It is not particularly difficult to decipher the signals from Moscow on Afghanistan. Indeed, the Soviet position is so obvious that it is rather surprising that there should be any confusion about it in Western capitals. Mr. Brezhnev said in a speech on February 22: “We will be ready to commence the withdrawal of our troops as soon as all forms of outside interference directed against the government and people of Afghanistan are fully terminated. Let the United States, together with the neighbours of Afghanistan, guarantee this, and then the need for Soviet military assistance will cease.” He developed the same points in his discussions with the US industrialist, Mr. Armand Hammer, on February 27. On both occasions Mr. Brezhnev chose his words carefully. Their implications are quite clear. “Outside interference” which means all forms of assistance to the Afghan insurgents and their operations from bases in Pakistan and Iran, must first be “fully terminated” and the termination must be guaranteed by the United States, China, Pakistan and Iran before the Soviet Union begins to withdraw its forces. The Kremlin will effect the withdrawal in phases so that it can make sure that the regime in Kabul gets enough time to consolidate itself. Though it is not stated in so many words, it is clear by implication that the Soviet Union will reserve the right to continue to render all forms of assistance – this would obviously include the posting of military advisers – to the friendly government in Kabul and that the treaty of friendship will remain in force after the gradual withdrawal of the combat troops and that it can be invoked again if necessary. Under this formulation, the status of the present Afghan government cannot be a subject of negotiation. It is the legitimate government of the country and it will have to be treated as such by those who wish to open discussions with Moscow on the question of the withdrawal of Soviet troops.
If there was any scope for confusion, the denunciation of the British-sponsored plan for the “neutralization” of Afghanistan by Sovietskaya Rossiya should remove it. The Soviet newspaper has described the plan as a “political decoration” designed to disguise US-led plans to reopen the cold war and has said that under the cover of “shuttle diplomacy”, the West is carrying out long-planned adventures, including an attempt last week to stage a counter-revolutionary putsch in Afghanistan. The denunciation makes obvious what has been implicit in the Soviet stand. Moscow will not accept the “neutralization” of Afghanistan, whatever this concept may mean. It has to be ruled by a government friendly to the Soviet Union and acceptable to the latter. Afghanistan can remain non-aligned in that it need not join a multilateral military pact. But what multilateral military pact can the Soviet Union wish it to join in any case? It does not necessarily follow that the West European initiative is doomed and talks between it and the Kremlin cannot begin. But the gap in the two positions is wide and the negotiations, if they begin, will be fairly prolonged. The Soviet stance may change in course of time if it finds that the cost of the takeover of Afghanistan is unbearably high. But there has been no sign of second thoughts in the Kremlin so far. And both in Eastern Europe and Cuba, Moscow has demonstrated that is willing to pay a pretty stiff price in defence of what it insiders its essential interests.