Though China has made a public declaration that it is withdrawing its troops from Vietnam and even informed the secretary-general accordingly, it is premature to say that it will, indeed, do so forthwith. By stating that the speed of the withdrawal will “depend on how much the Vietnamese obstruct our departure,” Peking has in fact already armed itself with an alibi for prolonging the stay of its troops in Vietnamese territory if it so decides. This is not -to say that it has taken such a decision — we just do not know — but that it can, provided the circumstances are right. This puts the Vietnamese in somewhat of a spot. For they will run the risk of forfeiting some of the sympathy which they have won so far on account of China’s aggression if they try to evict the Chinese troops forcibly. Most governments are too scared of a general war involving at some stage the Soviet Union to care sufficiently who is right and who is wrong. They feel relieved that the Chinese have conducted a limited war, limited both in time and space, and they would not wish Hanoi to do anything which can provide Peking with a pretext to renew its aggression. This may not be a rational approach because, if the Chinese were confident of continuing the conflict to their advantage, they would in all probability not have ordered the cease-fire so soon. But that is how most governments react in such situations.
But if, on the other hand, Hanoi is patient and lets the Chinese troops linger on in a part of their country irrespective of whether or not it is in dispute, they will risk losing face among the neighbouring governments which, it should be noted, are not fully reassured of its own future intentions. All of them without exception hated the Pol Pot regime, one of the cruellest, wickedest and stupidest in recent times. But they are concerned over the use by the Vietnamese of their armed forces on a truly massive scale to secure its overthrow so much so that they have been reluctant to take note of the grave and persistent provocations that it gave Hanoi. This reaction, too, may not be rational but it is natural on the part of governments which are at once highly security conscious and anti-communist. This is especially so when it happens, as it does in this case, that the governments concerned have faced communist insurrections and hence regarded the rebels and their supporters as the main, if not the only, threat to the security of their countries. Again, this is not to say that they have been elated over the Chinese attack on Vietnam or that they would have welcomed a decisive Chinese victory, but that their reaction to Peking’s action has been mixed.
This poses two problems for Hanoi, not just one. It has to save its face so that its neighbours do not start looking upon Peking as a potential protector and it has to reassure them that it is not aggressive. These are contradictory demands which are not easy to reconcile at tbe best of times. The task is virtually impossible in the present context. For, it is indisputable that the Chinese have got away with aggression, the Vietnamese have toppled an unfriendly government and Peking continues to enjoy the support of some leading Western governments. The US administration has, for example, sought to link its demand for the withdrawal of Chinese troops from Vietnam with the plea for the withdrawal of Vietnamese forces from Kampuchea; Whitehall remains willing to sell Harrier jump-jets to China despite its awareness that the latter may one day use them to enforce its extraordinary claims on islands stretching up to Indonesia on one side and the Philippines on the other; and Paris is still willing to sell to Peking the most sophisticated military hardware it produces.
Meanwhile, it is reasonably clear that China has failed to achieve its stated and unstated objectives. Though it has, for instance, managed to penetrate as much as 50 km into Vietnam and to take several provincial towns, it has done so against the Vietnamese militia and not against their regular forces. Thus it has failed to inflict a decisive defeat on Hanoi and humiliate it in the eyes of its neighbours. Indeed, an AFP report has quoted a Chinese document dated March 3 which concedes that the PLA was unable to carry on a modern war, that such successes as it achieved depended on the use of the human wave tactics involving 320,000 men, 170,000 of them in Vietnamese territory, and that it had suffered as heavy losses as the other side. Similarly, the Chinese appear to have failed to force the Vietnamese to withdraw too many of their units from Kampuchea which would have made the new pro-Hanoi regime in Pnom Penh vulnerable to the guerilla forces belonging to the previous Pol Pot, setup. Peking has not stated this to be one objective. But there can be no doubt that it was. Mr Deng Xiaoping’s statements can leave little scope for doubt on this score. Hanoi might have felt compelled to draw heavily on its forces in Kampuchea if Peking had continued the war longer. But in the process the Chinese would have risked Soviet intervention in one form or another. They have also failed to force Hanoi to the negotiating table under duress. In fact, since they have held out the threat of renewing aggression in future, it is highly unlikely that the Vietnamese will agree to negotiate. They will certainly never agree to discuss Kampuchea with Peking or accept the absurd suggestion emanating from certain Western quarters that Prince Sihanouk be restored as the head of a neutral government there.
It is also ridiculous to suggest, as some Western commentators are doing, that China has exposed the Soviet Union to be a paper tiger. The Kremlin has acted with restraint and thus avoided the risk of a major conflagration, possibly even a nuclear war. This fact may not be fully appreciated by some cold warriors in the West. But Western governments are too realistic to believe that the Kremlin has let down Vietnam despite the recent treaty of friendship and cooperation and to conclude from it that it is possible for them to challenge it directly in Africa and the Gulf region, not to speak of Europe. The test would have come for Moscow if the Chinese had continued the war and the Vietnamese resistance had collapsed unexpectedly suddenly. Clearly, that contingency has not arisen. In all probability it would have never arisen, though it is possible that Hanoi would have had to deplete its forces in Kampuchea. This having been said, it must be acknowledged that the Chinese aggression has not provoked a sufficiently strong reaction in the international community. Their attempt to woo India without conceding anything in return has failed as a result of their action in Vietnam and it will be a long time before a government in New Delhi, which is not out of its mind and utterly careless of the country’s security, will be inclined to accept its protestations of peaceable behaviour. But elsewhere outside the Soviet bloc the reaction has been muted, if not ambivalent, not entirely because of the Vietnamese intervention in Kampuchea. This assessment will need to be modified if it turns out that a strong section of the Chinese leadership has been opposed to the adventure which has clearly been conceived and pushed through by Mr. Deng Xiaoping and if the country is plunged into another leadership struggle as a result of its failure. But that is in the future, if at all. Right now he appears to be firmly in the saddle.
The Times of India, 7 March 1979