EDITORIAL: Another Tunnel

The United States claims to have caught North Korea building another tunnel under the demilitarized zone. Pyongyang is bound to deny this charge as it has denied similar charges in the past. But the three tunnels it had dug earlier are there for anyone to inspect. In fact, the third tunnel has become a major tourist attraction. As such it is difficult to dispute either the accuracy of the US state­ment or the inference that North Korea has not given up its aggressive intentions towards South Korea. Surely Pyong­yang would not go in for the enormous investment of resources required for building a two metre by two metre (six feet by six feet) tunnel about 80 metres below the ground – the third one is at that level (246 feet) – unless it wants to infiltrate saboteurs, spies and, indeed, thousands of troops into South Korea. It is somewhat surprising that President Kim II-Sung should expect that the exit at the South Korean end can be kept secret. After all, the demilitarized zone is only about four kilometres (two and a half miles) wide and the Americans and South Koreans spare no effort to keep the closest possible watch on what is going on in the neighbourhood in the north. But whether his confidence is justified or not, the fact remains that tun­nels have been dug from the north to the south.

In economic terms South Korea is a great success story. When President Park seized power in a military coup in 1961 its gross national product was two billion pounds sterling. This year the target is 56 billion pounds. The average per capita income has risen similarly and the country’s exports continue to grow. All in all South Korea is promising to become the second Japan of north-eastern Asia. But this economic miracle has in a sense made South Korea more and not less vulnerable. Two points may be mentioned. First, as a result of the growth of industry in and around Seoul, its population has increased to about 11 million. And Seoul is only about 40 kilometres from the demilitarized zone, that is within the range of North Korea’s long-range artillery. Secondly, as the memory of the de­vastation caused by the 1950-53 war has receded and a large middle class has arisen, the demand for liberty has grown more and more insistent. It is difficult to gauge the magnitude of active and effective discontent against the Park regime. But on most counts it is considerable. Again, it is not possible to say how far President Kim II-Sung can take advantage of it if he is able to infiltrate his men into South Korea in sufficiently large numbers. But it is a rea­sonable proposition that he can create a great deal of con­fusion if he can send thousands of his troops dressed as South Korean soldiers across the demilitarized zone and create the impression that South Korean troops have re­volted. This threat cannot justify the continuation of the restrictions on freedom which President Park still maintains. On the contrary, that makes it all the more necessary for him to liberalise his set-up. But it would be naive for anyone to believe that such a move on his part will persuade President Kim II-Sung to give up his plans for the “re­unification” of the two Koreas – under his auspices and on his far from peaceful terms.

The Times of India, 6 September 1979

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