On the face of it, it may appear unduly alarmist to take the view that the West is about to revert to the Pakistan policy which Sir Olaf Caroe had so forcefully and forthrightly expounded in the late ‘forties whereby he had left Mr Nehru in no doubt that Karachi would have preference over New Delhi in the proposed West-sponsored arrangement in the region even if the latter was willing to join it and give up his concept of non-alignment. But a close scrutiny will show that this possibility cannot be ruled out altogether, though it is obvious enough that history seldom repeats itself.
The United States moved towards a decision to arm Pakistan in the early ‘fifties when Mr Mossadeq was successfully undermining the position of the Shah, threatening British oil interests and beginning to tilt towards the Soviet Union. The CIA managed to overthrow Mr Mossadeq and restore the Shah to the peacock throne in 1953. But Washington continued to regard Pakistan as the main bulwark against the Soviet Union and therefore undertook to arm it.
Valuable ally
President Johnson apparently acted in a huff when he cut off military supplies to Pakistan – and India which was not so dependent on US supplies – at the time of the Indo-Pakistan war in 1965. But the decision in respect of Islamabad conformed to America’s perception of its interests then on several counts. Pakistan was not any more indispensable to US purposes in the Persian Gulf area in view of Iran’s stability – the Shah had defeated the mullahs in 1963 – and the Soviet failure to make any significant advance in Afghanistan. India was a valuable ally, though an undeclared one, in the common struggle against China which Washington then took extremely seriously in view of the rapidly growing US involvement in the war in Vietnam and the firm US conviction that if Saigon fell to the communists the whole of south-east Asia would follow.
President Nixon was clearly prejudiced against India and favourably disposed towards Pakistan on account of his memories of the cold war period. Hence the tilt towards Islamabad in 1971. But his principal foreign policy aide, Mr Henry Kissinger, saw the need for and the advantage of Indo-Iranian friendship soon afterwards and began promoting it after 1972. Mrs. Gandhi could respond to these proddings and friendly noises coming out of Teheran because in the existing situation friendship with Iran did not involve hostility of any kind towards the Soviet Union which itself was trying to cultivate the Shah.
The US perception must now be different. The Soviet Union looms larger than ever before as a threat to the main source of the West’s and Japan’s oil supplies – the Gulf area. Iran is once again unstable, though the Shah may well survive. China has not only ceased to be a threat but has for all practical purposes become NATO’s “Asian ally.” The first two developments – the rise in Soviet influence in Afghanistan and the turmoil in Iran – increase Pakistan’s importance for the United States and the third – China’s indirect alliance with the West decreases India’s.
Pertinent point
Thus it seems to me that the United States might decide to help rearm Pakistan, though it cannot ignore the fact of the internal crisis in the latter country. Unlike from 1954 to 1965, it is not likely to provide Islamabad military hardware free of cost. Instead it may encourage friendly countries like Saudi Arabia to continue to pick up the bills on Pakistan’s behalf. But that is a relatively small matter. The pertinent point is that a significant change in American policy may well be on the cards. At least New Delhi cannot ignore this possibility.
In the past at least many influential Americans and Westerners have believed that only the armed forces can hold Pakistan together and that the Soviet Union would be the main beneficiary from Pakistan’s break-up. Mr Kissinger stated this proposition explicitly at the high-level discussions in Washington at the time of the Indo-Pakistan war in 1971 and it was to compel New Delhi to give up its alleged plan to move into West Pakistan in order to cripple Pakistan’s military machine that Washington sent a formidable task force of the Seventh Fleet into the Bay of Bengal. In Mr Kissinger’s view, the decimation of the Pakistani armed forces would have meant the end of Pakistan as one political entity. I believe that this view survives and that it has been strengthened by Mr Bhutto’s failure to work the democratic system in a democratic manner.
Thus it seems possible that the Indian policy-makers may face in the not too distant a future a situation tougher than the one Mr Nehru faced. Mr Nehru was, in a manner of speaking, on the right side of history. For a strong anti-Western tide was sweeping through the whole of Asia in the ‘fifties. He was thus assured of the support of Col Nasser (Egypt), Dr Sukarno (Indonesia) and U Nu (Burma). In retrospect it is evident that the Chinese had reservations about him and his policy. But up to 1959 they, too, found it useful to appear to be friendly towards him.
Today, the anti-Western sentiment is not strong in any major Asian country. President Sadat, for example, is a virtual ally of the United States and so is President Suharto of Indonesia. President Ne Win has shut Burma to the rest of the world, as it were. Even countries like Syria and Iraq, which depend heavily on Soviet military supplies, do not wish to alienate the West. Iraq is in fact busy expanding its economic ties with the West. And the trend in that direction is bound to be strengthened if President Carter is able to sustain his truly remarkable success in securing President Sadat’s and the Israeli Prime Minister, Mr Begin’s acceptance of the framework of peace which he and his aides have produced. It will doubtless be an altogether different situation if the effort collapses. But it is somewhat early to discuss that possibility.
Clearly the government cannot oblige the CPI and its supporters and interpret the policy of non-alignment in anti-Western terms. But equally clearly it cannot afford to whittle down its friendship with the Soviet Union because, as in the ‘fifties and the ‘sixties, it may well need the support of the latter in order to cope with an uncertain future. As I see things, a rearmed Pakistan is bound to try to revive the Kashmir issue if it comes to possess a reasonably stable and strong military regime – I cannot think of another kind of set-up emerging in Islamabad. General Zia-ul-Haq clearly does not fill the bill. But another General, Brigadier or Colonel can replace him.
A great deal has been said and written about Indo-Pakistan relations in recent months. Much of it has ignored the starkly simple twin facts that the dominant ruling elite in that country cannot possibly define its identity except in religious terms, a euphemism for anti-Hindu terms, and that it must activate the Kashmir dispute in an attempt to restore among the people the sense of élan which defeat at India’s hands in 1971 undermined.
Pakistan’s dilemma
In plain terms, Pakistan must move either towards becoming a loose confederation or conflict with India. In the context of a strong, stable and rapidly modernising Iran and Indo-Iranian friendship favoured by the West and at least acquiesced in by the Soviet Union, the first possibility appeared more likely to materialise. In the new context of turbulence in Iran or an Iran held down by the Shah by brute force and the likely shift in the West’s policy towards Pakistan, the second possibility cannot at all be dismissed.
As far as I am aware, not one of the participants in the debate on India-China relations has shown awareness of any link between these ties and the developments in Iran and their likely impact on Indo-Pakistan relations. Perhaps I am over-emphasising this link. But as I see it, normalisation of relations with China was a practical proposition for this country from the middle of 1973 when Indo-Iranian ties took a dramatic turn for the better to the end of 1977 when the Shah still appeared invulnerable and Iran well set on the road to modernisation. For in that framework China could not hope to bolster Pakistan as India’s rival in South Asia. It follows that in my view the turmoil in Iran leading to an improvement in Pakistan’s importance in Western eyes is likely to encourage Peking to return to its old approach, that is, of helping Pakistan keep the Kashmir issue alive and preventing India from gaining and retaining due status in the region. This is the crux of the matter and not the border dispute, though obviously the importance of a border settlement, if it can somehow be arranged, cannot be and should not be minimised.
Barriers
Since the history of India-China relations is a fairly complicated one, the temptation to explain it in terms of one or two dominant themes should be resisted. But it should be reasonably clear that there is a ceiling on India-China ties which is pretty low in terms of both friendship and hostility. They can neither help each other nor hurt each other in any big way, the first because of cultural, linguistic and geographical barriers, the non-complementary nature of their economies, the differences in their national interests and therefore attitudes towards Moscow and the second because of geographical barriers. Even in boosting Pakistan, China can at best play second fiddle to the West. It can train and equip Naga and Mizo rebels. But India can cope with that problem, as it has all these years, especially if Bangladesh is reasonably helpful. The possible gains from an understanding with Peking, too, must, therefore, be rather limited unless, of course, it can be persuaded not to help rearm Pakistan and encourage Islamabad to become intransigent once again towards this country. On the face of it, that does not appear to be a practical proposition.
(Concluded)
The Times of India, 21 September 1978