The Union cabinet appears to have given Mr. Atal Behari Vajpayee a brief which is flexible enough to permit him to engage in wide-ranging discussions with his Chinese hosts in Peking and not tie himself down to topics of direct mutual interest, especially the border. This is as it should be. Mr. Vajpayee’s is to be an exploratory mission and it would have made no sense for him to undertake it if he was to be given a restricted brief. Some Union ministers – Mr George Fernandes and Mr Rabi Ray – and Janata party leaders – Mr Madhu Limaye and Mr Raj Narain – have expressed reservations regarding the timing and even the desirability of the visit. But that is a different proposition. For there is scope for bona fide differences of opinion on this and related issues. The pertinent point in the present context is that if Mr. Vajpayee has to open what may qualify for being described as a dialogue with the Chinese leaders, he just cannot afford to behave as if the border issue is all that matters to India or that an amicable and mutually acceptable solution of this problem alone will ensure friendly relations between the two countries. Such an approach can at best freeze the relations at the present unsatisfactory level and at worst harm them considerably.
If, however, we face one kind of danger if we focus our attention solely on the border problem, we risk buying the Chinese view of the world if we seek to engage in wide-ranging discussions with them. The danger arises on two counts. Many of us, including those who make this country’s foreign policy, have reservations regarding certain Soviet actions like the introduction of Cuban troops into Angola and Ethiopia and we are seriously concerned over certain developments like the communist coup in Afghanistan which we fear might lead to an extension of Soviet influence in the region of immediate and direct interest to us. Indian policy makers do not as a rule admit this to be the case because they are afraid that this will expose them to the charge of being pro-West, especially pro-US, and anti-Soviet, but that cannot alter the reality. This raises several questions. In the present context, the pertinent point to emphasise is that there is a measure of sympathy in New Delhi for the Chinese assessment regarding the nature of the alleged Soviet threat to the peace, stability and independence of other countries.
We also risk buying the Chinese world view because there is a strong tendency among us to play down differences as if it is bad manners to bring them out into the open and to look for so-called areas of agreement as if failure to find such areas is some kind of a moral lapse on our part. We behaved like that towards China in the early ‘fifties when we came to emphasise our differences with the United States in search for an area of agreement with it. And we can behave like that again, this time underscoring our reservations regarding Russians in the unstated conviction that this will endear us to the Chinese and persuade the latter to settle the border issue more or less on our terms. It is self-evident that Mr Vajpayee must avoid this pitfall if he is to win the respect of Chinese leaders and establish a basis for genuine understanding which is different from condescension which the Chinese often show towards other peoples. But in the process he must not fall into the opposite trap. He must not feel called upon to defend all Soviet policies. India needs and must continue to seek Soviet friendship. But India has not been and must not become an apologist for the Soviet Union. The CPI and its supporters will not appreciate this point because they do not wish to recognise that even if certain Soviet moves and policies suit us because they help contain Western, particularly US, influence, we cannot be interested in the promotion of Soviet influence to the point where the West is excluded from any region, including our own. This is what the policy of non-alignment must mean in the given situation when most developing countries and the Third World as a whole are not capable of asserting their independence in a positive way. In logical terms, our approach, which we have labelled bilateralism, is not feasible. For, it does not make sense for us to expect a greater power to be sensitive to our wider interests unless we show a similar sensitivity to its interests. But these things do not move that way. India is a big enough country to be in a position to pursue that line.
However these propositions apart, Mr. Vajpayee should seek to engage the Chinese leaders on certain specific issues. India has an interest in knowing the Chinese views on a variety of questions. How can, for instance, the situation in Iran be stabilised? What is their evidence that the Soviet Union has a hand in the turmoil? If the situation in Iran remains turbulent, how is the rest of the gulf region to be insulated from its impact? How is the display of US power relevant? Why are the Chinese so overwrought over the rise of Vietnam as a dominant power in Indochina? Are they seriously interested in helping and promoting guerilla warfare in Kampuchea (Cambodia)? If yes, what do they expect to achieve by it? The discussion may not and need not produce the so-called identity or near identity of views to be meaningful.
The Times of India, 10 February 1979