There is no doubt that India’s basic decision not to establish diplomatic relations with Israel has vitiated its West Asia policy and made it difficult for it to work effectively for peace in the region.
The absence of diplomatic relations with Tel Aviv cannot, however, explain or excuse such lapses as its endorsement of President Nasser’s disastrous decision to close the Gulf of Aqaba to Israeli shipping in 1967 in spite of Israeli warnings that such a move would lead to war, its decision to accord diplomatic status to the Arab League mission in New Delhi, its gratuitous insult to the Israeli Head of State when he was on his way to Kathmandu in March 1966 and its current reception to an Al Fatah delegation. New Delhi does not have to throw away all discretion to the winds just because it does not have proper diplomatic ties with Israel.
The decision to recognise Israel but not to exchange ambassadors was taken soon after partition when India considered it vital to counter Pakistan’s drive to canvass Arab support for its concept of pan-Islamism on the one hand and its claim to Kashmir on the other. Since Pakistan was trying to convince the Arab world that the Muslims in India were having a raw deal New Delhi thought it expedient to bend over backwards to win the sympathy of the Arab countries by giving them all-out support.
Pakistan found a willing ally in Britain in its machinations in the Arab world when the latter was still the dominant power in the region. Though the Labour Party was in office at the time it was pursuing the traditional policy of trying to perpetuate its hold in West Asia on the strength of its bases and the support of the sultans and the sheikhs. It strongly favoured a regional grouping based on religion which fully suited Pakistan. Though the Baghdad Pact was still some years away moves in that direction were already afoot towards the end of the ‘forties.
Discreet
It is easy to understand why the Nehru Government thought it discreet in these circumstances not to give the least offence to the Arabs. But then Israel had been created under a resolution of the UN General Assembly and both America and Russia had exchanged ambassadors with it. As India too had recognised the new State it should not have denied itself the advantage of being represented in Tel Aviv. Such representation would have improved its bargaining position with the Arabs and also placed it in a better position to work for peace in the region. Mr Nehru was of course too shrewd a leader to have missed these points. It may be that he acted under the advice of men who were obsessed with more immediate and narrower problems.
India did not have a single reliable friend in the Arab world till the early ‘fifties. Even Mr Nasser wavered in the beginning because he did not fully realise that the scope and purpose of the revolution he had successfully led was not limited to the overthrow of a corrupt, inefficient and servile monarchy and its hangers-on and that it ushered in a new era of secular nationalism in West Asia. It was perhaps the attempt on his life by the Muslim Brotherhood in October 1954 and his participation in the Bandung Conference early in 1955 which crystallised his thinking on the two critical issues of secularism and non-alignment. The agreement for the supply of Czech arms to Egypt was signed in September 1955.
Since the Bandung Conference India has been steadfast in its support for the Nasser regime. This has in fact been the centre-piece of its West Asia policy. The nature and purpose of this support have been widely misunderstood and it has been argued that India has ignored the susceptibilities of other countries like Saudi Arabia and Jordan at one end of the scale and Tunisia at the other. But discussions on this question, which have been either partisan or unduly inhibited, have by no means served the cause of Indo-UAR understanding.
Dictatorial
President Nasser’s is a dictatorial and repressive regime and does not tolerate any dissent and opposition. In spite of his popular appeal the social base of his regime is narrow and it depends heavily on the State’s coercive apparatus for its survival. He dare not allow the people a free vote lest he and his supporters be swept aside in favour of the traditional elements, specially the Muslim Brotherhood. Even the educated middle class, which generally shares his views regarding the outmoded social institutions and the place of religion in society, has become increasingly critical of him. The administration is generally corrupt and inefficient. A democratic India with its liberal political culture can hardly be enthusiastic about the political system developed by President Nasser.
Of the factors that have led New Delhi to lend support to him, those relating to its desire to contain Western and Pakistani influence in the region have received the greatest attention. This is understandable. But the crux of the matter is that India has a stake in the survival of President Nasser and the force which he represents because they hold the promise of secularising politics in West Asia. It is not an accident that the reactionary and conservative elements in the Indian Muslim community abhor him and look up to King Feisal and his ilk for guidance and support.
The Nasserite revolution has several facets. It has come to represent the UAR’s imperial ambitions which have taken the form of pan-Arabism. It is anti-Western and symbolises the revolt of Islam against the disruptive impact of the West. The revolution has got entangled with Arab hatred of the Jewish State of Israel. But above all it seeks to modernise the Arab world and exorcise the ghost of pan-Islamism. And though it proclaims the doctrine of a united Arab nation it has set in motion forces which have led to the rise of competitive nationalisms. Countries where educated middle class military officers, politicians and bureaucrats have seized power, cannot possibly be absorbed in the United Arab Republic.
Main Plank
On an overall view therefore friendship with the UAR and other radical regimes in the region must remain the main plank of India’s West Asia policy. The frequent coups in Syria and Iraq, the witch-hunting in Baghdad, their strident clamour for the liquidation of Israel and irrational anti-westernism do no credit to them. But these irritants should not be allowed to confuse the main issue.
This does not mean that public opinion in this country should not express itself on these “embarrassing” issues or that the Government should pretend that it shares the radical Arabs’ hatred of Israel and the West. But it does mean that India should remain friendly to countries which are trying hard to move away from stagnant medievalism to modernity.
It is easy and emotionally satisfying to divide the world arbitrarily into friends and enemies. It is much more difficult and often frustrating to make a discriminating and judicious approach. As a people we have yet to learn to do so.
The emphasis of Indian policy has to be suitably adjusted to the significant developments taking place in West Asia at present. The Soviet Union is rapidly emerging as the preponderant power in the region. Its naval presence in the Mediterranean is being extended to the Indian Ocean. An awareness seems to be beginning to dawn in Cairo that Arab and Russian interests are far from being identical, that Moscow gives top priority to its relations with America and favours a solution which will be acceptable to both Washington and Tel Aviv, and that increasing dependence on the Soviet Union constitutes a threat to the UAR’s genuine independence.
It is not necessary to share the extremist view that President Nasser’s one-time trusted Marxist lieutenant, Mr. Aly Sabry, has been trying to overthrow him or that the Soviet Union has been involved in such a plot. But Mr. Sabry has been dismissed from his influential posts in the Arab Socialist Union, the only political party in the UAR, and the relations between Moscow and Cairo are not free from the taint of mutual suspicion or even bitterness.
This is not an altogether sudden development. But until recently Russian and Egyptian leaders had successfully kept up the appearance of an accord. They will find it increasingly difficult to do so in the future.
The situation is still confused. President Nasser is perhaps dimly aware that even a limited victory over Israel may not be round the corner and that the continued struggle against Tel Aviv may add to his dependence on Russia without enabling him to settle scores with the former. But he is not yet ready to face up to the fact that if he is interested in regaining a measure of independence vis-a-vis the Soviet Union he has to de-escalate the conflict with Israel and resume the dialogue with the West generally and the United States in particular.
The prevailing indecision and confusion are likely to last for quite some time and it is not yet possible to say what India can and should do in this complicated situation. But it is obvious that New Delhi will need much greater flexibility, resilience and acumen than it has shown itself capable of in the past if it is to cope with it.
India has so far operated a fairly simple policy in West Asia. Friendship with the UAR and support for anti-colonialism could easily be fitted into its generally pro-Soviet posture in international affairs. That era is clearly over. Rabat has nothing to do with all this. It is easy to express displeasure against Jordan and Morocco. It is much more difficult to deal meaningfully with the realities of the new situation in the world around us.
(Concluded)
The Times of India, 9 October 1969