It is difficult to vouch for the accuracy of the report emanating from Peking that the Chinese are alarmed at the nationalist upsurge in East Bengal. The only available piece of evidence which can be said to provide some kind of confirmation for this report is a recent article in Deshbrati, the illegal mouthpiece of the pro-Chinese CP (M-L), denouncing Sheikh Mujibur Rahman as a stooge of the imperialists.
But in spite of the lack of concrete evidence it stands to reason that the Chinese would be concerned over the present turn of events because these are bound to demolish Pakistan’s old claim to equality with India and to decrease Islamabad’s capacity to harass New Delhi. Peking cannot be oblivious to the danger of losing a major instrument for cutting India to size.
It has been known for long that Peking came to look upon Pakistan as a useful counterweight against India as early as 1954-55. That was why Mr. Chou En-lai went out of his way to befriend Mr. Mohammad Ali Bogra, the then Pakistan Prime Minister, at the Bandung conference in 1955 in spite of Karachi’s adherence at the time to the supposedly anti-China SEATO Pact. Soon after the conference, a top-level Chinese diplomat visited Pakistan to assure its rulers that in Peking’s view there was no basic conflict of interest between the two countries, that the same was not true of China’s relations with India, and that it appreciated their anxiety to strengthen their military potential by joining West-sponsored alliances because of the “threat” from India.
Calculations
Pakistan has figured a great deal in China’s calculations since its attack on this country in 1962. There can be no doubt that though Pakistan neither asked for nor secured a specific commitment regarding direct intervention, Peking encouraged Islamabad to try to seize Kashmir by force in 1965. Since then China has been quite generous in extending military and economic assistance to Pakistan. Only last November Peking gave President Yahya Khan a welcome the like of which it has not extended to any visiting dignitary for years and signed a loan agreement for Rs. 100 crores. China could not have indicated its stake in the survival of the military-bureaucratic regime in Islamabad on the eve of the elections in December in a more eloquent manner.
Its dismay now must be particularly great if it is true, as it is generally believed on the basis of the available evidence, that Peking has been guided by the view that while Pakistan is strong and stable India cannot master the forces of disruption in the foreseeable future. It is indeed a cruel blow for the Chinese that India has thrown up a strong and stable Central Government under a dynamic leader precisely at a time when Pakistan faces the gravest crisis in its history.
It does not however follow that the Chinese will immediately review their policy towards the subcontinent in the light of current developments in India and Pakistan and reciprocate Mrs. Gandhi’s oft-repeated desire for normal relations between the two countries. They may cling to West Pakistan tenaciously in a desperate bid to salvage something out of the wreckage of their hopes. The same may be true of the West Pakistani rulers.
The West Pakistani ruling elite has three options. It can try to crush the nationalist upsurge in East Bengal; it can allow the Sheikh to secede or it can reconcile itself to a very weak centre.
Little Choice
In the first case it will be caught in an impossible situation and will have little choice but to lean heavily on China because the indications are that the United States, the Soviet Union and Britain will not want to bail it out. These powers are not at all hostile to the aspirations of East Bengal though they cannot openly declare their support for the Sheikh.
On a superficial view, the Chinese, too, will find it difficult to support a West Pakistani bid to suppress the united people of East Bengal in view of their own propaganda in favour of “wars of national liberation.” But on a closer scrutiny of Chinese policies in the past it will appear to be a reasonable inference that they will have no great difficulty in circumventing this ideoogical problem by denouncing Sheikh Mujibur Rahman as a creature of US imperialism, Soviet “social imperialism” and Indian “reaction.”
But even if the military junta in Islamabad is realistic enough to recognise that it cannot rule 70 million East Bengalis by force and allow them to secede, West Pakistan will need to redefine its identity and its policy towards India.
In theory, two alternatives will then be open to the ruling elite in West Pakistan. It can recognise that the two-nation theory was absurd from the very start and seek to come to terms with the reality of a stable India which is beginning to demonstrate its capacity to accommodate religious, cultural and linguistic minorities in its democratic framework without seeking to destroy their identities. Alternatively it can intensify its “Hate India” campaign, hold this country responsible for the rise of East Bengali nationalism and seek compensation for the loss of East Bengal in the annexation of Kashmir.
As far as one can assess the situation at this stage, it appears reasonably certain that the West Pakistani elite will opt for the second alternative and that this will offer China an almost irresistible opportunity to install itself in the sub-continent and interfere in its affairs on a grand scale.
It is difficult to say whether the West Pakistani ruling elite is genuinely convinced about the validity of the two-nation theory. But it has tried very hard indeed to sell it to the world. Pakistani historians have rewritten the entire history of India since the Arab invasion of Sind in the 8th century with that end in view. The repudiation by East Bengal of the theory of a nationalism based on religion cannot persuade them to have a second look at their works. Instead they are bound to cling to their dangerously outmoded views even more desperately.
There is another problem in addition to the crisis of identity. The West Pakistani elite has accepted the view, put forward by Sir Olaf Caroe in his book Wells of Power, that in terms of geography, culture and religion, the western wing belongs to Central Asia and not to the sub-continent, that Kashmir is a natural part of it and that it should seek close ties with Iran, Afghanistan and Turkey. The loss of East Bengal will inevitably strengthen West Pakistan’s desire to opt out of the sub-continent. The attempt is bound to fail. But that is a different issue because it may be decades before the rulers and the people recognise that they cannot break away from India and that they are ties to it for good or ill.
Another point is equally pertinent in this context. We have seen in the last six years that the military-bureaucratic complex and the radical intelligentsia as represented by Mr. Bhutto are united only in their hatred of India and that this is the only platform which can supersede the forces of linguistic nationalism in West Pakistan.
Complex Task
If this assessment is broadly accurate, the chances are that West Pakistan will move even closer to China in case East Bengal secedes and that the two together may do all in their power to create difficulties for India in Kashmir.
This is not to suggest that other considerations which have persuaded Peking in recent months to drop vague hints regarding its interest in improved relations with this country, have completely ceased to operate in the context of the new situation in the subcontinent. The point is that the already complex task of normalising relations with China is likely to be complicated further by current developments in India and Pakistan.
It is self-evident that India has much to gain from friendship with China. But relations between the two countries can be normalised only if Peking reconciles itself to the fact that New Delhi cannot accept either its world view, which aims at the total elimination of the influence of the two super-powers from Asia and Africa, or its right to interfere in the affairs of the sub-continent. These two issues are as pertinent as the border dispute.
In the new setting, New Delhi need not be in a hurry to make some conciliatory move towards China. Before elections, it could legitimately be argued that it needed China as a counterweight against the growing influence of Russia, especially in view of the American retrenchment of commitments in the region. The Indian electorate has disposed of this problem by giving the new Congress an overwhelming majority in the Lok Sabha because Mrs Gandhi’s government can now deal with Moscow on a basis of equality. At the same time it can hope to strengthen its ties with the United States and leading West European countries without in any way compromising its overall policy.
All in all, while India’s options have suddenly increased, China’s have shrunk.
The Times of India, 24 March 1971