The least that can be said for the North Vietnamese and the Viet Cong is that they have fought the world’s greatest military power to a stalemate. If the best equipped US expeditionary force ever has not been defeated, it has without doubt been humbled. General Giap’s statement that “all South Viet Nam is Dien Bien Phu” is not an empty boast. In fact most Americans admit that much.
By any standard it would be unfair to the North Vietnamese and their allies in the South to compare their performance with either that of the Chinese in Korea in 1951 or of Japan against Russia in 1905. Yet this saga in courage and endurance has not touched off anything like the wave of admiration and enthusiasm in Asia as the other two events did.
One reason for this lack of enthusiasm can be that the outcome of the war in Viet Nam may still be said to be uncertain. The conflict can be greatly prolonged and intensified in case peace negotiations break down. But too much importance should not be attached to this calculation. In a psychological sense the United States has conceded that the war in Viet Nam cannot be won and in fact need not be won. Behind the peace movement in America lies the widespread feeling that this has been an unjust and unnecessary war which must be terminated at the earliest. Mr. Johnson’s decision not to seek re-election and Mr. Robert Kennedy’s to enter the presidential race on the slogan of getting the American troops home, have reflected the strength of the peace movement. Peace talks may suffer repeated and even serious setbacks but it is difficult to believe that the United States will spare any effort to reach a negotiated settlement.
Confidence
Two other reasons for the absence of enthusiasm in Asia over North Viet Nam’s and the Viet Cong’s incredible successes against the United States and its allies deserve more serious attention. First, nationalism in Asia has not acquired racist overtones and undertones. The war in Viet Nam has generally not been viewed as an anti-white crusade, Japan’s victory over Russia in 1905 was seen in that light. It gave coloured peoples in Asia a new sense of confidence because it showed that a white nation could be defeated militarily. Most Asian nations had won independence by the time of the Chinese intervention in the Korean war. Still the Chinese victories against US and allied forces provided a vicarious sense of satisfaction even to non-communist Asians. The situation has been different in the case of the war in Viet Nam.
The Caucasian-type American, Australian and New Zealand soldiers have certainly been out of place among the Mongoloid Vietnamese. This fact of sharp racial and linguistic differences has placed a barrier between them and the people they were supposed to defend. But it has not been a race war in any sense of the term. Hanoi and the South Viet Nam Liberation Front have regarded it as a patriotic war of independence against the “US imperialists” and their “lackeys”. If there has ever been any racist undertone in their propaganda against the United States, it has not attracted much attention.
On the face of it Western commentators have been more sensitive to the fact of racial differences between American and other white soldiers and the Vietnamese people than most Asians. Even the Chinese have not tried to convert the Viet Nam war into an anti-white struggle. Their view of the world as being divided between the generally pro-status quo rich white nations on one hand and poor and revolutionary Asia, Africa and Latin America on the other can be said to have racial undertones. But they attach great importance to ideological veneer and it would be less than fair to them to conclude that they believe in a race war as such.
Conclusive
The Viet Nam war is not the only evidence which supports the view that nationalism in Asia has not degenerated into anti-white racialism. But it is conclusive in the sense in which Malaysia’s and Singapore’s fondness for British bases, India’s continued membership of the Commonwealth and the post-war ties of Japan, South Korea, Formosa, Thailand and the Philippines with the United States are not. In all the other cases it can at least be argued that the bourgeois regimes in power have betrayed the cause of Asian nationalism.
The causes that have saved nationalism in Asia from degenerating into some form of open or disguised racialism is a major subject for investigation by social scientists. But it is incontestable that Asian nations have matured fast and that the rise of non-racial nationalism is an event of the greatest significance for the future of Asia and the world.
The fear of communist expansion is clearly the second important reason why North Viet Nam’s and the Viet Cong’s victories have been received rather coolly in non-communist countries of South and South-East Asia. It would be absurd to ascribe this fear to American propaganda alone though it has played an important role in opinion formation. The domino theory, for instance, crops up again and again in discussions on Viet Nam. But the apprehension is deep rooted and Hanoi itself would do well to recognise it in its long-term interest.
It is a pity that the issue of communist expansionism continues to be treated in either/or terms. In this kind of framework China is regarded either as an expansionist power prepared to stake everything on a programme of spreading revolution or as a peace-loving country wholly preoccupied with the task of internal construction and consolidation. The motivating force is believed to be either nationalism with emphasis on restoring China to its former preeminent position or Marxism-Leninism-Maoism with emphasis on spreading the doctrine.
Similarly, Hanoi is described either as Peking’s satellite or the capital of a wholly independent nation which has historically fought against Chinese domination for a thousand years in the past and can be depended upon to serve as a bulwark against Chinese expansionism in the future. By this reckoning Ho Chi Minh is either reduced to the humble status of being Mao Tse-tung’s faithful pupil or is elevated to that of being his rival for the leadership of South-East Asia.
The reality is far more complex. China can be expansionist or peaceful depending on its internal evolution and the external setting in which it has to operate. It is motivated by both nationalistic and ideological considerations. Hanoi can at once be Peking’s ally and rival. Past history is relevant but it can be a grievous folly to think exclusively in historical terms. All in all the issues are far too complex to admit of simplification and of treatment in either/or terms.
The situation at the moment is so fluid that it is pointless to speculate on the likely course of developments in this part of the world. No one can possibly be certain regarding the terms on which Hanoi and the NLF on the one hand and America and the Saigon Government on the other may finally be prepared to settle. Similarly, one can only speculate whether North Viet Nam’s ambitions are limited to South Viet Nam or whether they extend to Laos and Cambodia, the two other units in the former French Indo-China. Right now the pro-communist Pathet Lao contains thousands of North Vietnamese who give it most of its effective fighting strength. Similarly Hanoi’s troops move in and out of Cambodia at will. Presently this interference can be said to be the result of the war. But whether the termination of the war will see the end of it all, is a matter of conjecture.
Unique Case
The number of question marks against China’s future behaviour is equally large, if not larger. Will Peking grow bolder in the pursuit of its theory of wars of national liberation in the wake of a likely US withdrawal from South Viet Nam? Will it step up guerilla activities in northern Burma and Thailand in competition with Hanoi? To raise these and other similar questions is not to subscribe to Washington’s domino theory.
Viet Nam is a case by itself and no other South or South-East Asian country bears comparison with it. In any event the theory that the United States could stabilise the situation on the periphery of China with its military presence has been severely strained. It is not difficult to think of contingencies in which Washington can once again be sorely tempted to commit its forces to the Asian mainland. A massive Chinese invasion of India or Burma is one such contingency. But such developments are highly improbable and it is a safe inference that never again will America be so reckless in committing its forces as it has been in the case of Viet Nam. This by itself alters the Asian scene radically and calls for fresh appraisal of its policy by every government interested in the future of the region.
The Times of India, 17 April 1968