Just as China has talked a great deal about Russo-American collusion against it, the Soviet Union has been accusing China of “objectively” co-operating with the United States in its efforts to split the communist world and defeat liberation movements. But this is the first time that Moscow faces the genuine possibility of Sino-US understanding and, in the long run, even of co-operation.
In theory, the Kremlin has, broadly speaking, three options. It can continue to push ahead in the confident belief that the US Administration is too preoccupied with serious domestic problems to accept additional external commitments and that China is still too weak to challenge Russian ambitions. It can seek to reassure Washington and or Peking about its intentions. Or it can try to pursue both these courses at the same time.
In practice the first option will be untenable in the long run on three counts. First, it will involve the risk of bringing America and China closer together than either of them intends today.
Limited Detente
Secondly, the Soviet Union has all along been averse to conflicts on two fronts. This is why it established a limited detente with the United States before tearing up the nuclear agreement with China and withdrawing its experts from there. Again, this is why it has taken care to play down the issue of a separate peace treaty with East Germany since 1963 when the rift with China came into the open. It has acted boldly in pursuit of its ambitions only after 1965 when the US got bogged down in Viet Nam. In fact its most forceful phase in West Asia dates back to the end of 1969, that is after Mr. Kosygin’s visit to Peking in September and the freezing of the active border conflict with China.
Finally, the Soviet leadership does not feel strong enough either at home or in Eastern and Central Europe to be able to take on America and China at the same time. There is a good deal of unrest in East European countries and it is apt to grow if the international prestige of the Soviet Union suffers a serious set-back.
The second option will be less out of character for the men in the Kremlin. But while it is difficult to think of the concessions they can make to China, a genuinely conciliatory approach towards the United States and its West European allies can further weaken the legitimacy of their hegemony in Eastern and Central Europe. The Soviet occupation of Czechoslovakia in August 1968 and the shifts in Moscow’s stance over Berlin in recent months illustrate the nature of the dilemma facing the Kremlin.
In all likelihood Moscow will attempt a limited detente with the United States and a freezing of the conflict with China so long as Chairman Mao is in command and explore the possibilities of winning Peking back to the fold once he disappears from the scene. Even this approach is not free from a serious drawback in that it will not disarm America’s suspicions which have led it to open a dialogue with China. But the more pertinent point just now is that it will not exacerbate its relations with either Washington or Peking.
W Asia Conflict
As far as the United States is concerned, it will judge Soviet intentions primarily by what Moscow does in West Asia though agreements on Berlin and the future development and deployment of offensive and defensive nuclear missiles will doubtless ease tensions between them. Washington wants the Kremlin to stop the introduction of more and more of highly sophisticated weapons into the UAR, to exert its influence in Cairo in favour of a stage-by-stage negotiated settlement of the Arab-Israeli dispute and to give up its attempt to exclude the US from the region and undermine pro-American regimes.
Moscow cannot possibly meet all these demands without virtually writing off the colossal investment it has made in West Asia, specially since the Arab-Israeli war in June 1967. But it can modify its present policy which in effect is intended to prevent the UAR from normalising relations with the US and making use of its good offices for securing a limited agreement with Israel on the reopening of the canal.
As for China, the Soviet Union cannot make a conciliatory gesture to it on border and ideological disputes, on the future of Outer Mongolia or on Peking’s place and role in the international communist movement. But it may seek to reassure Peking on some other issue.
But it is pertinent to remember that the Kremlin has been speaking in two voices on the question of Bangla Desh, one highly critical of the Pakistan army’s ghastly crimes there and the other reassuring the military regime regarding the Soviet position on the question of Pakistan’s territorial integrity and advising New Delhi to act with “restraint”. It will not be altogether surprising if the second note becomes more pronounced in Soviet statements on the subject in the coming months.
In plain words, the chances are that just as the Soviet Union has failed to help the UAR to win back its occupied territories, it will in all probability be unwilling and unable to facilitate India’s task in creating an independent Bangla Desh to which the nearly seven million refugees now in this country can return in safety.
It needs to be emphasised that no vital Egyptian national interest was at stake when President Nasser ordered mobilisation in 1967 on the wrong Soviet information that Israel was planning to attack Syria, forced the UN emergency force to leave and closed the Strait of Tiran to Israeli shipping and that when it came to the crunch, Russia quietly stood aside, having advised the late UAR leader to observe restraint.
India’s case is entirely different. It has a tremendous stake in the independence of Bangla Desh because the refugees cannot otherwise go back to their homes and their permanent stay here can play havoc with the future of the whole of North-East India. But closer ties with the Soviet Union cannot be of much help. They will, if anything, strengthen America’s and China’s commitment to the survival of Pakistan in its present form. This would not have mattered too much if Moscow could see India through the crisis. But it cannot.
Strong Reasons
India has good reasons to be aggrieved against the United States because it has continued to provide arms to Pakistan even after March 25. The fact that it took Islamabad into confidence in regard to Mr. Kissinger’s visit to Peking and the timing of the trip itself cannot but strengthen New Delhi’s doubts regarding Washington’s bona fides. But Indian policy-makers will be less than fair if they do not take note of their own failure in recent years to maintain a proper balance in their relations with Washington and Moscow. Peking has a similar grievance regarding India’s ties with the Soviet Union.
There are signs that opinion in the US Congress, specially the Senate, is against further aid to Islamabad on account of its gruesome crimes in East Bengal and it is possible that the Nixon Administration may be forced to take note of it, whatever its own predilections. India itself can do a lot to promote an evolution of American policy in the right direction by making sure that the Pakistani military regime does not succeed in running East Bengal as a colony.
If the guerillas continue to grow in strength as they are doing now, it can be only a matter of time before Washington readjusts its policies to the new realities in the sub-continent. Even Peking may find that the two wings of Pakistan can no longer be run as one State.
This is indeed the crux of the matter. Great Powers, including the Soviet Union, have played the game of balancing India and Pakistan and they will not stop doing so unless it is established beyond doubt that the break-up of Pakistan is unavoidable because the East Bengali people are ready to pay the price, however high, of independence. India has too big a stake in their success to let them down in the interest of buying a sham peace with Islamabad.
India is naturally keen to expedite the process and reduce, as far as possible, the cost for the East Bengali people and for itself. But it will be easier for it do so if at least two of the three major Powers with strong interests in the sub-continent are well disposed towards it. The task is a complicated one in view of the bias of the US Administration. But it is not impossible provided New Delhi does not look for non-existing quick and cheap solutions.
(Concluded)
The Times of India 22 July 1971