The Prime Minister can claim some credit for the US House International Relations Committee’s decision to approve the administration’s move to supply 7.6 tonnes of enriched uranium to this country for Tarapur, some because it is by no means certain that the committee would in the final analysis have acted differently in case Mr. Morarji Desai had not gone to Washington. But leaving that aside, the decision should be welcomed only to the extent that it has helped postpone a virtual crisis in the relations between the two countries. It has not averted the crisis because it has not ensured continued supply of the nuclear fuel to India by the United States in terms of Washington’s contractual obligations under the existing agreements.
On the contrary, despite President Carter’s vague assurance, the chances are that the proposed 7.6-tonne consignment may be the last unless either the US administration and influential members of the Congress revise their views as result of rebuffs their country might suffer elsewhere or the government of India for some unknown reason agrees to sign on the dotted line and accept the so-called full-scope safeguards. So long as Mr. Desai is the Prime Minister, the second possibility can safely be ruled out. He is not the kind of leader who can be blackmailed into surrender. The first possibility, too, is not likely to materialize. For even under the pressure of events, the United States will not easily review its stand because it haunted by the fear that, unless it acts firmly now, Brazil and Argentina might develop nuclear weapons. Thus the possibility of a major conflict between the United States and India on the question of the supply of enriched uranium the remain fairly serious.
This is not to write off the Prime Minister’s trip as an exercise in futility but to place it in a proper perspective. Indeed, Mr. Desai himself did not undertake the visit in the hope of finding a satisfactory solution to the enriched uranium issue. He perhaps expected to explore other areas of possible cooperation with that country. In that regard, he has met with a limited measure of success. If the United States does begin to grant four-year visas to Indian students, they will be saved a lot of harassment to which they are now exposed if for some reason they come home before finishing their studies. Similarly, it may be possible for India to step up its exports to America if the retired businessman the latter proposes to post in New Delhi is able and willing to provide sound advice. But the importance of these agreements must not be exaggerated. Three points may be made briefly in this connection. First, essentially the United States does not have much to offer to this country and this country does not need much from it Secondly, if in coming years the international scene comes to be dominated, as appears likely, by fierce competition between the two super-powers, the scope for Indo-US cooperation in the larger sense of the term is bound to be fairly limited. Finally, the bitterness of the infighting in the Janata Party during Mr. Desai’s absence provides yet another indication that for some years this country will be too preoccupied with domestic problems to be in a position to play an active role abroad. As it happens, the United States has just about overcome the defeat in Vietnam and is getting ready for pursuing an activist foreign policy.