Mr. Kissinger could neither have been surprised nor displeased by Mr. Chiao Kuan-hua’s speech at a banquet in his honour in Peking last Sunday. The US Secretary of State could not have been surprised because he knows only too well that the Chinese are highly critical of the US policy of detente with the Soviet Union and not displeased because in reality Washington itself has come to adopt a fairly tough attitude towards Moscow.
Whatever his public stance, Mr. Kissinger can, in fact, have no interest in trying to soften the Chinese stance on the question of detente because their criticism is directed not so much at the United States as at the Soviet Union which is represented as the more expansionist and aggressive of the two super-powers and therefore as the greater threat to peace. On the contrary, he would be keen to ensure that the Chinese leadership continues to pursue this course in the post-Mao period.
Hardliners
This is clearly an issue of the greatest importance not only for hardliners in the United States like Mr. Schlesinger but also for moderates like Mr. Kissinger because the very viability of the concept of balance of power hinges on China’s continued suspicion of, if not hostility towards, the Soviet Union. He will, of course, never say so in so many words because an explicit statement would complicate his task in dealing with Moscow. But America’s requirements speak for themselves.
The overall military power of the Soviet Union has grown and continues to grow so rapidly that it can easily establish an overwhelming superiority over NATO in Europe if it is relieved of the obligation of deploying over a million men along the Chinese border in Central Asia and Mongolia. This may not lead to what is called Finlandisation of Western Europe in a direct and obvious way. But there can be little doubt that such a shift in the power balance would oblige the United States and its allies either to rearm on a big scale or to defer to Moscow’s interests and susceptibilities. It is, for instance, difficult to believe that the Americans and the West Europeans could have taken the tough stand they have in respect of developments in Portugal in that kind of context.
Similarly, it goes without saying that a Sino-Soviet rapprochement would dramatically change the situation in the Korean peninsula to the disadvantage not only of Seoul but also of Tokyo and Washington. As it is, the United States maintains tactical nuclear weapons in South Korea as a deterrent to Pyongyang because in view of the experience in Viet Nam, Washington cannot think in terms of committing more American troops for the defence of its ally. But a change in China’s policy towards the Soviet Union can vastly complicate the problem for America, above all in respect of Japan.
Right now it is difficult for anyone to predict how the Japanese will react to Sino-Soviet rapprochement and the threat to South Korea implicit in it. But irrespective of whether they decide to go nuclear or to come to terms with the new power realities, the United States will be called upon to make major adjustments in its policy towards the whole region.
From the American and the Western point of view, China is also playing a highly useful role in containing the Soviet thrust in Africa – Peking commands considerable influence in Tanzania and Zambia and it is involved in the Zaire-led and US-supported attempt to frustrate the Soviet-backed MPLAs bid for power in Angola – and the Persian Gulf. The rebellion in Dhofar in Oman, for instance, could have assumed menacing proportions if the Chinese had not withdrawn their support to it in 1973 in the wake of their decision to befriend the Shah of Iran and support his efforts to assure peace and stability in the region and thereby weaken the possibility of the Soviet Union extending its influence there.
Thus it is only natural that Western leaders, including Mr. Kissinger, would want China to persist in the present course and that they should be willing to do all in their power to see to it that there is no dramatic change in Peking’s foreign policy in the post- Mao period. But, unfortunately for them, the man best qualified to ensure orderly succession and smooth transition has been quite ill for over a year and recently his health is known to have deteriorated further. While the problem has been mitigated to some extent by Mr. Teng Hsiao-ping’s growing authority, it has by no means been resolved. He cannot fill Mr. Chou En-lai’s role fully.
Demand
Since the demand for normalisation and improvement of relations with the Soviet Union has in the past come from military leaders – Marshal Peng Teh-huai in 1958, Gen. Lo Jui-ching in 1965 and Marshal Lin Piao in 1970 – it is being assumed that in future also the military top brass will push for a policy of reconciliation with Moscow. Indeed, some commentators are interpreting the present anti-capitulationists also in these terms. Mr. Victor Zorza has, for instance, gone so far as to say: “The strength and bitterness of its (The People’s Daily’s) attack on the pro-Soviet faction shows how powerful that faction is and how greatly Mao fears its victory after his death, or perhaps even before it”.
It is difficult to say how widely this view is shared in the West among policy makers and students of communist affairs. But some Americans have been dropping hints regarding their country’s willingness to provide some sophisticated hardware like computers, radar, transport and fighter planes and reconnaissance equipment to Peking precisely because they want to weaken the case and position of the allegedly pro-Soviet faction in the Chinese military leadership. Mr. Michael Pillsbury is fairly explicit in his article “US-China military ties?” in the autumn issue of Foreign Policy, New York, and so obviously is the CIA in its study as reported in The New York Times.
But while too little is known about the current debate in China for anyone to say anything definite either about the identity of the contestants or the issues involved, two points may be made vis-a-vis the views expounded by Mr. Victor Zorza and other like-minded individuals. First, the Kremlin would not be so keen as it apparently is to advertise the alleged existence of a powerful pro-Soviet faction in the Chinese defence services if it in fact existed. Such propaganda is generally intended to mislead the other side – in this case Chairman Mao, his supporters and the Western world. Secondly, while in the past Marshal Peng Teh-huai and Gen. Lo Jui-ching could justify their advocacy of rapprochement with Moscow on the plea that they needed access to Soviet weapons in view of the US threat, no Chinese general today can hope to convince the political leadership that the threat to the country’s security comes from that source.
Pressure
But be that as it may, the pressure for normal ties with the Soviet Union can also come from the cadres who are tired of the convulsions into which Chairman Mao has thrown them and the country since 1957 when he concluded that the Soviet model was not valid for China and decided to hew out his own path to socialism and communism. They would want security for themselves and favour an economic system which provides for incentives for workers and peasants and allows for bigger differences in emoluments for different categories of people.
There is clearly a direct connection between the two. Maoism is distinguished from the orthodox Soviet-style communism by its passionate, almost religious, commitment to egalitarianism and must by its very nature call for upheavals like the cultural revolution of the ‘sixties because there is no other method of curbing the power of the party and the state bureaucracy in a communist country. Thus those Chinese who look for security and stability will have to repudiate Maoism, even if quietly and tactfully, and they cannot do so unless they encourage a return to the more orthodox approach to development.
But it does not follow that the Sino-Soviet alliance will be or even can be resurrected. It cannot be. All Chinese are deeply nationalistic and they will not accept the second place to the Soviet Union which the revival of the alliance would entail. In the early ‘fifties, the US threat was also a reality. In fact, China was then involved in a war against it in Korea and Gen. McArthur was threatening to bomb installations beyond the Yalu in Manchuria. Now Washington no longer seeks either hegemony in Asia or isolation of China. In the early ‘fifties, the Chinese leaders knew little of the technological assistance they could expect from the West. Today they compare the quality and the prices and invariably conclude that the Soviet Union cannot compete in either with Japan and Western Europe. All in all, when China readjusts its policy after the end of the Mao era, it is likely to adopt a more balanced stance towards the superpowers.
The Times of India, 22 October 1975