Anti-Shah riots have broken out in Iran for the fourth time this year. The occasion has been the fortieth day of the death of a number of persons in the previous clashes with the police. As earlier, the most seriously affected cities have been the Shia religious centre of Qom, the capital of Azerbaijan, Tabriz, and Teheran itself. The estimates of those killed last time varied between 10 (official) to 200 to 300 (opposition) and the same story is being repeated once again. But whatever the number of casualties, there cannot be the slightest doubt that opposition to the regime has assumed serious proportions so much so that thousands of people are prepared to risk death. The all pervasive presence of the Savak, the secret intelligence service which is not above resorting to torture to break its victims, is apparently no longer able to terrorize them into silence. The authorities have claimed that only a few thousand people are involved in the opposition to the Shah and that their ‘calmness’ “has been misunderstood by the saboteurs who have concluded that the government’s patience is unlimited”. This is so much nonsense. A few thousand isolated individuals cannot stir up trouble in places as far away from one another as Tabriz and Qom and hundreds of troops armed with sub-machine guns do not have to surround the ancient bazaar in Teheran to cope with a small number of opponents. As a result of the exposure of cases of torture on the one hand and pressure on the Shah, especially from his Western friends, on the other, the regime might have become a little more careful in its treatment of its opponents. But essentially, the set-up in Teheran remains repressive and cannot legitimately claim that its tolerance has encouraged the present opposition.
As in the past, the government has taken the stand that religious bigots and Marxist communists have formed an alliance against the Shah’s progressive policies. This theory can no longer be dismissed as easily as it could be before, though it may be somewhat far-fetched to see a connection between developments in Iran and the recent coup in Afghanistan. But whatever the truth, it cannot absolve the Shah of his share of responsibility for the unrest. He has ruled the country in an autocratic manner, he has relied heavily on the Savak for dealing with friends and foes alike and he has squandered billions of dollars on buying arms which are superfluous for dealing with small neighbours and useless in dealing with the Soviet Union. Above all, he has pursued an economic policy which has produced runaway inflation, aggravated shortages and made life for the relatively poor, especially in the countryside, harsher than before. He may have meant well by his people. But he has failed to carry them with him. This has been as true of the illiterate people under the influence of the imams as of the educated ones, the latter point being evident from the hostile demonstrations he has faced from Iranian students abroad. The chances are that as a result of the present turmoil he will tighten the screws further. But he will be ill-advised to do so. He can at best succeed once again in driving the dissent underground but at the risk of alienating the people further. Liberalisation, too, it must be conceded, involves some risks. But these may turn out to be smaller than those resorting to terror is bound to produce.