In its effort to justify its policy of detente with the West, specially the United States, without even mentioning either its national interests or the compulsions under which it is functioning, the Soviet leadership has tied itself in knots. Its explanations raise more questions than they answer.
If, as Moscow alleges, the nature of imperialism has not changed in that it remains as exploitative and hostile to the socio-economic aspirations of developing countries as ever before, does it not follow that the Soviet Union should continue to wage a relentless struggle against it? Alternatively, it should give up its claim to the leadership of what it calls the “historical alliance of socialism and the national liberation movements”.
The Soviet leadership has, of course, been keen to emphasise that while the nature of imperialism has not changed, the opportunities open to it have shrunk as a result of the shift in the world power balance in favour of the “forces of peace and progress.” But how does that justify the policy of detente on the part of Moscow? On the contrary, if imperialism is on the defensive, as the Kremlin contends, its opponents should step up the pressure and thus deny it a chance to regroup its forces.
Caution
The Kremlin would have the third world believe that instead of being compelled to reduce its assistance to national liberation struggles it will be able to increase it. But how? The chances in fact are that in its anxiety not to jeopardise its growing co-operation with the West, it will act with extra caution in areas where the latter’s vital interests are involved as in the Persian-Arab Gulf. It will perhaps continue to extend a certain amount of financial and military aid to groups like the Palestinian guerillas and the Dhofar rebels in Oman and Muscat and radical regimes like those in South Yemen and Iraq. But if, as in the case of Egypt, it wants to avoid risking a direct confrontation with either the United States or its allies in the region, this assistance is likely to be rather modest.
Since Mr Khrushchev put forward the formulation that peaceful co-existence is the highest form of class struggle in our era, it has been fashionable for Soviet leaders to repeat it in season and out of season. But what precisely does this mean? How can “confrontation of imperialism and socialism” take the form of “peaceful co-existence of the two systems,” specially when they are supposed to be “diametrically opposed to each other”?
Moscow and its adherents can legitimately argue that this kind of criticism ignores the fundamental superiority of the socialist system and the ability of socialist states to turn the detente to their advantage. But this will be empty talk because the Soviet leaders are scared of a free competition of ideas on their soil. Why else would they want to confine all contacts with the West to the official level and rule out all contact at the individual level? This clearly suggests that they are on the defensive and therefore ill-equipped to turn in their favour the situation which the detente with the West will create.
It is a matter of speculation whether Mr Brezhnev himself favours the present policy of tightening the screws on dissident Soviet intellectuals or whether he has found it necessary to allow the more orthodox and doctrinaire members of the Politburo a free hand at home in return for their support for his efforts to reach accommodation with the West specially the United States and West Germany. But whatever view one takes of his possible position it cannot be seriously disputed that a fairly influential section of the Soviet leadership is apprehensive that detente with the West might encourage dissidence at home and in other East European countries and that the so-called moderates in the Politburo have not been able to prevent show trials and a vilification campaign against men like Mr Sakharov and Mr Solzhenitsyn.
The Kremlin has seized on Mr Sakharov’s statement that “western countries are running the risk of finding themselves face to face with a Soviet Union armed to the teeth and presenting a menace to its neighbours if they agree to peaceful co-existence on the Kremlin’s terms” to make it out that he has aligned himself with the western proponents of the cold war. On a superficial view this criticism is credible, though Mr Sakharov has strongly disputed it. But whatever his motives, in a deeper sense he is flattering the Soviet leadership because implicit in his warning are the twin assumptions that the policy of detente will produce greater confusion and disarray in the West than in the Soviet bloc and that Moscow has greater capacity to plan its moves in secrecy than Washington. Neither of these assumptions can stand the test of scrutiny. In spite of all its difficulties NATO as an alliance system is in a better shape than the Soviet block and no one can dispute that Mr Brezhnev has not at any point shown the kind of decisiveness which Mr Nixon has again and again.
Reality
All this is not to suggest that the policy of detente is not the correct one for the Soviet Union to follow but that it should justify it in terms of its bitter quarrel with China, its need for western technology, capital and markets, the desirability of restraining the nuclear race with the United States, the advantages of freezing as far as possible the status quo in Central Europe and so on. It should not insult the intelligence of others by talking of a shift in power balance, of the shrinking opportunities for the West and of its desire to divert to the developing countries and liberation movements in colonies and semi-colonies the resources saved as a result of the proposed curbs on nuclear arms.
The reality is indeed very different from the picture presented by the Kremlin. As was evident from Mr Nixon’s visits to Peking and Moscow last year the United States had managed to seize the diplomatic initiative in its dealings with friends and foes alike even before it had ended its direct and extremely cruel military intervention in Indochina. Its disengagement from Indochina has greatly increased its leverage with the result that it has now managed to place itself in the middle of all three major triangles on the international scene – the Russia-America-China, China-Japan-US and Western Europe-Soviet Union-America – and that even countries like Egypt, Syria and Libya are convinced that it alone commands the necessary influence in Tel Aviv to persuade or compel it to adopt a less intransigent attitude.
There is a great deal of talk of the weakness of the dollar and America’s growing dependence on oil imports from the Persian-Arab Gulf. But the dollar is weak only in relation to the currencies of its Japanese and West European allies which only means that the United States has to show greater respect towards them.
It does not follow that the pull and power of the capitalist world as a whole has weakened. Similarly, no one need be surprised if the rich countries are able to assure adequate supplies of oil for themselves by manipulating the oil producing countries and the worst sufferers are poor countries like India.
Markets
On this reckoning, it would indeed be wrong to equate the Soviet Union with the United States. For, while the Soviet Union is on the defensive despite the remarkable increase in its military, particularly naval, power, the United States retains sufficient self-confidence and vigour to think not in terms of Pax Americana but of stabilising the world on the basis which is fully in conformity with its interests. Witness Mr Kissinger’s interpretation of the agreement with Mr Brezhnev on the question of avoiding a nuclear conflagration whereby the former has sought to bind the latter not to hold out threats against China, his call for a new Atlantic Charter which would take cognisance of Japan’s economic might and accommodate it and the proposed initiative in West Asia.
There is also no justification for the charge that the Soviet Union is a party to a plan to divide the world between the two super powers. There is no such plan because the US intention is to reduce if not exclude Soviet influence from vital areas like West Asia, specially the Persian-Arab Gull and confine it to Eastern Europe where its hold still remains unchallengeable. Washington perhaps does not mind a measure of Soviet influence in South Asia partly because the countries concerned do not possess either raw materials or sizable markets and partly because it is not averse to an intensification of Sino-Soviet rivalry in this region. But it does not follow that the United States accords to the Soviet Union the status of a co-director in the management of the world. On the contrary, Washington expects Moscow to facilitate its tasks by exercising what is euphemistically called a restraining influence on governments and movements which depend on it for assistance and therefore heed its advice. Viet Nam is a case in point. And so in a sense is India because as far as the Americans are concerned, they have convinced themselves that Moscow used its influence in New Delhi in favour of an early cease-fire in December 1971 and peace on terms acceptable to Pakistan subsequently.
The Times of India, 26 September 1973