It is not particularly difficult to “reconcile” President Zia-ul-Haq’s statement that he will not concede bases to the United States with reports from Washington that the White House has drawn up plans for establishing American military presence in Pakistan. If to begin with, the proposal is to fly in US war planes and make them stay in Pakistan for “longer and longer tours of duty”, as the Columbia Broadcasting Network has reported, the problem can theoretically be solved by keeping the air bases under Islamabad’s control. Similarly in the next phase, American warships can call at Pakistani ports without establishing permanent base facilities there. The final phase is said to involve the movement of US ground troops into Pakistan. But this may never need to be implemented because it is highly unlikely that the Soviet Union will ever attack the country. It is possible, though not likely, that Russian troops in Afghanistan may occasionally pursue the insurgents operating out of Pakistan across the Khyber. As reports go, Soviet troops are not concentrated on this border. And even if they are so deployed in coming months, they are likely to leave much of the fighting to the Afghan army which is being reorganized and retrained. Surely Pakistan will not need American troops to cope with forays by Afghan soldiers. But technicalities apart, a qualitative change will have taken place in the Pakistan-US relations with the establishment of the American military presence in Pakistan. The consequences of such a change can be dangerous not only for India-Pakistan and India-US ties, but also for the Zia regime itself. As it is, President Zia has little support among the people, especially in the sensitive NWFP and Baluchistan, and the top brass in the armed forces. The establishment of US military presence can reduce whatever little support he now enjoys.
Meanwhile, President Zia’s insistence on a new defence pact with the United States deserves attention. The 1969 defence agreement states: “In case of aggression against Pakistan, the government of the United’ States in accordance with its constitutional procedures, will call for such appropriate action, including the use of armed force, as may mutually be agreed and is envisaged in the joint resolution, to protect peace and stability in the Middle East and in order to assist the government of Pakistan at its request.” The joint resolution was approved by the US Congress affirming the Eisenhower doctrine whereby Washington expressed its determination to resist communist aggression in the Middle East. The defence agreement is not a treaty but is equally binding on both parties. Why then is President Zia demanding that it be superseded by a new pact? One possible explanation is that in 1969 the Americans decided, over Islamabad’s protests that the agreement would not apply to Pakistan’s wars with India. Mr. Kissinger tried to confuse the nature of US commitment to Pakistan in 1971 but in the final analysis America did not intervene in the armed conflict on Islamabad’s side. New Delhi must now ensure that Washington does not widen the scope of its assurance and support to Pakistan.