It is difficult to be sure whether or not the Chinese are back at the old game of trying to mobilize Indian public opinion in their favour without conceding anything in return. The statement made by the vice-president of the Chinese National People’s Congress, Mr. Ulan Fu, to the visiting Indian journalists can admit of either interpretation. While those inclined to take an optimistic view of Peking’s intentions towards this country can interpret it to mean that it has indeed decided to defer to the Indian government’s desire to settle the border dispute, the others can fairly effectively argue the opposite case. They can point out that if the Chinese had meant business and not propaganda, they would in all probability have used the normal diplomatic channels and a delegation of journalists who, though selected by the ministry of external affairs, cannot claim to speak in its behalf, and that even if for some reason they had decided to make a public declaration of their willingness to settle the border issue, they would have spoken through the foreign minister and not Mr. Ulan Fu who holds no executive responsibility. But these arguments are not incontrovertible. For, it is only well known that Peking used an invitation to a US ping-pong team in 1970 to signal a change in its policy towards that country. Indeed, an overall view of the international scene – especially the sharp increase in Soviet influence in Africa, the coup in Afghanistan, the growth of opposition to the Shah in Iran, the disarray in Pakistan, the inability of the United States to help break the stalemate between Israel and Egypt, the sharp deterioration in Sino-Vietnam relations and the re-emergence of Mrs. Gandhi in India – would suggest that the Chinese have reasons to be concerned and seek a settlement of the border dispute with India quickly so that the Janata government does not feel obliged to maintain the old close ties with the Soviet Union.
Thus New Delhi can neither welcome Mr. Ulan Fu’s reported statement as a possible breakthrough nor reject it as nothing more than a propaganda effort. While still pursuing a cautious approach, it is obliged to undertake a probe of Chinese intentions. To begin with, it must find out through diplomatic channels whether Mr. Ulan Fu’s observation represents official policy, that is, whether the Chinese leadership is ready to open negotiations, not with the intention of stalling the issue for years and decades but with the intention of settling it expeditiously. If it is found that this is, indeed, the case, New Delhi would perhaps be well advised to seek a solution at the highest political level as Mr. Chou En-lai proposed in April 1960 and not to get bogged down in official-level talks which can prove highly frustrating. If they are serious, the Chinese can be quite reasonable, as is evident from their successful negotiations with Burma, Nepal and Outer Mongolia in the past. And they are past masters in the art of prolonging talks for years if they are not interested in a settlement as they have been doing in the case of the Soviet Union. In the first case, the Janata government, too, will need to demonstrate a measure of flexibility. It cannot allow itself to be bound by the famous parliamentary resolution of 1962 and hope to reach an accord. The formula Mr. Chou En-lai was said to have proposed in 1960 may still serve has a good basis for negotiations and settlement.