President Ayub Khan is once again beginning to command respectful attention in India. If in 1959-60 he was hailed here as a strong man who had rid Pakistan of political instability, administrative inefficiency and widespread corruption and set the country on the road to economic progress, he is currently being credited with the remarkable feat of having won freedom of action in the field of foreign policy without forfeiting the advantages of the military alliance with the United States. A London weekly’s description of him as the Muslim de Gaulle is being repeated in New Delhi.
There can be no doubt that President Ayub Khan fancies himself in Mr Nehru’s role as a leading mediator in major conflicts in Asia. Though Pakistan has been moving away from the policy of rigid adherence to the West-sponsored SEATO and CENTO for some years, President Ayub Khan’s ambition to dress himself in Mr Nehru’s mantle is of more recent origin. He has offered to mediate in the Malaysian-Indonesian dispute and has maintained a non-committal attitude on the current crisis in Viet Nam.
For Pakistan the turning point came in 1959. The death of Mr John Foster Dulles in the summer of that year symbolised the passing away of an era. Pakistan could no longer take America’s support against India for granted. Rawalpindi’s fears were further confirmed when President Eisenhower visited India towards the end of the year and lavishly praised the success of democratic institutions and the experiment in planned economic growth in our country. Pakistani leaders could no longer shirk the realisation that the policy of non-alignment had become respectable even in the United States.
Not Much Panic
But there was not much panic among Pakistan’s rulers as long as the Republicans were in power in Washington. But Mr Kennedy’s election as the President of the United States dashed their hope that America’s goodwill towards non-aligned India would prove to be short-lived. The Pakistani reaction to Mr Kennedy’s criticism of SEATO and CENTO during the election campaign and the warm references to Mr Nehru’s “soaring idealism” in his inaugural address was nothing short of hysterical. The ruling junta shared the popular disillusionment with the United States and also fostered it.
The feeling of disillusionment bred a feeling of helplessness. President Ayub Khan repeatedly threatened to quit SEATO but he knew it was not feasible to do so in view of Pakistan’s total dependence on the United States for economic as well as military assistance. Western economic assistance at that time accounted for almost 25 percent of the country’s development expenditure, and the army was equipped from head to foot with American equipment. Only Mr Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto felt that it was possible to make an effective gesture of protest and he seized the Soviet offer of technical co-operation for oil exploration. Having made the deal with the Soviet Union, the Pakistani leaders found that they had enough room for manoeuvre only if they were willing to use it. President Ayub Khan himself received a great welcome in the United States and economic aid, instead of being curtailed, was in fact raised.
Laotian Crisis
Two other developments in 1961 deserve to be noted. During the Laotian crisis in the summer of that year the United States tried to persuade its SEATO allies to lend a helping hand. When France blocked the move, it was clear to President Ayub Khan and his advisers that SEATO was a defunct organisation. Since its membership involved no obligations it was not necessary to leave it and thus invite America’s displeasure. Subsequent events have confirmed the correctness of this view since Washington has not thought it worthwhile to bring SEATO into the picture in dealing with the crisis in South Viet Nam.
The second notable development in 1961 was Pakistan’s decision to order the closure of Afghanistan’s trading agencies in Peshawar and Quetta. This decision led to the rupture of diplomatic relations between Pakistan and Afghanistan and denial of transit facilities to landlocked Afghanistan. Though America’s efforts to limit Soviet influence in Afghanistan were jeopardised by this move on the part of Pakistan, President Ayub Khan did not take Washington into confidence before he ordered the closure of the trading agencies.
Since then the only significant development in Pakistan’s foreign policy has been the establishment of friendly relations with China. To some extent it is a reaction against Anglo-US military assistance to India and their failure to compel New Delhi to surrender at least the Kashmir Valley to Rawalpindi. But it is also true that neither its mutual defence pact with the United States nor membership of SEATO had at any time complicated Pakistan’s relations with China. Mr Rushbrook Williams has quoted officials in Pakistan as having told him that soon after the Bandung Conference in 1955 they received a secret message from the Chinese Government to say that it appreciated Pakistan’s anxiety to strengthen its defences against India. The implication of this message is certainly corroborated by the fact that even during the period of friendly relations with India the Chinese Government did not publicly recognise New Delhi’s claims on Kashmir.
The Chinese Government was obviously guided by long-term considerations. It was sensitive to India’s influence in Tibet and was naturally keen to eliminate it. It knew that democratic India was a competitor for influence in South-East Asia. At no stage since the Sino-Indian agreement over Tibet was signed in April 1954 did it regard its borders with India as having been properly settled. It was, therefore, only logical that it did not wish to antagonise Pakistan. Since it did not take SEATO itself too seriously Pakistan’s membership of it did not worry Peking.
President Ayub Khan, on his part, has never been seriously concerned over the possibility of Chinese incursions into Pakistan. It is doubtful if his offer of a joint defence pact with India was anything more than a tactical move to persuade New Delhi, in the first instance, to reduce its military strength in Kashmir. It is well known that when Mr Nehru visited Pakistan to sign the Indus waters agreement, President Ayub Khan gave him a map defining the Pakistan-occupied Kashmir’s northern frontiers with China. This more or less tallied with Chinese maps of this area.
President Ayub Khan had the full support of the United States in demarcating occupied Kashmir’s border with China. Washington tried to block the civil aviation agreement between Pakistan and China and at one stage objected to spare parts for American planes being stored at any Chinese airport. But the objection was soon dropped because of the fear that Pakistan might buy British or French aircraft. Pakistan’s acceptance of an interest-free Chinese loan of sixty million dollars has not even provoked a protest from Washington. There is no question that as far as Britain and France are concerned, Pakistan’s standing has never been higher.
Russian Interest
Where does Pakistan go from here? The immediate objective is obviously to improve relations with Russia which is also showing interest in improving its relations with States on its southern border – Pakistan, Iran and Turkey. Moscow has, for instance, endorsed the Turkish proposal for a federal solution in Cyprus though it is supplying military equipment to President Makarios’s government. It is doubtful if President Ayub Khan expects Russia to reverse its stand on Kashmir. He should be content with an offer of such Soviet assistance as Moscow can make without straining its relations with India.
While President Ayub Khan has not made much headway in winning friends in the Arab world which is at odds with his Turkish and Persian allies, he has secured the noisy support of President Sukarno in his campaign against India. Friendly relations with China and Indonesia have strengthened Pakistan’s position in the third world. At least its alliances with the West have ceased to be a barrier against co-operation with other Afro-Asian countries. Pakistan has broken out of the isolation which its membership of SEATO and CENTO had once imposed on it.
This does not mean that President Ayub Khan can now play the role Mr Nehru played in the ’fifties in Korea and Indo-China. Today there are too many countries wanting to play that role. In any case Moscow and Washington will not require intermediaries if and when they decide to negotiate. But this need not detract from his considerable achievements.
Washington entered into a defence pact with Pakistan because it wanted military bases for possible use against the Soviet Union. Even when Pakistan refused to allow US military bases on its soil, Washington comforted itself with the belief that it was good enough to keep suitable military bases in readiness for use in an emergency. The faith was not altogether misplaced since several U-2 flights over Russia took place from the Peshawar base. That consideration is no longer relevant for a variety of reasons. But there is no evidence that Washington is engaged in a reappraisal of its policy towards Pakistan. Under the mutual defence pact it is committed to keep Pakistan’s defence forces of a specified strength properly equipped and it cannot go back on it.
Washington has also given Pakistan what amounts to a veto over the supply of sophisticated weapons to India and thus enabled it to continue its policy of intransigence. Washington now appears to find consolation in the fact that Pakistan is a stable non-Communist country and that it will not enter into a military alliance or arrangement with China. This view of the alliance suits President Ayub Khan remarkably well.
The Times of India, 20 March 1965