At the height of the cold war in the fifties Mr. Nehru repeatedly expressed the view that the real division in the world was not between the capitalised and a largely democratic West and the Communist East, but between the industrialised and prosperous North and the under-developed and poor South.
This conviction was strengthened by his reading of European history which led him to the conclusion that just as religious wars had lost their appeal in the past, the present ideological struggle would soon lose its drive.
This understanding influenced his approach to international relations and led him to develop what may be called an Asian and non-aligned outlook. But he could not but have realised that without a major schism in the highly developed North with its near monopoly of both economic and military power, the policy of non-alignment would not have been credible and meaningful.
The concept of non-alignment is relevant primarily in the context of a bipolar Northern world, not in the crude sense that the division makes it possible for some countries to play one side against the other and take aid from both, but in the sense that only in such a world can weak, poor, illiterate and often badly administered countries of Asia and Africa acquire a measure of capital resources and technical know-how without having to barter away their freedom of action once again. A far-sighted Asian leader like Mr. Nehru could not but attempt to use the power of the Soviet Union and the fear that it generated in the West to redress at least partly the imbalance in his country’s relations with the West.
Bipolarity has had two aspects – the intra-family conflict in the Northern European world and the East-West struggle for a dominant position in Asia, Africa and Latin America. As the West saw it, Russia constituted a threat to it in Europe as a great military power already lodged in the centre of the continent and it menaced its positions in the third world as leader of a powerful world-wide communist movement able to win the support of non-aligned nations from time to time in the name of anti-colonialism.
In theory the two aspects of the Soviet power could have reinforced each other. In practice Russia made the first series of major moves in Asia beginning with the delivery of arms to Egypt in 1955 only after Western Europe had placed itself outside its grasp through the NATO and a phenomenal economic recovery with generous US aid. Since the 20th Soviet Communist Party Congress in February 1956, Russia’s weakness in Europe has adversely affected its ability to lead the communist movement into a sustained assault on Western positions in Asia, Africa and Latin America.
The Soviet push in Europe had lost its thrust even during Stalin’s life-time. The failure in Greece and in Berlin and the defection of Yugoslavia were symbolic of the loss of initiative. His successors recognised this fact and indicated their willingness to accept the status quo by signing the Austrian peace treaty. But by then the communist system itself was in a crisis. There was demand for political liberalisation and more consumer goods within Russia and for greater autonomy in Eastern Europe. Both these demands became explosive in the context of the struggle for power in the Soviet Union and various East European countries. De-Stalinisation and the revolt in Hungary were the logical result. Mr. Khrushchev went on talking of overtaking the United States and of burying the capitalist system. But initiative in Europe had been lost.
The weakness in Europe could have been redressed by some spectacular success in Asia. Mr. Khrushchev sensed that West Asia was the best place for him to challenge the established order because of the existence of a radical nationalist ferment against the pro-Western feudal classes and of general Arab resentment against Israel. He therefore agreed to provide arms to Egypt in 1955. The Soviet Union subsequently extended aid to a number of other countries in Asia and Africa. But in these two continents the Soviet effort was severely handicapped from the start.
Rising Corruption
Well-organised communist parties did not exist in most of these countries. The nationalist regimes were distrustful of the local parties and of the Soviet Union because of ideological differences. Russia could at best supplement and not supplant Western aid and trade. The Western-educated elites did not wish to sever cultural and economic links with former imperial countries. The Soviet model of industrialisation was not found suitable. Finally as one nationalist leader after another – Dr. Nkrumah and Dr. Sukarno were the most conspicuous examples – began to flounder amidst rising corruption, inefficiency and grandiose schemes totally unrelated to the needs of their countries. Russia’s capacity to undermine the Western positions was further weakened.
The weakness of the Russian position was fully exposed by the retreat on Cuba and the public split with China. Since then there have been two major crises – the Indo-Pakistan war in 1965 and the Arab-Israeli war last June. In the case of the former the Soviet Union openly joined the United States first to bring about a ceasefire and then to secure India’s withdrawal from strategic passes in Kashmir and from the occupied territory near Lahore and Sialkot. In the Arab-Israeli war again it has found itself trailing behind America, first on the question of an unconditional cease-fire and now on the terms of a settlement.
Unlike Russia, China has continued to breathe fire against the West. But the result of its policy has been disastrous for the cause of both communism and nationalism in Asia and Africa. It has isolated itself from one friendly country after another, weakened Russia’s position in the region by splitting and paralysing local communist parties and front organisations and legitimatised the return of Western influence through amateur attempts at subversion and reckless distribution of arms to all and sundry in Africa.
Thus slowly the world has ceased to be bipolar in the sense that Russia and other communist countries have failed to build up a rival system which can challenge the world-wide West-dominated system. Russia is a great and growing power in both economic and military fields. It has not been and is not likely to be, in the foreseeable future, a full-fledged member of the European family in the sense Britain and France are. Thus it will not cease trying to change the present balance of power in its favour.
Anti-colonialism and pan-Asianism were two other facets of Mr. Nehru’s policy and it has become necessary to examine whether and to what extent these concepts are valid today.
Some of the aims of the anti-colonial movement have been realised. Most Afro-Asian countries are free. The two West-sponsored regional alliances – SEATO and CENTO – are almost defunct. Former imperial powers have dismantled many of their bases and are in the process of dismantling those that remain. These are not small gains for Asia and Africa. But they fall far short of the objectives of the anti-colonial and pan-Asian concept.
Racial Discrimination
The struggle against racial discrimination for instance has met with little success so far. South Africa has never been more impregnable than it is today. The Afro-Asian world has not been able to deal with the challenge of the 200,000 white settlers in Rhodesia. In fact the consolidation of a racist regime in Salisbury has been accompanied by a pro-Western trend all over black Africa and, apart from Algeria, even in Arab Africa.
In terms of power almost the same story has been repeated in Asia. Israel has inflicted a crushing defeat on the United Arab Republic, Jordan and Syria. Gone is the dream of an Arab nationalist movement sweeping away the feudal monarchies and sultanates and with it the Western influence from the region.
Several factors are responsible for the debacle of the concept of Afro-Asianism. In spite of the general trend towards the liquidation of West European empires, the Western position has always been intrinsically strong and, as argued earlier, the Soviet bloc has never been particularly well placed to undermine it.
The ineptitude of the two principal communist powers has also contributed much to the West’s easy success in Asia and Africa. Moscow has bungled badly in Africa. It pushed President Nasser into a defence alliance with the highly unstable Syrian regime and laid the basis of the disaster which has overtaken the United Arab Republic and radical Arab nationalism. China’s irresponsibility and ineptitude beggar description. It delivered a body blow on the concept of Asian unity and co-operation when it marched its forces into India. It has continued to play havoc with all attempts to promote Afro-Asian co-operation. In 1965 it played a key role in wrecking the second Afro-Asian conference.
Within the non-aligned part of Afro-Asia, the fate of Dr. Nkrumah and Dr. Sukarno is a portent. It is not necessary to dwell on their love of pomp and pageantry, their extravagance, their unending search for status symbols, their disastrous mismanagement of the economies of their countries, their messianic and saviour complex and their obsessive and compulsive anti-Westernism. They have discredited very concept of Afro-Asianism.
It can be argued that the idea of newly independent countries of Asia and Africa being able to shake off Western influence was to begin with much too ambitious because it ignored the realities of economic, administrative and political weaknesses and paid little attention to the fact that in most of these countries the freedom movements were more like sporadic student agitations than serious and sustained struggles. This view cannot be easily contested. In fact the economic and political weaknesses have acquired a new edge because political independence has neither been accompanied nor been followed by the revival of what can be meaningfully be called a national culture.
Mr. Nehru organised the Asian Relations Conference in 1947 to proclaim the rise of a distinct Asian personality. Eight years later the Bandung Conference was held to announce that both Asia and Africa had come or were rapidly coming into their own. In retrospect the declarations have turned out to have been highly premature.
The Times of India, 26 January 1968