The Chinese Government cannot be so naive as to believe that it can either browbeat New Delhi and Moscow by its propaganda offensive in the United Nations and outside or win the permanent gratitude of the intelligentsia in West Pakistan by supporting the military junta’s reign of terror in East Bengal.
Moral considerations apart, the Chinese Government’s tactics might have made some sense if India had not signed a treaty of peace, friendship and co-operation with the Soviet Union because in that case New Delhi could have been inhibited by its threats. But after the signing of the pact, which provides for more than consultations in the event of a threat to the security of either, the Chinese policy lost its raison d’etre.
The Chinese policy might have retained some contact with reality if the Soviet Union had wavered in its support to India on the twin issues of a political settlement in Bangla Desh and the return of the ten million refugees or if the West Pakistan junta had shown the will and the capacity to win over at least a section of the East Bengali population to its side and thus create a social base for itself.
As things are, Mr. Chou En-lai and his colleagues did not need much foresight to see that Moscow would stand by New Delhi through thick and thin and that Islamabad could never consolidate its hold in East Bengal. They should have therefore realised that it was futile for them to mess up their relations with India and invite the charge of opposing one of the biggest liberation movements in history. Why then have they failed to adopt a sensible approach?
Three Reasons
Three reasons are generally advanced for the present Chinese Government’s behaviour. It is suggested that it is angry with India because it has signed the treaty of friendship with the Soviet Union, that it has been slow to grasp the fact that Pakistan as one political entity is dead and that it is desperately anxious to befriend the ruling elite in West Pakistan as part of its long-term plan of building up an anti-Russian front in Asia, specially among the Muslim countries. But none of these explanations is wholly convincing.
The first does not square either with Peking’s long initial silence on the Indo-Soviet Treaty or with Mr. Chou En-lai’s first comment that he had taken note of Moscow’s and New Delhi’s statements that the pact was in no way directed against China. But even if it is assumed that Mr. Chou En-lai did not mean what he said, the right thing for him to do in his country’s national interest would have been to try to ensure that India did not need to invoke the treaty and to move closer to Moscow. But instead he and his representatives, specially in the UN, have acted in such a provocative manner that most Indians are now fully convinced that the Soviet Union is their most reliable friend.
The second explanation is wholly unconvincing. The Chinese leaders who fought and won a guerilla struggle stretched over two decades could not have been so daft as to believe that the people of East Bengal would ever again agree to stay in a united Pakistan or that the generals could defeat the Mukti Bahini in Bangla Desh. Since they have assumed that India was training and arming the freedom fighters, the hopelessness of Pakistan’s situation should have been even more easily evident to them.
The third explanation makes somewhat better sense. But implicit in it is the suggestion that the Chinese do not understand the psychology of Pakistan’s ruling elite. Once the present war with India ends, the men in power in Islamabad, whoever they may be, are bound to take note of the fact that when it came to the crunch China was unable to save them from the wrath of the people of East Bengal and the Indian armed forces. It is, therefore, more than likely that they will look for some other patron.
Overtures
Peking may or may not be aware that the lack of self-reliance among the ruling elite in Pakistan is so complete that it has of necessity to seek the protection of what it regards as the most powerful country. It opted for a national defence pact with the United States in 1954 when most Asian countries favoured the policy of non-alignment and looked with disfavour at US attempts to assume the mantle of former colonial powers in the name of fighting alleged communist expansionism. In more recent years its overtures to Moscow were to no small extent influenced by its conviction that the US was on the retreat and that the Soviet Union had become a global power. Similarly, China’s importance grew in its eyes after Peking exploded the first nuclear device in 1964. On this reckoning, it is not going to be guided in coming years by any feeling of gratitude for the aid it received in the past but by a cold assessment of the new realities of power which cannot be said to be unduly favourable to China.
In view of the inadequacy of the popular explanations for Peking’s whole-hearted support to Pakistan, it is necessary to examine the problem a little more closely. Such a scrutiny can provide several clues to the Chinese riddle.
First, Peking has admitted, albeit indirectly, that it is afraid lest the independence of Bangla Desh encourages Tibetans and other non-Han minorities in China itself to claim autonomy. Otherwise Mr. Huang Hua would not have referred to alleged Russian and Indian interference in Sinkiang and Tibet in the past.
This apprehension is clearly an expression of a feeling of insecurity among the dominant faction in Peking. But it will be a mistake to regard it as being the result of any imminent threat or of brewing local revolts in the two regions.
The Chinese Government cannot but feel somewhat insecure because it knows that since 1966 it has kept itself in power through a series of temporary and opportunistic alliances with powerful elements at home. The recent shake-up in the leadership in Peking resulting in the mysterious disappearance of Chairman Mao Tse-tung’s heir-designate, Marshal Lin Piao, the Chief of Army Staff, the Commander of the Air Force and the Political Commissar of the Navy, speaks for itself.
This sense of insecurity has apparently led Chairman Mao to believe that not only he but China is surrounded by enemies. The Soviet Union tops the list with India, and possibly Japan, not far behind. In this frame of mind it must have been easy for him to jump to the conclusion that Moscow and New Delhi may collude to encourage disruptive elements in his country.
Secondly, the co-operation between China and the United States is developing so rapidly and smoothly that it is no longer possible to dismiss the view that the two governments have already reached some far-reaching agreements aimed at the Soviet Union and its friends like India.
Two points are notable in this context. First, America, which had adopted an ambivalent position on the Bangla Desh issue till Mr. Kissinger’s first visit to Peking last July, took up a tough anti-India position soon afterwards. It has become increasingly hostile since. Secondly, Peking has come out fully against alleged Indian intervention in East Bengal, Russia’s supposed encouragement to New Delhi and the Indo-Soviet treaty only after Mr. Kissinger’s second trip to Peking. Earlier it was hedging its bets.
Genuine
In spite of the alliance with Pakistan, previous US Governments were able to see that the people of East Bengal had genuine grievances. In fact they maintained such close contacts with the Awami League that papers in Karachi repeatedly accused them of working for the break-up of Pakistan. For at least a week after the Pakistan army began its campaign of terror on March 25, the Nixon government did not expect it to succeed. But after that its policy changed all of a sudden.
President Nixon authorised the continuance of military supplies to Islamabad in the middle of April by which time the arrangements regarding Mr. Kissinger’s visit to Peking must also have progressed considerably. It is quite likely that Washington became hostile to the Awami League only after it reached some understanding with China.
On this assessment India has no option but to infer that there may be no significant improvement in its relations with China in the near future. China is not likely to be interested in good neighbourly ties with this country so long as Peking remains hostile to the Soviet Union.
This does not mean that New Delhi should give up its attempt to normalise relations with Peking. Its present approach reflects a sense of confidence and maturity and it has no reason to behave the way it did in the early ’sixties. Any hysteria on this issue will be a sign of weakness and not of strength. But New Delhi should be willing to wait until Peking feels compelled to revise its policy to make it conform to the realities of the new situation in the region following the break-up of Pakistan and the consolidation of an independent Bangla Desh.
India has no hostility towards China in spite of all that has happened in the past. But it cannot give up its attempt to secure its legitimate place in the region and the world. Any power which seeks to frustrate its legitimate aspirations in every possible way can have no claim on its friendship.
The Times of India 7 December 1971