In view of the US defence secretary, Mr. Brown’s recent trip to West Asia and statements by him and some other members of the Carter administration, especially Mr. James Schlesinger, it is reasonably clear that Washington has more or less decided to step up its military presence in the Gulf area. Mr. Schlesinger has, for instance, said: “The United States has vital interests in the Gulf. The United States must move in such a way that it protects those interests, even if that involves the use of military strength or of military presence.” And he has added: “We have been prepared to discuss the question of a military presence in the area with the states involved,” and that the proposed presence would have to be worked out “in response to their desires and with some flexibility.” While neither Mr. Schlesinger nor Mr. Brown as spelled out the options which the US believes are open to it, administration sources have been quoted as having said that these include “increasing naval power to establish a more constant presence in the Indian Ocean and making more port calls; sending in new types of ships, possibly including those that carry marine landing forces; putting aircraft carriers in the Indian Ocean; and making a show of air strength in the area through training exercises or other means”.
Apparently, some of these, and other measures would make sense if the problem facing the United States was essentially one of countering either a growing Soviet military presence in the region or a growing impression that Washington was being outclassed by Moscow in the military field. But surely that is not the problem America faces in the Gulf. The Soviet presence in the region remains small. There is a pro-Soviet regime in South Yemen. But it is not a new one and its presence cannot influence significantly the course of events. The US administration is bothered because the Shah of Iran whom it, like its predecessor, had sought to build and project as the Gulf’s gendarme has been thrown out. But surely the men who make policy in Washington cannot possibly ignore certain obvious points in that connection. First, even if, despite the absence of evidence, it is assumed that the Soviet Union has been involved in the anti-Shah movement in Iran, this was not the kind of intervention that a US military presence in the area could have helped counter. Secondly, if there is a lesson to be drawn from recent developments in Iran, it is that a military build-up can provoke a popular upsurge; it cannot help contain one. Thirdly, in the case of the Gulf and adjoining areas, it is more than obvious that Islam remains a powerful factor and that any policy which offends that sentiment is likely to prove counter-productive. Several conclusions flow from this analysis, the most pertinent in the present context being that the US will be ill-advised to step up its military presence in the region, persuade friendly regimes to draw closer to it in respect of military co-operation, and continue its pro-Israel stance which must offend the Arabs. Meanwhile, there are reports that Saudi Arabia has rebuffed US overtures in this regard and that the postponement of Prince Fahd’s visit to Washington has to be viewed in that light. If these reports are accurate, the men in Riyadh are displaying robust commonsense which should stand them in good stead.
The Times of India, 3 March 1979