The Chinese know it as well as anyone else that India has not set up or allowed the Dalai Lama to set up a Tibet government-in-exile. It is in fact highly doubtful that he has even put forward such a proposal to New Delhi. On the contrary, if his recent interview to the Newsweek is any indication, he is not averse to the idea of making peace with Peking and returning to Tibet more or less on Chinese terms. Why then have the Chinese used the administrative and budgetary committee of the United Nations to make this charge against this country?
It is clearly not easy to fathom the Chinese mind. The same words do not convey the same meaning to them as to us. But three possible explanations can be advanced in a tentative effort to unravel the mystery. First, the Chinese have taken note of the Dalai Lama’s interview and wish to leave him in no doubt that they regard him as a traitor and an Indian puppet and that they will not engage in any kind of discussions or negotiations with him.
Insecure
Secondly, despite the lack of evidence of active trouble in Tibet, the Chinese may still be feeling insecure in Tibet and fearing that assistance by India to the local people and infiltration of well-trained and armed guerillas can seriously complicate the situation for them. In view of the sustained Soviet criticism of their policy towards the minorities they may have come to apprehend that New Delhi and Moscow will one day synchronise their moves regarding Tibet and Sinkiang.
Finally, this may be the Chinese way of letting India know that they are interested in improving relations with it provided it is prepared to give them what they regard as credible assurances regarding its intentions in Tibet. It is not at all clear whether they would like to establish contact with the refugees and try to persuade them to return. But it is fairly obvious that Peking regards their presence in this country as a potential source of trouble for it.
Far from being mutually contradictory these possible explanations are complementary. They also rule out, though not completely, the possibility that the Chinese are deliberately indulging in what they know to be false propaganda against India. New Delhi should scrutinise their statement carefully because they are trying to convey some message in their own peculiar fashion. It should note that their present charges represent a reversal of their previous line whereby for years they had maintained that India constituted a threat not to them but to its smaller neighbours.
The Indian representative at the UN committee in question has naturally repudiated the Chinese charge that this country was in any way involved in the revolt that broke out in Lhasa in March 1959 and he can doubtless do the same in respect of the allegation that a Tibet government-in-exile has been set up under the leadership of the Dalai Lama in this country. But this will not be an adequate response on New Delhi’s part to what may well be intended to serve as an opening for a meaningful dialogue by the other side.
In plain terms, India should try to find out whether the Chinese are genuinely anxious about its intentions in Tibet, what kind of assurances and measures can satisfy them and whether they are prepared to reciprocate by stopping interference in its internal affairs by way of encouragement and support to dissident elements like the Naga rebels and Naxalites. This kind of exploration can be undertaken only at secret negotiations.
Public statements by Indian leaders reaffirming their desire for normalisation of relations with Peking cannot possibly be a substitute for secret diplomacy. These should in fact be shunned. In the past these could serve the twin purposes of sounding and preparing public opinion. But that is no longer necessary because it is reasonably clear that the Indian people favour improved ties with China on fair and honourable terms.
There is, of course, a section of opinion in the country which believes that only those who are opposed to the Indo-Soviet treaty and wish to undermine it are advocating normalisation of relations with China. This is a calumny which should be rejected with the contempt it deserves. While Indo-Soviet friendship is a fact of life which neither Peking nor Washington nor their alleged supporters here can wish away, it cannot be used to justify a policy which is bound to isolate this country from other major power centres in the world.
Hostile
The same section of opinion argues that China has for all practical purposes entered into an anti-Soviet alliance with the United States and Japan and that Peking is certain to remain hostile to India for precisely the same reason. This plea is an insult to people’s intelligence and it should not in normal circumstances be necessary to rebut it. But since it is being pushed with great vigour, it cannot be ignored.
Its proponents cannot be unaware that the United States and Japan themselves are not interested in ganging up with China against the Soviet Union. Washington has reached a series of agreements with Moscow ranging from the one limiting the development of offensive and defensive missiles to that on the repayment of the lend-lease debt. And there cannot be the least doubt that the Nixon administration wants to widen the area of agreement and cooperation with the Kremlin in the interest of a stable international order. Similarly, the Japanese Foreign Minister is currently paying a visit to Moscow to continue the discussions begun by Mr. Gromyko in Tokyo earlier this year on a peace treaty between the two countries. Negotiations between them regarding the joint exploitation of Siberia’s enormous resources are going ahead.
It cannot be denied that China is involved in ideological and territorial disputes with the Soviet Union and that ideological controversies may continue to foul their relations long after the border problem has been sorted out. But there is not the slightest evidence to show that Peking expects or seeks American or Japanese assistance in order to redress its present unfavourable power balance with Russia. On the contrary, those at the helm of affairs in Peking cannot but be fully aware that the Russo-US detente is growing rapidly and that Tokyo’s economic power poses enormous challenge to their country’s influence in the region. If America and Western Europe are uneasy at the progress of the Japanese giant, China cannot possibly be viewing it with equanimity.
Parallel
This is not to suggest that the United States and China cannot and will not from time to time pursue policies in respect of South Asia which happen to run parallel. This possibility cannot be ruled out any more than a similar parallelism between Soviet and American policies in this and other parts of the world. The fact of the matter is that the international situation has become unfrozen with the result that the very concept of an anti-Soviet or anti-US alliance, direct or indirect, has become wholly outdated.
On this reckoning, the improvement in its relations with the United States and Japan cannot by itself reinforce China’s indifference or hostility towards this country. If anything, Peking will be under some compulsion to revert to a suitably modified version of the Bandung concept in its foreign relations as it comes out of the shelter which ideological extremism provided it for well over a decade. This compulsion will increase if this country manages to establish and maintain good relations with Pakistan and Bangladesh and thereby denies Peking proxies through whom it can harass and embarrass New Delhi.
On its part, India, too, has little to gain by exaggerating the importance of its treaty with the Soviet Union. The entire international scene has changed since it was concluded on August 9 last year. Moscow may still continue to indulge in anti-American and anti-Chinese propaganda and it may encourage similar sentiments in this country. But it cannot in practice pursue anti-US or anti-Chinese policies without running the risk of pushing Washington and Peking closer to each other than they would otherwise draw. It should not therefore be particularly difficult for New Delhi to distinguish between the form and content of Soviet policy. This would help it to avoid unnecessary complications with China on the one hand and misunderstanding with Moscow in the long run on the other. If nothing else, the history of Sino-Soviet, Pakistan-US, Russo-Egyptian alliances should serve as a warning to it as well as to the Kremlin.
The Times of India 25 October 1972