President Nixon deliberately cultivated the reputation of being unpredictable, rash and even slightly mad to ‘persuade’ the Soviet leaders to act with restraint lest he went over the brink and plunged the world in a nuclear holocaust. It is doubtful that President Carter was in search of a similar image when he ordered the abortive commando raid to rescue the hostages in Teheran. And whatever else may be said about Mr. Nixon, he cannot be accused of weak nerves. He ordered the mining of Haiphong and the carpet bombing of the Haiphong-Hanoi area on the eve of his visit to Moscow in 1972. Even at the time of Arab-Israeli war in 1973 when he was in deep trouble on account the Watergate scandal and America had become critically dependent on Arab oil, he not only rushed enormous military supplies to Israel but also ordered a nuclear alert to ensure that President Brezhnev did not carry out his threat to land Soviet troops in Egypt. Mr. Carter has not yet been so tested. But by ordering the commando raid, he has demonstrated that he is willing to take serious risks. It may, therefore, be wrong to assume that an awareness of the possible cost of military action against Iran will in the final analysis deter him. Next time the objective cannot be the rescue of the hostages because they have now been dispersed. But he may decide to ‘punish’ Iran and seize the oilfields. He will be under considerable pressure from his allies and others not to act rashly. But how can one be sure that he will heed this advice?
Before the Soviet leadership intervened forcefully in Afghanistan last December, most western Sovietologists were agreed that it was too cautious to risk a confrontation with the United States except under the gravest provocation. Some of them have revised this assessment since. But many of them, especially, in western Europe, stick to it. They remain convinced that the Kremlin acted defensively in Afghanistan and in the full conviction that it did not involve the risk of a direct confrontation with the United States. They, therefore, feel that should President Carter decide on a military action in Iran, the Soviet Union may not come to its rescue directly. They are also not sure whether the Kremlin can help the Iranians clear the mines if the Americans decide to mine their ports. And they are convinced that Moscow is just not in a position to ease Iran’s problems arising out of a US naval blockade.
Mr. Michael Binyon, for example, has written in The Times, London: “geography rules out any large-scale movement of goods. There is only one rail crossing from Soviet Armenia to Iran – the old lend-lease route during the war – but this is little used. There are ports at both ends of the Caspian Sea, but the overloaded Soviet rail network would be seriously strained by having to supply Iran through Astrakhan. In any case Iran cannot now import from or export to western Europe. Iranian oil pipelines all lead south, and the Russians would have to send sea tankers down the Gulf, risking immediate confrontation with the Americans if a naval blockade was imposed.” All this means that those who counsel restraint to the Americans should also advise the Iranians not to yield to euphoria over the failure of the rescue mission and find a way to release the hostages.