it happens the unilateralists also stand for the cloth cap tradition which has little relevance in a developed country embarking on the technological revolution with near full employment. Mr. Wilson has been able to push the cloth cap under the carpet. In power he can do the same with unilateralism but not out of it. Transforming the Labour party from a party of protest to one of power is as difficult as to give a social conscience to the Conservative party, traditionally the party of power. The struggle goes on in both organisations.
The Times of India, 7 March 1964