In view of the way in which the United States has abused its power, specially in Indochina, and sought to dominate the world, it is only natural that its decision to build certain additional military facilities on the British-owned island of Diego Garcia should have provoked protests from a number of countries. But the prospect of converting the Indian Ocean into a zone of peace wasn’t particularly bright even before that.
In fact the United States itself has been for years deploying missile-bearing submarines in the northern part of the Indian Ocean in order to cover large parts of the Soviet Union, and there was little chance, except in the wholly unlikely event of an agreement on general and complete nuclear disarmament between the two superpowers, of its ever agreeing to withdraw these vessels from the area.
On the contrary, as the Soviet Union has developed SS-9 and SS-11 missiles which are capable of knocking out the hardened sites which house America’s minutemans, the USA has come to depend more and more on submarines for maintaining an over-all strategic balance with its principal adversary. As such, it has been consistently averse to the concept of a nuclear-free Indian Ocean.
US Challenge
The point has often been made that in sending its fleet into the Indian Ocean the Soviet Union has only responded to the American challenge and provocation. This is doubtless the case to some extent, though it will be absurd for anyone to suggest that once Moscow had acquired the capability to project its naval power all over the world and its stake in the Indian Ocean area had grown to the point where it could legitimately look upon itself as the predominant power in West Asia and South Asia, it would have refrained from establishing its presence in the region. Be that as it may, the crux of the matter is that just as the Soviet Union will continue to deploy its massive missile-carrying submarine fleet in the Atlantic and the Pacific, from where it can comfortably cover all important targets in the United States, the latter will continue to use the Indian Ocean for a similar purpose.
Since the United States already possesses communication facilities at Diego Garcia for keeping in touch with its submarines in the area, its present decision should not logically be criticised primarily in terms of the general principle of excluding external powers from the Indian Ocean. America has been present in the area and it would not have withdrawn even if it had not decided to build what is loosely being called a base on Diego Garcia. Its latest move should rather be viewed in the context of the recent changes in West Asia, with special emphasis on developments in the Persian Gulf. This may or may not make it appear less ominous. But that is a different matter.
Since the Nixon administration had ended America’s direct military involvement in the Indochina war which had earlier monopolised its attention and absorbed its energy, and since it had disposed of at least partly the Dullesian legacy in respect of relations with China and the Soviet Union, it would in all probability have attended to the Arab-Israeli problem towards the end of 1973. Indeed, there were reports that immediately on his confirmation as Secretary of State, Mr. Kissinger was preparing to tackle this issue. But by deciding to go to war with Israel last October and by using oil as a political weapon at the same time, President Sadat and King Faisal transformed the whole West Asian scene even before he was able to make the first move towards an Arab-Israeli settlement and thereby obliged him to refashion his entire approach.
This is important not only because it makes Mr. Kissinger more anxious to produce results and Mrs. Golda Meir more amenable to his persuasion and pressure than they would have been otherwise but also because it has changed the entire framework in which the United States has shaped its West Asia policy since 1967.
Three points deserve attention in this connection. First, the issue is no longer whether the United States can depend on Israel to police the area as it could in recent years when the threat of intervention by Tel Aviv was enough to force Syria to withdraw its tanks from Jordan and to persuade the Muslim population in Lebanon to preserve the generally pro-Christian status quo in that country. The question now is whether Washington can persuade Tel Aviv gradually to withdraw from the occupied territories without having to guarantee its security. And if the answer is in the negative, as it must be, it follows that the US has to take some action which convinces the Israelis that it means what it says.
Secondly, the old US policy of detaching the oil-rich Persian Gulf from the larger Arab-Israeli conflict on the strength of friendly relations with Saudi Arabia and Kuwait and of dependence on Iran to preserve peace and stability there has suddenly become inadequate, if not out of date, in view of King Faisal’s leading role in the use of the oil weapon and the growing rivalry between Riyadh and Teheran.
The fact
Washington has doubtless not given up and has no long-term reasons to give up the hope of restoring friendly ties with King Faisal. But it cannot be oblivious to the fact that having discovered his strength, he will want to play a much bigger role in the Arab world than he has done in the past, change the terms of relationship with the United States to make it less and less exclusive and increase his room for manoeuvre through deals with West European countries.
Similarly, while the Nixon administration would continue to sell highly sophisticated weapons to Iran, it cannot but be aware that the Shah’s effectiveness is likely to be reduced on account of the upsurge of confidence among his Arab neighbours who will now pile up enormous foreign exchange reserves and weapons, the new pull of Saudi Arabia and the readiness of France and Britain to provide all manner of arms to the sheikhdoms around Iran.
The Nixon administration had, of course, acquired base facilities in Bahrain when Britain withdrew from the Persian Gulf and thus indicated that it would, if necessary, establish and maintain an overt naval presence in the region on a permanent basis. But there can be no question that until recently it depended primarily on Israel and Iran to establish and maintain a power balance which would protect its own and the larger Western interests in the region. This is no longer possible and as it happens Bahrain has terminated the earlier agreement with the United States.
Thirdly, while it would not be wholly accurate to say that in the past America did not use its influence with Tel Aviv to arrange an Israeli-Egyptian settlement because it wanted to keep the Suez blocked, there can be no question that the reopening of the canal would greatly facilitate the Soviet Union’s task in projecting its naval power and extending its political influence in the Gulf region. According to the rules of the game as the big powers play it, the prospect of greater Russian naval activity in this sensitive, unstable and oil-rich area is by itself enough to provoke a US response.
The Context
All this is not to suggest that the US decision in respect of Diego Garcia is justified but that it should be discussed in the context of the intense competition for influence in the Persian Gulf and not in terms of the principle of excluding external powers from the Indian Ocean. However laudable the objective, this was unattainable even earlier.
For four months the whole world has been so preoccupied with the problems arising from the fourfold increase in crude oil prices and its impact on industrialised and developing countries alike that no one has had the time or the inclination to try to figure out the consequences of the unheard of accumulation of oil revenues for the producer countries themselves. Arab sensitivity has also reinforced other people’s reluctance to discuss this problem. But there can be no doubt that this flood of wealth would have a highly destabilising effect on traditional societies. Therefore, if anything, the danger of external powers trying to manipulate tensions within each of these societies and within the region as a whole will be greater than it has been in the past.
Countries like India can perhaps warn them. But there is precious little that they can do to help avert the danger of great power intrigues because the men concerned are not likely to heed such warnings. Indeed, New Delhi will be lucky if in the parlous days ahead it can protect its own narrowly defined interests. It will need a lot of goodwill in a number of capitals if it is to get the kind of assistance it now requires to tide over the crisis created by the sudden and unprecedented rise in oil prices and to prevent a serious economic dislocation. That should be first priority, however great its abhorrence of the role of external powers in the neighbouring regions.
The Times of India 21 February 1974