It is widely assumed in New Delhi and other capitals that Japan which will soon become third largest industrial power in the world, after the United States and the Soviet Union, will not long remain content with its present “low posture” in international relations. Every action of the Japanese Government is therefore carefully scrutinised to provide confirmatory evidence that it is looking for an opportunity to proclaim itself as the preponderant power in the Far East and South-East Asia.
Apart from its growing economic power, broadly four factors tend to strengthen the view that Tokyo is busy reappraising its foreign and defence policies. First, the Japanese people have overcome the shock of defeat, thanks to their economic prosperity and subsequent political rehabilitation. There can be no more convincing proof of this rehabilitation than that both Washington and Moscow should woo it and expect it to play an important role in the containment of China. The memories of the Japanese performance in some of the countries they occupied in the last war have also faded with the result that they are now prepared to welcome economic and other forms of cooperation with Tokyo. In striking contrast, some of these very nations seek to exclude India from schemes of regional economic cooperation.
Tokyo’s Ambition
Secondly, Japan’s ambition until the Second World War was to emerge as the preponderant power in the Far East and South-East Asia. It has been obvious since 1955 that it would try to recover its lost status, influence and prestige at the first opportunity. This does not mean that it still nurses imperial ambitions. That is a thing of the past. Neither the world situation nor the internal power balance in Tokyo would permit the revival of a plan of military domination. But this does not preclude it from seeking a decisive influence in the region through economic aid, trade and other means.
Thirdly, most American and Indian commentators take it for granted that like them the Japanese people and Government are preoccupied with the problems posed by the emergence of China as a nuclear power and would therefore seek to meet this challenge either in alliance with other countries or alone. In this context Japan’s ambitious nuclear power programme, though subject to inspection by the International Atomic Energy Agency, is believed to presage a decision to go nuclear. On a superficial view the argument appears sound, particularly in view of the energy with which Tokyo has been pursuing its rocket programme as well. But its validity is open to doubt. It will be difficult to sustain it if Japan signs the proposed non-proliferation treaty and thus gives up the option to go nuclear.
Finally, even those who think that Japan may not feel so menaced by China’s nuclear power as India and that it may regard the American umbrella as adequate, feel that it cannot be oblivious to the need for an Asian balance of power. Implicit in this is the conviction that the United States will not, and cannot reasonably be expected to, stay indefinitely in the region to offset China’s power. The factors on which the conviction about the inevitability of the American withdrawal from Asia is based have not been spelled out. In realistic terms the United States is as much a Pacific power as Japan or China and will maintain its military presence there irrespective of the outcome of the Viet Nam war. Even the opponents of the US involvement in Viet Nam do not advocate a retreat to “fortress America”.
World Role
All this does not prove that Tokyo has no option but to undertake an agonising reappraisal of its current policies and accept new obligations and responsibilities. But it does confirm the belief that it is looking for an international role which is more in keeping with its economic power and national self-confidence. This is only natural. The question is whether this search will conform to the trends that have emerged in the past two decades or so or whether there will be a sharp departure from these.
There is no room for dogmatism in dealing with such complex issues, particularly at a time when the situation is highly fluid. The developments in Japan will no doubt be influenced by the outcome of the Viet Nam war and the so-called proletarian cultural revolution in China. But barring wholly unexpected developments which upset the present balance in Asia it is more than likely that Tokyo would seek a synthesis of the existing trends and not a radical departure from them. In concrete terms, it is likely to try to serve as a bridge between America and China than as a rival of China.
It should be recognised that Tokyo is under no obligation to choose between close ties with the United States and developing trade and other links with China. Even when it decided to recognise Marshal Chiang Kai-shek’s Government in Formosa in 1951 as the price for the termination of the American occupation, the then Prime Minister, Mr. Yoshida, stated in his letter to the US Senate that “the Japanese Government desires ultimately to have a full measure of political peace and commercial intercourse with China which is Japan’s neighbour”. In the 1952 peace treaty with the so-called Republic of China, it was clearly stated on Japan’s initiative that it applied only to “territories which are now or which may hereafter be under the control of the Government” in Taipeh. Thus even at that time the Japanese did not fail to recognise the long-term need for friendly relations with China. There has been no deviation from this policy. It is difficult to think of circumstances which would persuade Tokyo to abandon the policy of developing relations with Peking.
Broadly three considerations make it necessary for Japan to maintain the friendliest possible relations with the United States in spite of its wholly understandable desire to move out of the shadow of American power and to assert its own personality in international relations. First, the mutual security pact with the United States ensures its security, at little cost to itself. Japan spends just about 1.1 per cent of the gross national product on defence. This gives it an edge over its rivals, West Germany and Britain, in exports. Secondly, America accounts for about 30 per cent of Japan’s trade and no Government interested in the country’s well being can ever think of jeopardising it. Finally America provides the model in Japan’s march towards modernisation. The last factor is not as tangible as the other two but its psychological importance should not be under-estimated.
But it is inconceivable that Japan will extend the area of military co-operation with the United States directly and indirectly and risk a direct confrontation with China. The fact that it did not join the South-East Asia Treaty Organisation in 1954 is pertinent. Washington itself is foreclosing certain developments by insisting that Japan sign the non-proliferation treaty.
Similarly, there are several reasons why any significant shift in the Japanese attitude towards China is unlikely. First, Japan has emerged as China’s biggest trading partner. In terms of percentage the trade with China may not be particularly impressive. It accounts for a little over two per cent of Japan’s total trade, just a little higher than Japan’s trade with Formosa. But it is an expanding trade and the possibilities can be immense if China comes to adopt rational economic policies. In any case Tokyo does not wish to be left behind its European competitors.
Capital Goods
Since the split with the Soviet Union, China also needs new resources for the supply of capital goods and it is quite clear that it has chosen Japan as one such source. The consideration of trade would lose much of its importance if Tokyo shared the Indo-US view that China is an expansionist power and constitutes a threat to its own security. But Tokyo does not think in those terms and is prepared to take a more tolerant view of Peking’s propaganda excesses than Washington and New Delhi.
It is even more significant that Japan cannot achieve a national consensus on the basis of a policy which is directed against China. Such a policy would also offend against the pacifist sentiment which is the result of the sad experience in the last war, of the bitter memories of Hiroshima and Nagasaki and the general revulsion against militarists. In the case of Japan the cause of democracy has come to be identified with that of pacifism. The ruling Liberal Democratic Party polled less than 50 per cent votes in the last General Election in January 1967. It will not do anything to provoke a bitter controversy which divides the nation.
If this assessment of Japanese policy towards the United States and China is generally accurate it is logical to expect that Tokyo will in course of time emerge as a bridge between Washington and Peking. This will not require the repudiation of any existing commitment, except to some extent in the case of Formosa and that too not in the near future. It is possible to envisage that the US and Chinese Governments would welcome Japan in that role if and when the Viet Nam conflict can be terminated. Meanwhile Tokyo is carving an important place for itself in the region through economic aid and expanded trade. This is not a heroic vision of Japan’s future role. But such a role would not be inconsistent with the current trends in Japanese thinking and the leadership’s continuing preoccupations with internal problems. Industrialisation is profoundly unsettling in its social and economic consequences and it will take Japan decades to deal with these effectively.
The Times of India, 6 March 1968