India and the United States could have avoided much needless controversy if they had realised that the relations between them would have suffered a sea-change in the ’seventies even if there had been no civil war in Pakistan in 1971. Such an appreciation of the reality might or might not have made for friendly ties between the two. But it could have at least helped them to view the relevant issues in proper perspective and engage in a meaningful dialogue.
India cannot expect any large-scale aid from the United States on a bilateral basis in the current decade for the simple reason that American public opinion no longer favours such assistance. Even US liberals have come to doubt its efficacy either for winning genuine friends or promoting rapid growth in the aid-receiving country. They feel that most developing nations, including India, treat external assistance as a substitute for socio-economic reforms, fiscal discipline and an earnest effort for raising the rate of domestic savings, with the result that such aid, far from promoting development, hampers it. As aid weariness has grown the US Administration has come to favour private investment to which this country is allergic for a variety of reasons.
Dependence
Similarly, India cannot continue to depend on food imports under PL 480 in difficult years. The US government no longer has the necessary stocks to sustain the programme. Though the Soviet Union emerged as a major importer of wheat and feedstock in 1972, largely as a result of a sharp drop in output due to extremely adverse weather conditions, some Americans believe that it will need to make large yearly purchases abroad for some time if it is to raise its meat production fast enough to meet the rapidly growing demand at home. Moreover, since the United States has run into payment difficulties which are likely to become more and more acute in view of its increasing dependence on oil imports, it has come to regard food as a major foreign exchange earner.
It is also obvious that, with the recent change in US policy towards China, India can no longer look upon Washington as a potential source of assistance in the event of a conflict with Peking.
This is, of course, not an altogether new development. It can be traced back to 1964 when President Johnson turned down India’s request for sophisticated military hardware to improve its defence capability vis-a-vis China. Though New Delhi then turned to the Soviet Union for arms, the significance of the actions of the two governments did not become obvious for some years for two reasons.
First, the United States continued to justify its military involvement in Indochina in the name of containing China. This inevitably created in India the erroneous impression that in refusing supplies to it the United States was guided solely by its desire not to offend Pakistan. Secondly, India asked for and received from America massive wheat imports of around ten million tonnes a year in 1966 and 1967 to ward off a widespread famine. This large-scale assistance obscured the shift in American public opinion towards this country and China.
Clear
By the time Mr. Nixon came to power in 1969, it should have been reasonably clear to any perceptive observer that the Sino-Soviet dispute was less amenable to an early settlement than the Sino-US quarrel and that if India needed a long-term ally in order to cope with the Chinese threat, it had little choice but to cultivate the Soviet Union. But it is doubtful that anyone in New Delhi or Washington drew such a conclusion.
This is not to suggest that Mr. Nixon is wholly unjustified in claiming that the two countries needed the clash of 1971 to inject “a healthy realism and maturity” in their mutual relations but that these would have had to be placed on a different footing in the ’seventies even if the two governments had managed to mute their differences in 1971.
But while it is easy to emphasise the need for a new framework in which Indo-US relations can prosper, it is not equally easy to outline it even after Mr. Nixon has stated his views in his latest report to Congress. Since he has said that the United States has no interest in “altering the basic framework of the sub-continent,” promoting an arms race, denying India its new stature as a “major country” and joining any groupings or pursuing any policies directed against it, he can claim that he has accepted New Delhi’s prescription for friendly relations. But this will not resolve the difficulties between the two countries.
Broadly speaking, three problems will dog Mr. Nixon’s and Mrs. Gandhi’s steps. First, India’s and America’s terms of reference are so different that it is not feasible to reconcile them. Secondly, it is just not possible to insulate the sub-continent either from external influences or from the impact of developments in adjoining areas. Finally, India does not possess and is not likely to acquire in the near future the economic strength to sustain its aspirations as the “major country” in South Asia.
As for the first point, the difficulty arises from the fact that while India thinks in terms of the essential unity of South Asia, Mr. Nixon’s report to Congress leaves no room for doubt that he regards sovereignty of the constituent units as the first and most important principle. Else he would not have found it necessary to say: “We do not view them (the smaller nations of South Asia) as part of any country’s sphere of influence … each has its character, aspirations and problems. And we seek relationship with each one on the basis of mutual respect.”
India does not believe in spheres of influence and it has no desire to limit the sovereignty of any country, however small, in South Asia. But implicit in its stance is the assumption that the countries in the region possess a certain unity and community of interests, that external powers should not exploit and aggravate the differences among them, and that as the largest country India is the natural centre of a regional grouping. Mr. Nixon, too, has spoken of an Asian regional system. But the general trend of the relevant section of his message to Congress is very different. It does not even occur to him that they share a common past and that they would find it easier to solve many of their problems if they agree to cooperate and evolve something like a common market.
Mr. Nixon is at some pains to make out, albeit indirectly, that by signing the treaty of friendship and co-operation with the Soviet Union, India has facilitated its entry into the sub-continent. But the fact remains that the United States was the first to ignore Mr. Nehru’s passionate plea for not dragging the area into the cold war and that China established specially close ties with Pakistan in order to use it as a counterweight against this country and encouraged anti-Indian elements in Nepal.
Ironical
Lastly, it is ironical that India’s military victory in December 1971, which marked its emergence as the first power in South Asia and the end of Pakistan’s pretensions to parity with it, has been followed by one of the century’s worst droughts and the consequent food shortages and rise in prices. The failure of the monsoon in 1972 has however only spotlighted the grim fact that the margin of safety for this country remains very small indeed.
Drought or no drought, India’s economic performance has been far from impressive ever since independence. And there is little to show so far that those in power will be able to overcome their own penchant for populism, enforce the necessary discipline and ensure a rate of growth which can enable the country not only to dispense with foreign aid but also help its neighbours in times of difficulties. On the contrary, it cannot be ruled that the Indian government will take on more and more responsibility and thus place unbearable burdens on a none-too-efficient administrative machinery.
This will widen the gap between its economic performance and political aspirations and generate bitterness among the people. The government may or may not look for scapegoats but others will not be slow to take advantage of India’s failure to challenge its claim to be a “major country”.
The Times of India 9 May 1973