It will be a gross exaggeration to say that President Carter’s visit to New Delhi has been a fiasco. But it has not been a glorious success either. Mr. Morarji Desai did not invite him, and he did not accept the invitation, in the expectation of resolving the basic differences between the two governments on the issue of international inspection of nuclear facilities that this country is trying to establish entirely on its own. As such it will clearly be wrong to assess the visit solely in that context or to attach too much importance to Mr. Carter’s off-the-cuff remark to his secretary of state that “when we get back, I think we ought to write him (Mr. Desai) another letter, just cold and very blunt”. Even so it cannot be denied that if the visit has not led to a sharpening of the differences, it has put them into sharper focus – a result neither side could have either wished for or anticipated when the trip was planned. Thus New Delhi cannot now pretend that Mr. Desai’s unilateral commitment to forgo all nuclear tests for peaceful purposes has made much of an impression on the Carter administration in practical terms; that is in terms of its willingness to abide by its commitment to supply enriched uranium for the Tarapur plant on a long-term basis. Similarly, Washington cannot be under any illusion that Mr. Desai’s concept of “genuine non-alignment” includes a willingness on his part to place all of India’s nuclear facilities under international inspection. This is in a sense a healthy development in that it may end, hopefully, the silly talk of a “new chapter” in Indo-US relations. But surely Mr. Carter did not undertake the trip to New Delhi to impart realism to the thinking of the Janata party leaders.
It may or may not be correct to interpret Mr. Carters’ “just cold and very blunt” remark as an indication that he and Mr. Desai have not hit it off too well in their first face-to-face encounter, the lengthy and friendly correspondence between them notwithstanding. But it will not be surprising if this has been the case. For neither of them can be said to be particularly adept in blurring issues, which was perhaps the best that was possible in the present case. This, of course, would not have mattered all that much if the two leaders had discovered other large enough areas of possible cooperation between the two countries. It is doubtful that they have or, indeed, that they have even tried. The brevity of the so-called “Delhi declaration” with its exclusive emphasis on principles – it does not refer to any specific area of cooperation at all – speaks for itself. This shows as clearly as any public document can that the discussions between Mr. Carter and Mr. Desai have been perfunctory and that neither knows nor has tried to find out what he can expect from the other. The US President’s main speech in New Delhi – his address to the Indian Parliament – strengthens the impression that he, on his part, had little to offer.