No one interested in Maharashtra politics can be surprised over the latest turn of events in the state. Mr. Y.B. Chavan, once the dominant figure in the stale Congress, and his still faithful lieutenants headed by Mr. Sharad Pawar, had been less than enthusiastic about the coalition with the Congress (I) from the very start. And they had been thoroughly opposed to moves to bring about some form of “unity” between the two Congress parties by, among others, Mr. Vasantrao Patil. For months there had been rumours from time to time that a number of Congress legislators were about to withdraw support to the ministry and enter into an arrangement with the Janata to set up an alternative government. Indeed, on June 9, the leader of the state Janata legislature party, Mr. Uttamrao Patil, had offered Congress legislators led by Mr. Pawar a choice between a coalition government with the Janata or the Janata’s support for a minority government formed by them, and on June 19 at a meeting of the Congress Working Committee Mr. Vasantdada Patil had offered to resign on the ground that 40 party legislators had issued a statement threatening to withdraw their support to him.
In view of Mrs. Indira Gandhi’s past performance, especially during the emergency, and her deliberate decision to split the Congress for the second time last January, it is easy to understand Mr. Chavan’s and Mr. Pawar’s opposition to the coalition government in Maharashtra and the so-called “unity” talks. But the coalition ministry was formed with the approval of the party’s Working Committee and the advocates of “unity” with the Congress (I) have had its permission to continue their efforts, however misguided. The committee had fixed July 10 as the deadline for those talks and, as far as Mr. Vasantrao Patil is concerned, he had withdrawn from them well before that date. It follows that Mr. Chavan and Mr. Pawar should have sought and secured the approval of the Working Committee before they look the present step to bring down the coalition government. By failing to do so, they have struck a body blow at whatever is left of that once great organisation. Mr. Chavan will perhaps take the stand that he is not responsible for the move by Mr. Pawar and other legislators to bring down the state government. And Mr. Pawar will doubtless produce an “explanation” for his action. But neither Mr. Chavan’s plea of innocence nor Mr. Pawar’s justification is likely to convince anyone.
It can be argued on Mr. Chavan’s behalf that his behavior is no worse than Mrs. Gandhi’s. Indeed, it is not. The former Prime Minister is often guided by considerations of expediency. But for Mr. Chavan’s supporters to say that he, too, serves no nobler ideal is to condemn him. Moreover, Mrs. Gandhi is at least a shrewd tactician and more often than not her brazen moves pay off. Thus she retained the support of a vast majority of party legislators in Parliament and most state vidhan sabhas when she split the Congress in 1969 and she was able to win landslide victories in Karnataka, Andhra and the Vidarbha region of Maharashtra in the wake of the second split in the party earlier this year. But can the same thing be said of Mr. Chavan? He miscalculated when he decided to oppose her at the famous Bangalore session of the AICC in 1969 on the issue of the selection of the party nominee for the presidency; he miscalculated when after a period of wavering he returned to her fold after her candidate, Mr. V.V. Giri, had been elected President of the Republic and he may have miscalculated once again. He has lent a measure of credibility to Mrs. Gandhi’s charge that he and some other Congress leaders have been in touch with the Janata leadership. He has ensured that she and her party are alone seen to be in opposition to the Janata, and thereby perhaps rendered an invaluable service to her. The Congress in the state may not find it easy to survive the embrace of the Janata for the obvious reason that there is little to distinguish the two parties and the Janata is much bigger. The latter is also running a serious risk since the coalition with the Chavan-Pawar faction cannot but affect the power balance within it between its constituents. But that is a different matter. More pertinently in the present context, what if a sufficiently large number of members of the Congress Working Committee take strong exception to the moves in Maharashtra and indict Mr. Pawar and his colleagues? Equally pertinently, can it have any claim to the respect of the rank and file if it acquiesces in so gross a disregard for it? Perhaps Mr. Chavan has taken all these risks because he is convinced that there is no other way to hold Mrs. Gandhi. But in that case he should have at least put it to his colleagues in the Working Committee and tried to carry them with him.