It would have been highly surprising if Mrs. Gandhi’s visit to Australia, New Zealand, Malaysia and Singapore had not by itself raised doubts in certain quarters regarding the Government’s continued adherence to the policy of non-alignment. Some of the Prime Minister’s utterances have added fuel to the fire. These are likely to be used in coming weeks and months to lend support to the criticism that she has in fact deviated from her father’s policy. She has, of course, done nothing of the kind.
In the past New Delhi generally shied away from developing close ties with these countries at least partly because Australia and New Zealand were members of ANZUS and SEATO and Malaysia and Singapore were heavily dependent on Britain for their security. Mrs. Gandhi has pushed aside the inhibitions and the inertia of years gone by in undertaking the journey to these countries.
Anti-West Bias
In the ‘fifties the concept of non-alignment was unavoidably tied up with that of anti-colonialism. For one thing, India had recently won its independence after a long struggle and the memories of this struggle were fresh in the minds of Mr. Nehru and his colleagues. For another, scores of other countries in Asia and Africa had yet to overthrow imperialist rule. Newly independent India regarded it its moral duty to render such assistance and encouragement as it could to freedom movements in other countries. The consequent anti- Western bias in the Indian policy of non-alignment was further strengthened when the United States decided to provide military assistance to Pakistan in 1954.
The wedlock between the two intrinsically sound concepts of non-alignment and anti-colonialism however produced certain undesirable results. New Delhi could, for example, seldom summon the courage to make the mildest criticism of Dr. Sukarno and Dr. Nkrumah in spite of their avowed hostility to this country and Mr. Nehru’s personal dislike for them. This was so because they were supposed to be in the vanguard of the worldwide anti-colonial movement. On the other hand it consistently failed to cultivate countries like Iran, Thailand, the Philippines and, as noted above, even fellow members of the Commonwealth in the region because of their pro-West orientation.
Though harmful to India’s interests this lack of resilience was understandable till the late ‘fifties when communist countries still functioned as one bloc, when the Sino-Soviet dispute was still being fought out in secret and when New Delhi could hope that Peking would mend its ways and return to the policy of peaceful co-existence. The situation has changed greatly since then. New Delhi need not be inhibited by fake ideological considerations when the Soviet Union itself is pursuing a highly pragmatic approach and provides economic aid to Turkey and Iran and even missiles to the latter. Moscow incidentally is interested in developing economic ties with Malaysia.
The need for vigilance, resilience, pragmatism and the capacity to act quickly to keep pace with the march of events has never been greater than now. Britain has already decided to withdraw from its bases in Singapore and Malaysia by 1971. The US withdrawal from South Viet Nam is a distinct possibility. These two events, themselves the products of profound changes in the region, can be expected to transform the scene in our part of the world. It is immaterial whether one thinks or does not think in terms of a power vacuum.
The more relevant point is that New Delhi cannot afford to be muscle-bound in such a revolutionary situation. To begin with, India must open a dialogue with all countries in the region irrespective of the differences of approach and outlook. If nothing else this can ensure that the country’s policy is based on a realistic understanding of the facts of life in South-East Asia and not just on wishful thinking.
All this is not to imply that the concept of non-alignment can no longer provide the framework for a meaningful Indian policy for South-East Asia. Quite the contrary. The situation has not been so favourable for a long time for treating the problems of the region in a politico-economic framework.
New Situation
In the context of the East-West struggle non-alignment unavoidably came to be defined in terms of avoidance of involvement in military alliances. In the new situation created by the Russo-American detente, the Sino-Soviet split and the loosening of ties within the two blocs, non-alignment of this kind is an irrelevance. In the present context the concept can be meaningful only if its other aspect – the need to find non-militaristic political solutions to problems is emphasised.
The Government of India has, to its credit, all along taken the view that the problem of China’s containment need never have been militarised in spite of Korea. It was not Mao Tse-tung but Stalin who was responsible for the North Korean invasion of South Korea. China intervened only when US forces moved across the 28th Parallel towards Yalu in spite of the advance warning conveyed through India. Even after the intervention Peking’s response to India’s efforts towards a negotiated settlement was, as Mr. George Kennan has noted in his remarkable memoirs, far more helpful than Moscow’s. An imaginative American policy could have paved the way for peace and stability in Asia.
But the United States chose instead to adopt a militaristic approach to the problems of South-East Asia. SEATO was an expression of the approach which led stage by stage to America’s massive and tragic involvement in South Viet Nam. Even the hawks in Washington would now be prepared to admit that the US approach has been both intolerably costly and ineffective. It has led to an escalation and not to a resolution of the conflict.
It is only too likely that the United States will maintain and possibly strengthen its military presence in Thailand if and when it withdraws from South Viet Nam under an agreement with North Viet Nam. But Washington will not in future be keen to get involved in local conflicts. Mr. Irving Kristol’s summing up in The New York Times of May 12 is noteworthy in this connection. He writes:
Not Feasible
“In short, it seems to be the case, after Viet Nam, that American military intervention in world affairs will henceforth take one of two forms. Either it might, if sufficiently provoked, move towards a nuclear confrontation, as during the Cuban missile crisis. Or it might, if the Government is absolutely certain it can bring overwhelming force to bear, rely upon swift sorties, as in the Dominican crisis. But that large middle ground upon which American Foreign policy has rested since World War II has now been cut away from under our feet.”
Neither type of military intervention envisaged by Mr. Kristol is feasible in South-East Asia.
The consequences of an American withdrawal could have been truly disastrous if China was bent on military adventurism and expansionism. There has been little evidence that Peking is so inclined. If anything the continuance of the so-called proletarian cultural revolution is a fairly firm indication that China remains more or less wholly preoccupied with problems of domestic reorganisation. Moreover, the internal turmoil which has continued for a decade in one form or another has clearly affected adversely the regime’s capacity to bring its power to bear on developments in neighbouring countries.
Thus the collapse of the American policy of military intervention and the emasculation of the Chinese drive offer a real chance to what may be called the Nehru approach. It is not inconceivable that in course of time even Washington and Peking may stop opposing this approach. But that would be a long way off even on the most optimistic calculation.
China’s xenophobia and commitment to a programme of subversion in neighbouring countries can be explained partly in terms of the humiliation it suffered at the hands of Western nations in the 19th century, partly in terms of the post-war US policy of encirclement and partly in terms of its own view of its role in advancing the cause of world revolution. It will therefore be some time before the US withdrawal from South Viet Nam comes to be reflected in the pursuit of a moderate policy by China. Meanwhile it will continue to try to stir up trouble wherever it can – Burma, Northern Thailand and North-East India.
But it should no longer be necessary to argue that alien armies cannot be particularly effective in dealing with guerilla bands. The approach has been tried and failed. Viet Nam has shown that escalation by one side leads only to escalation by the other and not to quick victory. It is time a more peaceable politico-economic approach is tried in the region as a whole.
Confusion
A great deal of confusion continues because it has come to be accepted, quite erroneously, that China and pro-Peking communist parties constitute the main threat to the integrity of South-East Asian countries. In fact most of these countries face disruption from within and they would have done so even if China did not exist. Nationalism has lost a good deal of its appeal because of the failure of nationalist governments and parties to meet aroused expectations in the economic field, to satisfy the legitimate aspirations of ethnic minorities, to help their peoples discover a new sense of identity when religion no longer suffices, to reduce if not bridge the gap between the Western-educated elites and the masses in the countryside and to perform effectively a host of other urgent tasks.
The demands on nationalist governments and parties have in all conscience been excessive, the time at their disposal short and the resources in terms of capital, trained manpower and effective administration severely limited. But the fact remains that “little nationalisms” have arisen in almost all South and South-East Asian nations precisely because it has not been possible for nationalist governments to move fast enough. China and pro-Peking communist groups are seeking to forge alliances with these separatist forces. It is difficult to believe that this challenge can be met through alliance or predominantly military means. This is not to dismiss the need for a strategic balance so that China does not feel free to send its forces across its frontiers but to underline the essentially politico-economic nature of the problems facing South and South-East Asian countries and to emphasise that their solution has to be sought in that direction.
The Times of India, 29 May 1968