The Soviet government continues to behave as if the expulsion of its military experts from Egypt has not adversely affected its relations with that country. It has ignored President Sadat’s statements accusing Moscow of having failed to live up to its commitment to supply sophisticated offensive weapons and maintained the pretense that its advisers have returned home on the fulfilment of their mission. Pravda has in fact gone out of its way to criticise the United States and Britain for their endorsement of Mrs. Golda Meir’s appeal to President Sadat for direct talks in order to make it appear that the Soviet Union remains the most steadfast friend of Egypt and other Arab countries.
This is understandable because the Brezhnev-Kosygin-Podgorny triumvirate has to save its face and disarm those in the top leadership who may have been critical of its handling of West Asia since 1967 when Israel’s total victory in the six-day war left little room for doubt that the Arabs could not in the foreseeable future meet its challenge through resort to force. It is not easy to identify the opponents of the Soviet’s West Asia policy but they must exist. There is hardly any major facet of Soviet foreign policy which has not been the subject of intense debate and controversy in the Kremlin. Surely, West Asia cannot be an exception. The Soviet Union’s investment in the region has been too big for that.
Not Upset
But it also seems that the Soviet leadership is not unduly upset over President Sadat’s action. On the contrary, it is not inconceivable that having carefully weighed the actual and possible gains against the cost it has, as The New York Times has put it, “invited itself out” of Egypt. Otherwise, it would be difficult to explain the absence of any Soviet move to propitiate President Sadat between July 8 when he communicated to the Soviet Ambassador the decision to pack off the advisers and July 18 when he made it public. Instead, Moscow started withdrawing its men three days before the announcement.
It can, of course, be argued that after having repeatedly refused to deliver weapons like TU-16 bombers, MIG-23s and surface-to-surface missiles, the Soviet Union could not have yielded to President Sadat’s pressure tactics without practically mortgaging its West Asia policy to him. But would Moscow have taken so firm a stand in the first instance unless it was prepared to run the risk of losing the influence it had bought at a pretty heavy price?
The Soviet government’s contention is that it has denied Egypt certain categories of weapons in order to avoid another war which, it has good reasons to believe, the Arabs could not win. But this plea is not as conclusive as it might appear on the surface. The introduction of some new weapons would not by itself have unleashed a war, not in the short run at least; unless it is assumed that the Egyptian leadership is totally devoid of realism and commonsense.
The conclusion appears irresistible that at a certain point in time the Soviet leadership decided that it was not worth its while to try to maintain a dominant position in Egypt. It could have been driven to this view partly by President Sadat’s action in eliminating all allegedly pro-Soviet elements from the government and the Arab Socialist Union and establishing a direct line of communication with the United States and partly by its own reappraisal of its West Asia policy in the light of its efforts to ease tensions in central Europe and extend the area of cooperation with the United States. Two additional points may be made in this connection.
Obvious
First, if Moscow ever believed that progress towards so-called socialism as a result of Cairo’s growing economic ties with it could help to subdue Egyptian nationalism, it must have been disillusioned when President Sadat decided to return to their former owners the properties his predecessor had seized, release members of the right-wing Muslim Brotherhood, dwell time and again on the conflict between Islam and Marxism on the one hand and nationalism and communism on the other and take a hand in defeating the pro-communist coup in Sudan. By stepping up pressure at the same time on Russia for the supply of highly sophisticated offensive weapons he also placed himself in a position where he would appear to be the injured party. No one in the Kremlin could possibly miss the significance of these developments and fail to grasp the obvious point that nationalism is not a natural ally of communism, whatever Lenin may have said more than 50 years ago.
Secondly, Mr. Brezhnev could not have inaugurated an era of Russo-American co-operation, specially in the economic field, unless he was prepared to whittle down Soviet ambitions in West Asia. From the long term point of view President Nixon and Mr. Kissinger attach far greater importance to America’s place in this region than to the outcome of the war in Viet Nam for the simple reason that Western Europe and Japan draw most of their oil supplies from West Asia and the USA’s own dependence on this source is increasing rapidly. Since Mr Brezhnev wanted “mind-boggling” credits from the United States and to dissuade President Nixon from going too far in seeking China’s friendship, he had to provide evidence of his willingness to accommodate vital American interests. His acquiescence in the mining of North Viet Namese harbours would not have sufficed to win over Mr. Nixon.
As it happens the Soviet Union is itself becoming increasingly a status quo power in West Asia. Its concern for stability in the region is likely to grow as it acquires a share in the exploration and development of oil.
Russia’s role in the region has always been ambivalent. For instance, it never showed much sympathy for the Palestinian guerilla movement which promised to serve as a catalyst of change all over the Arab world. In the years to come its stake in stability will increase further. For in the process of modernising its industries, it will come to depend on heavy imports of oil from the area. Western estimates are that it will need to import around 100 million tons of crude oil in the ‘eighties to meet its own and Eastern Europe’s requirements. Up to now it has been self-sufficient in this regard.
If the Soviet Union prizes, as it apparently does, co-operation with the United States and seeks stability in West Asia, it is somewhat odd that Admiral Gorshkov should boast that Russia’s nuclear submarines backed by missile-carrying planes and ships could destroy an enemy vessel anywhere in the world or that Marshal Grechko should claim that the build-up of nuclear submarines and other ships would continue at the current rate. Perhaps four explanations can be offered for these two statements.
First, the Soviet naval expansion programme has acquired a powerful momentum and this must run out before it can be suitably trimmed and brought in line with the country’s overall foreign policy.
Insecurity
Secondly, in view of their bitter experience in the past, the Russian people suffer from a deep sense of insecurity and only demonstrable superiority over any possible combination against them can help them overcome it. The present naval programme itself was launched after they suffered humiliation in the Cuban crisis in the winter of 1962.
Thirdly, just as the United States intends to improve the quality of its nuclear arsenal in order to be able to bargain with the Soviet Union from a relatively advantageous position, Moscow too may have decided to continue to expand its naval forces in order to reach a favourable agreement with Washington when the time comes to discuss this problem.
Fourthly, it is possible, as a number of western commentators have argued, that the marshals and admirals in the Soviet hierarchy continue to adopt a hawkish posture in order to ensure that the political leadership does not impose drastic cuts on the defence budget and that they enjoy the support of the more conservative and doctrinaire elements in the party who still favour the primacy of basic and heavy industries in the economy and look askance at plans to reduce controls and give wider powers to managers.
These explanations are not mutually exclusive. But if Russia’s naval expansion continues at the current rate, this is bound to provoke serious misgivings in the West and hamper progress towards genuine co-operation.
The Times of India, 2 August 1972