A commentator has interpreted the annual report of the Ministry of External Affairs to suggest that “the Indian Government would like to see the British and American forces in Asia replaced by a Soviet presence.” This interpretation does not tally with New Delhi’s policy of non-alignment and credits the Government with the kind of direction and purposefulness of which it has not shown itself capable for a long time.
India will have to adopt a wholly different posture if it really intends to legitimise Soviet military presence in Asia. It will have to argue that American withdrawal is now a foregone conclusion, that this will create a dangerous power vacuum, specially in south-east Asia, in view of the instability and weakness of most Governments there and China’s hegemonistic ambitions, that halting attempts at regional economic co-operation will not provide an answer to the problem of security, and that Mr Brezhnev’s emphasis on the need for collective measures in the region offers the hope that the Soviet Union may be willing to assume in some modified form the role which the United States is rapidly giving up.
Soviet Role
Several Governments in south-east Asia (Thailand, Malaysia and Singapore) have been arguing in somewhat similar terms. They are less convinced about their capacity to cope with the Chinese challenge and local subversive forces than the Government of India which continues to take the optimistic view that local nationalisms, economic growth and regional cooperation would suffice to ensure independence and stability in the region. New Delhi apparently ignores such pertinent facts as the rise and growth of ethnic conflicts (Burma and Malaysia), rival ambitions (North Viet Nam and Thailand), fears of smaller and weaker countries against more determined local powers (Cambodia, Laos and Singapore), and the disruptive pressures which the process of modernisation inevitably releases in traditional societies.
Even so the External Affairs Ministry’s report shows a bias in favour of the Soviet Union. It commends Mr Brezhnev’s “proposal” for collective security in Asia even though there is so far no evidence to show that the Kremlin has done anything more than to send out a vague feeler to individual Governments on the periphery of China that it is willing to extend some form of assistance to them.
The report refers to Mr Dinesh Singh’s visit to Moscow last September and his discussions with Soviet leaders and adds: “What was clear was that the central principle of the proposed system was an agreement among Asian nations to renounce the use or threat of force in the settlement to disputes.” But it is precisely because some nations are not willing to enter into such pacts or to honour them that the need for security arrangements arises.
Mr Dinesh Singh could not possibly have accepted such a fatuous explanation, specially in view of this country’s own bitter experience with China. Peking’s signatures to various documents have not inhibited it from using force and promoting insurrections. The implication is that either the Soviet leaders did not take Mr Dinesh Singh into confidence or their own views are still nebulous. The latter appears more likely for the simple reason that the situation in countries on the periphery of China is much too fluid and complex for the Soviet Union to provide a ready-made solution. But in either case it makes little sense for New Delhi to commend a proposal about which it knows almost nothing.
Similarly, the report goes out of its way to make the gratuitous statement that the Brezhnev “proposal” is a declaration that the Soviet Union is as much an Asian as a European power. This exercise is meaningless unless the intention is to convey the impression that Moscow has superior claims to forge intimate ties with Asian countries than Washington.
Russia has been an Asian power since the middle of the 19th century when Moscow seized large chunks of territory in Central Asia and the Far East. The new element in the situation is that the Soviet Union has developed the naval capability to operate far beyond its borders and that in recent years its leaders have downgraded ideological considerations in international relations sufficiently to be able to establish durable ties with non-socialist Governments. The Brezhnev “proposal” is an expression of the Soviet Union’s new confidence. It is neither a declaration of its Asian status nor a concrete plan of action.
The bias in favour of the Soviet Union is understandable and even legitimate inasmuch as it reflects New Delhi’s appreciation of Moscow’s assistance in containing first America’s and then China’s hegemonistic ambitions and its current assessment that Russian assistance is vital in this country’s search for security against Peking.
Policy Drifts
Some people deliberately ignore the limitations of China’s power and preoccupation with domestic problems to exaggerate the threat Peking poses to India in order to create the impression that New Delhi has no choice but to endorse all Soviet moves. These partisan activities are entirely misconceived because they seek to distort the people’s and the Government’s thinking. Any nation interested in preserving its independence has to accept certain risks. All the same the fact remains that India’s scope for manoeuvre vis-a-vis the Soviet Union will remain limited so long as China does not respond to its gestures and does not show any desire to settle disputes peacefully.
The trouble arises when New Delhi makes projections for the future regarding Soviet power and role. Though it is an exaggeration to say that the Government of India regards Russia as the wave of the future, the drift of its policies cannot but create the impression that it takes an unduly optimistic view of Soviet capabilities.
America has a far stronger navy than Russia and far more extensive economic and other ties with Asian countries. New Delhi has allowed itself to be unduly influenced by the superficial view that the United States is in full retreat in Asia and that it has lost the capacity and the will to stay the course after suitably readjusting its policies.
Similarly, Mr Dinesh Singh’s anxiety to upgrade the mission in Hanoi can make sense only if he takes it for granted that North Viet Nam has already won the war, that this victory gives the Soviet Union an opportunity to erect a barrier against Chinese expansionism, and that America has for all practical purposes been eliminated from the scene. All these assumptions are open to doubt. The situation in south-east Asia is in fact so full of contradictions that it defies any attempt at generalisation.
On a broader view which is not conditioned wholly by such developments of limited importance as the expansion of Soviet naval power and the leverage it at present enjoys in West Asia, Moscow must be seen to be working under serious handicaps. These are the result of both internal and external factors and cannot conceivably be eliminated in the foreseeable future.
The Compulsions
The compulsions of its confrontation with China oblige the Soviet Union to seek a modus vivendi with West Germany and to extend the détente with the United States. But since it cannot reduce its forces in Eastern and Central Europe in view of anti-Russian nationalistic ferment in those countries, the heavy additional commitment in Central Asia and the Far East must strain its resources and therefore limit its options in other parts of the world.
The Soviet influence in West Asia is not stable. Arab nationalism is highly emotional and may well turn against Russia if it continues to be frustrated in its struggle against Israel. As matters stand, it is fairly evident that only direct Soviet involvement can secure the defeat of Israel and the kind of peace which the Arab nationalists can find honourable and acceptable. Moscow is thus torn between contradictory pulls – its desire to maintain and increase its influence in the Arab world and the compulsion not only to avoid a direct collision with the United States but also to reach with it a degree to accommodation which facilitates agreement on limiting the strategic arms race and lays the spectre of a Sino-US deal which haunts it.
At home, the economy is in poor shape; the gap between Soviet and Western technology is rapidly widening; the limited experiment in giving wider powers to managers and technocrats is provoking resistance from the well entrenched party bureaucracy; the Marshals have begun to influence decisions to a degree which appeared unthinkable even under Mr. Khrushchev; and the system as a whole is not showing the necessary resilience and capacity for innovation. All these factors have major implications for Soviet foreign policy.
New Delhi’s task was relatively simple during the cold war period in the ‘fifties. It was not unduly complicated till the war with Pakistan in 1965 because till then the Soviet Union supported it in its disputes with both Peking and Islamabad. Even until last year it could ignore the complexities of the international scene because America’s policy lacked flexibility. But now it has to operate in a world which is increasingly beginning to resemble a complicated chess-board. It cannot get away with over-simple solutions any longer.
The Times of India, 31 March 1970