One of the leading China watchers in Hong Kong has offered what is apparently the most unlikely explanation of what is happening in that mysterious land. He has written in the February 27 issue of the Far Eastern Economic Review:
“Although a power struggle is in progress in China the fight is not between the men who already have high office. With Mao still able to give orders, such fighting would be no more than (a game of) musical chairs. The battle is against those who tasted power in the storms of 1966 to 1969 or were promoted by Lin Piao and resent the post-1969 frustration of their ambitions. Mao would not tolerate violent repression of the extremists on Soviet lines. They have to be lured into the open; given an opportunity to challenge lawful authority; and then, the government hopes, (be) condemned by the broad masses.”
Precedent
The Sinologist in question has not offered any precedent in support of this view. But it is possible that he has the “Let hundred flowers bloom” campaign of 1956 and 1957 in mind. During that campaign not only members of the Chinese Communist Party but also others, specially those belonging to organisations like the Democratic League which had been allowed to survive in name alter the 1949 revolution, were first encouraged to speak out frankly and then condemned. Indeed on July 1, 1957, the People’s Daily had gone so far as to write:
“Some people will call this scheming, but we say it quite openly. We told the country in advance that before ‘monsters and serpents’ could be wiped out they first had to be brought into the open, and only by letting poisonous weeds show themselves above ground can they be uprooted…. The class struggle is an objective reality which cannot be changed at will. Why have reactionary class enemies enmeshed themselves in the net spread for them?”
Since Chairman Mao is a great exponent and practitioner of the art of guerilla warfare, it is in theory possible that he launched the “let hundred flowers bloom” campaign with the specific objective of bringing disgruntled elements out into the open. The revolt in Hungary in October 1956 could have shaken him and persuaded him to resort to such a stratagem. But in view of subsequent developments it is difficult to accept that this was the whole story. It appears equally likely that in 1957, as subsequently, he was overruled by the less romantic and more pragmatic among his colleagues, who were either genuinely surprised and alarmed at the virulence of the criticism or used it to reverse the decision of the supreme leader and to tighten their own hold on the party. It is true that Chairman Mao was soon afterwards able to launch the “Great leap forward” campaign and discard the Soviet model of development. But he had to do so in a circuitous manner.
While commenting on developments in China, one will be well advised to remember the remarks perhaps by Mr. Fairbanks, the doyen of American Sinologists, that there is no expertise on that country; there are only varying degrees of ignorance. But experts or ignoramuses, most well-known students of Chinese affairs have been generally agreed that Chairman Mao was in a minority in the party politburo in 1959 when the “great leap forward” campaign was put in the reverse gear and he himself was obliged to step down as head of state and in 1965-66 when he initiated the so-called great proletarian cultural revolution largely with the help of the People’s Liberation Army under the control of Marshal Lin Piao and the Red Guards it was able to unleash.
During that upheaval, the Chairman even dropped the pretence that the party leadership was in command. The cultural revolution was managed by a small group handpicked by him and the decimation of the party leadership was its principal objective. And surprising though it may seem, it appears that he might not have gained a majority in the politburo and the central committee when the party began gradually to be revived after 1969 and the representation of the PLA in its principal organs at the centre and in the provinces was slowly reduced after the elimination of Marshal Lin Piao and his supporters in September 1971.
Mr. Teng Hsiao-ping could not have staged the spectacular comeback he did in 1973 with the help of Mr. Chou En-lai if the Chairman had his way. For, while in the past he had permitted the rehabilitation of men who had “reformed” themselves or who had suffered wrongly, there was before 1973 no instance of that kind of return to power at the highest level of leadership. And it is pertinent to recall that Mr. Teng Hsiao-ping had not only been reviled as the second most dangerous “capitalist roader” after President Liu Shao-chi but also invited the personal wrath of Chairman Mao who was quoted as having said during the cultural revolution that the former had treated him like a “dead father”. Mr. Teng had, of course, recanted but only under duress.
Reality
It will clearly be a gross exaggeration to suggest that after the elimination of Marshal Lin Piao in September 1971, Mr. Chou En-lai and other pragmatists successfully placed Chairman Mao on the shelf. The Chairman was certainly active in the field of foreign policy so much so that it is open to question whether Mr. Chou En-lai could have made the opening towards the United States without his approval. But there can be little doubt that along with the military commanders, who had played a key role in clearing up the mess of the cultural revolution and packing off the Red Guards, they were effectively in control.
Sniping against them continued from time to time. But that could not and did not shake their grip on the levers of power. The appointment of Mr. Teng Hsiao-ping first as one of the senior Deputy Prime Ministers in 1973, then as the party’s Vice-Chairman and finally as the Chief of Staff of the Army was itself conclusive evidence of the new power reality in Peking. But as it happens, Mr Teng in turn rehabilitated the former army Chief of Staff, Gen. Lo Ji-ching, last July. This was as significant a move as his own return to power. For Gen. Lo had been dismissed during the cultural revolution because of his emphasis, in direct opposition to the Mao-Lin theory, on the need for a highly professionalised defence establishment and for mending fences with the Soviet Union so that the PLA could regain access to sophisticated hardware and military technology.
It is still difficult to be certain that the meeting of the National People’s Congress was organised last year by Mr. Teng in the knowledge that the Chairman could not or would not attend. But such a charge has now been made and it does not appear wholly incredible. There was then a great deal of speculation on the Chairman’s absence and no satisfactory explanation could be found because in view of the memories of the cultural revolution no commentator on Chinese affairs was willing to envisage the possibility that he was being bypassed once again.
Criticism
Thus even before the People’s Daily disclosed the existence of a split in the central committee on February 17, it was possible to take the view that the radicals headed by Chairman Mao were in a minority in that body and that Mr. Hua Kuo-feng had been appointed acting Prime Minister because he was a compromise candidate. The disclosure can only strengthen such an interpretation. It also appears that a majority of important military commanders, if not all of them, are on the side of the pragmatists. Otherwise, the People’s Daily would not have found it necessary to accuse the alleged unrepentent capitalist-roaders of not respecting the Maoist precept that the party must have command over the gun.
The radicals in a minority in other important organs of the party and the state have apparently been better represented in the mass media for years. They were able to use these to criticise, though only obliquely, Mr. Chou En-lai and his actions. This was fairly evident during the so-called anti-Confucius campaign with its allusions to a royal minister hundreds of years ago who abused his office to smuggle his supporters into the administration. But so long as Mr. Chou was alive, Chairman Mao did not publicly endorse the radical criticism for reasons which are still obscure. The former’s death has removed this restraint. That is one reason why the struggle broke out immediately after his passing away.
But whatever the Chairman’s calculations and compulsions, the present campaign, like the earlier ones, is unlikely to end in the victory of the radicals. All revolutions must settle down with or without a Thermidorean reaction. The Chinese revolution cannot be an exception. Politics cannot get priority over economic development in our era because the explosion of technology calls for higher and higher degrees of expertise and investment.
The Times of India, 10 March 1976