While it is reasonably certain that Pakistan is trying to acquire nuclear capability with financial support from some publicly unidentified oil-rich Arab countries, it is premature to say either that it will succeed soon or that it and its patrons will be able to agree on the control mechanism. President Kennedy tried his best to produce a proposal whereby America’s West European allies could participate in the making of decisions regarding the use of nuclear weapons and failed. He was not willing to allow anyone else access to the trigger. Similarly, the Soviet leaders preferred an outright split with China in the early ’sixties to helping it produce nuclear weapons. It will thus be truly remarkable if Pakistan and the other countries involved in the production of the so-called Islamic bomb can agree to share possession and control of the dread weapon. And much can happen in the meanwhile. After all, Israel and its supporters are not going to sit idly by as some Arab countries gain access to nuclear weapons. But even if it is assumed that everything goes reasonably well with the project, there is no need for this country to take an alarmist view, though it cannot afford to be complacent either.
Pakistan is in an awful mess and it does not possess a leadership capable of sorting it out. The morale of its military-bureaucratic elite is low for a variety of reasons – the judicial murder of Mr. Bhutto, mounting economic difficulties and the imposition of the so-called Shariah laws by the fiat of one man – and it is not likely to improve significantly, especially if the revolutionary regime in Kabul manages to survive and consolidate its hold on the country. The Arabs, the rich as well as the poor, are passing through a convulsion, the consequences of which no one can predict. The conflicts among them are bound to sharpen irrespective of whether or not President Sadat survives the separate peace with Israel. The Saudi Arabian rulers are in panic over the possibility that the pro-Soviet and the self-proclaimed Marxist set-up in Aden might succeed in overthrowing the present pro-Riyadh North Yemeni regime in Sana. Libya falls in a different category. But Col. Gaddafi must view with concern President Sadat’s survival, the proposed supply of sophisticated hardware by the United States to Egypt and the distinct possibility that the Egyptian-Israeli treaty will be successfully implemented. Thus both Saudi Arabia and Libya may remain too involved in intra-Arab conflicts to be in a position to render much assistance to Pakistan. Above all, India’s relations with the Soviet Union are in good shape and the latter can meet its defence needs so much so it need not stockpile arms in a big way in anticipation of an armed conflict with Pakistan or, for that matter, China. And it need not fear that the United States will react adversely to its ties with the Soviet Union because Washington is as wary of the resurgence of Islam as the Kremlin. But New Delhi will perhaps need to be more candid with the Soviet leadership than it has been under the Janata party. It will have such an opportunity when the Soviet Defence Minister, Mr. Ustinov, visits this country next week.
The Times of India, 18 April 1979