Contrary to earlier fears, the US administration has displayed considerable good sense, realism and maturity in connection with the Chinese vice-premier, Mr. Deng Xiaoping’s (Teng Hsiao-ping under the previous spelling) visit. It has refused to buy his thesis that the Soviet Union poses a great threat to world peace, that it is pointless to negotiate any agreement with it, including the proposed SALT II one, and that it is necessary to forge a world-wide alliance system, with China in it, to contain the Kremlin’s hegemonistic ambitions. President Carter has instead spared little effort to leave Mr. Deng and his Chinese colleagues in no doubt that he regards reasonably stable relations with Moscow as vital in the interest of world peace, that he remains as keen as ever to conclude the SALT II agreement with it in order to avoid an escalation in the nuclear arms race and that he does not wish to use the new relationship with Peking to embarrass the Kremlin unduly. All this is to his credit. And this is especially so because public opinion in the United States has been highly critical of the Soviet Union on account of its actions in Africa – massive assistance to Ethiopia in its struggle first against Somalia and now against the Eritrean secessionists, the presence of Soviet-aided Cuban troops in Angola and so on. Also at the time of the recognition of China last December it was widely believed that President Carter had pushed the decision in order to strengthen Mr. Deng’s position vis-à-vis his adversaries in the Politburo and the Central Committee so that the latter are not able to reverse the modernisation programme. In other words, though the Americans appear to have established a stake in the success of Mr. Deng’s visit, the first ever by a leading Chinese since 1949, they are not willing to fall for his anti-Soviet line.
Mr. Deng’s visit to the United States will be over by the time Mr. Atal Bihari Vajpayee prepares to leave for Peking and its results will have become known. In terms of specific agreements regarding trade, transfer of technology and credit, it is neither possible nor necessary to anticipate the results. For our purpose the important point is that in spite of its enthusiasm for China, the Carter administration has felt obliged by the facts of life not to buy Peking’s anti-Soviet line. It does not mean that Mr. Vajpayee would have been forced to fall in line in case the Americans had gone along with the Chinese view. But it does mean that in that eventuality his task in Peking would have become somewhat more difficult. He need not have much worry on that count now. It is also notable that influential sections of opinion in the United States are not interested in an anti-Soviet crusade even if they are critical of the Kremlin and would wish to curb what they regard as its expansionist policy. All in all the United States is just not inclined to lead another cold war against the Soviet Union. Of course, it is not even in a position to do so because it no longer enjoys in the military and economic fields the ascendancy it did in the ’fifties and the ’sixties. But even if this assessment regarding its power is not accepted, the previous one will stand and should facilitate this country’s task in seeking normalisation of relations with China without having to change its overall foreign policy approach.
The Times of India, 1 February 1979