If one of Mr Kosygin’s objectives in visiting Hanoi last month was to persuade Dr Ho Chi Minh to side with the Soviet Union in its ideological dispute with China, he clearly did not succeed. Though American bombing of North Viet Namese military installations during Mr Kosygin’s visit itself forcefully underlined the country’s dependence on Russia for modern interceptors and missiles, Dr Ho Chi Minh has not abandoned the policy of neutrality in the Sino-Soviet dispute. In fact this policy is so completely the result of factors beyond Dr Ho Chi Minh’s control that it must be doubted that the Soviet Prime Minister could have seriously expected him to change it.
It is, for instance, well known that strong pro-Soviet and pro-China factions exist within the ruling Lao Dong and the party would be seriously split if Dr Ho Chi Minh takes sides in the Sino-Soviet conflict. Also, as long as the Viet Namese communists are engaged in a struggle against the United States in a bid to reunify their country, they cannot afford to forfeit the support of either China or the Soviet Union. Though Russia is better able to meet their economic and military needs, Soviet assistance can be sent directly only through China. The sea route is too long.
On The Fence
This is not to suggest that the Viet Namese communists have not leaned towards one side or the other since the beginning of the Sino-Soviet dispute in the wake of Mr Khrushchev’s denunciation of Stalin at the 20th Congress of the Soviet Communist Party in 1956. But they have been careful not to alienate the other side. In fact no other communist party has been so adept at sitting on the fence as the Lao Dong.
The policy of neutrality is also rooted in the Viet Namese attitude of ambivalence towards the Chinese. During their thousand-year rule over Viet Nam, the Chinese also thoroughly sinicised the people. The Chinese came to the aid of the Viet Namese in their struggle against France in a big way. But the result was a perceptible increase in Chinese influence in their internal affairs. By the end of 1956 Dr Ho Chi Minh had clearly decided to bring in the Soviet Union as a counterweight to China.
In a sense it was only logical that the Viet Namese should seek Soviet assistance for their ambitious programme of industrialisation since China was not in a position to meet their needs. But the pro-Chinese group in the Lao Dong suspected Dr Ho Chi Minh’s motives in seeking Soviet assistance at a time when there existed a serious divergence of opinion between Moscow and Peking, not only on Mr Khrushchev’s policy of denunciation of Stalin, but over the handling of the situation in Eastern Europe. In fact President Voroshilov’s visit to Hanoi in May 1957 provoked a major split in the Viet Namese leadership. This was resolved only towards the end of the year when China and the Soviet Union were able to agree on the famous joint policy statement for the communist world at the Moscow Conference.
Careful
Since then Dr Ho Chi Minh has been more careful than any other communist leader in maintaining the balance between the Soviet Union and China. This balance could have easily been upset in 1959 when he decided to intensity guerilla activities in South Viet Nam. The decision was precipitated by the realisation that the Diem regime would not collapse under the weight of its own unpopularity and by acute food shortages in the North. It created an identity of interests between Peking and Hanoi because both desired the elimination of American influence from South-East Asia. But Dr Ho Chi Minh continued to pursue a middle path between Moscow and Peking. While he spent two months in the Soviet Union he personally attended the 10th anniversary celebrations of the People’s Republic of China in Peking and the Viet Namese press lavishly praised China’s “great leap forward” programme which was disapproved by Russia. Simultaneously it applauded Russia’s contribution to the cause of world peace though the word “co-existence” had by now become anathema to the Chinese leaders.
The Sino-Soviet conflicts became even more bitter in 1960. But the North Viet Namese completely ignored the whole controversy. When Mr Khrushchev openly arraigned the Chinese leaders at the Bucharest Congress of the Rumanian Communist party, the Viet Namese representative, Mr Le Duan, stayed neutral. Though later in the year the Viet Namese moved somewhat closer to Moscow apparently because their need for economic assistance was pressing, they were deeply concerned over the growing rift between Russia and China and spared no effort to bring about some kind of rapprochement between the two. They naturally felt relieved when representatives of 81 communist parties at their meeting in Moscow in November 1960 succeeded in papering over the Sino-Soviet differences and producing a document acceptable to both sides.
Problem
The 22nd Congress of the CPSU in Moscow in October 1961 witnessed a further escalation in the Sino-Soviet conflict. While Mr Chou En-lai publicly expressed displeasure at Mr Khrushchev’s attack on Albania and left Moscow while the Congress was still on, the Viet Namese adopted a characteristically cautious attitude. Though, for instance, they continued to regard Albania as a Socialist country, they did not explicitly endorse Hoxha’s leadership. A high-power Chinese military mission was warmly received in Hanoi in December 1960, but the Viet Namese did not agree either to the idea of a defence treaty or to any form of military co-operation with China.
The crisis provoked first by China’s campaign of vilification against India and finally by aggression in October-November 1962, posed a serious problem for the North Viet Namese leadership in view of Russia’s attitude. As long as China limited itself to a cold war against India, the Viet Namese resolved the dilemma by blaming America for trying to drive a wedge “between China, India and other countries” and endorsing Chinese proposals for border talks. During the aggression they endorsed the Chinese stand that “the Indian Government falsely accused China of invading its territory”. But their support for China was far less enthusiastic than Albania’s and North Korea’s and their performance during the Cuban crisis was an exercise in tight rope walking. While they praised Mr Khrushchev’s decision to withdraw Soviet missiles as a decisive contribution to the relaxation of tension, they followed the Chinese lead in lending support to Castro’s five demands.
Balance
The visit of a Soviet military delegation and a Supreme Soviet delegation in early 1963 were followed by President Novotny’s visit to Hanoi. Since President Novotny was known to be one of Mr Khrushchev’s foremost supporters, the visit created the impression that Dr Ho Chi Minh was again moving closer to Moscow. But in the joint communiqué the traditional balance in praise for the Soviet Union and China was maintained. The Soviet Union was itself not sure of North Viet Namese support and the leader of their delegation to the East German Communist party congress in Berlin was not allowed to address it.
To remove any possible annoyance President Novotny’s visit might have caused to the Chinese, the Viet Namese invited Mr Liu Shao-Chi to pay a state visit to Hanoi. The visit took place towards the end of April. The Viet Namese leaders, however, were extremely careful in their speeches during the visit and the joint communiqué did not repudiate the policy of peaceful co-existence though Mr Liu Shao-Chi had repeatedly condemned it during the visit. At the end of the visit the Viet Namese press once again emphasised the need for strengthening the unity and solidarity of the communist movement. Since then the North Viet Namese leadership has refrained from doing anything which would cause too much offence to either Moscow or Peking.
When America bombed North Viet Namese torpedo boat bases and an oil storage depot last August, it was generally assumed that Hanoi would invite the Chinese army and air force into the country as a warning to Washington. Hanoi did not do so, though it would also be rash to assume that the Chinese were themselves too keen to be embroiled in a direct confrontation with America. Later when American planes bombed the famous Ho Chi Minh trail in Laos, the North Viet Namese played down the bombing. Even the fact of the bombing became known only when two American planes were shot down there and Washington released the news. Dr Ho Chi Minh has not sought Chinese intervention even after American raids on North Viet Nam.
Apparently there is little justification for the view that North Viet Nam will act blindly at the behest of either China or Russia. Apart from Mr Mao Tse-tung and Marshal Tito, Dr Ho Chi Minh is the only communist leader to have made his revolution and he will try his best to preserve his freedom of action.
The Times of India, 2 March 1965