The Prime Minister has so far managed to circumvent the demand for India going nuclear with considerable skill. Every time the issue is raised by interested persons and parties, she quietly reiterates the government’s policy and leaves it at that. She has chosen not to state publicly whether in her view the country needs nuclear weapons for defence purposes or not. In one of her speeches she spelt out the possible complications of an Indian decision to make the bomb. But that was a long time ago.
It is possible that her strategy is best suited to cope with the pressure from the Jana Sangh and some members of her own party. But the central issues need to be debated in the country with clarity.
To begin with, it is rather surprising that the demand for the bomb has acquired the maximum political support at a time when China, which alone can be said to constitute a threat to this country, is wholly pre-occupied with problems of its own security vis-à-vis the Soviet Union and is trying to improve its relations with other countries, including the United States.
It is true that the Sino-Soviet conflict cannot be sustained indefinitely at the present level. There is bound to be a thaw in course of time. It need not necessarily await Chairman Mao Tse-tung’s disappearance from the scene because, according to some experts, less belligerent men like Mr. Chou En-lai have already begun to assert themselves. What is more, as China makes adjustments with the United States and the Soviet Union, it will gradually become part of the international system and begin to lose the psychological and other compulsions to disrupt it. It cannot have it both ways, that is, it cannot seek accommodation with the two super-powers and also hope to break up the system they are trying to establish with great difficulty.
Pertinent
It is equally pertinent that a nuclear balance has existed in Asia ever since the ‘fifties. It was effective even when the Soviet Union and China were allies. After the Sino-Soviet split and the acquisition of nuclear weapons by China, the balance has taken a different form but it has not broken down. As far as China is concerned, the American deterrent has been reinforced by Russia’s as well.
This position is not likely to change whatever other developments may take place in the triangular relationship between America, Russia and China. In plain words, India does not need nuclear weapons of its own to eliminate the risk of Chinese blackmail and it does not have to ask for nuclear guarantees either from the United States or the Soviet Union or both as it did in the past without much forethought. A nuclear stalemate should serve it well enough.
Currently it is fashionable in some quarters to conjure up visions of a friendless India facing nuclear blackmail by China. On the face of it, this is a case of persecution mania. In reality India has benefited from the international system and can continue to do so.
China is not an imperial power in the old territorial sense. There is no evidence to show that it is inclined to use the nuclear threat in the pursuit of whatever objectives it might have. But even if it is so motivated, the two superpowers will have to restrain it in their own interest and for the sake of the stability of the international system. It is not particularly material therefore whether they are solicitous of India’s well-being or not. The only contribution New Delhi can make is to manage its affairs well enough to avoid the threat of internal disruption.
Neutral
The Sino-Indian dispute has got blown out of all proportion due to misunderstandings on both sides and a variety of other factors like the Sino-Soviet conflict. But essentially it is a bilateral and limited affair and can be reduced to manageable proportions once both New Delhi and Peking begin to view it in that light. That is why it is vital for India to remain strictly neutral in the Sino-Soviet confrontation and keep clear of all schemes of “collective security” in Asia sponsored either by the Soviet Union or the United States.
It cannot be over-emphasised that apart from America and Russia, China’s main rival for power and influence in South-East Asia is Japan and not India. Tokyo is fully cognisant of this reality and Peking is slowly waking up to it.
The myth that India and China are competitors for power and influence in South-East Asia is a hangover from the early ‘fifties when this country enjoyed a certain amount of leverage in the region. The position was then altogether different. Russia was not an Asian power in any sense of the term. Japan was wholly pre-occupied with problems of economic revival and was more than willing to efface itself from the regional scene. China welcomed India’s efforts because it was in the interest of both to check American expansionism in the name of anti-communism. This was clearly an artificial situation and cannot possibly be restored.
The advocates of the bomb have not quoted a single instance which shows conclusively that nuclear blackmail has worked in the past nor produced a credible scenario in which China can find it necessary and useful to hold out a nuclear threat against India.
It is true that the late President Eisenhower made in his autobiography some claims regarding the effectiveness of the nuclear threats he held out to China. But it is common knowledge that the cease-fire in Korea was converted into a permanent truce only when the entire Soviet foreign policy posture underwent major changes after Stalin’s death in 1953. If the truce was the result of the American nuclear threat to China, what about the Austrian peace treaty and the withdrawal of Soviet troops from there at about the same time? It is well known that China accepted Russia’s leadership of the communist world till the mid-’fifties.
Similarly, the North Viet Namese made certain concessions at Geneva in 1954 not only because of the Russian and Chinese pressure but also because they calculated that they could win South Viet Nam through other means. When these failed they did not hesitate to resort to arms. Why then did the US not renew the nuclear threat in the sixties despite its massive involvement? The same question can be asked in respect of the Berlin blockade in 1948.
It is plainly incredible that China can think of invoking its nuclear power in NEFA, Ladakh, Bhutan, Sikkim or Nepal. It has not even made a determined effort to dislodge Indian influence and power in the Himalayan belt, notwithstanding the brief military encounter in 1962 and the strictly limited arms assistance to Naga rebels. In other words, the basis on which India and China agreed to co-exist – New Delhi’s recognition of Peking’s sovereignty over Tibet in return for China’s acceptance of India’s special position in the sub-Himalayan belt – can still be revived.
With Vigour
Three other arguments are being pressed with considerable vigour these days. First, it is said that India needs to become a great power in order to stay united. The implication is that the great powers or China will try and succeed in breaking up India if its power is not proportionate to its size.
It is difficult to see the connection between power and unity. On the contrary, it appears that the threat to unity arises, if at all, primarily from the inability of the Indian system to meet the aspirations of minority groups and the demands that the spread of education and modernisation are making on it.
In any case power cannot be said to grow out of the barrel of a gun in our times, whatever Chairman Mao may believe. These days military power itself has become dependent on industrial development, political cohesion, national morale and various other socio-economic and psychological factors. The adoption of wrong priorities can therefore delay rather than facilitate the objective of a strong and self-reliant India.
Secondly, it is argued that the bomb is the poor man’s best defence because he cannot afford modern conventional weapons in view of their enormous and ever-rising costs and the rate at which they are becoming obsolescent. This is a fallacious view. The experience of America and Russia suggest that nuclear powers need strong conventional forces. The ineffectiveness of Britain and France underscores the same lesson in a different way.
Finally, India does not have to go in for the bomb in order to develop its independent nuclear technology. It has a sovereign right to do so irrespective of the misunderstanding it might cause in the outside world. This is in fact why it has not signed the Non Proliferation Treaty which obliges non-nuclear weapons powers to abstain from underground explosions even for purely peaceful purposes. These may not be a practical proposition at this stage, but India cannot on that account sign away its right to go in for such explosions whenever they are feasible.
The Times of India, 2 September 1970