It is obvious in retrospect that India could not have liberated Bangla Desh in April-May, as many leaders of public opinion had advocated at the time, and it could not have done so even in November-December in the absence of the treaty of friendship with the Soviet Union.
After the number of refugees fleeing from the military terror in East Bengal had crossed the one million mark, everyone knew that it would swell to ten million in a few months. But it was impossible to convince the outside world at that stage that India had no choice but to take a hand in the liberation of Bangla Desh.
Though even today most governments have taken a stand against this country at the United Nations, they are not half as hostile to it as they would have been if the war had come six months earlier. In that event they would not have easily reconciled themselves to the rise of an independent Bangla Desh. The more pertinent point, however, is that Peking would in all probability have intervened militarily and in doing so it would have had the blessings of the Nixon Administration.
Most students of Chinese affairs here were clearly taken in last summer by the apparent toning down by Peking of its propaganda campaign against New Delhi, by the tenor of Mr. Chou En-lai’s letter to General Yahya Khan and by the absence of any explicit denunciation by the Chinese Government of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman’s Awami League. They wrongly concluded from this the Chinese would not come down heavily on the side of Pakistan to frustrate an Indian move to liberate Bangla Desh.
Difficulties
It is clear now that if Peking has desisted from creating difficulties for this country in Ladakh – in the eastern Himalayas the passes are frozen by the middle of November – it is largely because of its fear of a possible retaliation by the Soviet Union in Sinkiang.
The Chinese have not made any secret of their apprehensions in this regard. Mr. Huang Hua might have been trying to score a point over Mr. Jacob Malik when he asked him in the UN General Assembly to say clearly if the Soviet Union intended to invade Sinkiang. But he was also giving expression to long-standing Chinese fears. It is even more revealing that Peking should have accused the Soviet Union of indulging in “gangster logic” just because it warned the other powers not to aggravate the Indo-Pakistan conflict since it was taking place on its southern borders.
Mr. Chou En-lai was reported to have told a visiting dignitary last summer that there was no cause for alarm at the turn of events in the sub-continent because India would not go beyond loud protests. If there was any doubt then that his apparent moderation was the result partly of his low esteem for this country and partly of his desire not to push it closer to the Soviet Union, he himself has been at pains to remove it. Why else would he say that “only because of the support of social imperialists (the Soviet Union) did the Indian reactionaries dare to launch a war of aggression against Pakistan and thus become insolent?”
Last summer it did not even occur to anyone in this country – this includes the CPI leaders – that the Nixon Administration, too, would threaten direct intervention in an Indo-Pakistan war. But with the advantage of hindsight, it can be said that when Dr. Kissinger told Indian officials in New Delhi and the Indian Ambassador, Mr. LK Jha, in Washington that in case India became involved in active hostilities with Pakistan, China would intervene and that New Delhi could not this time depend on US support, he was in fact indirectly indicating that Peking would have the Nixon Administration’s endorsement in whatever action it chose to take.
Credit
By claiming credit for having prevented the dismemberment of West Pakistan by India, the US Government is perhaps trying to suggest that it is getting reconciled to the birth of Bangla Desh. But it is telling a white lie if it implies that it has not been seriously opposed to such a development. President Nixon would have gone even further than he has in preventing the liberation of Bangla Desh if he was not restrained by the fear of a direct confrontation with the Soviet Union. He would have almost certainly invoked the 1959 bilateral pact with Pakistan in a more menacing manner than he did at the time of the conflict.
It is doubtful that even those in the Government who advocated and pushed through the treaty of friendship with the Soviet Union were fully aware of the extent of the US Administration’s hostility to any change in the status quo in the sub-continent. They apparently did not pay adequate attention to the impact on American policy of President Nixon’s efforts to reach a detente with China, and to the fact that, unlike in 1965, an Indo-Pakistan conflict in 1971 would transform the power balance in the region to the detriment of a Sino-US rapprochement.
It is also wrong to think that the Soviet Union signed the treaty of friendship with India on August 9 in full awareness of the possibility that it would soon be called upon to live up to its provisions or that the US Administration would not in course of time readjust its policy to accommodate this country’s legitimate interests. President Nixon has shown that under compulsion of circumstances he is capable of jettisoning old ideas and commitments and there is no good reason why he should not be able to do so in the case of the sub-continent.
Only those who have had the opportunity to visit Moscow in recent months and to talk to people there can understand how deeply and sincerely the Soviet Union was committed to a peaceful resolution of the conflict in Bangla Desh and how concerned it was at the possibility of wider complications. In spite of all evidence to the contrary, it apparently continued to hope till at least as late as the end of October that General Yahya Khan and other members of the military junta would listen to friendly advice, release Sheikh Mujibur Rahman and open negotiations with him.
It was only during Mrs. Gandhi’s visit to Moscow last October that Soviet leaders were clearly told that India would not wait indefinitely. That in a sense is the crucial date in any assessment of the evolution of Soviet commitment to this country. But even so, the Soviet leaders might not have overcome their hesitations if Pakistan had not attacked India on December 3. This settled the issue for them.
Whatever President Nixon and Mr. Chou En-lai may say for propaganda purposes, they will be making a grievous mistake if they do not take note of this background and ignore the fact that India has fought on its own initiative and in defence of its own interests and that until the last the Soviet Union did its best to restrain it.
This is not to suggest that the Soviet Union has not and will not benefit from India’s victory or that New Delhi could have pulled it off without Moscow’s invaluable support which ensured that Peking and Washington would not intervene directly on the side of Pakistan. But the Kremlin has not called the tune – it has not even tried to do so – and it has not consciously sought the advantages that India’s success has given it.
Obvious
Some of the consequences of Indo-Soviet co-operation are obvious enough. India has emerged as the strongest military power in the region. As The Economist, London, has put it, it has removed the only rival to its supremacy in the area stretching from Iran to Indo-China. No one will in future think of it in terms of the debacle it suffered at the hands of China in 1962 or of the stalemate in its war with Pakistan in 1965.
As for the Soviet Union, its position is bound to be strengthened from the Mediterranean to the Straits of Malacca. Even its detractors in the Arab world will revise their views about it, and the South-East Asian countries will now have greater confidence in its willingness and capacity to protect them against encroachments by China.
But some other possible gains are not equally evident. It is, for instance, not generally realised that the rise of an independent Bangla Desh has made it difficult for the US and China to go ahead with their old plans of a detente which were based on a total lack of respect for Moscow’s and New Delhi’s interests and susceptibilities.
It is important to bear two points in mind in this context. First, Washington has discovered once again that in dealing with important issues of war and peace in Asia as elsewhere, it cannot do without Moscow’s co-operation because Peking’s capacity to influence the course of events even in areas on its periphery is strictly limited. This explains the change in the tone of US pronouncements regarding Moscow’s role in the Indo-Pakistan war, and it has major implications for Sino-Soviet-US relations.
Secondly, while the US may wish to come to terms with the new realities in the sub-continent and contribute to the stabilisation of the new status quo once President Nixon has overcome his sense of anger against India, China will not spare any effort to disrupt it because it makes nonsense of extravagant ambitions in the region. The recent statements from Peking illustrate its chagrin at the collapse of its dreams. Even if the Chinese leaders discover that their antics have not won them the gratitude of the ruling elite in West Pakistan, they will not find it easy to deal with Bangla Desh leaders. By calling them India’s stooges, they have not only insulted them but offended the national susceptibilities of an entire people who have just won their freedom in the face of terrible odds.
The Times of India, 21 December 1971