Apart from the question of relations with China no facet of Government’s foreign policy has been subjected to such a sharp and sustained attack in recent years as its stand on the West Asian crisis. This has partly been responsible for greater clarity in India’s official position on the crucial issues of Israel’s right to exist as an independent and sovereign State irrespective of the circumstances of its birth and its right of innocent passage through the Gulf of Aqaba and the Suez.
This necessary corrective does not in any way detract from the justice of the broad policy pursued by the Government so far. In fact the Israeli bid to keep the newly occupied territories lends further weight to it. The consequences of a change of policy would have been highly adverse for India. It would have earned the hostility of all Arabs irrespective of their internal differences, confirmed the unhappy and erroneous impression in the Soviet bloc that India has for all practical purposes abandoned the policy of non-alignment, facilitated the task of Pakistani and Chinese diplomacy in isolating this country in the third world and alienated the Muslim intelligentsia at home. The last point is as important as any other and must always be kept in view in framing a policy for West Asia. The extent to which the Johnson administration defers to the susceptibilities of the Jewish minority on the West Asian issue shows how careful other countries are in dealing with their minorities.
The Risks
No possible advantage in terms of Israeli and American goodwill could have offset even partly the risks which are involved in incurring the hostility of the Arabs. It is indeed surprising that the possibility of Israeli technical assistance in certain fields should have been cited in the debate on West Asia. Even in those terms the goodwill of the Arabs is far more valuable to India because they account for trade worth Rs. 100 crores and this figure is bound to rise steadily in coming years.
If arguments born purely out of religious bias and the hangover of the cold war are ignored the Government’s West Asia policy has been assailed mainly on four grounds.
First, it has been argued that Mr. Nehru was guilty of a serious error of judgement when he failed to establish normal diplomatic relations with Israel in 1948-49. But even at that stage the Government’s decision was greatly influenced by the compulsions of the unavoidable competition with Pakistan for the friendship of Arab countries. Those who can recall the circumstances of the country’s partition in 1947 and the need not to provide Pakistan an easy propaganda victory in the Arab world will recognise that the choice before Mr. Nehru was by no means simple.
Leading Role
But even if he could brush aside the consideration of an unhealthy competition with Pakistan in the late ‘forties, he could not do so in the ‘fifties when the West stepped up its effort to bring the Muslim countries of West Asia together in an anti-Soviet alliance, with Pakistan cast in a leading role. The success of these plans would have been dangerous for India. An anti-Soviet alliance which did not encounter serious resistance in the Arab world would have acquired strong religious and therefore anti-Indian overtones. New Delhi thus acquired a stake in siding with countries, principally Nasser’s Egypt, which were interested for reasons of their own in frustrating Western plans. It has been the same story ever since, the latest example being King Feisal’s abortive attempt to organise a Muslim bloc last year.
The second argument hinges on the concept of reciprocity in international relations. This has had wide appeal in the country in view of its unhappy experience with China, Sukarno’s Indonesia and Nkrumah’s Ghana. The contention in connection with West Asia is that since most Arab countries took up a neutralist stance at the time of the Chinese aggression in 1962 and tended to side with Rawalpindi at the time of the Indo-Pakistan war in 1965, New Delhi is under no moral obligation to support them in their dispute with Israel. On a superficial view the case is plausible but it cannot bear scrutiny.
This contention conveniently ignores the distinction between friendly Egypt, Kuwait and Yemen, neutralist Iraq, Syria, Lebanon and Morocco and pro-Pakistan Saudi Arabia and Jordan. The fact that at the time of the Indo-Pakistani conflict President Nasser was able to block a resolution critical of India and to get a rather vaguely-worded motion adopted by the Arab Heads of State shows that they were not all that hostile. But even if it is conceded that the Arabs have been unfriendly, policymakers in New Delhi cannot afford to withdraw into their shell and sulk. India is inextricably tied to the Muslim world and cannot be disinterested in its fortunes.
It would be highly unrealistic for India to expect the Arabs to choose between New Delhi and Peking and New Delhi and Rawalpindi. The Arabs have ties of religion and culture with Pakistan which they cannot be expected to ignore. The pro-West Arab Governments also tend to be pro-Pakistan. As for China it has provided economic and other forms of assistance from time to time – 150,000 tonnes of wheat and $10 million in cash to the UAR and 20,000 tonnes of wheat and a loan of 50 million Swiss francs to Syria after the June debacle. But it deserves notice that almost all Arab countries sided with India on various issues relating to the abortive second Afro-Asian summit at Algiers in the summer of 1965.
Thirdly, Israel has been represented as a brave little country of 2.5 million people fighting for its survival against 100 million hostile Arabs. This picture of the Israeli David pitted against the Arab Goliath has been oversold. The Arabs have never been able to unite against Israel except in words. Even today the intra-Arab disputes have only been muted. The West, particularly the United States, has seen to it that the Israeli armed strength matches the forces that can possibly be put in the field against it. It was known even before last June that Israel could field more and better trained men than the neighbouring Arab countries and that its air force had a decisive edge over those of its enemies.
June War
In more basic terms, the June war has only underscored the vulnerability of Arab societies still in the process of modernisation. India is going through the same process of modernisation and facing similar difficulties and should therefore be sympathetic towards the Arabs. Moreover, if Israel deserves support just because it is tiny and victorious India should logically be on the side of 250,000 white settlers in Rhodesia who have defied the whole of black Africa and defeated economic sanctions.
Finally, the Government is open to criticism that it should have cautioned President Nasser when he asked for the withdrawal of the UN Emergency Force and proceeded to close the Gulf of Aqaba to Israeli shipping in spite of Tel Aviv’s clear and repeated warnings that it would regard that as casus belli. Instead it fully endorsed his moves little realising that the exercise in brinkmanship would prove disastrous for him, the UAR and other Arab countries.
There is substance in this criticism. In fact it can be said that New Delhi has seldom utilised fully its friendly relations with other nations to influence their policies. In the early stages of the West Asia crisis, Indian diplomats should have been active not only in Cairo but also in Moscow, Washington, London, Paris, Belgrade and other capitals which could have helped to find a peaceful solution. Even lately, India in the United Nations has reflected rather than promoted the change in the UAR’s policy towards moderation. If President Tito has felt free to advise moderation without risking the loss of Arab friendship there is no reason why Mrs. Gandhi could not have supported his initiative more openly and boldly. But it should be recognised that all world powers are deeply involved in the affairs of West Asia and that India has to operate under severe limitations which tend to discourage initiative and sometimes even frankness.
The “realists” derided Mr. Nehru when he wrote to Stalin and President Truman regarding Korea in July 1950 and then pursued his mediatory efforts without much encouragement from either side in the beginning. But this proved to be a landmark in the development of India’s international relations. Like Stalin in 1951 and 1952, Mr. Brezhnev and Mr. Kosygin in 1967 have had to revise drastically their assessment of India on account of the Government’s West Asia stand.
The Times of India, 22 November 1967