It is rather surprising that Belgium which has no major interest in either India or Pakistan should have taken the lead in circulating a resolution among members of the Security Council on the current situation in the subcontinent. In spite of its membership of NATO, it should have thought twice before agreeing to serve as a front for some other western powers, specially the United States, in an area which it can hardly claim to know adequately.
The timing of the initiative is also somewhat odd. For it is only now that the Mukti Bahini has begun to inflict heavy losses on the Pakistan army in Bangla Desh and the Government of India at last made up its mind that it cannot sit idly by as its borders are shelled and its air space violated day after day.
Having tried and failed to persuade the military junta in Islamabad to end the reign of terror in East Bengal and to attempt to reach a political settlement with the elected representatives of the people, the Western powers should not, by normal’ logic, have been unduly anxious to rush to its rescue. But for reasons best known to them, they have chosen to ignore the junta’s crimes and to extend diplomatic support to it through the agency of the Security Council.
Natural
In the circumstances, it is only natural for India to conclude that these powers are wholly indifferent to the carnage in Bangla Desh, the flight of ten million of its people in sheer terror and the intolerable strain the presence of so many refugees has placed on this country. They seem to be mainly interested, for geopolitical considerations, in preserving the so-called unity of Pakistan. But even if it is assumed that they are not quite as cynical as they appear, it is difficult to justify the present flurry of diplomatic activity under the not so disguised leadership of the United States.
The concerned western powers, it seems, are deliberately exaggerating the risk of a full-scale Indo-Pakistan war on the one hand, and its consequences for the two countries on the other, in order to justify their own attempts to freeze the status quo in a manner that enables the junta in Islamabad first to stabilise and then to consolidate its position in East Bengal. Since a number of well-meaning people are also falling into this trap, it is necessary to discuss both these questions at some length.
To begin with, it needs to be said that since the bulk of the Indian and Pakistani armour and aircraft are concentrated on the western front, a war there alone can be regarded as an all-out affair. Limited skirmishes in the east cannot merit that description, whatever view one may take of the rights and wrongs of conflict there.
Similarly, it is necessary to make two other points at this stage. First, India and Pakistan fought on the western front in 1965 because the dispute centred on Kashmir. That problem has not been settled, but it is not the cause of the present tension. Secondly, if the two countries could limit their hostilities to the west in 1947-48 and 1965, there is no reason why they cannot do so in the east this time.
Obviously no one can be sure that the Pakistani generals will not strike at India on the western front when they find, as they must in course of time, it impossible to maintain their hold in East Bengal. But are they in fact likely to do so?
On the face of it, they have several powerful reasons to desist from such a course of action. The super-hawks among them may be so obsessed with their hatred of India that they may tend to ignore these rational considerations. But the more sober among them are likely to heed the realities of the situation.
Superiority
They cannot fail to recognise that India has a distinct military superiority over them and that in view of the Indo-Soviet treaty they cannot hope to invoke China’s presence in Tibet to offset it and to frighten New Delhi as they did in 1965.
India’s armed forces are on all accounts much better equipped and trained than in 1965 by which time the process of reorganisation and re-equipment after the debacle of 1962 had not made enough progress. Pakistan too has made large-scale military purchases since 1965 but it is reasonably certain that the gap between its and the Indian armed forces has grown wider since then. The Pakistani generals themselves accept that this is the case. General Yahya Khan’s recent interview to Newsweek is a case in point. In his previous statements on July 19, August 9 and September 1, he had threatened to go to war with India if the guerillas seized any part of East Bengal.
Pakistan will be writing off not only East Bengal but also its 80,000 troops there the day it strikes at India in the west. No military leadership can ever survive if it abandons so many of its men in this reckless fashion.
The Pakistani troops in Bangla Desh cannot possibly withstand a joint campaign by India and the Mukti Bahini for more than a week at the most. Whatever view one may take of the relative positions of the two countries on the western front, in the east India’s superiority is overwhelming if the growing strength and effectiveness of the Mukti Bahini is taken into consideration.
Some people here fear that Islamabad may try to seize Kashmir to compensate itself for the “‘loss” of East Bengal. But the Indian defences in the state have been strengthened since 1965 and the internal situation there is much more stable than before. Though Pakistan’s calculations proved wrong even then, it had at least some reason to expect limited support from the local people. It can have none this time.
Finally, Islamabad’s decision to ban the National Awami Party, which captured a majority of seats in the NWFP and Baluchistan provincial legislatures in the general election last December, is an indication that the authorities are not assured of the solidarity of West Pakistan itself. This means that while deciding whether or not to go to war with India, they must take into account the possibility that a major military defeat in the west would encourage and strengthen secessionist forces in the two provinces and possibly even in Sind.
The issue, it should be emphasised, is not whether the N.A.P. is in fact a secessionist organisation, because for the purpose of the present discussion the perception of the Pakistani generals alone is relevant. Since they are convinced that they face a separatist challenge in the N.W.F.P. and Baluchistan, they must be careful in initiating or provoking a war with India in the west lest these forces become unmanageable as a result of even a limited defeat.
Those who contend that the Pakistani generals may go to war with India to save face, ignore the fact that as far as the people of West Pakistan are concerned, Islamabad has already convinced them that its troops are fighting not the East Bengalis, but regular Indian formations. The size of these formations expands and shrinks in Pakistan’s propaganda according to the requirements of the moment. That however is a different matter.
Even if it is assumed that the Pakistani military leaders are so possessed by the idea of jehad as to ignore the unfavourable balance of power, the pertinent question is whether the consequences of a war will be more disastrous than those flowing from an indefinite continuation of the present crisis. The two countries cannot engage in a prolonged war for the simple reason that they do not have the military and industrial resources to do so. The last war lasted three weeks and cost them less than Rs. 100 crores each – a sum India is spending on the refugees in less than two months.
Recession
Some otherwise well-informed people believe that the economic difficulties India has faced since 1965 have been largely if not exclusively the result of the war that year. In fact, the recession had nothing to do with the war, which in no way disrupted the country’s economic life. It was directly the result of the two unprecedented droughts.
In any case, the present tension in the area cannot be eliminated so long as the people of East Bengal are denied their rights and the ten million refugees do not return to their homes. The people of Bangla Desh regard no sacrifice too great a price for freedom and will continue to cooperate with the freedom-fighters despite the army’s punitive measures. The Mukti Bahini has overcome its teething troubles and is becoming an increasingly effective force. It cannot be defeated so long as it is assured of Indian support which, whatever Washington may say or do, cannot and will not be withdrawn unless conditions are created in which the refugees can go back to their homes. The kind of disengagement suggested by Washington cannot eliminate tension. If it is interested in peace, it must come up with proposals which are at once more practical and just.
The Times of India, 1 December 1971