The Chinese satellite has given an edge to the demand that India too must go in for nuclear weapons. The argument briefly is that if New Delhi shirks a decision, it will expose the country to Chinese blackmail and condemn it to technological backwardness.
This viewpoint is still being pressed by a small group of men who do not number more than a few scores. Though this does not by itself mean that the case for an Indian Bomb is unsound, it does show that the advocates have not managed to stir the imagination of even a sizable section of the elite, not to mention the people.
This is not particularly surprising. The Indian elite, by and large, takes less than casual interest in the problems of national security in spite of the wars against China in 1962 and Pakistan in 1965. This indifference suits the Government and it has therefore no desire to promote an intelligent discussion on the subject. It has not felt it necessary to spell out its views on the implications of the Chinese Bomb for India’s security.
Malaise
But the malaise is only partly the result of the Defence Ministry’s secretiveness. Barely a handful of civilians make use of such limited information as the Government releases from time to time in connection with the annual defence budget and in reply to occasional questions in Parliament. Only a couple of universities have cared to establish departments for the study of defence problems. The Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses in New Delhi is trying to arouse interest in the complicated problems of strategy and tactics. But it will be a long time before it can make a noticeable dent in popular apathy.
This indifference is itself a product of many factors. Most Indians have not shaken off the habits they acquired during the British period when they could take the country’s security for granted. They have also not got over the impact of a grossly simplified view of Gandhiji’s philosophy of non-violence. Similarly Mr. Nehru’s policy of non-alignment has for some peculiar reasons which can only be explained in terms of national psychology, come to inhibit a rational and sensible discussion of the international environment in which India has to exist and function.
In view of this massive apathy one cannot but admire the enthusiasm and dedication of the advocates of the Bomb. But this does not quite help to banish the fear that they may unwittingly be giving expression to an irrepressible urge to find a short cut to national security and greatness. The frequent references to the supposed need for doing something that can give the people a sense of self-confidence and self-respect only increases this apprehension.
No Short Cut
There is nothing wrong in the elite’s desire for national greatness. A country of the size of India cannot normally be content to remain a second class or a third class power. But it is common sense that the Bomb cannot provide a short cut to security, self-respect and influence. Britain and France provide ideal examples. Both have sunk to the status of second class powers in spite of their nuclear arsenals. All its pretensions notwithstanding, France depends as much on the United States for its security as Britain or West Germany which incidentally is becoming the dominant power in Western Europe by virtue of its economic strength. The influence London and Paris manage to command in former colonies has little to do with their possession of the Bomb and no one can possibly argue that they can do without American technology.
Numbers are said to be a decisive factor. That is presumably why it is currently taken for granted in India that China is on the way to becoming the third superpower. But is it?
Power in our age is inseparable from economic expansion. America and Russia are superpowers not so much by virtue of their nuclear armoury as of their economic strength. In that respect Japan is far ahead of China and the gap is likely to grow with every passing year. Whether Tokyo goes in for nuclear weapons or not, there can be little doubt that in the long run it is Japan and not China that will win recognition as the world’s third major power.
China enjoys two major “advantages” at present. It is able to impress world opinion by its strident propaganda against the United States and the Soviet Union. More significantly, it has mastered the art of stirring up trouble in countries on its borders at small cost to itself. Its ideology appeals to disaffected ethnic and religious minorities and to alienated groups in search of a utopian society. It can win their adherence through propaganda and limited aid in the form of small arms, training in guerilla warfare and money. This may well enable it to extend its influence in south-east Asia, specially in view of the confusion in Moscow and Washington’s growing incapacity to act coherently and decisively. But that would not make China a super-power and it remains to be seen whether Peking can maintain its posture after Chairman Mao disappears from the scene.
It is open to question whether the Chinese Bomb is the result of a rational consideration of its defence needs or of psychological compulsions dating back to the 19th century when the old Confucian order disintegrated and the country had to put up with the unbearable humiliation of being parcelled out by European powers. Though defence considerations may have contributed to the decision, it is fairly evident that psychological factors have been decisive.
Obsession
It is common knowledge that the Chinese elite, nationalist as well as communist, has been obsessed with the middle kingdom complex and that the communist elite in particular has been consumed by a passion to restore the country to what it believes was its previous status. It is equally well known that this intense nationalism has deeply influenced Peking’s policy, domestic as well as international, in the last two decades and that it largely explains the present conflict with the Soviet Union.
Unlike its Indian counterpart, the Chinese elite was attracted to the West by its military and technological power and not by its liberal and humanistic values. It opted for Marxism-Leninism in its search for a doctrine which could be a substitute for outdated Confucianism and help it in the task of national consolidation. It lost little time in sinifying the imported doctrine so much so that as soon as the communist regime was established in Peking in 1949, it laid claim to the leadership of anti-western revolutionary movements in Asia, Africa and Latin America on the strength of the thought of Mao. Thus in the context of China’s history of the last 100 years and longer, it would have been surprising indeed if Chairman Mao had not decided to manufacture nuclear weapons, the supreme virility symbol. Power grows out of the barrel of a gun not only for him but for most Chinese of his generation.
Chairman Mao has virtually invented the Russian devil to fulfill his and his people’s psychological need for external enemies and he would have done the same in respect of the United States even if the late Mr. John Foster Dulles was not so obliging. He can justify the bomb in terms of the American and the Soviet threat and it will no doubt add to China’s security as well as to its capacity for mischief. On the other hand, if Peking had followed a more prudent policy, the Soviet Union would have remained its ally and the US would have been reconciled to it a long time ago. But the Chinese have been working out their complexes and that process does not admit of much rationality except in the purely tactical sense.
Response
The Indian response to the Western impact has been altogether different. The elite here has sought to absorb the West’s liberal and humanistic values and philosophy even during those periods when it has been seriously concerned with the preservation of its own heritage. The so-called revivalist movements have predominantly been reform movements. India has not suffered from xenophobia. Its anti-colonialism has been a rational affair. The Indian elite has not been strongly attracted to power. Mr. Nehru’s foreign policy and its appeal can be explained mainly on that basis. If he was ever interested in military power, he would have exploited America’s morbid fear of communism and not tried to expose its irrationality and futility.
Like their Chinese counterparts. Indian leaders too have often spoken of self-reliance. But unlike the former the latter have behaved as if they can take international aid for granted.
The instances are so many and they are so well known that it is hardly necessary to mention them. But by way of illustration it may perhaps be noted that India imports foodgrains even in years of record crops, that it allows collaboration agreements for the production of cosmetics, that it is not averse to importing “technology” from a backward country like Bulgaria, that its national laboratories have little to show by way of results and that it has practically ignored research and development in the field of defence.
It will be comforting to believe that the political system is solely to blame for all this. But can anyone say in all honesty that the communists in India are a different breed of men from those who constitute the ruling elite today? They have been in power in Kerala and West Bengal and have advocated policies the net result of which can only be greater dependence on foreign aid and the weakening of central authority which alone can be the instrument of building national power. The willing servility of the Naxalites towards China underscores the same point that no communist of any brand is genuinely interested in power.
Judgment
This is not an attempt to pass a moral judgment. The intention is only to point out that the psychological compulsions which have moved China do not operate in the case of India. The conclusion is obvious that if by some mischance the Government decides to exercise its so-called nuclear option, it can only make a mess of it. The urge which is needed to sustain a programme of this type is plainly missing. In the process, the country’s defence policy can become thoroughly dysfunctional. Immense scientific, technological and financial resources will be invested in a nuclear programme of doubtful value while urgent problems such as those of tribal and student unrest will remain unattended.
There is no lack of evidence to show that for years and possibly decades, India will be plagued by mounting violence and subversion aided by hostile China and Pakistan. The country’s survival will depend on its ability to cope with this growing menace. The evidence that India can do so is far from convincing. The lack of popular resistance to the Naxalites and the delay in the enactment of a preventive detention law even for West Bengal speak for themselves. On top of it there is a real possibility that the Centre’s capacity to act firmly may be further weakened as a result of political fragmentation. In such circumstances the Bomb can only help to rationalise New Delhi’s failure to do its normal duty of preserving law and order. It can create the illusion of strength and raise a facade to cover grave weaknesses.
The Bomb as a climax to all-round achievement is one thing and as a substitute for genuine economic and military strength quite another.
The Times of India, 13 May 1970