There is no lack of evidence to show that since the unsuccessful Hungarian uprising in 1956 at least the United States has more or less been reconciled to the Soviet Union’s pre-eminence in eastern and central Europe. Indeed, it has been open to question whether even in the case of Hungary in 1956 Washington played a significant role in encouraging the revolt. Some broadcasts by the US-controlled Radio Free Europe located in Munich were cited at that time as evidence in support of the charge that the Eisenhower administration was deeply involved. But that was by no means conclusive.
If, however, there was any illusion among US foreign policy makers that the Soviet Union would ever allow its hold in eastern and central Europe to be undermined, its firm action in Hungary finally dispelled it. That is why the United States made no attempt at all in 1961 to stop the construction of the Berlin wall which, as is well known, has been decisive in stopping the “bleeding” of East Germany by way of the flight of hundreds of thousands of trained people year after year, and in enabling it to step up its economic growth. Similarly, Washington was by and large neutral in respect of events in Prague in 1968 so much so that President Johnson wanted to undertake a trip to Moscow within months of its military intervention in Czechoslovakia.
Security
In subsequent years when America’s foreign policy has been dominated by Mr Kissinger, the USA has not done anything which can be said to indicate an interest on its part to upset the status quo in eastern and central Europe. During the Helsinki conference on European security and co-operation, it did not even show much enthusiasm for the so-called third basket whereby America’s West European allies tried to persuade the Kremlin to allow a freer flow of ideas, information and human beings across the frontiers.
On the contrary, Mr Kissinger has not made any secret of his lack of interest in the Soviet Union’s internal developments. He has been more keen to reach agreements with the Kremlin on issues like limiting the development of new strategic nuclear missiles and preventing the spread of nuclear weapons than to embarrass it on questions like the treatment of dissident intellectuals or the right of Jews to emigrate. It is illustrative of his approach that he should have advised President Ford not to receive Mr Solzhenitsyn in the White House.
But so far there has been no candid public statement on how far Washington has been willing to go to respect Moscow’s interests and susceptibilities in respect of eastern Europe. This lack has now been made good by the publication by Mr Rowland Evans and Mr Robert Novak (International Herald Tribune, March 22) of the essence of the secret briefing Mr Helmut Sonnenfeldt, Mr Kissinger’s right-hand man in the state department, gave to US ambassadors in Europe last December.
The briefing is significant in that it elucidates Mr Kissinger’s approach on an extremely vital subject. The timing adds to its significance because it shows that the US Secretary of State has not deviated from the policy of respecting the Soviet Union’s interests in eastern Europe despite the furore over the Kremlin’s alleged support to the Portuguese Communists and its fairly substantial intervention on the side of the MPLA in Angola.
According to the commentators’ version of the transcript, Mr Sonnenfeldt said – Mr Kissinger was present at the briefing – that lacking the attractiveness of past empires, the Kremlin relies “on the presence of sheer Soviet military power” to unify eastern Europe and because “a more viable, organic structure” is lacking, “the desire to break off the Soviet strait- jacket” is strong among the countries concerned.
Loyalty
Mr Sonnenfeldt is saddened rather than gladdened by this. For, he is quoted as having said: “The Soviets’ inability to acquire loyalty in eastern Europe is an unfortunate historic failure because eastern Europe is within their scope and area of natural interest. It is doubly tragic that in this area of natural interest and crucial importance it has not been possible for the Soviet Union to establish roots of interest that go beyond sheer power.”
Mr Sonnenfeldt Is concerned that this “unnatural relationship” may “sooner or later explode causing World War III” and therefore warns that an American attempt to exploit the differences between the Soviet Union and the East European nations might reverse the “desired process” of making the relationship “organic.” And he adds: “It must be our policy to strive for an evolution that makes the relationship between the East European and the Soviet Union an organic one.”
To leave no room for doubt, he recommends to the United States “a policy of responding to the clearly visible aspirations in eastern Europe for a more autonomous existence within the context of a strong Soviet geo-political influence. This has worked in Poland. The Poles have been able to overcome their romantic political inclinations which led to their disasters in the past.”
Mr Sonnenfeldt goes so far as to want the Yugoslavs to be “less obnoxious” to the Kremlin and to be disabused of the impression that “they can have a free ride” guaranteed by the United States.
This statement may perhaps help explain why the Chinese have been so critical of the US policy of detente towards Moscow and why they have been at pains to emphasise that the Soviet Union poses a threat to western Europe. For, it is quite possible that Peking recognised the logic of American policy long before Mr Sonnenfeldt thought it necessary to spell it out on such candid terms.
But be that as it may, there must be a quid pro quo by the Soviet Union. Mr Kissinger acknowledges that there is. In the same article cited above, he is quoted as having said: “The Soviets are not the key element in producing the instabilities (sic) that we now face in western Europe. A communist western Europe would be a headache for us. It would be a headache for the Soviets as well.” He is convinced that the Russians do not want to see Communist parties take over in western Europe though “in the final analysis their ideology requires them to assist in these efforts.”
It should be noted that he gave expression to this assessment despite the widespread charge that Moscow endorsed Mr Cunhal’s bid for power in Lisbon and that it extended financial assistance to his party. At one point last year Mr Kissinger was said to be deeply pessimistic regarding Portugal and threatened to get it excluded from NATO if the Communists seized control.
It is perhaps open to question whether the Kissinger-Sonnenfeldt formulation amounts to a proposal for a super-power condominium in Europe. But there can be no doubt that Mr Kissinger would love to freeze the status quo if he can. Only he might not be there to preside over US foreign policy for long and the situation may be too fluid for him or his successor to control. The European scene will, for instance, undergo a major change if the Italian Communists come to share power with the Christian Democrats or if the Socialist-Communist alliance triumphs, as is only too likely, in the election to the national assembly in France in 1978 and the presidency itself two years later.
Desire
Implicit in the Kissinger model is also the desire to freeze the status quo in other parts of the world and where that is not possible, as in the case of the Israeli occupation of Arab lands or in southern Africa, to ensure that the change is peaceful and orderly.
In the key area of West Asia, events have moved in that direction. Two of these are notable – President Sadat’s decision not only to go in for an interim accord with Israel but also to repudiate the treaty with the Soviet Union and the Iran-Iraq agreement whereby the former has withdrawn support to the Kurdish rebels and the latter accepted the median line in the Shatt-el-Arab estuary as the natural frontier between the two countries.
The first development is important for the West because it ensures the continuance of the truce, however uneasy, in the Arab-Israeli conflict and the second because it has helped pacify the oil-rich Persian Gulf region and reduced the possibilities of Soviet influence growing there. Lebanon has been burning for months. But the Lebanese do not hold the key to the future of West Asia. The prospects in southern Africa are less reassuring for the West where it remains to be seen whether the United States and Britain can force a change in Rhodesia and thereby buy some time for South Africa.
The Times of India, 31 March 1976