Since March 1959 when India’s friendship with China came under a cloud in the wake of the revolt in Lhasa and the flight of the Dalai Lama and thousands of Tibetans into this country, its relations with the outside world, specially its neighbours, have never been as balanced as they now promise to become in view of the agreement with Peking to exchange ambassadors and with Islamabad to resume full diplomatic relations. This may or may not be a triumph of the concept of bilateralism and the exclusion of interference by the super-powers in the affairs of the region. But there can be no question that it is a tribute to the Indian leadership’s, particularly the Prime Minister’s, far-sightedness and tactical skill.
The process of which we are witnessing a partial consummation began with the Simla summit between Mrs Gandhi and Mr Bhutto in June 1972. There was no dearth then of people in this country who argued that India should neither withdraw from the occupied Pakistani territory nor return the prisoners-of-war except in exchange for a final and formal settlement of the Kashmir issue. Mrs Gandhi rejected this chauvinistic and arrogant advice and took the view that a just peace alone could be durable. She obviously made the assumption that, despite his previous talk of a thousand years of conflict with India and his general waywardness, it was possible to do business with Mr Bhutto and that he was likely to remain in power in Islamabad for quite some time.
Despite the striking changes in the sub-continent in the past two years, it is hardly necessary either to recall the complexity of the task of persuading Sheikh Mujibur Rahman to give up his just demand for the trial of Pakistani POWs guilty of crimes against humanity, or to underscore the self-evident proposition that any attempt on this country’s part to follow in the footsteps of Israel in respect of the occupied territory would have led to its isolation in the international community. Even the Soviet Union would have found it difficult to stand by it.
Bona Fides
As it happened, India’s decision to withdraw from the occupied Pakistani territory and its efforts to do all in its power to avoid the trial of Pakistani POWs by Bangladesh helped convince to a considerable extent a number of leaders abroad of this country’s bona fides. The Shah of Iran was one such leader. This point is significant partly because India could not have befriended Iran if the Shah had not been convinced that it sincerely wished to live in peace with Pakistan and partly because in the absence of friendly ties with Teheran, New Delhi would have been greatly handicapped in some of its other diplomatic initiatives.
It will factually be inaccurate to suggest that in 1972 itself the Shah of Iran was wholly reassured regarding India’s intentions towards Pakistan and, indeed, in the region, including the Persian Gulf. For instance, he gave expression to his suspicions and fears in his oft-quoted interview to Mr. Sulzberger of The New York Times almost a year after the Simla summit. But the Indian stance towards Pakistan had made an impact on him, with the result that when the then Minister of External Affairs, Mr Swaran Singh, visited Teheran in July 1973, he was more than willing to listen and be convinced.
No one outside the small and not very communicative circle of the Prime Minister’s advisers can be sure of the calculations which persuaded her to send Mr Swaran Singh to Teheran at that stage. In plain terms, it is not possible for us to say with any assurance whether she made the move wholly in the context of India’s relations with Pakistan or whether she was guided by larger considerations. But in view of the Arab-Israeli war the following October resulting, among other things, in the four-fold rise in oil prices, the role Iran played in raising the oil prices, the leverage the boost in oil revenues gave it in the international community, the importance China came to attach to it in its bid to contain Soviet influence in the region and the speed at which the Shah has equipped his armed forces with the most sophisticated weapon systems available anywhere, the initiative was clearly extremely well timed.
Desirable
In the new context created by the rise in oil prices and India’s needs to secure, on the one hand, credit on reasonable terms to cover at least partly the additional payments burden and, on the other, access to the rapidly growing Iranian market for its products, friendship with Iran is highly desirable in purely bilateral terms. But to assess it in those terms would be to underestimate seriously its true import. The Shah has not only withheld weapons from Pakistan which he could have transferred to it and used his considerable influence with Mr Bhutto to persuade him to seek accommodation with India but also helped dispose of the baseless charge that New Delhi serves interests other than its own.
Needless to say, Indo-Iranian friendship would not have been possible if it served only New Delhi’s interests and not Teheran’s as well. Indeed, the Shah responded to Mrs Gandhi’s gesture in sending Mr Swaran Singh to Teheran with alacrity because he was looking for an independent role for his country, independent that is of the United States, and he recognised that he needed India’s understanding and, if possible, endorsement of his aspirations in this regard. But that is how friendly relations generally develop between any two countries.
In this connection, it may perhaps be useful to recall that the Indian leadership showed considerable perspicacity in 1973 and 1974 in steering clear of the Iranian-Iraqi dispute and in cultivating both countries simultaneously. Again, there was no lack of people in New Delhi who took an ideological view of the matter. Thus those who were inclined to take an anti- Soviet line wanted India to side with Teheran, and those who were ill-disposed towards the United States wanted it to lean towards Baghdad. Fortunately, the leadership did not oblige either group, with the result that when the Iranians and the Iraqis decided to bury the hatchet last year, it could sincerely welcome it as a contribution not only to peace and stability in the region but also to the independence of all countries in it.
But in spite of these achievements – the Simla agreement with Pakistan, the release of the Pakistani POWs with the consent of Bangladesh, the breakthrough in the relations with Iran and the development of a new level of understanding with Iraq – India’s international relations would have continued to lack balance if New Delhi had failed either to sort out whatever problems existed between it and its smaller neighbours, that is Nepal, Sri Lanka and Burma, or to begin the process whereby it may be possible one day to restore a level of understanding, if not of warmth, in its ties with China. It has done both and won for itself a kind of respect which it has not enjoyed since the military debacle in NEFA in 1962. India was, of course, widely hailed as a major regional power in the wake of its victory over Pakistan and the consequent liberation of Bangladesh in December 1971. But that was an altogether different kind of recognition.
Even Mrs Gandhi’s detractors abroad have been impressed by the statesmanlike attitude she adopted towards Pakistan within months of India’s military victory, the smooth manner in which she has demarcated her country’s boundaries with Burma, settled the Kachativu issue with Sri Lanka by conceding the island to it, demarcated the continental shelf with Indonesia and Sri Lanka, secured Peking’s agreement to an upgrading of the diplomatic representations in the two capitals and finally made a package deal with Mr Bhutto on resumption of overflights, goods and passenger railway traffic and full diplomatic relations.
No Devaluation
Mrs Gandhi still needs an agreement with Bangladesh on Farakka before she can claim that she has licked the foreign policy problems she had inherited. But that depends, above all, on the emergence of a stable government in Dacca which feels strong enough to defy the traditionally anti-India and communal elements whose raison d’être is the hatred of this country. Hopefully, it should be possible to look forward to Gen. Ziaur Rahman consolidating his authority and establishing co-operation with India without which Bangladesh cannot possibly prosper.
It will clearly be wrong to exaggerate the importance of the agreement to exchange ambassadors with Peking, specially in the context of the present uncertainty there. But it should not be unnecessarily devalued either. The Chinese do not raise or downgrade their representations in a casual manner and it is just possible that they are as interested in a measure of understanding and even cordiality with India as we are on our side.
The Times of India, 19 May 1976