With the agreement on what virtually amounts to an exchange of diplomatic missions with the USA and its appeal to the Chiang government for direct talks, China has tied all but one loose end in its foreign policy. This relates to its relations with India.
This is not to imply that the Taiwan issue has been settled for all practical purposes. It is still very much there. But if there was any room for doubt after the Nixon-Chou joint communiqué of February 27, 1972, that neither side would permit the issue to deflect it from its central objective of improving relations with the other, the Chou-Kissinger deal should remove it once and for all.
At the time of his visit to Peking last year Mr. Nixon publicly abandoned the policy of two Chinas or one China and one Formosa, and agreed gradually to withdraw US troops from the island as tension in the area was reduced, that is, after a cease-fire agreement had been reached in Viet Nam. Mr Chou En-lai, on his part, did not make a specific commitment that his government would seek to win back Taiwan through peaceful means. But it was reasonably clear even then that he would not wish to jeopardise the prospects of detente and cooperation with the United States by seeking to annex the island through force.
Breakthrough
In spite of this breakthrough no one anticipated that the United States and China would sidestep this issue to establish virtual diplomatic relations with each other. In fact till as late as Mr. Kissinger’s latest trip to Peking last month, the general view was that the two countries would continue to deal with each other on an ad hoc basis. But this only shows how slow the world has been in appreciating the logic of the Sino-US detente.
China’s appeal to the Chiang government is a natural corollary to its agreement with the United States. It shows that Peking is not only prepared to let the situation evolve but also willing to concede to the island a good deal of autonomy in its internal affairs in return for acceptance of its sovereignty by Marshal Chiang Kai-shek or his successor. Since this is precisely the kind of arrangement the United States favours, it can be depended upon to use its influence in Taiwan towards that end.
On the face of it, it seems somewhat rash to take smooth relations between America and China for granted so long as the Viet Nam issue is not finally settled one way or the other. But as far as one can make out, both the Nixon Administration and the Chinese leadership are beginning to recognise that their capacity to shape the future of Indochina is limited and that they have no long-term choice but to accept the realities emerging from a clash of rival forces there.
Peking’s main anxiety just now is to see to it that the Soviet Union does not gain a significant foothold in the region. But two observations would be pertinent in this connection.
First, by doing all it can to promote a settlement in Viet Nam which the US regards as honourable and by withdrawing its longstanding objection to continued American military presence in the area, China has already made sure that the Soviet Union does not emerge as a major factor there. The Soviet Union could have done so only if the United States had been humiliated in Viet Nam and non-communist regimes in the region had lost faith in the credibility of US support. Peking has helped Washington to avoid both these developments.
Secondly, irrespective of whether the Chinese leaders favour one Viet Nam or two or even three, and whether or not they view with concern the possibility of Hanoi imposing its will on Cambodia and Laos as well, they have little reason to conclude that North Viet Nam would disregard its own and Peking’s interests to offer a foothold to the Soviet Union. The North Vietnamese are fierce nationalists but they are also a pragmatic people. They are not likely to be insensitive to Chinese susceptibilities so long as Peking does not disregard their interests and sentiments. Thus while it is quite possible that certain difficulties may arise between them, these are not likely to be such as to offer any advantage to a third country.
It is also no secret that China allots the highest priority to the containment of Soviet influence all over the world. That is why it is opposed to a withdrawal of US troops from Western Europe and a weakening of NATO. That is also why it has endorsed Japan’s security treaty with America and is seeking to establish close ties with the EEC, Iran and Pakistan in the Persian Gulf and Tanzania and Zambia in East Africa.
In this over-all strategy the one obvious gap is the Indian subcontinent because China cannot either counter Soviet power based on friendly relations with India and Bangladesh with the help of Pakistan or play a meaningful role in bringing about a rapprochement between Dacca and Islamabad except in the context of friendly ties with New Delhi.
Weaker
Peking would have been in a relatively weaker position even if Mr. Bhutto had succeeded in winning the confidence of the National Awami Party which has a sizable following among the Pathans and the Baluchis. But he has not even tried to do so seriously. As things are, it should not be particularly difficult for Chinese policy-makers to realise that the situation in Pakistan is not likely to be stabilised except in the context of friendly relations between their country and India on the one hand and New Delhi and Islamabad on the other.
The two are not inextricably inter-linked in that China can in theory continue to pursue its present policy towards India even after Mr. Bhutto has normalised relations with New Delhi. But Indian misgivings regarding Pakistan cannot be set at rest so long as China continues to pour in arms there and to maintain what at best amounts to a posture of indifference towards it. Thus Indo-Pakistan amity is contingent on Sino-Indian reconciliation. Incidentally, that would also strengthen Mr. Bhutto’s position.
In view of Iran’s massive military build-up with US assistance and the close ties that exist between it and Pakistan, Peking could have sought at least a temporary solution of its predicament by encouraging the army to seize power if only it was assured that the Generals could hold the country together without frequent and excessive use of force. But another military coup in Pakistan can only exacerbate the existing tensions between Punjab on the one hand and Sind, Baluchistan and the NWFP on the other.
Ridiculous
It would be ridiculous to draw a parallel between Bangladesh and the minority provinces in present-day Pakistan. All of them are politically and ethnically fragmented. The Urdu-speaking people account for well over 40 per cent of the population in Sind. The Baluchis still think in tribal terms and cannot be said to constitute a homogeneous entity. In the NWFP, too, the Punjabi-speaking people constitute a sizable and influential community. Unlike Bangladesh these provinces are not cut off from the heartland of Pakistan. The pertinent point, however, is that a Pakistan beset with serious internal problems cannot play the role Peking would like it to.
If this assessment is not too wide off the mark, the obvious inference is Peking will be interested in normalising relations with this country once the Pakistani prisoners- of-war have gone back. This view is subject to the twin qualifications that the Chinese, on their part, do not underestimate this country’s capacity to run its own affairs and New Delhi, on its part, takes some steps which can convince them that it means what it says.
It is difficult to assess the significance of the first qualification because we just do not know the Chinese leaders’ estimate of the Indian leadership. All that can be said is that they will be making a serious mistake if they base their judgement on their own experience because ideological questions, which are inevitably involved in relations between two communist regimes and influence the domestic debate on foreign policy, are absent in a non-communist government’s dealings with others.
But be that as it may, New Delhi has nothing to lose by taking certain steps which can dissipate Chinese doubts, real or feigned, regarding its intentions. This need not and must not detract from its treaty with the Soviet Union.
The Times of India 7 March 1973