Since Chairman Mao Tse-tung met President Nixon himself for only 45 minutes last February, no one could have predicted that he would spend as much as two hours with Mr. Kissinger during his latest visit to Peking. But this is not particularly surprising in view of the personal interest the Chinese leader has taken in improvement of Sino-US relations in the last two years and the role Mr. Kissinger has played in persuading President Nixon to come to terms with the Chinese reality and to end the war in Viet Nam on terms acceptable to Hanoi.
Since the Chinese leaders have been quoted as having said more than once that Mr. Kissinger speaks a language they understand, it stands to reason that they would be somewhat perturbed over the continuing speculation over his future in the American press. It is therefore possible that Chairman Mao’s gesture to him is intended at least partly to convey it to President Nixon that he would be well advised to retain the services of his emissary.
There are two other possibilities. In spite of the rapid growth of Sino-US understanding in the past two years, it cannot be ruled out that the talks between Mr. Chou En-lai and Mr. Kissinger had hit a snag with the result that it became necessary for Chairman Mao himself to intervene. The difficulty could well relate to the future of Prince Sihanouk whom the Chinese continue to recognise as Cambodia’s prime minister.
It is equally plausible that Mr. Mao’s decision to confer with Mr. Kissinger is intended to let the world know that a major breakthrough has been achieved in Sino-US relations.
Interpretations
The three possible interpretations are not mutually exclusive. Though no one can be too sure that the western diplomats are justified in their assessment that a breakthrough has been achieved, it appears likely that the United States and China have reached a fairly high level of understanding. Two facts deserve to be noted in this connection.
First, Mr. Chou En-lai has gone out of his way to endorse publicly the official American policy in Europe and the Pacific. He has said that the West needs the NATO alliance to deter the Soviet Union and that Japan is justified in stepping up its military expenditure and retaining the US nuclear shield.
The general interpretation has been that the Chinese prime minister has made these statements with a view to wooing the EEC countries and Japan. But, to put it at its lowest, he has also approved the Nixon administration’s approach to two areas of vital interest to it and in the process weakened the position of its critics at home who want it to reduce US forces in Western Europe and Japan and drastically cut down the defence budget.
Secondly, by sending Mr. Kissinger to Peking straight from Hanoi, President Nixon has, on his part, not only acknowledged the assistance China has provided it for ending the war in Viet Nam but also conceded that it is entitled to have a major say regarding the future of Indochina.
The second inference would have been justified even if the Nixon administration had simultaneously initiated a similarly high-level exchange with Moscow because it is well known that Washington now accepts that there can be no peace in south-east Asia without China’s co-operation and that it shares Peking’s concern regarding alleged Soviet ambitions in the region. But, as it happens, Mr. Nixon has not yet opened a similar dialogue with Mr. Brezhnev in respect of the future of Indochina. As far as this area is concerned, there can therefore be no question that Washington has accorded a higher place to Peking than to Moscow.
American View
This does not mean that Washington can afford to or intends to disregard Moscow. On the contrary, Mr. Nixon can hope to stabilise the military balance between Hanoi and Saigon and Saigon and the provisional revolutionary government only with the cooperation of both the Soviet Union and China. He knows as well as anyone else that Moscow has provided most of the sophisticated equipment like surface-to-air missiles and interceptors to North Viet Nam since 1965 and expects it to exercise “greater restraint” in this regard in future. But in the US view, the Soviet Union is not entitled to the same kind of influence in south-east Asia as China. Also it is not easy to discern the same kind of parallelism in US and Soviet policies towards the region as can be identified between American and Chinese perspectives without too much difficulty.
It would be both rash and unfair to the Chinese to jump to the conclusion that they share US opposition to the unification of the two Viet Nams. There is undoubtedly some evidence to show that at times they have given greater prominence to NLF and the PRG representatives in Peking than to Hanoi’s. They did so only recently when almost the entire leadership turned up at a rally in honour of Madame Binh and Chairman Mao personally received her. But in the context of the complicated game that has been going on between Moscow, Peking and Hanoi, it is impossible to draw any firm inference from this episode. Moreover, the Chinese are a pragmatic people and they will adjust themselves to the realities of power.
But it is reasonably clear that Peking favours continued American military presence in the region and peace in Indochina in order to counter possible Soviet moves there and that this establishes a community of interests between it and Washington at least for the time being. American and Soviet interests in the area do not coincide in the same way. The detente between them is the result of other factors and considerations.
The situation in Indochina is extremely fluid and Washington and Peking cannot for ever freeze the status quo resulting from the cease-fire in Viet Nam. But if the present trend in US and Chinese policies continues, changes can take place without putting too much strain on their bilateral relations. After a period of time this understanding would also be a strong enough guarantee that if the precarious arrangements that are being worked out for Indochina begin to break down, America would not wish to intervene again.
The United States would never have involved itself in a land war in Indochina if its leadership had not completely misunderstood the nature of the Chinese revolution and regarded it as a threat to the stability of rest of Asia. Having extricated itself from this longest, cruellest and most senseless war in its history and having initiated the process of reconciliation and even active co-operation with China, it can have no desire to allow itself to be drawn into future conflicts there. The only reasonable qualification to this view can be that North Viet Nam would not try to take over the south in one massive assault. The chances clearly are that this condition will be met. At the moment even Hanoi seems willing to cooperate with Washington and Peking to produce a measure of stability in Indochina. This much is evident from its cordiality to Mr. Kissinger and the proposed establishment of a joint commission for the reconstruction of North Viet Nam.
In the light of these developments, it is, on a surface view, legitimate to pose the question whether the Nixon administration is conceding to China the same kind of primacy in south-east Asia as it and the Soviet Union enjoy in their respective spheres of influence. But is the question not misplaced?
No Different
South-east Asia cannot become the sphere of influence of one great power after the failure of the American effort. All great powers are bound to retain a measure of influence there – China by virtue of proximity, Japan by that of trade and aid, the United States because of its alliances and military presence, the Soviet Union on the strength of its naval expansion in the Indian Ocean and the EEC as the biggest trading unit in the world.
It is also about time that we asked ourselves whether the assumption that China is no different from other great powers in its basic motivations is wholly valid. For, it is possible that even if it is able, which it is not, it may not wish to establish an exclusive sphere of influence. This doubt is pertinent because it is becoming increasingly evident that Peking does not look upon itself as the third Rome. It challenges Moscow’s primacy in the communist movement. But it has not proclaimed itself as a rival centre. Its leadership seems to be convinced that nationalism remains the strongest force in our era.
The Times of India 21 February 1973