It is legitimate to assume that Mr. Brezhnev has made significant ideological concessions to “nationalist” communists at the recent conference of European communist parties in Berlin and that he has been guided by a host of considerations. For no simple or straightforward explanation of what has happened is really convincing.
Thus, while it is true that having worked for it for two years, Mr. Brezhnev could not have abandoned the idea of a conference without some loss of face, he could have easily secured its postponement. Indeed, that should have been his natural choice if he was convinced of what the Soviet media have been saying about the increasing gravity of the crisis of capitalism. For, in that event he would have only to wait before the deepening crisis sharpened the contradictions between the West European communists and the others and compelled them to look up to Moscow for support, if not guidance.
Similarly, even if the Kremlin regarded the Berlin summit as a necessary step towards the larger objective of a world communist conference where it could be assured of the support of the vast majority of communist parties which depended on it for their very survival, it did not make sense for it to yield in advance to nationalist pressures to the detriment of “proletarian internationalism”. After all, it could be interested in a world communist conference only if such a gathering was likely to promote its pre-eminence in the international movement.
Unconvincing
A world communist conference can be of little interest to the Kremlin once it has given up the concept of “proletarian internationalism” which has been the very basis of its pre-eminence in the international communist movement. It is unconvincing to argue that it can recover at a larger gathering the ground it has yielded in Berlin. For, what is there to prevent the Italians, the Yugoslavs and the Rumanians either from threatening to boycott it in case their viewpoint is not conceded once again in advance or from digging in their toes at the conference itself?
As opposed to the above propositions that the Kremlin had no choice but to go ahead with the Berlin conference and that it hopes to make good its losses at a subsequent larger gathering, there may be a stronger case for the view that the Soviet leaders have decided to make the best of a difficult situation. Since there is nothing they can do to prevent the assertion of independence not only by the Yugoslavs but also by the Italian, French and Spanish communists, they might have concluded that it was more in the Soviet Union’s long-term interest to persuade them to accept (in Belgrade’s case) and maintain (in the other cases) their membership of the international movement on whatever terms than to let them drift out of it.
This is doubtless a sound contention provided, of course, the Soviet leaders are confident that they can insulate Eastern and Central European states in the Comecon and the Warsaw Pact from the impact of their concessions to the West European parties. Perhaps they are so assured. But as a rule communists do not think in compartments; they take an integrated view of the world scene. Even as it is the efforts of the Soviet Union to step up the integration of East European economies with its own have not been sufficiently successful to reassure its leadership. Indeed, it cannot but be concerned over the desire of almost all its East European allies to seek access to West European technology, markets and capital in order to modernise their economies and fulfil the aspirations of their peoples for higher living standards.
Aspect
The proposition has, however, another aspect which might well have been decisive. The Soviet leaders could well have made concessions to the West Europeans out of the fear that otherwise they might in course of time make common cause with the Chinese. This apprehension is not as misplaced as it might appear in view of the puritanism and extremism of the Chinese radicals. The Chinese, the radicals among them as well the moderates, are interested above all in weakening the Soviet Union’s position in the world and in the international communist movement and they will come to terms with anyone who is similarly inclined. While they could not, for example, have approved of Mr. Dubcek’s policies which, by their standards, were wholly “revisionist”, they strongly opposed Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia which was at least partly intended to restore orthodox theories and practices.
This has, of course, not been the Chinese leaders’ approach always. In the ’fifties they conducted a virulent campaign against the Yugoslav and Italian brands of ‘revisionism’ and in 1956 they fully endorsed the Soviet intervention in Hungary. But that was a long time ago. In recent years they have taken the public position that nothing like a world communist movement exists and that every party is completely free to shape its policies. They doubtless still talk not in terms of national interests but in those of the Marxist-Leninist ideology. But the ideological facade is pretty thin as far as their dealings with foreign powers and parties is concerned. Their own actions are determined largely by their perception of their national interests and they respect all those who are guided by similar considerations. In the present context this means that they would be only too glad to receive Mr. Berlinguer and Mr. Marchais in Peking if they come to be estranged from the Soviet Union.
By and large commentators have so far discussed the Soviet concessions in Berlin in the framework of the communist movement. This is understandable inasmuch as these represent a major break not only with the Stalinist past when Moscow was the unquestioned headquarters of the movement but also with the more recent one when Mr. Brezhnev and his colleagues interpreted the concept of “proletarian internationalism” as being synonymous with that of the primacy of the Soviet Union and regarded it obligatory for all communist parties to endorse their policies and actions, both at home and abroad. But can the Soviet approach towards communist parties, specially in Western Europe, be divorced from the compulsions of the larger policy of detente with the West?
To pose this question is, in a sense, to answer it. The two policies cannot be separated from each other. Thus if the Kremlin is interested, as it doubtless is, in preserving its detente with the West, it cannot but concede to the West European communists the right to manage their own affairs. The West has for years regarded the Soviet attitude towards Yugoslavia as a test case and its concern and vigilance have sharply increased in recent years in view of Marshal Tito’s advanced age.
Italy’s case is different from Yugoslavia’s because the communist party is not yet in power there, and in the foreseeable future it can at best hope to be a partner in the ruling coalition. But the sharp increase in the party’s vote has created a delicate situation not only for the Americans but also for the Russians, for the former because it represents a threat to the existing status quo in NATO and for the latter because the slightest suggestion of a desire on their part to subordinate the Italian Communist Party to their will is bound to be seen in the West as an attempt on their part to undermine NATO and the Western alliance system.
Absurd
The issue has been confused as much by the ideologues in the Soviet Union as by the hawks in the West. Their propaganda statements complement and reinforce each other. While the former argue that detente does not involve any relaxation in the ideological struggle, the latter contend that detente is a one-way street – a proposition that Soviet leadership cannot counter if what its own ideologues have been saying is taken at its face value. But both these stances are absurd. Detente is not a one-way street, for the West benefits as much from it as the Soviet Union.
Much has been made in the West of Portugal and Angola. But while it is open to question whether Soviet assistance to the Portuguese communists antedated Western assistance to their opponents, it is widely accepted now that the former was on a much smaller scale than the latter. As for Angola, it was as much outside the US sphere of influence as it was out of Russia’s and even there Washington’s covert intervention on the side of UNITA and FLNA preceded the Soviet-Cuban assistance to MPLA.
Not all Soviet leaders may be equally enthusiastic about detente with the West. But there is a broad consensus in its favour and the compulsions to adhere to the present policy are pretty strong. This means that the Kremlin must respect the other side’s susceptibilities, specially in Western Europe. A recognition of the independence of communist parties there is one way to demonstrate such respect.
The Times of India, 14 July 1976